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ABSTRACT 
Advancing User Authentication and Access Management 
Jeffery Lake Crume 
In order for online systems to transact business or exchange other sensitive information, there must be an 
environment where the parties involved can verify that the other is who they claim to be. Authentication 
mechanisms provide this verification process, thereby, improving confidence in the confidentiality and integrity of 
communications.  
However, attackers can exploit this trust if they are able to successfully impersonate a legitimate user and gain access 
to the system with all the rights and privileges of that user. One particularly difficult class of attacks of this sort 
involves an attacker inserting themselves between the end user and the system they are communicating with. This 
man-in-the-middle (MITM) scenario affords the attacker access to passwords, transaction details and other sensitive 
information, which they may then modify or use to suit their purposes resulting in identity theft, information 
compromise and misappropriation of funds via electronic transfer, among other scenarios. 
Current solutions are able to mitigate some of this risk, but more work is needed here given the difficulty in detecting 
MITM attacks. This thesis deals generally with the subject of identity and access management with a specific focus 
in the area of authentication within an IT system.  
The research described here provide new approaches to user-centric and transaction-centric authentication as well 
as capabilities to improve support for the broader authentication system. The first category of user-centric 
improvements involves mechanisms which:  
• leverage a communications side channel so that the user can know with greater certainty that the website 
they are interacting with is the one they intend,  
• allow a service provider to detect a MITM by determining the user’s geographical location is consistent 
across multiple channels,  
• allow for the detection of a MITM through an out of band voice prompt presented to the user and 
• improve confidence that a user is who they claim to be by dynamically verifying that they are geographically 
where they are expected to be even when traveling. 
The second category of transaction-centric improvements involves mechanisms which leverage out of band 
communications to verify transaction details have not been tampered with through: 
• a voice call in which transaction amounts, accounts, etc. are read aloud to the user for confirmation and 
• a specially constructed QR code which contains these details and can be verified with a purpose-built mobile 
app. 
The third category of broader authentication system support mechanisms which: 
• detect a MITM attack by recognizing changes in login traffic patterns,  
• detect rogue domain name service providers which might attempt to redirect traffic to attacker websites, 
• allow for non-disruptive, secure migration of users across authentication systems and 
• allow for a secure means to regain access to a mobile device for which the passcode has been lost.  
 
 
 viii 
This research consists of a body of published works, most of which have taken the form of patent filings, which have 
been peer reviewed and granted by the US Patent and Trademark Office.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Fundamental to any important transaction is the notion that the parties to that transaction are, in fact, who they 
claim to be. Without this assurance, no trust can be established and sensitive information cannot be safely 
transmitted or business conducted. The process by which this assurance is provided is one of authentication.  
Authenticating parties in face-to-face settings may involve recognizing the appearance, voice or other biometric 
considered unique to the parties. Absent this level of prior knowledge for comparison, a system of credentials issued 
by a trusted third party (e.g. passport, driver’s license, etc.) may suffice to establish identity.  
However, this process becomes more complex when communications are conducted remotely over a data network. 
In this case we need to develop other means for authentication. Attackers often exploit this complexity and use it to 
subvert the system. Therefore, mechanisms for authenticating identities through technical means are needed. 
Typically, these involve verifying something the individual: 
• Knows (e.g. a password, PIN, etc.) 
• Has (e.g. a smartcard, mobile phone, security token, etc.) 
• Is (e.g. a biometric such as a fingerprint, facial scan, voiceprint, etc.) 
1.1 PASSWORD CHALLENGES 
Passwords, and other knowledge-based authentication systems, are notoriously weak due, in large part, to the 
human element involved. Stated in grossly oversimplified terms for effect -- If a password can be easily remembered, 
it can be easily guessed. Conversely, if a password cannot be guessed, it will likely be difficult to remember and will, 
therefore, result in denying access to authorized users. This is due to the fact that people tend to remember things 
that are significant or have specific meaning to them such as the name of a pet, a favorite destination, birthdate, 
spouse’s name, etc. (Crume, 2000) 
It follows, then, that the more an attacker knows about the personal life and preferences of a user, the greater their 
odds of being able to guess that user’s password. Password cracking tools such as IBM’s Cracken (Bryan & Heywood, 
2017) are able to process billions of combinations per second in an offline attack (Bryan & Heywood, 2018) and may 
find shortcuts by using dictionaries of common passwords as a starting point to shorten the time to required.1 (Ur, 
et al., 2015) 
Based upon an analysis of 70 million user-chosen Yahoo! Passwords, (Bonneau, 2012) found that “passwords provide 
less than 10 bits of security against an online, trawling attack, and only about 20 bits of security against an optimal 
offline dictionary attack.” This research also found that “even proactive efforts to nudge users towards better 
password choices with graphical feedback” were largely ineffective. Further, (Adams & Sasse, 1999) found that 
“users forced to comply with password mechanisms incompatible with work practices may produce responses that 
circumvent the whole procedure.” 
In addition to user behaviors, (Morris & Thompson, 1979) describes technical problems dating to the 1960’s due to 
weak security in the way passwords were stored on early online systems. A wide range of vulnerabilities have been 
                                                             
1 Heywood claims the ability to process 500 billion password hashes per second with a Hashcat configuration. 
(Heywood, 2017) 
 
 
 2 
exploited over the years since in order to obtain large collections of password hashes and even cleartext passwords. 
The largest example to date of the latter was the 1.4 billion collection of credentials published on the dark web as a 
single, aggregate database (Thompson, 2017). 
1.2 OTHER AUTHENTICATION CHALLENGES 
Other authentication methods which rely on something the user has (i.e. possession-based authentication) or 
something the user is (i.e. biometric-based authentication) introduce additional vulnerabilities (O'Gorman, 2003). 
Mechanisms involving the former are vulnerable to theft or device cloning (Tabassum, 2017) (Mahato, et al., 2014), 
while the latter can be compromised through a number of different attacks including (Shan, et al., 2008): 
• replay of digitized biometric data (Smith, et al., 2015),  
• tampering with the biometric reader (Franken, 2007) and  
• imitating physical characteristics of the user resulting in a false positive identification (Patel, et al., 2015). 
For these reasons, many organizations have adopted a multi-factor approach to authentication which employs a 
combination of these methods in order to minimize risk by complicating the task of an attacker. 
1.3 ATTACKER TACTICS 
In addition to these exploits, attackers frequently set up imposter web sites which have the same look and feel as 
their legitimate counterparts as a way to steal passwords or other sensitive information. They may then direct a user 
to the imposter site through a phishing email requesting the user to click on a link embedded in the message 
contents. This link may be obfuscated such that it appears to match the URL for the user’s bank, for instance, but 
actually points to the imposter site. 
In still other cases, attackers may actually insert themselves into the communication path between the user and a 
legitimate site, thereby, becoming a “man-in-the-middle” (MITM) capable of seeing and even modifying all 
communications between the two parties. In this scenario, communications, say from a banking customer, will first 
be sent to the MITM who then may read and/or change the contents before forwarding the transmission on to the 
bank’s web site, and vice versa. If the attacker is successful, both the bank and the customer believe they are 
communicating exclusively with each other when, in fact, all communications are under the direct control of the 
MITM attacker. Such attacks are categorized and described by the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and 
Classification system as CAPEC-94: Man in the Middle Attack (The MITRE Corporation, 2018). 
(Wagner & Bryner, 2001) describes an example of such an attack involving subverting the Address Resolution 
Protocol in order to route traffic to an MITM site.  (Callegati, et al., 2009) discuss the means by which an MITM can 
undermine the security of the HTTPS protocol via ARP poisoning and self-signed certificates. Further, (Conti, et al., 
2016) provides a comprehensive survey of MITM attacks along with a categorization scheme based on the OSI model. 
The insidious nature of these attacks makes them difficult to detect and defeat. Authentication technologies can 
assist with this task and help to improve trust in online communications so long as the authentication mechanisms 
are not also subverted by the MITM.  
1.4 LIMITATIONS WITH EXISTING DEFENSES 
As described in (Burkholder, 2002), the TCP/IP protocol is subject to MITM attacks. With the introduction of session 
encryption technology such as SSL and, later, TLS, this threat was believed to be detectable and, ultimately 
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preventable. This resulted from the web browser’s ability to detect invalid digital certificates and present the user 
with a warning message recommending that the session be aborted. However, as this paper demonstrates, an 
improperly implemented or configured client opens a significant window of vulnerability.  
In particular, it finds that: 
“One faulty SSL client implementation, Microsoft's Internet Explorer, allows for transparent SSL MITM attacks 
when the attacker has any CA-signed certificate. An even greater risk is posed by unprotected systems where an 
attacker can preload his/her own trusted root authority certificates. In public environments such as libraries and 
computer labs, there is little to prevent such an attack from taking place. Casual observation of such places 
indicates that an attacker would see them as low-risk, high-opportunity environments.”  
While the vulnerabilities described are no longer an issue as the particular web browser in question has since been 
replaced, such a finding can be abstracted and applied to show that encryption protocols and their real-world 
implementations are not without their problems. The paper goes on to cite other published references such as 
(Ellison & Schneier, 2000), (Seifried, 2000) and (Seifried, 2000), which provide support for the notion that such 
vulnerabilities are more prevalent than many would believe and will likely continue to emerge in various forms. 
As previously mentioned, an additional problem exists even when all the technical components perform correctly 
and identify the presence of an imposter web site and that involves the behavior of end users in this scenario. 
Research conducted by Carnegie Mellon University (Sunshine, et al., 2009) found that 55% and 100% of study 
participants ignored certificate warning messages regardless of the sensitivity of the material on the site. Another 
study by Brigham Young University (Jenkins, 2016) found that up to 90% of users studied ignored these warnings 
while they were multi-tasking. Further, researchers at the University of Pennsylvania and Google (Felt, A.; et al, 2015) 
found that even a redesigned certificate warning message which conveyed an increased sense of urgency, was 
essentially ineffective in preventing users from ignoring the message and proceeding in spite of the stated risk. 
1.5 RESEARCH AIMS 
This document provides a summary of research upon which the PhD in Information Security will be based. It 
identifies the nature and significance of these works as they relate broadly to the theme of Identity and Access 
Management (IAM) and more narrowly to the areas of authentication and authorization.  
The objective of this research is to advance the field of Information Security by providing additional mechanisms for 
authentication and authorization which better detect and defend against impersonation attacks. These attacks may 
involve a simple case where an unauthorized user attempts to login using stolen credentials. More complex scenarios 
focus on hijacking sessions between authorized users and legitimate web servers through the insertion of a man-in-
the-middle (MITM).  
The latter cases may prove particularly difficult to defend against since the MITM may be undetectable by both the 
user and the web site leading each party to believe that they are dealing directly with the other when, in fact, all 
communications between the two are subject to review and modification by the eavesdropper. The consequences 
of such an attack can undermine the entire system of trust necessary for online transactions including e-commerce, 
banking and others. If left unmitigated, the results could range from compromise of credentials to significant 
financial loss. 
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The body of research and publications described here consists of a series of patents – granted and pending – which 
represent significant, novel contributions to the field. All of the inventions described have been:  
1. peer-reviewed by an IBM Invention Disclosure Board comprised of IBM Master Inventors and subject matter 
experts 
2. reviewed by IBM internal legal counsel for prior art conflicts 
3. reviewed by external legal counsel for prior art conflicts 
4. (for those with patents granted) reviewed and judged to be novel by an independent patent investigator 
from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). 
However, it should be noted that while two of the patent filings listed have not as yet been granted, they have, at a 
minimum, successfully passed through the first three phases of review and judged by IBM, a company that has led 
the world in patents for more than two decades straight, to be of sufficient novelty and substance to merit a filing 
with the USPTO. 
1.6 SECTION STRUCTURE 
Section 2 includes a solution framework which helps address some of the challenges described previously along with 
a set of integrative use cases, which demonstrate how this research could be deployed in real world examples. 
Sections 3, 4 and 5 discuss a series of patents which, taken together, provide a set of solutions to the challenges 
described previously. Specifically, Section 3 focuses on improvements to authenticating users, while Section 4 deals 
with authenticating transactions. Section 5 complements this work through a discussion of improvements to the 
overall authentication support system. Section 6 provides a conclusion by summarizing the work and offering areas 
for future research.  
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2 SECURITY SOLUTION FRAMEWORK 
Given the issues described previously, a solution framework is needed which can reduce risk by creating greater 
confidence in the authentication system. This problem space is quite complex as evidenced by the substantial body 
of research that already exists in this area. Still, many of the same fundamental challenges persist in spite of this 
work.  
Identity and access management capabilities should be thought of holistically as part of a larger security solution 
framework. (Crume, 2014) introduces such a framework along with its key components, as depicted in Figure 1: 
Identity and Access Management Architecture.  
 
FIGURE 1: IDENTITY AND ACCESS MANAGEMENT ARCHITECTURE 
Further, the requirements of the solution framework should include the ability to: 
• Verify that the user is who they claim to be. 
This is, of course, the primary requirement of an authentication system. It needs to reject imposters while 
not putting an undue burden on legitimate users to prove their identities.  
• Verify that the user is where they should be, geographically. 
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A system which knows in advance where a user should be, would be able to deny access to an imposter 
who might have otherwise been able to fool the system by providing stolen credentials. However, if the 
system knows, for instance, that the user logging in is not in the location where the legitimate user is 
scheduled to be, access is denied regardless of whether the credentials are correct. This requirement needs 
to extend beyond conventional, fixed geographical constraints, which assume that users remain in the same 
region, and be able to account for global travel for both personal and professional reasons. (Denning & 
MacDoran, 1998) 
• Verify that the web site the user is logging into is not an imposter site. 
Much of the effort spent in the area of authentication focuses on allowing a web site to authenticate a user 
is who they claim to be. However, given the rise in phishing and other imposter attacks, there is a critical 
need for users to be able to authenticate that the web site is what it claims to be as well. Server-side 
certificates help with this but are insufficient since far too many users ignore warning messages when 
problems are identified. (Sunshine, et al., 2009) (Jenkins, 2016) 
• Detect the presence of a rogue DNS resolver attempting to misroute traffic to an imposter site. 
Tremendous faith is placed in the ability of the DNS system to direct network traffic correctly. Most users 
have no idea how dependent they are on this system, which has been shown repeatedly to be vulnerable 
to subversion. (Carli, 2003) (Jalalzai, et al., 2015) In order to justify that trust, additional protections are 
needed to guard against attack.  
• Detect the presence of an MITM along the communications path. 
Users implicitly trust that their communications with, for instance, an e-commerce or banking web site are 
private and cannot be read by anyone other than the organization they intend. In order to ensure that this 
is the case, there is a requirement to ensure that there are no other parties to these communications, as 
described by (Callegati, et al., 2009). 
• Ensure that transaction details have not been tampered with. 
As with the previous requirement, not only is there a risk of eavesdropping from an MITM reading 
confidential transmissions, but also with the MITM altering the details of those transactions resulting in 
substantial losses to the legitimate parties involved. (The MITRE Corporation, 2018) 
• Provide a means to ensure that the underlying network has not been subverted. 
One way that attackers are able to hijack sessions is for them to override DNS or other network protocols 
in order to divert traffic to their MITM as described in (Conti, et al., 2016). The solution needs to detect 
spoofing of this sort, when possible, and alert support personnel so that appropriate mitigations can be 
implemented. 
• Provide a means for a web site to migrate users to a new authentication system nondisruptively. 
A peripheral requirement for the authentication system would be that it allow for a smooth transition to a 
replacement system. Typically, such migration of users has resulted in disruptive change for both users, 
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who must then create new login credentials, and for IT organizations, who must support the transition and 
resolve issues which may arise.  
• Provide a means for an authorized user to regain access to a mobile device for which they have forgotten 
the password and, thereby, allowing the device to be used in the authentication system. 
The mobile phone has rapidly become a key component in many authentication systems due to its ubiquity, 
covering more than 2/3’s of the world’s population (GSMA Intelligence, 2017), and its ability to provide 
multi-factor capabilities through biometrics. With this rise in importance also comes a rise in the need to 
be able to securely recover from a lost password to unlock the device.  
The research described here proposes a solution framework which addresses these requirements through a set of 
patents which advance the field. Taken together, these inventions provide a set of capabilities which help to increase 
trust and reduce fraud. These mechanisms are depicted as part of a larger whole in the system context diagram 
presented in Figure 1. 
 
FIGURE 2: AUTHENTICATION SOLUTION SYSTEM CONTEXT DIAGRAM 
The primary components of this solution along with a brief description of the authentication solution capabilities of 
each are as follows: 
• Web site authentication system – This component verifies that the end user is who they claim to be. It 
accepts as input a set of credentials and authenticators. It also collects the IP address of the end user for 
use in geolocation.  
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• Web site Voice Response Unit (VRU) – This component performs the following tasks: 
o Answers calls from the end user 
o Verifies that calls are coming from the preregistered number for that user 
o Reads transaction details to the end user and solicits confirmation 
o Reads location details to the end user and solicits confirmation 
o Communicates confirmation (or denial) status to the web site authentication system 
• End user workstation – This component contains a standard web browser capable of SSL/TLS encryption 
and certification verification.  
• End user mobile phone - The end user’s mobile phone will be configured to contain: 
o The phone number for the web site VRU stored in the contacts list 
o A transaction verifier app for decoding and displaying QR codes  
o A recovery app which allows for a trusted user to assist the end user in resetting their passcode in 
the case where this information has been forgotten 
• Geolocation service – When provided with an IP address and mobile phone number from the web site 
authentication system, this component: 
o determines the geolocation associated with the IP address based upon ISP information lookup 
o determines the geolocation associated with the mobile device based upon communications 
service tower triangulation, GPS and other methods available to the mobile provider 
o confirms (or denies) whether these two locations are within an acceptable distance of each other 
as specified by the web site authentication service 
• DNS monitor – This component monitors the network and alerts when incorrect DNS resolutions are 
provided based upon a table of known mappings 
• Migration web site authentication system – This component provides a means to move users from one 
authentication system to another nondisruptively 
2.1 AUGMENTING EXISTING DEFENSES 
The patents and publications discussed here represent additional defenses intended to support the authentication 
process. These contributions were developed by the author in an effort advance the state of the art with a particular 
focus on detecting and defeating MITM attacks, which have proven to be extremely complex and difficult to 
overcome.  The result of applying this work can create greater awareness of the threats to this key enabler of online 
transactions as well as greater confidence in the authenticity of the various parties to a transaction by thwarting a 
number of MITM and other impersonation attacks. 
One way to lessen the risk of an MITM or other imposter attack is to use an out of band (OOB) communication path 
for some or all of the authentication activity. This way if an attacker has compromised the primary communication 
path, as might be the case through a phishing attack which has misdirected the user to an imposter site, the MITM 
would not be able to impersonate the user since the user’s authentication data would not flow through the MITM 
site.  
While most authentication technologies tend to focus on verifying the identity of the user, fewer tend to focus on 
enabling the user to verify the authenticity of the web site they are connected to. Typically, an encrypted SSL/TLS 
session is established between the user’s browser and the web site. The browser validates the web site’s digital 
certificate through a system of well-known trusted third-party certificate authorities. If verification fails, a warning 
message is displayed to the user letting them know that they could be dealing with an imposter. As previously 
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described, the problem with this is that most users simply ignore messages of this sort and proceed anyway so 
additional mechanisms are needed. 
Therefore, there is a need to provide better mechanisms for ensuring that both parties to the transaction are, in 
fact, who they claim to be.  
2.1.1 GEOLOCATION AS A DEFENSE 
Since most MITM attackers will not be physically near their victims, this discrepancy in distance would be a clue that 
an attack was underway. 
Mobile Phone IP Address Location Correlation Service on page 16 provides a method for detecting an MITM. This is 
accomplished by comparing the geolocation of the user’s mobile phone versus the location of the IP address 
associated with the user’s session with the web site. In the case of an MITM, the web site would see the IP address 
of the MITM and realize that it was not physically near the location of the user’s mobile phone and authentication 
would be denied. This invention also offers a degree of privacy protection for the user as outlined in the description 
of this patent subsequently in this document. 
Detecting Man-in-the-Middle Attacks using Geolocation and Voice Response Telephony Prompts on page 17 
leverages an OOB communication where the user calls into a predetermined VRU which tells them the approximate 
location that the legitimate web site believes the user’s session with the site is emanating from. If this stated location 
is not physically near the user, then an MITM would be suspected and the user would abort the session. 
Geolocation can also be used to improve the confidence that a user is who they claim to be as part of the 
authentication process.  
Access Control Based Upon Expected User Location on page 19 goes beyond simple, country-based geographic 
restrictions such as “this user lives in country X so an attempt to login to their account from country Y should be 
disallowed.” Such a system produces false rejections when the user travels internationally as well as false 
acceptances when the user is abroad, and an imposter attempts to login from the user’s home country. This 
invention permits or denies access based upon where the user is expected to be at that particular moment based 
upon travel itineraries, work schedules and the like, thereby reducing the likelihood of both false rejections and false 
acceptances. 
2.1.2 AUTHENTICATING TRANSACTIONS 
Reaching further past the basic authentication of the user would be the ability to authenticate details of the 
transaction the user is requesting.  
Verification of Transactional Integrity on page 24 and Verifying Online Transaction Integrity and Authentication with 
QR Codes on page 26 provide mechanisms for a user to leverage an OOB channel for verifying details of the 
transaction they have requested. The former involves a call to a VRU, which reads details of the transaction to the 
user allowing them to confirm and proceed with the transaction or abort if the details do not match their intentions, 
indicating the presence of some form of tampering. The latter leverages a QR code generated by the web site 
containing the details of the transaction which is then read by an app on the user’s mobile phone. This app then 
decodes the QR code and asks the user to confirm and proceed or abort the transaction if it appears that tampering 
has occurred.  
2.2 ENABLING APPROACHES SUPPORTING THE AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM 
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Detecting and Defending Against Man-in-the-Middle Attacks on page 31 provides a mechanism for detecting the 
presence of an MITM by observing a sudden increase in the number of authentication requests emanating from a 
single IP address. The assumption being that most users login at somewhat random intervals from a wide range of 
devices and locations. However, if a significant number of users start logging in from the same IP address to a degree 
not previously seen, then this could be an indication that these users have be redirected through an MITM, 
therefore, authentication should be denied. 
Yet another way for an attacker to subvert the authenticity of the communications path would be to hijack the 
Domain Name System (DNS), which provides translation from human-recognizable names (e.g. www.ibm.com) into 
IP addresses (e.g. 9.1.2.3). Since users rarely remember the latter, the former makes for a more convenient way to 
indicate which site a browser should communicate with. However, if the DNS translator were to be under the control 
of an attacker, the attacker would be able to misdirect communications to an imposter site and have access to 
sensitive user information such as login credentials.  
[Note: US patents 8,533,821  and 8,522,349  were split into separate patents by IBM attorneys in order to maximize 
legal protection and business value through the US Patent and Trademark Office. However, these are treated as one 
work for the purposes of this discussion.] 
 
A System for Detecting the Presence of Rogue Domain Name Service Providers through Passive Monitoring on page 
32 describes an invention which detects unauthorized DNS providers on a network by observing DNS traffic and 
comparing it to a list of known DNS mappings. If an incorrect resolution is supplied on the network, an alert is 
generated. As mentioned previously, (Wagner & Bryner, 2001) describe a scenario in which the ARP system is 
subverted. In fact, this invention could be applied to that protocol as well.  
In some cases, an organization may need to migrate users from an existing authentication system to a new system. 
Doing this in a manner that is nondisruptive both to the users and to the support staff, which will be called upon to 
deal with issues that may occur, is challenging. Further, it may be required that password expiry intervals be 
preserved across the migration process so that users with newer passwords aren’t required to change these again 
and users with older ones aren’t given an artificial extension.  
Migration Across Authentication Systems on page 35 describes a system where users can be migrated in controlled 
batches and, within these batches, spread out over to occur at the user’s next login. The user’s password is preserved 
as well as the password expiry interval maintained to ensure no violations of security policy. 
Mobile phones are an increasingly important part of the authentication ecosystem. Since these devices are so 
common with nearly everyone using an IT system having at least one that is uniquely theirs, they have become a 
convenient way to satisfy the “something you have” criteria for authentication. Further, since many also provide a 
built-in biometric reader for a fingerprint or facial recognition, they can also satisfy the “something you are” criteria 
as well.  
Given the critical role these devices play, the ability to regain access in a secure manner if the passcode to the device 
has been forgotten is of paramount importance since the inability to do so locks out a user not only from their device, 
but also from all the related services for which the mobile phone is relied on as an authenticator. 
Mobile Device Password Reset on page 37 describes an invention which allows an authorized user to recover full 
access to their mobile phone through a series of interactions with a predetermined trusted user’s device.  
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2.3 INTEGRATIVE USE CASES 
The following use cases demonstrate how this body of work could be used in combination to strengthen the 
authentication system with a particular focus on detecting and defeating MITM attacks. The details of the patents 
referenced in this section are described later in this document. The intent here is to show how these work together 
to provide a more holistic defense. 
2.3.1 WEB CUSTOMER USE CASE 
In this use case (depicted in Figure 3: Web customer Use Case), a banking customer wishes to transfer $1,000 from 
their savings account to their checking account using the web browser on their laptop. The customer is traveling 
abroad and opts to use the Wi-Fi service provided by his hotel. The customer also has a mobile phone which has 
been registered in advance with the bank. 
1. In order to ensure that the public Wi-Fi network has not been compromised by a rogue DNS resolver, 
(Crume, 2017) is deployed on the network to spot suspicious activity.  
2. The customer initiates a login to the bank’s web site (2a). The bank sends an OTP to the customer (2b). The 
customer then calls the bank’s VRU, who’s number has been stored previously in the contacts list on his 
mobile phone, and enters the OTP (2c).  When the VRU responds that the OTP is correct, the customer 
knows that he is on the correct web site rather than an imposter (2d). (Bravo & Crume, 2014) 
3. Having previously received the customer’s travel itinerary from a third-party booking web site, the bank 
knows that the customer should be in Brazil, rather than his home country, USA (3a). The bank verifies that 
the IP address the customer’s session is originating from is, indeed, in Brazil, so the transaction can 
continue. (Note: If the address had been in the USA, where the customer would typically, the bank would 
actually need to reject the transaction because it knows the user is not actually there.) (Bravo & Crume, 
2018) (3b) 
4. While the customer is still on the phone, the VRU tells the customer that the system believes he is currently 
in Brazil. The customer indicates agreement and the transaction continues. (Bravo & Crume, 2014) 
5. The customer then ends the call and proceeds to enter the details of their transaction (e.g. accounts, 
amounts, etc.). The bank then displays a QR code containing an encoded playback of these details which 
the customer then verifies with the bank’s app running on his mobile phone. Confirming that the details 
are correct, the customer indicates consent to proceed with the transaction. (Bravo & Crume, 2017) 
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FIGURE 3: WEB CUSTOMER USE CASE 
2.3.2 MOBILE DEVICE USE CASE 
In this use case (depicted in Figure 4: Mobile Device Use Case), the customer uses their mobile phone to conduct the 
banking transaction and leverages a different set of protection mechanisms. 
1. The customer realizes they have forgotten the passcode to unlock their mobile phone. They use a landline 
phone in their hotel room to call a friend who has been previously registered as a trusted user to initiate 
the reset process. Through a series of communications between these individual’s mobile devices, the 
phone is unlocked, and the customer regains full access to their phone and initiates login. (Bravo, et al., 
2015) 
2. The customer then logs in to the bank’s web site using their mobile phone. 
3. The bank sends the user’s IP address and mobile phone number to a third-party location correlation service 
which verifies that the geolocation associated with each is within an acceptable distance so as to conclude 
that a MITM attack is unlikely. This follows from the fact that the IP address seen by the bank would have 
been that of the MITM, who would not likely be physically near the location of the customer’s phone. (Bravo 
& Crume, 2014) 
4. The customer then enters the transaction details on the bank’s web site and is instructed to call the bank’s 
VRU using the number they have previously stored in their contacts list. (4a) The VRU then reads the 
transaction details to the customer who then confirms that they are correct and the transaction proceeds. 
(4b) (Bravo & Crume, 2014) 
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FIGURE 4: MOBILE DEVICE USE CASE 
 
2.3.3 MITM DETECTION AND REMEDIATION 
This use case highlights how the bank might determine the existence of a MITM attack affecting its customers and 
act to remediate by migrating these users to a new system which supports a more sophisticated access control 
system (e.g. risk-based access). 
1. As depicted in steps 1 through 4 in the diagram below, the bank detects a significant number of login 
attempts from a wide range of customers all originating from the same IP address, which, notably, none 
have used before. The bank responds by blocking login attempts from this IP address until an investigation 
can be conducted. (Crume, 2013) 
2. The bank concludes that a more effective access control system which authorizes requests based upon a 
risk score determined by a wide range of inputs would better guard against fraud. The decision is made to 
migrate customers in a phased, nondisruptive manner to the new system in such a way as to preserve 
existing login credentials as well as password expiry intervals. (Crume, 2010) 
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FIGURE 5: MITM DETECTION AND AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM MIGRATION 
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3 NEW APPROACHES TO USER-CENTRIC AUTHENTICATION  
The patents in this section focus on providing better assurance that the endpoints involved in a transaction are, 
indeed, who they claim to be. 
3.1 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS 
In a phishing attack an end user is tricked into providing login credentials and/or other sensitive information by an 
attacker impersonating a legitimate web site. The reason this attack succeeds is that the victim is unable to 
adequately determine whether the web site in question is authentic. Most existing defenses require the end user to 
discern legitimacy based upon: 
• the overall appearance of the site, which is easily faked,  
• a specially-chosen site authentication image, which can be replicated in a man-in-the-middle attack, or  
• the verification of the site's digital certificate, whose absence is often overlooked by the user. (Sunshine, et 
al., 2009) 
 
Further, since the Internet is largely insensitive to geographical limitations due to its high degree of connectedness, 
attackers need not be limited to targets that are located physically near them. The removal of this limitation enables 
attacks to originate from any location and affect users on the other side of the world. This is an advantage attackers 
frequently leverage.  
 
However, this also means that the likelihood that an MITM and their intended victim would be geographically near 
each other is small. In most cases, the attacker simply does not need to know or care about where their victim 
actually is. This lack of location awareness can, therefore, be exploited to work against the attacker.  
 
In an attempt to mitigate risk, it has become more common for authentication systems to verify that a login is 
occurring from a legitimate geography in addition to verifying that those credentials are correct. This way a login 
from a country in which the organization does not do business might be rejected even if the user enters the correct 
userid and password. The assumption being that these credentials may have been stolen. 
 
However, simple, country-based geographic restrictions such as “this user lives in country X so an attempt to login 
to their account from country Y should be disallowed” can result in false rejections when the user travels 
internationally. Further still, false acceptances can result when the user actually is abroad, and an imposter attempts 
to login from the user’s home country.   
(Denning & MacDoran, 1998) proposes a system for determining geolocation as part of the authentication service 
by requiring devices to send their coordinates via a specially designed message. (Jaros & R., 2010) describes a 
location-based authentication system which provides a temporal element within a cryptographically secured 
message. (Camaisa & Samuelsson, 2007) uses browser cookies, which limit applicability to using the same browser 
for each session and may raise privacy issues for some users. (Kiliccote, 2008), (Kiliccote, 2008) and (Stoll, et al., 
2008) use images, which the user must store and present for authentication. This approach lacks the degree of 
portability that many users desire. (Adida, n.d.) deals with web authentication only with no out of band process and 
is limited to browsers with JavaScript support, which may be turned off by security-conscious users. 
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(Constable, 2008) describes a system which would receive location information as input but does not actually 
determine the location. (Niedermeyer, 2008) uses location as determined by an unspecified location sensing device 
but does not compare this with the location as determined by the IP address of the user’s browser. (O'Neil, 2002) 
does not leverage mobile phones and requires a special, localized network where all transactions are performed 
rather than a general purpose, public network. (Turnbull & Gedge, 2006) only applies to a restricted, previously 
designated workspace. (Clough, 2007) requires the addition of new data flows to the mobile phone backbone 
network as well as changes to message formats. 
(Kato, 2013) leverages location data as part of the authentication process but is specifically designed for use with 
ATMs which have a known, fixed location and not with end users who may be mobile. (Wahl, 2010) relies specifically 
on calendar entries as the source for expected user location.  (Goldberg & Boaz, 2013) relies on past logins to predict 
where a user might log in next. It also considers the distance between the current login location and the previous 
one to determine if the user could, in fact, have traveled that distance in the time that elapsed between the two.  
(Kermode, 2009) and (Alicherry & Angelos, 2009) detect MITM attacks but do not leverage mobile phones and 
depend on the use of digital certificates. (Dewe, et al., 2009) requires a specialized app to be downloaded to the 
mobile device in order to perform cryptographic functions.  
3.2 ENABLING APPROACHES FOR USER-CENTRIC AUTHENTICATION 
Patents described in this section extend and refine this defense by including additional aspects of location and 
leverage other mechanisms for determining coordinates.  
3.2.1 WEB SITE AUTHENTICATION 
Much of the typical focus of authentication efforts has been on offering a service provider the ability to determine 
the identity of the user of that service. Instead, US patent 8,762,724  (Bravo & Crume, 2014) provides the ability for 
an end user to know whether the service, specifically, a web site, is, indeed, the one they intended to be transacting 
with.  
This is done via a One Time Password (OTP) that the legitimate web site presents and which the user then repeats 
over a side communications channel -- in this case, a call from a phone preregistered with the web site. The Voice 
Response Unit (VRU) number that the user calls has also been determined in advance and communicated to the user 
who should have stored it in their device’s phone book for easy retrieval and to avoid calling a fake number. The OTP 
is then verified by the VRU to ensure that it matches the one generated by the web site.  
A potential phishing attack is then defeated because the attacker would not know the appropriate OTP to present 
to the user and the VRU would inform the user that no OTP match occurred.  
When combined with traditional user authentication methods, this invention can close the loop with a return path 
for mutual authentication.  
3.2.2 MOBILE PHONE IP ADDRESS LOCATION CORRELATION SERVICE 
US patent 8,683,609 (Bravo & Crume, 2014) improves the confidence that a user is who they claim to be by 
comparing the user’s geolocation, as determined by their IP address, to their geolocation as determined by their 
mobile phone service provider. The later may use mobile phone tower triangulation, for instance, to make this 
determination.  
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The notion here is that an MITM attacker would likely have a different physical location than the victim as there is 
no reason that the two would need to be co-located in the first. Therefore, when the attacker impersonates a user 
by sending transactions to the service provider under the user’s identity, their geolocation, as determined by IP 
address, would differ significantly from the geolocation of the user, as determined by their mobile phone provider 
based upon characteristics of the mobile network. 
This invention works by having the web site send the following to a third-party location correlation service: 
• IP address of the user session 
• mobile phone number of the user (from Caller ID or preregistered) 
• a differential radius corresponding to the degree of risk the web site is willing to accept 
The correlation service calculates the geographical location of the mobile phone through GPS or mobile tower 
triangulation and compares this to the geolocation location associated with the IP address. The service then returns 
an indication as to whether the two locations are within the specified distance of each other.  
Further still, this invention offers a degree of privacy protection if the geolocation service is provided by a different 
organization than the organization being impersonated in the attack. This way the third-party service, likely the 
user’s mobile service provider, who already must know the location of the device in order to route calls, can give 
confidence to the web site without divulging unnecessary details by providing a simple confirmation or denial of 
location proximity between the phone and the IP address.  
3.2.3 DETECTING MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACKS USING GEOLOCATION AND VOICE RESPONSE TELEPHONY 
PROMPTS 
US patent 8,917,826 (Bravo & Crume, 2014) extends the protections described in the previous section (3.2.2 Mobile 
Phone IP Address Location Correlation Service) by providing the user a means for detecting MITM attacks in 
electronic transactions – typically with a web site.  
The mechanism for doing so involves having the web site receive a request from a user, provide the user with an 
OTP and instruct the user to call a predetermined number to complete the verification process. Once the user has 
called, the voice response unit (VRU) will instruct the user to enter the OTP.  
If the OTP matches, then the VRU will speak to the user the approximate location where they are believed to be, 
based upon the geolocation of the IP address determined by the web site. If the user agrees that their physical 
location is correct (within a reasonable degree of variance), then they confirm the transaction and processing 
continues.  
 
The notion is that if an MITM is involved, then the web site will detect an IP address that is likely to be distant from 
where the user actually is at that time and, therefore, exposing this information to the user will allow them to know 
that something is amiss, and the transaction should be aborted.  
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FIGURE 6: MITM DETECTION WITH GEOLOCATION AND VRU 
1. Attacker lures User to initiate transaction. This could be the result of a phishing email, cross-site scripting 
attack or other.  
2. User logs on to Attacker’s system thinking it is the service provider and enters transaction details (e.g. 
transfer funds from savings account to checking)  
3. Attacker starts a separate session with the service provider, logs in with User’s credentials and enters 
modified transaction details (e.g. transfer funds from savings account to Attacker’s account)  
4. Service Provider generates OTP and sends (unknowingly) to Attacker along with instructions to call the 
Verification Service to verify details.  
5. Attacker relays OTP and instructions to User  
6. User places call to Verification Service via a predetermined phone number and enters OTP when prompted 
by VRU  
7. Verification Center determines probable location of User based upon IP address of browser session (in this 
case the IP address points to Attacker)  
8. If IP address is in the list of known exceptions no further verification is done  
9. VRU asks User if their geographical location matches the one it has determined  
10. Since Attacker’s IP address is different from User’s the VRU will state an incorrect location so User cancels 
transaction  
11. Optionally, an alarm is sent to Service Provider for further investigation and analysis  
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3.2.4 ACCESS CONTROL BASED UPON EXPECTED USER LOCATION 
 
US patent 10,027,770 (Bravo & Crume, 2018) extends beyond conventional IP address geolocation-based checking, 
which tends to be static and can result in false rejections in the case where legitimate users, who happen to be out 
of their normal area due to a business trip, vacation or temporary work assignment, are denied access. 
In order to account for these exception cases and to provide a greater degree of accuracy and flexibility, which 
reduces false rejections and increases security, this invention takes as input, the user’s expected location as 
determined by:  
• travel itineraries,  
• work schedules,  
• vacation schedules and  
• any other relevant data feeds. 
For example, if the user’s travel itinerary indicates that they should be in another country on a particular day and 
they try to login from that country, the system would allow this attempt. Conversely, a login attempt from the user’s 
home country would be rejected if the user should, in fact, be visiting another country on that particular day. Neither 
of these use cases would be handled correctly by traditional IP address geolocation checking alone. 
This invention creates a more adaptable authentication system which provides greater security and confidence 
based upon these trusted location data sources. 
3.3 IMPACT OF CONTRIBUTIONS 
The inventions described in this section build on and eliminate some of the limitations of the works cited previously 
in 3.1 Background and Related Works. By removing the need for browser cookies, predefined images, special 
networks and new protocols, this research describes mechanisms offering greater flexibility and security.  
The current research extends the work of (Leung, n.d.), (Bychkov, 2007) and (Steinberg, 2007), which leverage OTP’s 
as a means for detection, by adding location verification as well.  US# 8,917,826 builds on concepts in US# 8,683,609 
in that the user audibly hears where the system believes they are and the user – not the system – decides whether 
to continue with the transaction or not. US# 10,027,770 builds on (Wahl, 2010) by including other sources such as 
travel itineraries from a travel agent or provider, work schedules (e.g. for shift workers) and vacation schedules, 
thereby, providing a more generalized framework. 
The inventions presented here have been the basis for subsequent research and inventions, as show in Tables 1-4. 
These consist of a total of 39 external citations from other companies such as Motorola, eBay, MasterCard, 
Microsoft, FedEx, Alibaba, Tata, Bank of America, Juniper Networks, Verizon, Xerox and Samsung. These references 
include patents from the US, UK, Japan, China, Singapore, South Korea and the World International Property 
Organization (WIPO). In addition, to these external citations, this work has been used by the inventors as the basis 
for further enhancements as demonstrated through 9 self-citations. In addition, these works resulted in 233 forward 
citations to yet other works. 
(Note: US# 10,027,770 Expected Location-based Access Control was just recently granted a patent in July 2018 and 
has, therefore, not been in the public domain long enough to collect very many citations as of this writing.) 
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TABLE 1: CITATIONS FOR US# 8,762,724 WEBSITE AUTHENTICATION 
Publication number Assignee Year Forward 
Citations (38) 
Title 
External Citations (12)     
US10015153B1    EMC IP Holding 
Company LLC 
2018 0 Security using velocity metrics identifying 
authentication performance for a set of 
devices 
US8681965B1    Intervoice 
Limited 
Partnership 
2014 1 Systems and methods for authenticating 
interactive voice response systems to 
callers 
WO2011121566A1 Paytel Inc. 2011 14 A method for mutual authentication of a 
user and service provider 
US9348992B2    eBay Inc. 2016 4 Linked identities 
GB2488766A    Intercede Ltd 2012 9 Securely transferring data to a mobile 
device 
US20130144620A1    Telcordia 
Technologies, 
Inc. 
2013 1 Method, system and program for verifying 
the authenticity of a website using a 
reliable telecommunication channel and 
pre-login message 
US20140359736A1    Deviceauthority, 
Inc. 
2014 6 Dynamic voiceprint authentication 
US20150082401A1    Motorola 
Solutions, Inc. 
2015 1 Method and device for facilitating mutual 
authentication between a server and a 
user using haptic feedback 
CN104954332A    腾讯科技（深
圳）有限公司 
2015 0 Website identification method and device 
US9430630B2    Textpower, Inc. 2016 2 Credential-free identification and 
authentication 
WO2017003379A1    Treebox 
Solutions Pte 
Ltd 
2017 0 A method performed by at least one 
server configured to authenticate a user 
for a web service login 
SG10201506058UA    Mastercard Asia 
Pacific Pte Ltd 
2017 0 Method and system for website 
verification 
Self-Citations (5) 
 
  
 
US10169759B2 IBM Corp 2019  Verifying online transaction integrity and 
authentication with QR codes 
US8533821B2 IBM Corp 2013  Detecting and defending against man-in-
the-middle attacks 
US8683609B2 IBM Corp 2014  Mobile phone and IP address correlation 
service 
US8838988B2 IBM Corp 2014  Verification of transactional integrity 
US8917826B2 IBM Corp 2014  Detecting man-in-the-middle attacks in 
electronic transactions using prompts 
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TABLE 2: CITATIONS FOR US# 8,683,609 MOBILE PHONE AND IP ADDRESS LOCATION CORRELATION SERVICE 
Publication number Assignee Year Forward 
Citations 
(117) 
Title 
External Citations 
(15) 
    
US20130301595A1    Core Wireless 
Licensing 
S.A.R.L. 
2013 6 Method of controlling a mobile terminal, 
and an associated mobile terminal 
US20140282984A1    Microsoft 
Corporation 
2014 1 Service relationship and communication 
management 
US20160036777A1    Aaa Internet 
Publishing, Inc. 
2016 1 Method of Near Real-Time Automated 
Global Geographical IP Address Discovery 
and Lookup by Executing Computer-
Executable Instructions Stored on a Non-
Transitory Computer-Readable Medium 
US9648002B2 Microsoft 
Technology 
Licensing, Llc 
2017 0 Location-based user disambiguation 
US9087213B2    Fedex Corporate 
Services, Inc. 
2015 9 Systems and methods for rule-driven 
management of sensor data across 
geographic areas and derived actions 
JP5751060B2    ブラザー工業
株式会社 
2015 7 Printing apparatus and a printing system 
CN102594908B    华为技术有限
公司 
2014 5 Method, equipment and system for 
transmitting network contents 
KR101392047B1    주식회사 
엘지씨엔에스 
2014 6 User verification server and the mobile 
terminal of the user verification method, 
do this 
JP5763592B2    株式会社野村
総合研究所 
2015 2 Authentication system and the 
authentication device 
US9355231B2    Telesign 
Corporation 
2016 41 Frictionless multi-factor authentication 
system and method 
US9124582B2 Fmr Llc 2015 37 Mobile security fob 
CN104580112B    阿里巴巴集团
控股有限公司 
2018 2 Kind of business authentication method, 
system and server 
WO2015060950A1    Alibaba Group 
Holding Limited 
2015 0 Method and system for authenticating 
service 
CN105592074A    中国银联股份
有限公司 
2016 0 Method and system of mobile device 
cooperation authentication on the basis of 
geographic position 
US20190037071A1    Tata 
Communications 
(America) Inc. 
2019 0 Mobile roaming and authentication 
Self-Citations (3) 
 
  
 
US10169759B2 IBM Corp 2019  Verifying online transaction integrity and 
authentication with QR codes 
US8533821B2 IBM Corp 2013  Detecting and defending against man-in-
the-middle attacks 
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US20100269162A1 IBM Corp 2010  Website authentication 
US8838988B2 IBM Corp 2014  Verification of transactional integrity 
US8917826B2 IBM Corp 2014  Detecting man-in-the-middle attacks in 
electronic transactions using prompts 
 
TABLE 3: CITATIONS FOR US# 8,917,826 DETECTING MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACKS USING GEOLOCATION AND 
VOICE RESPONSE TELEPHONY PROMPTS 
Publication number Assignee Year Forward 
Citations (77) 
Title 
External Citations (9)     
US9444812B1    Seven 
Networks, Llc 
2016 38 Systems and methods for authenticating a 
service 
JP5763592B2    株式会社野村
総合研究所 
2015 2 Authentication system and the 
authentication device 
KR101451214B1    주식회사 
엘지씨엔에스 
2014 15 Payment method, server performing the 
same, storage media storing the same and 
system performing the same 
US20150032620A1    Bank of 
America 
Corporation 
2015 7 Communication network for collecting 
data and executing electronic transaction 
services 
US9722801B2 Juniper 
Networks, Inc. 
2017 6 Detecting and preventing man-in-the-
middle attacks on an encrypted 
connection 
US9515984B1    El Toro.Com, 
Llc 
2016 3 Determining and utilizing one or more 
attributes of IP addresses 
US9407762B2    Bank of 
America 
Corporation 
2016 5 Providing enhanced user authentication 
functionalities 
US10091193B2    Mastercard 
International 
Incorporated 
2018 1 One time passcode 
US10148816B2    Verizon Patent 
and Licensing 
Inc. 
2018 0 Interactive voice response (IVR) call 
authentication 
Self-Citations (1) 
 
  
 
US10169759B2 IBM Corp 2019  Verifying online transaction integrity and 
authentication with QR codes 
 
TABLE 4: CITATIONS FOR US# 10,027,770 EXPECTED LOCATION-BASED ACCESS CONTROL 
Publication number Assignee Year Forward 
Citations (1) 
Title 
External Citations (3)     
US20160127873A1    Samsung 
Electronics Co., 
Ltd. 
2016 0 Method of predicting location of 
rendezvous and electronic device for 
providing same 
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US9747768B1    Xerox 
Corporation 
2017 1 System and method for proving physical 
presence 
US20180145990A1    Microsoft 
Technology 
Licensing, Llc 
2018 0 Multi-factor authentication using 
positioning data 
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4 TRANSACTION-CENTRIC AUTHENTICATION  
The contributions in this section focus on providing greater assurance that the transaction details have not been 
altered by an attacker such as an MITM.  
4.1 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS 
The increasing dependence upon online channels to conduct sensitive transactions such as Internet banking and e-
commerce carries with it an increasing risk that these transactions could be subverted by a determined attacker. A 
rise in the prevalence of malware which can act as an MITM logging keystrokes, redirecting network traffic, 
eavesdropping, etc., creates a direct threat by increasing the likelihood that fraud may be committed remotely.  
For instance, a computer could be infected by malware capable of subverting even strong, second factor 
authentication mechanisms. The user of such a compromised machine could be prompted by the malware to 
authorize a transaction of one sort while the MITM modifies the request before submitting it.  
An example of this might be the case where a user requests that funds be transferred to another account, 
authenticates the transaction and then the MITM modifies the transaction to divert funds to a different account -- 
possibly changing the amount in the process as well. A special case of this type of attack involving a compromise of 
the user's browser is also known as a man-in-the-browser (MITB) attack and is being seen with increasing prevalence.  
(Bravo & Covalla, 2006) shows how strong authentication can be accomplished inexpensively and conveniently by 
entering a 4-digit OTP via a pre-registered mobile phone. (Jones, et al., 2008) requires the user to call the service 
provider first to initiate the transaction using the mobile device for verification.  
(Rados, et al., 2009) involves authenticating the user via an OTP generated by the mobile device. (Calabrese & 
Stemer, 2008) and (Law, et al., 2008) involve verifying transaction details through entering an OTP or PIN on the 
mobile device. However, this approach leaves a greater potential for MITM attack since the same channel is used 
for all communications.  
4.2 ENABLING APPROACHES TO TRANSACTION-CENTRIC AUTHENTICATION 
4.2.1 VERIFICATION OF TRANSACTIONAL INTEGRITY 
Current systems typically rely solely on memorized passwords to authenticate a user, but these can be discovered 
and replayed. This invention builds on (Bravo & Covalla, 2006) where the user is required to send (via mobile phone 
messaging) an OTP chosen randomly by the server. The server then verifies that the OTP sent by the user matches 
the one it chose for that log in and that it was sent from the mobile phone number registered to that user. 
US patent 8,838,988 (Bravo & Crume, 2014) adds protection against an MITM that might attempt to modify a 
transaction by providing data integrity checking and transaction-level authentication through an out of band 
communications channel -- specifically, a mobile phone call -- which the MITM attacker would not have access to.  
This invention may optionally leverage special mobile phone carrier-based service messaging to initiate the call (i.e. 
a sequence typically beginning with # or * and followed by a few alphanumeric digits assigned to this service). As 
such, the risk of Caller ID spoofing is greatly reduced, thereby providing greater confidence that the caller is, in fact, 
the authorized user along with the additional benefit of not charging the user for air time for the call. 
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Once the user has called the predetermined number and entered the OTP supplied by the web site, the VRU will 
state audibly the details of the transaction (e.g. amounts, accounts, transaction type, etc.) and ask the user to 
confirm these details. If an MITM has tampered with the transaction (e.g. example changed the account that funds 
are to be transferred to), this will be obvious to the user, who can then indicate to the VRU that the transaction 
should be aborted. 
 
FIGURE 7: FLOW DIAGRAM FOR TRANSACTIONAL INTEGRITY CHECKING 
The following describes the steps involved in a transaction exploiting this technique. (Note: it is assumed that the 
user's OS or browser has already been compromised by a MITM remote monitor.)  
1. User logs into web site (e.g. a financial institution, e-commerce merchant or similar) passing through MITM  
2. User initiates a transaction such as a transfer of funds or purchase order  
3. MITM intercepts the transaction and modifies the details such as changing the destination account for the 
transfer or amount of goods purchased  
4. Web site parses the transaction and generates a unique, time-sensitive OTP which serves as a transaction 
id  
5. Web site sends the OTP and the characteristics of the call to the voice response unit (VRU) and instructs it 
to expect a call from the previously registered mobile phone for this user  
6. Web site instructs the user to place a special service call using the predetermined mobile phone dialing 
sequence (e.g. "#mybank") and enter the OTP for this transaction  
7. User places the call  
8. Web site's VRU, which may, in fact, be run by the mobile phone carrier or other 3rd party, determines user's 
phone number  
9. VRU asks user to enter OTP  
10. User enter OTP from web site  
11. VRU reads transaction details to user and instructs user to confirm transaction details by pressing 1 or reject 
by pressing 2 (or simply hanging up)  
12. User realizes that transaction details do not match and presses 2  
13. VRU informs web site about the acceptance or rejection of the transaction  
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14. Optionally user is asked whether they would like web site operators to follow up by investigating the source 
of the discrepancy 
 
 
4.2.2 VERIFYING ONLINE TRANSACTION INTEGRITY AND AUTHENTICATION WITH QR CODES 
(Bravo & Crume, 2014) verifies the details of a transaction providing a mechanism to detect the presence of 
tampering. This invention (Bravo & Crume, 2017) uses a different mechanism to accomplish these ends by providing 
a means for allowing the user to verify transaction details on a mobile device, thereby exposing tampering by an 
MITM.  
 
Encoded details are sent from the transaction server to the user in the form of a QR code displayed in the user’s web 
browser. The user then scans this image with a purpose-built mobile app, which presents the decoded details and 
asks the user to confirm or abort the transaction. Since the mobile device will have been preregistered with the 
transaction server, the confirmation message also serves as an additional authentication factor thereby increasing 
confidence for both the user and the server that the transaction is legitimate. 
The mobile app uses an out-of-band channel (i.e. the mobile phone network) to transmit confirmation, so any 
tampering with the transaction’s details by an MITM can be detected during the confirmation step and the attack 
thwarted. 
 
Further, since the mobile device is preregistered with the transaction server, the confirmation message from the 
verifier app will not only ensure transactional integrity but also provide an additional authentication factor. 
 
FIGURE 8: TRANSACTION INTEGRITY WITH QR CODES FLOW DIAGRAM 
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1. User logs into transaction server from computer browser with userid/pw (or another authentication 
method)  
2. User creates a transaction using browser  
3. Transaction server returns a QR code containing encoded transaction details to the user’s browser where 
the image is displayed  
4. User scans QR code with specialized verifier app on preregistered mobile device  
5. Verifier app decodes transaction details  
6. Verifier app displays details of transaction and asks user to confirm  
7. User hits confirm button in verifier app if details are consistent with original request or abort button if not  
8. Verifier app sends confirm or abort message to transaction server via mobile channel (i.e. SMS or data 
connection)  
9. Transaction server verifies that message is from authorized user matching registered device/user in data 
base  
10. Transaction server completes the transaction if details are confirmed or aborts if not and sends response  
4.3 IMPACT OF CONTRIBUTIONS 
The inventions described in this section build on the related works described in 4.1 Background and Related Works 
and reduce the likelihood of MITM attack by leveraging out of band communications channels. The first invention 
described in this section does essentially the reverse of (Jones, et al., 2008), where the transaction is initiated online 
(via web browser, ATM or mobile device) and a voice call is used to confirm the integrity of the transaction, thereby, 
closing the loop by offering an alternative path for verification. The second invention builds on (Rados, et al., 2009) 
by also verifying transaction details after authentication.  
The inventions described in this section have been the basis for subsequent research and inventions, as show in 
Table 5. These consist of a total of 4 external citations from Bank of America and iSignthis. These references include 
patents from the US and Canada. In addition, to these external citations, this work has been used by the inventors 
as the basis for further enhancements as demonstrated through 5 self-citations. In addition, these external citations 
resulted in 16 forward citations to yet other works.  
(Note: US# 10,169,759 Verification of Transactional Integrity and Authentication with QR Codes was just recently 
granted a patent early in 2019 and has, therefore, not been in the public domain long enough to collect any citations 
as of this writing.) 
TABLE 5: CITATIONS FOR US# 8,838,988 VERIFICATION OF TRANSACTIONAL INTEGRITY 
Publication Number Assignee Year Forward 
Citations 
(16) 
Title 
External Citations (4)     
US9595035b2 Bank of America 
Corporation 
2017 2 Service for Exceeding 
Account Thresholds Via 
Transaction Machine 
US9595036b2 Bank of America 
Corporation 
2017 13 Service for Exceeding 
Account Thresholds Via 
Mobile Device 
US9508076b2    Bank of America 
Corporation 
2016 1 Service for Account with 
Unavailable Funds or Credit 
Using a Passcode 
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CA2972104a1    Isignthis Ltd 2016 0 Securing A Transaction 
Self-Citations (5) 
 
  
 
US10169759b2 IBM Corp 2019  Verifying Online Transaction 
Integrity and Authentication 
with QR Codes 
US8533821b2 IBM Corp 2013  Detecting and Defending 
Against Man-In-The-Middle 
Attacks 
US8683609b2 IBM Corp 2014  Mobile Phone and IP Address 
Correlation Service 
US8917826b2 IBM Corp 2014  Detecting Man-In-The-Middle 
Attacks in Electronic 
Transactions Using Prompts 
US20100269162a1 IBM Corp 2010  Website Authentication 
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5 AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM SUPPORT  
Section 3 describes mechanisms which provide greater confidence that the parties to a transaction are, in fact, who 
they claim to be. Section 4 descries mechanisms which ensure that transaction details have not been tampered with. 
In addition, there is a need to further enhance the systems that support the authentication process. The 
contributions in this section broadly support this area by offering additional defenses and as well as capabilities 
which allow for nondisruptive migration to a new authentication system and a means for secure recovery of a mobile 
device for which the password has been lost. 
 
5.1 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS 
Since an MITM attack can affect the ability to correctly authenticate a user, any improvement in MITM detection 
and defense can help support the authentication process. 
As discussed previously, various mitigation techniques have been applied to defeating MITM attacks. While digital 
certificates could provide a reasonable measure of protection, they have primarily been limited to server-side 
deployments. This is due to the difficulty and expense of deploying and managing a vast number of certificates across 
a large end user population. Further complicating matters is the fact that those users may have limited technical 
skills and may also be highly mobile, using many different nodes to conduct transactions from. As a result, digital 
certificates tend only to provide one-way authentication (i.e. server proves identity to user) in the best of real-world 
circumstances. The fact that most users typically ignore warning messages of invalid server certificates means even 
this protection is often ineffective (Sunshine, et al., 2009). Digital certificates may also be used to subvert security if 
they are self-signed and the client and server fail to detect this condition. (Callegati, et al., 2009) 
Another increasingly popular defense is to use "strong" authentication mechanisms such as security tokens, smart 
cards or biometrics to ensure that the end user is who they claim to be. The problem with these defenses is that in 
the MITM case the digitized authentication data is simply passed directly through the intermediate node making it 
unnecessary for the attacker to actually possess the token, smart card or physical characteristic being measured.  
Still another technique for alerting end users that they are being lured into logging into a bogus web site involves 
the presentation of a graphical image preselected by the user. During login, if the user does not see the image they 
selected during registration, something which only they and the legitimate Web site should know to present, then 
they know to abort the authentication process. However, in an MITM case, the target Web site presents the image 
to the MITM node thinking it is the end user and the MITM node relays this image to the real end user making them 
believe that the attack node is legitimate, thereby rendering this defense ineffective. 
Also, key to the integrity of the authentication process is the Domain Name Service (DNS), which resolves 
alphanumeric domain names (e.g. www.ibm.com) into numeric IP addresses (9.xxx.yyy.zzz). This service is provided 
by a loose collection of servers scattered around the Internet as well as within local Intranets. If, however, the 
information supplied through this service comes not from an authorized source, but rather, an attacker's system 
supplying incorrect information, network traffic could be impeded in a denial of service (DOS) attack or misrouted 
in a spoofing attack resulting in sensitive traffic being delivered to untrusted systems. (Conti, et al., 2016) 
One way that these services could be subverted would be for an attacker to set up an "evil twin" Wi-Fi hot spot 
which impersonates a trusted wireless access point and establishes itself as an MITM, which can examine and modify 
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all traffic coming into and going out of the rogue network. Another way would be for the attacker to set up a rogue 
server which hijacks network services by broadcasting to all nodes in the network that it is online and available to 
process requests. This is due to the fact that in many cases the last server to broadcast will be considered 
authoritative by other nodes in the network. (Callegati, et al., 2009) shows how ARP and DNS poisoning attacks can 
be carried out in this manner. (Belenguer & Calafate, 2007) describe available tools which can carry out such ARP 
poisoning attacks. 
Another area where significant challenges can be encountered is when there is a need to migrate users from one 
authentication system to another. Typically, users are required to either change their password or re-register as 
credentials are not transferable. In addition, there may be a desire to provide a phased transfer where the number 
of users to be migrated at any one point in time is controlled in case problems are encountered with the new system. 
Finally, it may be desired that current password expirations be maintained across the migration process so as not to 
violate security policy by resetting these intervals on the new system while simultaneously not upsetting users by 
making them choose new credentials.  
Finally, current methods for resetting lost/forgotten mobile phone passwords require the user to perform a “master 
reset" on the device. Unfortunately, this action typically erases all settings including contacts, applications and other 
personalization data. Alternatively, a master reset may be automatically triggered after a predetermined number of 
failed attempts to enter the password. In neither case will the user be able to recover data on the device unless they 
have backed up the device to a cloud storage service or local computer. Even with such a backup, the restoration 
process can be time-consuming and may not bring back all the data and put the phone back in its original state, 
especially if the device was customized significantly. 
Since mobile phones are increasingly being used as security tokens and biometric readers, they have become an 
indispensable part of the authentication ecosystem. The inability to unlock this device could not only deny the user 
access to all the data they have on the phone, but also, the ability to access other services which leverage the phone 
as an authenticator.  
(Fremberg, 2005) requires that the client system be loaded with software, which will communicate with the server 
to authenticate.  This requirement is often impossible to enforce as user end points are not under the control of the 
service provider in many scenarios. (Crilly Jr., 2005) deals with wireless networking “interlopers” and depends upon 
the ability to detect anomalies in the signal based upon intrusion activities.  In the case of phishing and general 
purpose MITM attacks, no such assumptions can be made with regards to the underlying networking environment 
since they traverse the global Internet. (Lee & Choi, n.d.) provides a mechanism for detecting an MITM that is 
dropping packets but requires that all nodes in the path participate in the scheme, which would be an unreasonable 
requirement in a consumer-based MITM defense. 
DNS Watcher (SB-Software, 2005) is a service which performs a DNS health check by polling known DNS servers. 
(Doyle, et al., 2006), (Chesire, 2006),   (Olson & Ogorek, 2009) and (Shaobu, 2011) also employ similar polling 
mechanisms.  
(Gillet & Mantyla, 2011) resets a mobile phone password by communicating with a trusted contact, who then sends 
a password to the device in order to unlock it. (Hadizad, 2014) uses a similar process as the previous invention but 
the new password is communicated acoustically instead.  
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5.2 ENABLING APPROACHES SUPPORTING THE AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM 
5.2.1 DETECTING AND DEFENDING AGAINST MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACKS 
MITM attacks share a detectable characteristic which can be used to predict to some reasonable certainty that 
impersonation is taking place. Once detected, the legitimate web site can send a message which will be relayed by 
the MITM node to the user informing them (as well as alerting web site support staff) of the potential vulnerability 
and ending the session.  
This observable characteristic, which is shared by successful MITM attacks, is that:  
“to the target web site, it appears that a large number of different end users are simultaneously logging on 
from the same IP address -- the address of the MITM proxy.”  
Of course, this behavior alone would not always indicate malicious activity, but if the timing were such that certain 
definable thresholds were exceeded from a single, previously unknown address within a specific interval of time, 
then further investigation or even automated defenses would be warranted.  
US patents 8,533,821 (Crume, 2013) and 8,522,349 (Crume, 2013) add a mechanism as a side process to the 
authentication system which checks login details (e.g. IP address, userid) to see if a significant number of users have 
simultaneously started logging in from the same IP address within a given time window. If this threshold is exceeded, 
then an alert can be generated and, optionally, the login attempt denied.  
Specifically, the target Web site (e.g. a legitimate bank) would install an MITM detection and response component 
which would:  
• determine the origination of incoming login requests  
• check those requests against a blacklist of previously suspected MITM nodes  
• check to see if the MITM detection threshold had been exceeded  
• deny the login request if either of the previous conditions are violated or  
• allow normal login to proceed if thresholds have not been exceeded  
The thresholds would be customizable by the target organization according to their tolerance for risk (much like a 
biometric system or intrusion detection system must be tuned to minimize false positives while not overlooking real 
attacks). These observed values and associated thresholds could be expressed as follows:  
• N = number of userids logging in from the given IP addr 
• Nt = threshold of acceptable number of userids logging in from any given IP addr  
• T = time interval over which logins from a given IP addr have been attempted 
• Tt = time interval threshold triggering suspicion  
This data would be processed as follows: 
If N>Nt and T>Tt then  
suspect MITM attack  
otherwise 
proceed with login and record details  
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A table is maintained which keeps track of the various userids which have logged in from a given IP address. One 
possible implementation would involve a hash tree which indexes the IP addresses and then points to a linked list of 
userids which have logged on from that address, however, other options exist. 
Some advantages to this technique are that:  
• the threshold can be tuned to suit the risk tolerance of the target organization  
• detection can be automated  
• countermeasures can be automated to limit further damage  
• automated detection and response allow for constant vigilance by providing a continuous, 24x7 
defense  
• the basic technique can be extended beyond web spoofing/phishing attacks to other types of MITM 
scenarios  
• the more "successful" the attacker is at luring victims, the more likely the attack will be detected and 
repelled  
In order to improve efficiency, this invention also maintains a whitelist of known, legitimate proxies that users’ 
sessions might be routed through so as to avoid false alarms.  
 
FIGURE 9: MITM COMPROMISING MULTIPLE USERS 
[Note: US patents 8,533,821 (Crume, 2013) and 8,522,349 (Crume, 2013) were split into separate patents by IBM 
attorneys in order to maximize legal protection and business value through the US Patent and Trademark Office. 
However, these are treated as one work for the purposes of this discussion.] 
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5.2.2 A SYSTEM FOR DETECTING THE PRESENCE OF ROGUE DOMAIN NAME SERVICE PROVIDERS THROUGH 
PASSIVE MONITORING 
An attacker could impact the integrity of an authentication system by rerouting traffic to an imposter web site. One 
way this could be accomplished would be to insert a rogue DNS provider which misroutes traffic to the attacker’s 
web site rather than the legitimate one intended by the user.  
This invention described in US patents 9,648,033 and US# 9,225,731 (also registered as German patent 
102013208923) create a system for detecting the presence of rogue DNS protocol servers through the use of a 
passive monitor which looks for spoofed traffic of this sort. The monitor is positioned at a strategic point in the 
network such that it is able to observe traffic flows from other nodes. When the monitor detects DNS resolutions 
that don’t match those from a preconfigured list of known DNS entries, it sends an alert with details of the suspicious 
activity. 
This invention could be implemented either as a software tool running on as a general-purpose computer with access 
to network traffic, as a feature of an intrusion detection or intrusion prevention system (IDS/IPS) or as a stand-alone 
network appliance.  
A Known DNS Resolution table is preconfigured, which contains a list of domain name to IP address mappings that 
are known to be valid. These mappings could also be expressed using wildcards or ranges of addresses in order to 
handle more or less specificity. (Note: This list need not be comprehensive to be of value. As a matter of practicality, 
it is likely that only a selected few well-known, sensitive hosts will be configured to serve as a representative sample.) 
As mentioned previously, (Wagner & Bryner, 2001) describe a scenario in which the ARP system is subverted. In fact, 
this invention could be applied to that protocol as well.  
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FIGURE 10: ROGUE DNS MONITOR 
[Note: US patents 9,648,033 (Crume, 2017) and 9,225,731 (Crume, 2015) were split into separate patents by IBM 
attorneys in order to maximize legal protection and business value through the US Patent and Trademark Office. 
However, these are treated as one work for the purposes of this discussion. German patent 102013208923 (Crume, 
2016) describes the same invention.] 
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5.2.3 MIGRATION ACROSS AUTHENTICATION SYSTEMS 
This invention (Crume, 2010) provides for a means to migrate users from one authentication system to another in a 
manageable, orderly process which avoids sending out new credentials to users and, thereby, minimizing the risk of 
compromise of those credentials. It also allows for groups of users to be migrated over time so as to minimize the 
impact to the system, the user community and the support staff that would need to intervene in failure cases. 
Perhaps most importantly, this invention allows the user to keep their existing password on the new system without 
violating the password expiry policy. 
An administrator indicates a set of users to be migrated. When one of those designated users attempts to login to 
the system, the migration process begins. This approach creates two levels of staging to minimize disruption by 
migrating only a predetermined group of users at regular intervals and relying on the somewhat random timing of 
user logins to spread out the process further still.  
When a user designated for migration logs in, the system saves the cleartext password entered and verifies the 
password against the old authentication system. Once authenticated, the user’s password is then stored in the new 
authentication system and the user login process continues. After this time, the user will be authenticated only by 
the new system. In addition, the migration process also transfers the remaining password lifetime to the new system 
so that the password expiry interval is preserved across the migration process.  
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FIGURE 11: AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM MIGRATION FLOWCHART  
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5.2.4 MOBILE DEVICE PASSWORD RESET 
US patents 9,088,896 and 9,078,135 describe an invention which allows an authorized user to securely regain full 
access to a locked mobile device for which they may have forgotten the password. The authorized user, while still 
able to unlock the device, must define a list of privileged phone numbers which can be used in the recovery process. 
These numbers will, presumably, belong to a group of trusted associates (or even other devices owned by the 
authorized user). These trusted devices can then aid in the recovery process.  
To initiate this process the authorized user places a call (or has someone else place a call) to the locked device from 
one of the privileged devices. The authorized user confirms that the call is authentic because the Caller ID matches 
what is expected and answers the call and verifies the caller through their own innate ability to recognize the voice 
of the trusted caller. If the call is placed by an imposter, then the authorized user simply hangs up and the recovery 
process is ended. If the caller is recognized, the authorized user allows the call to continue until a predefined time 
interval has been exceeded. (Note: this delay allows the authorized user to determine the authenticity of the call.) 
After the call threshold time has been exceeded, a message is displayed on the authorized user’s phone asking if 
they want to reset their password. If this is desired, then the authorized user indicates this and terminates the call.  
At this point the locked device automatically generates a temporary password and dials the privileged number that 
initiated the previous call. When the call is answered on the privileged device, that user will hear a machine-
generated audible message telling them the temporary password and instructing them to enter it on their keypad. 
If this password is entered correctly, then the authorized user will be shown a password entry field where they can 
enter a new password and regain full access to their device.  
[Note: US patents 9,088,896 (Bravo, et al., 2015) and 9,078,135 (Bravo, et al., 2015) were split into separate patents 
by IBM attorneys in order to maximize legal protection and business value through the US Patent and Trademark 
Office. However, these are treated as one work for the purposes of this discussion.] 
5.3 IMPACT OF CONTRIBUTIONS 
The works presented in this section build on the research previously cited in 5.1 Background and Related Works by 
improving security and flexibility. For example, (Fremberg, 2005) requires special, client-side software to be installed 
while the current work does not. (Peterson & Shaw, 2007) provides a means for migrating across authentication 
systems. The present work builds on this concept and provides additional features for staging the migration process 
so as to limit impact and preserves password expiration intervals. (Bravo, et al., 2015) improves on (Gillet & Mantyla, 
2011) by having the locked device call back to the trusted device and then send the temporary password. This 
additional verification provides greater confidence that an attacker is not involved in the reset.  
The approach presented here in (Crume, 2015) for passive monitoring offers some advantages over this approaches 
taken by (SB-Software, 2005) and others as follows: 
• Passive monitoring does not introduce additional, superfluous network traffic as polling does (the latter 
being an approach used by other works) 
• A passive monitor cannot be (easily) detected by the attacker, whereas a polling solution could be 
discovered when performing reconnaissance of the target network  
• The polling approach only checks that known DNS servers are performing properly. The passive monitor 
described here is able to identify incorrect DNS resolutions coming from any host, making it useful in 
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detecting rogue DNS providers as these would not be known in advance and could, therefore, not be 
checked by the polling system.  
The inventions described in this section have been the basis for subsequent research and inventions, as show in 
Tables 6-9. These consist of a total of 36 external citations from other companies such as Alibaba, Bank of America, 
Symantec, AT&T, Forbes, Juniper Networks, Cyber-Ark, Visa, Wells Fargo, Amazon, Audible and Tencent. These 
references include patents from the US, UK, Japan, China, Germany and the World International Property 
Organization (WIPO). In addition, to these external citations, this work has been used by the inventors as the basis 
for further enhancements as demonstrated through 2 self-citations. In addition, these external citations resulted in 
149 forward citations to yet other works. 
TABLE 6: CITATIONS FOR US# 8,533,821 DETECTING AND DEFENDING AGAINST MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACKS 
Publication number Assignee Year Forward 
Citations 
(102) 
Title 
External Citations 
(24) 
    
CN104239758B    阿里巴巴集团控股
有限公司 
2018 8 A human-machine identifying method and 
corresponding CAPTCHA 
CN104519018B    阿里巴巴集团控股
有限公司 
2018 9 A method of preventing a malicious for the 
server request method, apparatus and 
system for 
CN105516066A    阿里巴巴集团控股
有限公司 
2016 0 Method and device for identifying 
existence of intermediary 
CN106357628A    东软集团股份有限
公司 
2017 0 Attack defense method and device 
DE102014222219A1 Robert Bosch Gmbh 2016 0 Method and apparatus for authentication 
of a device 
JP5088403B2    横河電機株式会社 2012 17 Improper communication detection system 
US20130311784A1     Micheal Bleahen 2013 4 System and method for preventing 
unauthorized access to information 
US20140283049A1    Bank of America 
Corporation 
2014 6 Handling information security incidents 
US20150135327A1    Symcor Inc. 2015 1 Method of obfuscating relationships 
between data in database tables 
US20170006060A1    Symantec 
Corporation 
2017 0 Systems and methods for detecting man-in-
the-middle attacks 
US8356333B2    Bespoke 
Innovations Sarl 
2013 21 System and method for verifying 
networked sites 
US8595829B1    Symantec 
Corporation 
2013 4 Systems and methods for automatically 
blacklisting an internet domain based on 
the activities of an application 
US8973140B2     Bank of America 
Corporation 
2015 6 Handling information security incidents 
US9083730B2 AT&T Intellectual 
Property I., L.P. 
2015 3 Methods and apparatus to identify an 
internet protocol address blacklist 
boundary 
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US9356845B1    Forbes Media Llc 2016 0 System and method for audience segment 
profiling and targeting 
US9438494B2    Avvasi Inc. 2016 10 Apparatus and methods for optimizing 
network data transmission 
US9443068B2    Micheal Bleahen 2016 4 System and method for preventing 
unauthorized access to information 
US9553882B2    Empire Technology 
Development Llc 
2017 0 Correlation of advertising content to 
malicious software 
US9722801B2 Juniper Networks, 
Inc. 
2017 6 Detecting and preventing man-in-the-
middle attacks on an encrypted connection 
US9800589B1    Sonus Networks, 
Inc. 
2017 0 Methods and apparatus for detecting 
malicious attacks 
US9888035B2     Symantec 
Corporation 
2018 0 Systems and methods for detecting man-in-
the-middle attacks 
WO2016178088A2    Cyber-Ark Software 
Ltd. 
2016 3 Systems and methods for detecting and 
reacting to malicious activity in computer 
networks 
WO2018023466A1    步晓芳 2018 0 Account input method and browser 
WO2018169522A1    Visa International 
Service Association 
2018 0 Method and system for relay attack 
detection 
Self-Citations (1) 
 
  
 
US10169759B2 IBM Corp 2019  Verifying online transaction integrity and 
authentication with QR codes 
 
TABLE 7: CITATIONS FOR US# 9,225,731 DETECTING THE PRESENCE OF ROGUE DOMAIN NAME SERVICE 
PROVIDERS 
Publication number Assignee Year Forward 
Citations 
(14) 
Title 
External Citations 
(6) 
    
GB2518460B     F Secure Corp 2015 5 Unauthorised/Malicious redirection 
CN105338123B     国际商业机器公司 2018 4 A method for resolving a domain name in a 
network, devices and systems 
CN104168339A     汉柏科技有限公司 2014 4 Method and device for preventing domain 
name from being intercepted 
US10230743B1 Wells Fargo Bank, 
N.A. 
2019 0 Rogue endpoint detection 
CN106060067B     上海交通大学 2018 1 Malice domain name detection method 
based on Passive DNS iteration cluster 
CN108156262A     中国联合网络通信
集团有限公司 
2018 0 Method and device for inspecting 
effectiveness of DNS (domain name 
system) configuration files 
Self-Citations (1) 
 
  
 
US20130318605A1     IBM Corp 2013  System for detecting rogue network 
protocol service providers 
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TABLE 8: CITATIONS FOR US2010/0269151A1 MIGRATION ACROSS AUTHENTICATION SYSTEMS 
Publication number Assignee Year Forward 
Citations 
(25) 
Title 
External Citations (2)     
US9819669B1 Amazon 
Technologies, Inc. 
2017 0 Identity migration between organizations 
US9112844B2 Audible, Inc. 2015 25 Device credentialing for network access 
 
TABLE 9: CITATIONS FOR US# 9,078,135 MOBILE DEVICE RESET 
Publication number Assignee Year Forward 
Citations 
(8) 
Title 
External Citations 
(4) 
    
US9355244B2     Tencent Technology 
(Shenzhen) 
Company Limited 
2016 4 Systems and methods for password reset 
CN104808934A     富泰华工业（深圳
）有限公司 
2015 4 Electronic equipment and unlocking control 
method thereof 
CN105786303A     纬创资通（中山）
有限公司 
2016 0 Screen unlocking method of electronic 
device, and electronic device 
CN106503539A     公安部第三研究所 2017 0 Screen lock password cracking method and 
evidence acquisition system for intelligent 
equipment based on Mobex protocol 
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6 CONCLUSION 
MITM attacks are one of the more problematic areas within the realm of Cybersecurity. If imposters are able to 
insert themselves into the communication path between two legitimate parties, personal details (including 
passwords and credit card numbers) as well as sensitive organizational information may be divulged and transactions 
altered. The key to defeating MITM attacks begins with strong authentication capabilities which ensure that the 
parties are, in fact, communicating with who they believe they are communicating with.  
This Integrative Summary has provided a description of contributions broadly in the field of Identity and Access 
Management with a focus more specifically in the area of authentication solutions and improvements in that space. 
This research is realized through a series of patent filings, which enhance the areas of user-centric and transaction-
centric authentication. These inventions further the goal of creating greater levels of confidence and trust through 
additional mechanisms, including out of band communications, expected user location and geolocation correlation. 
Each of these inventions help to ensure that the parties are who they claim to be and that transaction details have 
not been tampered with by an MITM. 
Further still, enhancements to the capabilities which support the authentication system have also been presented. 
These include a process which provides nondisruptive migration across authentication systems, a mechanism for 
securely regaining control of a mobile device for which the password has been lost and features which detect 
attempts to subvert the integrity of the underlying networking infrastructure.  
The research presented here spans a number of years during which time the threat of MITM attacks has increased, 
making this work even more relevant. Evidence of this can be seen from the fact that these patents have been cited 
by 79 other patents held by many innovative, high profile tech companies from around the world. Further, those 
patents have been cited by another 398 patents bringing the total of external works influenced to 477 at the time 
of this writing. Also, the individual works build on each other, as presented in Section 2, comprising an additional 18 
self-citations among the body of research. Figure 12: Citation Map illustrates these relationships with the IBM Corp 
nodes representing the patents that form the basis for this thesis.  
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FIGURE 12: CITATION MAP 
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However, limitations remain in this area as attackers continue to find ways to compromise the authentication 
system. Any system that relies on passwords will always run the risk that this knowledge is not exclusive and has 
been either shared or stolen. Mobile devices can be compromised with malware that intercepts authentication 
challenges and either actively intercedes or passively monitors communications. Also, despite the best technology, 
human error on the part of unsuspecting or uneducated users will be exploited by attackers.  
Future research should seek to further reduce the impact of these vulnerabilities. A focus on risk-based 
authentication and graded trust which moves beyond a simple “allow” or “deny” access determination, but which 
provides greater degrees of access based upon higher degrees of confidence is needed. Now that so many people 
carry mobile devices, which have reasonably strong embedded biometric readers, a move away from the use of 
passwords by users and toward multi-factor authentication could improve both security and usability – a rare win-
win in the security space between two objectives that are often in conflict. 
Follow-on efforts should look to improve both the accuracy and convenience of biometric systems while not 
compromising user privacy. Challenges have arisen in recent years where conflicting desires by vendors to assure 
users that their mobile devices are secure while law enforcement seeks backdoors that would allow them access. 
Technical solutions that balance these competing goals have proven difficult since a backdoor for some could prove 
to be a backdoor for all. Therefore, security researchers should also look explore areas of public policy and education 
as areas for future developments as well.  
Finally, some of the inventions comprising this research leverage SMS messaging and telephony voice calls as an out 
of band communications channel, which the MITM attacker would not have access to. However, as mobile device 
malware and surveillance software continues to develop, even these channels could be compromised by an attacker 
who has managed to establish a foothold on the device. The development of new mechanisms which are not 
vulnerable to this scenario is needed and should be the focus of future research.  
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8 LIST OF PUBLISHED WORKS 
The following list of published works contain the body of research that is the basis for this thesis. In addition, the 
results from the prior art searches conducted by outside, independent legal counsel as part of the patent filing 
process along with responses, which document the novelty of the inventions, are included. (Note: The differentiation 
comments included here are based upon adapted versions of the correspondence that was exchanged with legal 
counsel. The text has been edited down to the key points of relevance for each response, consolidating responses 
from multiple inventors, where appropriate). 
8.1 INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK 
Identity and Access Management Architecture 
• Crume, J., 2014. Identity and Access Management Architecture. In: R. O'Hanley & J. Tiller, eds. Information 
Security Management Handbook (Sixth edition, Volume 7). Boca Raton, FL, USA: CRC Press, pp. 221-238. 
Research Contribution 
This book chapter provides a holistic framework for identity and access management, which forms the basis upon 
which this work in the area of authentication is based.  
Author’s Contribution 
Jeff Crume was the sole author of this work.  
8.2 WEBSITE AUTHENTICATION PATENT 
• Bravo, J. & Crume, J., 2014. Website Authentication. USA, Patent No. 8,762,724. 
Research Contribution 
This US patent provides a greater level of assurance that a user is who they claim to be through verification of an 
OTP via an OOB communications channel.  
Author’s Contribution 
Jeff Crume and Jose Bravo collaborated on this patent. Both contributed to this work by developing and refining the 
idea, documenting the invention, defending the submission before the IBM Invention Disclosure Board, reviewing 
and providing commentary regarding similar prior art and reviewing the final patent filing.  
Differentiation response from 13 October 2008 
• US2007/0266257 A1 System and Method for Blocking Unauthorized Network Log in Using Stolen 
Password: This involves the use of browser cookies which limit its applicability to using the same browser 
for each session. The present invention does not have this limitation. Further, this approach described here 
requires the user to memorize a pre-determined secret, which is then used as the basis for the user to 
recognize the site. The present invention presents a unique, one-time password (OTP) with each log in with 
no memorization required. 
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• US2008/0181380 A1 Proxy for Authenticated Caller Name: This is limited to phone calls where the present 
invention is extensible to Web, ATM or other transactions. Also, this prior art authenticates the user to the 
system where the present invention authenticates the system to the user.  
• US 7,379,921 B1 Method and Apparatus for Providing Authentication: This involves the use of images for 
authentication. The present invention uses an OTP, which can subsequently be entered into a telephone 
keypad providing greater portability with no prior knowledge required by the user. 
• US 7,380,708, B1 Method and Apparatus for Providing Secure Document Distribution: Same as previous. 
• Sesame: Informing User Security Decisions with System Visualization (Stoll, J. et al): Same as previous. 
• Holistic VoIP Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (Nassar, M., et al): This deals with authentication 
of a voice over an IP telephony infrastructure and is focused on intrusions rather than authentication. 
• BeamAuth: Two-Factor Web Authentication with a Bookmark (Adida, B.): This deals with web 
authentication only with no out of band process and is limited to browsers with JavaScript support. The 
present invention does not have these limitations. 
• Getting Users to Pay Attention to Anti-phishing Education: Evaluation of Retention and Transfer 
(Kumaraguru, P., et al): This deals with a training methodology rather than an actual phishing detection 
mechanism as is the case with the present invention. 
8.3 MOBILE PHONE AND IP ADDRESS LOCATION CORRELATION SERVICE 
• Bravo, J. & Crume, J., 2014. Mobile Phone and IP Address Location Correlation Service. USA, Patent No. 
8.683,609. 
Research Contribution 
This US patent provides a means for detecting the presence of an MITM, who might, otherwise, be able to 
compromise the integrity of a transaction or impersonate a legitimate user.  
Author’s Contribution 
Jeff Crume and Jose Bravo collaborated on this patent. Both contributed to this work by developing and refining the 
idea, documenting the invention, defending the submission before the IBM Invention Disclosure Board, reviewing 
and providing commentary regarding similar prior art and reviewing the final patent filing. 
Differentiation response from 19 June 2009 
• US20080189776A1 Method and System for Dynamically Controlling Access to a Network: This is not 
applicable within the context of a mobile phone being used as a strong authentication factor. Further, it 
describes a system which would receive location information as input whereas the current invention 
describes a system in this information is actually derived and compared to a specified range. 
• US20080318548A1 Method of and System for Strong Authentication and defense against man-in-the-
middle attacks:  The present invention actually complements this prior art, which was developed by the 
same inventors, by allowing the correlation service to provide an indication as to location match without 
having to reveal full location details, thereby, preserving privacy.  
• WO2008147353A1 Method and system for authenticating internet user identity: This prior art does not 
deal with the context of a mobile phone used as a second factor for authentication, as the present invention 
does.  
• WO04079499A2 System and method for verifying user identity: Same comments as above 
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• US7360248 Methods and apparatus for verifying the identity of a user requesting access using location 
information: This relies on GPS, which may be inaccessible inside a building and would be a severe 
limitation. The present invention can use cell tower triangulation which, while not as precise, will work 
inside and should be exact enough for the intended purposes. 
• US7376431 Methods and apparatus for verifying the identity of a user requesting access using location 
information: This involves the use of specialized tracking devices which the present invention does not 
require. 
• US20020069165A1 Efficient and secure bill payment via mobile IP terminals: This does not leverage a 
mobile phone as a second authentication factor. Further, this invention relies on the use of a special 
localized network where all accesses must be performed. By contrast, the present invention works across 
the general purpose, public Internet. 
• US20090094682A1 Methods and systems for user authorization: This focuses on role-based 
authentication which the present invention does not deal with. 
• WO06103387A1 Location based authentication: This invention only applies to a restricted, previously 
designated workspace. The present invention can work essentially anywhere a mobile phone signal is 
available. 
• US7221949 Method and system for enhanced security using location-based wireless authentication: This 
invention requires the use of new data flows and changes to message formats. The present invention 
describes a separate service which does not interfere with the mainline data flows. 
8.4 DETECTING MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACKS USING GEOLOCATION AND VOICE RESPONSE 
TELEPHONY PROMPTS 
• Bravo, J. & Crume, J., 2014. Detecting Man-in-the-Middle Attacks in Electronic Transactions Using Prompts. 
USA, Patent No. 8,917,826. 
Research Contribution 
This US patent builds on the previous works by providing a mechanism for detecting an MITM by leveraging both an 
OTP and geolocation information.  
Author’s Contribution 
Jeff Crume and Jose Bravo collaborated on this patent. Both contributed to this work by developing and refining the 
idea, documenting the invention, defending the submission before the IBM Invention Disclosure Board, reviewing 
and providing commentary regarding similar prior art and reviewing the final patent filing. 
Differentiation response from 20 September 2011 
• GB 2 456 509 A Using a Human readable code communicated using a trusted channel to verify that a 
distributed public key was issued by the party who claims to have issued it: This invention involves 
verification of public keys and does not utilize either mobile or land line telephony. 
• DoubleCheck: Multi-path Verification Against Man-in-the-Middle Attacks (Alicherry, M., et al): This does 
not use telephony but rather involves certificate retrieval for verification. 
• US 2009/0300738 A1 Authentication Methods and Systems: This requires an app be downloaded to the 
mobile device in order to perform cryptographic functions, which the present invention does not require. 
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• VoIP Interception in P2P SIP Environment (Kooi, T., et al): This paper demonstrates how interception can 
happen in voice over IP telephony but does not present a strong authentication solution as of the type 
described in the present invention. 
• Depress Phishing by CAPTCHA with OTP (Leung, C., et al): This paper refers to the use of both CAPTCHAs 
and One Time Passwords, neither of which are leveraged by the present invention.  
• US 2007/0067828 A1 Extended One-Time Password and Apparatus: The present invention is not 
dependent upon OTPs as this one is. 
• US 2007/0136573 A1 System and method of using two or more multi-factor authentication mechanisms 
to authenticate online parties: The present invention is not dependent upon OTPs as this one is.  
• US 2007/0266257 A1 System and method for blocking unauthorized network log in using stolen 
password: This work provides a means for a user to determine if a web site is authentic. The present 
invention does the reverse.  
• US 2009/0106138 A1 Transaction authentication over independent network: The present invention is not 
dependent upon OTPs as this one is. 
• US 2010/0269162 A1 Website Authentication: This present invention builds on this one by the same 
inventors by providing greater assurance that the user is who they claim to be (rather than the reverse). 
• US 2011/0154459 A1 Method and system for securing electronic transaction: This invention involves 
storing credentials in a vault, which the present invention does not use.  
• US 2011/0197070 A1 System and method for in- and out-of-band multi-factor server-to-user 
authentication: This invention uses a random subset of predefined locations in the server path, which the 
present invention does not focus on. 
• US 7,840,993 B2 Protecting one-time-passwords against man-in-the-middle attacks: This invention uses 
cryptographic techniques to secure an OTP. The present invention involves neither technology.  
• Voice Interactive Personalized Security (VoIPSEC) protocol (Kopsidas, S., et al): This paper describes a 
system which leverages biometrics, which are not part of the present invention. 
8.5 EXPECTED LOCATION-BASED ACCESS CONTROL 
• Bravo, J. & Crume, J., 2018. Expected Location-based Access Control. USA, Patent No. 10,027,770. 
Research Contribution 
This US patent provides a means for greater confidence in the authentication process by verifying that a user is who 
they claim to be by ensuring that they are where they expected to be from a geolocation perspective.  
Author’s Contribution 
Jeff Crume and Jose Bravo collaborated on this patent. Both contributed to this work by developing and refining the 
idea, documenting the invention, defending the submission before the IBM Invention Disclosure Board, reviewing 
and providing commentary regarding similar prior art and reviewing the final patent filing. 
Differentiation response from 5 November 2013 
• US 2013/0109351 Authentication system, authentication method and authentication server: This 
invention is designed for use with ATMs which have a known, fixed location and not with end users who 
may be mobile.  
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• US 7,747,645 B2 System and Method for calendar-based anomalous access detection: This invention relies 
only on calendar entries as the source for expected user location. The present invention is written more 
broadly to include other sources. One important source includes a user's travel itineraries from a travel 
agent or provider. The present invention also extends to include work schedules (e.g. for shift workers) and 
vacation schedules.  
• US 2013/0055370 A1 Security for Future Logon Location: This work relies on past logins to predict where 
a user might log in next. It also considers the distance between the current login location and the previous 
one to determine if the user could, in fact, have traveled that distance in the time that elapsed between 
the two. The present invention uses network information only to determine current location -- not previous 
or future.  
8.6 VERIFICATION OF TRANSACTIONAL INTEGRITY 
• Bravo, J. & Crume, J., 2014. Verification of Transactional Integrity. USA, Patent No. 8,838,988. 
Research Contribution 
This US patent provides a means for ensuring that transaction details have not been tampered with by an MITM. It 
does this by speaking these details to the user via a phone call to a designated number.  
Author’s Contribution 
Jeff Crume and Jose Bravo collaborated on this patent. Both contributed to this work by developing and refining the 
idea, documenting the invention, defending the submission before the IBM Invention Disclosure Board, reviewing 
and providing commentary regarding similar prior art and reviewing the final patent filing. 
Differentiation response from 15 Dec 2010 
• US 2008/027301 A1 Mobile Payment System and Method: This involves having the user call the service 
provider first to initiate the transaction with the mobile device used for verification. The present invention 
does essentially the reverse where the transaction is initiated online (via web browser, ATM or mobile 
device) and a voice call is used to confirm the integrity of the transaction. 
• US 2008/0318548 A1 Method of and System for Strong Authentication and Defense Against Man-in-the-
Middle Attacks: The present invention builds on this prior art from the same inventors and could be used 
together to improve security. The prior invention is focused on authenticating the user via geo location 
matching of the mobile device and the IP address whereas the present invention deals with details of the 
actual transaction. 
• US 2010/0051686 A1 System and Method for Authenticating a Transaction Using a One-Time Pass Code: 
This involves authenticating the user via a one-time passcode generated by the mobile device. The present 
invention verifies transaction details after authentication has already occurred and does not rely on a one-
time passcode and can, therefore, work with any telephony device – not just a smart phone. 
• US 7,357,310 B2 Mobile Phone Charge Card Notification and Authorization: This does involve verifying 
transaction details but does it through entering a one-time passcode on the mobile device. The present 
invention uses an out of band phone call where transaction details are read audibly to the user for 
verification. 
• US 7,447,494 B2 Secure Wireless Authorization System: Essentially the same distinction as the previous 
invention. 
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• US 7,600,676 B1 Two Factor Authentications for Financial Transactions: Also similar to the two previous 
inventions but focused on authentication while the present invention deals with verification of transaction 
integrity. Further, this prior art relies on SMS messaging, which can be spoofed.  
8.7 VERIFICATION OF TRANSACTIONAL INTEGRITY AND AUTHENTICATION WITH QR CODES 
• Bravo, J. & Crume, J., 2017. Verifying Online Transaction Integrity and Authentication with QR Codes. USA, 
Patent No. US 10,169,759 B2. 
Research Contribution 
This US patent builds on the previous work and adds QR codes as a means to transmit transaction details.  
Author’s Contribution 
Jeff Crume and Jose Bravo collaborated on this patent. Both contributed to this work by developing and refining the 
idea, documenting the invention, defending the submission before the IBM Invention Disclosure Board, reviewing 
and providing commentary regarding similar prior art and reviewing the final patent filing. 
Differentiation response from 22 May 2015 
• US 2013/0086650 Communication System Including Optical Recognition and Method of Using Same: This 
involves a communication system which could be used to pass calls from one device to another. It is not 
designed to deal with security threats or to verify the integrity of transactions.  
• US 2015/0099758 Authenticating Users to ATMs and Other Secure Machines for Cardless Transactions: 
This invention is limited to authenticating a user to the system. It does not deal with attacks on the integrity 
of subsequent transaction details.  
• JP2008152737A Service Provision Server, Authentication Server and Authentication System: This 
invention is limited to authenticating a user to the system. It does not deal with attacks on the integrity of 
subsequent transaction details.  
• WO 2014/122614 A2 A Secure User Interaction Method Performing Defined Actions no Web Resources 
over a Separate Channel and a System Thereof: This invention is limited to authenticating a user to the 
system and authorizing the display of content. It does not deal with attacks on the integrity of subsequent 
transaction details.  
• WO 2015/014383 A1 Access network selection and connection methods, devices, and computer 
programs: This invention deals specifically with granting access to a network. It does not deal with attacks 
on the integrity of subsequent transaction details. 
8.8 DETECTING AND DEFENDING AGAINST MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACKS  
• Crume, J., 2013. Detecting and Defending Against Man-in-the-Middle Attacks. USA, Patent No. 8,533,821. 
• Crume, J., 2013. Detecting and Defending Against Man-in-the-Middle Attacks. USA, Patent No. 8,522,349. 
Research Contribution 
These US patents provide a means for detecting a large scale MITM attack by monitoring login patterns based upon 
incoming IP addresses and past user behaviors. 
Author’s Contribution 
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Jeff Crume and Jose Bravo collaborated on this patent. Both contributed to this work by developing and refining the 
idea, documenting the invention, defending the submission before the IBM Invention Disclosure Board, reviewing 
and providing commentary regarding similar prior art and reviewing the final patent filing. 
Differentiation response from 8 January 2007 
• US 7,028,179: This prior art assumes that a DDoS attack has already been recognized and addresses only 
mitigation.  The present invention deals more with phishing rather than DDoS and provides a means for 
recognition of the attack. 
• US 7,058,796: This is like the previous work in that it assumes the attack has already been detected.  
Further, this invention focuses on wireless LANs rather than phishing. 
• US 2005/0022020: This requires that the client system be loaded with software, which will communicate 
with the server to authenticate.  The present invention requires no client-side modifications, which is to be 
expected in phishing attacks. 
• US 2005/0075070: This deals with wireless networking and depends upon the ability to detect anomalies 
in the signal based upon intrusion activities.  In the case of phishing attacks, no such assumptions can be 
made with regards to the underlying networking environment since they traverse the global Internet, 
therefore, the present invention makes no such assumptions. 
• DE10317178A1: This invention deals specifically with wireless GSM networks and would not be suitable for 
phishing attacks. 
• Defending Against Redirect Attacks in Mobile IP (Deng, R, et al): This work deals specifically with IPv6 
routing. 
• A Resilient Packet-Forwarding Scheme against Maliciously Packet-Dropping Nodes in Sensor Networks 
(Lee, S., Choi, Y.): This deals specifically with routing as well and would require that all nodes in the path 
participate in the scheme -- an unreasonable requirement in consumer-based phishing defense. 
• Strengthening EPC Tags Against Cloning (Juels, A.): This deals specifically with and is limited to RFID attacks. 
• Real attacks on virtual networks: Vivaldi out of tune (Kaafar, M., et al): This is not focused on MITM attacks 
as the subject is mentioned only in the paper and no formal defense mechanism is outlined. 
8.9 DETECTING THE PRESENCE OF ROGUE DOMAIN NAME SERVICE PROVIDERS 
• Crume, J., 2015. System for Detecting the Presence of Rogue Domain Name Service Providers through 
Passive Monitoring. USA, Patent No. 9,225,731. 
• Crume, J., 2016. System zum Erfassen des Vorhandenseins eines bösartigen Domain-Name-Service-Providers 
durch passive Überwachung. Germany, Patent No. DE 10 2013 208 923 B4. 
• Crume, J., 2017. System for Detecting the Presence of Rogue Domain Name Service Providers through 
Passive Monitoring. USA, Patent No. 9,648,033. 
 
Research Contribution 
These patents issued in both the US and Germany provide a means for detecting rogue DNS providers, which might, 
otherwise, misdirect users to an attacker’s website rather than the one intended.  
Author’s Contribution 
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Jeff Crume was the sole inventor of this work. He developed and refined the idea, documented the invention, 
defended the submission before the IBM Invention Disclosure Board, reviewed and provided commentary regarding 
similar prior art and reviewed the final patent filing. 
Differentiation response from 22 December 2011 
• Real-Time Detection of Fast Flux Service Networks (Cagalayan, A., et al): This paper describes a method 
that narrowly focuses on fast flux DNS switching. The present invention is more general for any sort of DNS 
spoofing. Also, the technique described here is based upon behavior analysis over time while the present 
invention makes a determination based a comparison of DNS resolutions to a known, trusted set of 
addresses. 
• Corrupted DNS Resolution Paths (Dagon, D.): This presentation is a survey and analysis of certain DNS 
attacks. It does not describe an invention for preventing them. 
• A Measurement Based Rogue AP Detection Scheme (Han, H., et al): This paper describes a technique for 
detecting rogue access points -- not rogue DNS servers. It uses timing differences in network flows (including 
DNS services) to make its determination but the focus is on APs and no list of known good DNS resolutions 
is used (which is the basis of the present invention). 
• A Timing-Based Scheme for Rogue AP Detection (Han, H., et al): This is a publication of the same technique 
from the same authors described in the previous prior art listing. 
• US 7,756,933 B2 System and Method for Deterring Rogue Users from Attacking Protected Legitimate 
Servers: This involves identifying a set of protected users and then creating a set of decoys (called "traps" 
in the disclosure) to detected attacks. It does not focus on DNS or use a list of known DNS resolutions as 
the present invention does. 
• US 2006/0176822 A1 Method, System, Service and Computer Program for Identifying Incorrect Domain 
Name to Internet Protocol (IP) Address Mappings: This involves a system which actively polls various DNS 
servers and compares their results looking for errors. The present invention involves passive monitoring, 
which is more difficult for an attacker to detect. 
• US 2006/0253612 A1 Method and Apparatus for Detecting Responses to Network Queries: Like the 
previous invention, this one involves active polling of DNS servers rather than passive monitoring. 
• US 2008/0060054 A1 Method and System for DNS-based Anti-Pharming: This relies on user input to 
generate a DNS request which is then sent to multiple DNSs and the results compared. The present 
invention does not require user input and does not generate DNS requests. 
• US 2009/0327487 A1 Method and System for Discovering DNS Resolvers: This involves active polling of 
hosts to determine if they will respond to DNS resolution requests. The present invention involves passive 
monitoring. 
• US 2010/0031362 A1 System and Method for Identification and Blocking of Malicious Use of Servers: This 
is imbedded in a network client and involves comparing the currently assigned DNS server to ones used 
previously by that client and further tests the DNS through active polling and a comparison of the timing of 
responses from previous DNSs. The present invention typically would reside outside of a client and does 
not generate DNS requests as this one does. 
• US 2010/0262688 A1 Systems, Methods, and Devices for Detecting Security Vulnerabilities in IP 
Networks: This invention utilizes a fingerprinting technique to compare whether hosts have been tampered 
with along with some active polling techniques. 
• US 2010/0291943 A1 Method and Apparatus for Pooling Network Resources: This invention involves a 
technique for pooling network resources. It is not focused on detecting rogue DNS servers. 
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• US 2011/0106919 A1 Automated DNS Configuration with Local DNS Server: This invention involves a 
technique for automating DNS configuration using a DHCP server. It is not focused on detecting rogue DNS 
servers. 
• US 2011/0191455 A1 Using Aggregated DNS Information Originating from Multiple Sources to Detect 
Anomalous DNS Name Resolutions: This invention is similar to others described above where results from 
various DNS servers are compared in order to identify discrepancies. It does not use a list of known 
resolutions as the present invention does. 
• US 2011/0231931 A1 Method and Device for Preventing Domain Name System Spoofing: This involves 
active polling of DNS servers while the present uses passive monitoring. 
8.10 MIGRATION ACROSS AUTHENTICATION SYSTEMS 
• Crume, J., 2010. Migration Across Authentication Systems. USA, Patent No. US2010/0269151A1. 
Research Contribution 
This US patent filing provides a means for nondisruptive migration of users from one authentication system to 
another.  
Author’s Contribution 
Jeff Crume was the sole inventor of this work. He developed and refined the idea, documented the invention, 
defended the submission before the IBM Invention Disclosure Board, reviewed and provided commentary regarding 
similar prior art and reviewed the final patent filing. 
Differentiation response from 3 Dec 2008 
• Adaptive Resource Sharing in a Web Services Environment (Naik, V.): This paper describes a middleware 
architecture that deals with sharing resources based upon workloads and doesn't appear to have anything 
to do with security. 
• US 7,185,359 B2 Authentication and Authorization Across Autonomous Network Systems: This patent 
deals with how to trust the authentication done on a different system -- not how to migrate userids. 
• Harmony: A Desktop Grid for Delivering Enterprise Computations (Naik, V.): This paper describes a grid 
infrastructure designed to deal with user privacy and responsiveness and is not applicable to migrating 
userids. 
• US 2008/0109448 A1 System and Method for Managing Data Across Multiple Environments: This deals 
with data management across various systems. The portion that deals with authentication is focused 
exclusively on eliminating the need for the user to keep track of multiple userids but does not deal with 
migrating userids. 
• US 2008/0046434 A1 Centralized Management of Technical Records Across an Enterprise: This invention 
deals with controlling access to records across multiple system rather than migrating userids. 
• US 2008/0028205 A1 Method and Apparatus for Authenticating a User: This deals with using multimedia 
data as a means to authenticate a user -- not migrating userids. 
• US 2007/0083917 A1 Apparatus System and Method for Real-Time Migration of Data Related to 
Authentication: The present invention has some novel features that this invention does not include. One is 
the presence of an optional migration file which lists which users are to be migrated. This allows for far 
more control over the migration process by providing a means for a phased migration. This way the 
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organization can choose to migrate any sized subset of the user base which avoids two very important risks: 
1) if there is a failure in the migration process, the impact is minimized to a chosen set of users and 2) the 
additional processing overhead of the migration process can be spread out over time rather than incurred 
all at once when all users log in (say, first thing on a Monday morning). In addition, the present invention 
explicitly deals with the migration of the password expiry interval which: 1) saves users from having to 
create a new password during the migration process (effectively having to log in twice) and 2) avoids the 
potential of an unintended lengthening of the password expiry (since the new system would see the 
password as being new and, therefore, resetting the expiry clock). 
• At the Forge (Lerner, R.): This article deals with authentication using the OpenID standard and not migrating 
userids. 
8.11 MOBILE DEVICE RESET 
• Bravo, J., Crume, J. & Hinds, N., 2015. Mobile Device Reset. USA, Patent No. 9,078,135. 
• Bravo, J., Crume, J. & Hinds, N., 2015. Mobile Device Password Reset. USA, Patent No. 9,088,896. 
Research Contribution 
These US patents provide a means for securely regaining control of a mobile device for which the password has been 
lost. Given the increasing importance of mobile devices as an authenticator, such a capability is important in 
supporting the authentication system. 
Author’s Contribution 
Jeff Crume, Nigel Hinds and Jose Bravo collaborated on this patent. Both contributed to this work by developing and 
refining the idea, documenting the invention, defending the submission before the IBM Invention Disclosure Board, 
reviewing and providing commentary regarding similar prior art and reviewing the final patent filing. 
Differentiation response from 21 June 2013 
• IPCOM000224591D Automatic Mobile Phone Unlock Beyond a Predetermined Call Duration Threshold 
of a Trusted Call: This is a convenience mechanism for the case when the user is being called from a 
known/trusted phone number, however, as an access recovery mechanism it does not address the 
possibility where caller-ID has been compromised. Further, the user is not required to set a new passcode. 
The present invention, however, extends this notion to a more secure means of recovering a mobile 
device with a lost passcode. For example, the mobile device will disconnect the call originated by the 
trusted phone and call back with a random one-time PIN. The PIN must be entered on the mobile device 
within a predetermined period. Once the mobile device is unlocked the user is forced into a passcode 
reset process. This mechanism can also be combined with a lock-out mechanism, so after a certain 
number of failed logins, the device can only be unlocked using the disclosed method.  
• US20110159844A1 Method and apparatus for user interaction while device is locked: This is another 
convenience mechanism to allow access to an otherwise locked mobile device. It includes methods to 
authenticate the current device user to the device owner, who is remote, or a third party. This invention 
initiates the process from the mobile device and requires another party to grant access. In the present 
invention the owner authenticates him/herself to the mobile device by using a second phone to which 
only the owner has physical access (trusted phone number).  
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1. 
WEBSITE AUTHENTICATION 
This application is a continuation application of co-pend 
ing U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/423,928, filed on Apr. 
15, 2009, which is hereby incorporated herein. 
FIELD OF THE INVENTION 
The present invention relates generally to website authen 
tication, and more particularly to website authentication 
using a one time password and a voice response unit. 
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
Computers and other devices, as well as secure facilities, 
services and financial accounts, often contain proprietary, 
personal and/or sensitive information, which could be com 
promised if accessed by unauthorized individuals. Thus such 
devices, facilities, services and accounts (hereinafter 
“restricted items) often incorporate security techniques, 
Such as database access control mechanisms, to prevent unau 
thorized users from accessing, obtaining, or altering the pro 
prietary, personal and/or sensitive information. Authentica 
tion techniques allow users to prove their identity and obtain 
authorized access to a given restricted item. 
In a phishing attack, a user is tricked into providing login 
credentials and/or sensitive information by an attacker imper 
Sonating an authentic website. The reason the attack Succeeds 
is that the user is unable to determine whether the website is 
authentic or fake. Most existing defenses require the user to 
discern an authentic from fake website based upon the overall 
appearance of the website, a specially chosen website authen 
tication image, or verification of the website's digital certifi 
cation. Appearances may be imitated by the attacker or over 
looked by the user. 
Website authentication, either in addition to or as an alter 
native to appearance based defenses against phishing attacks, 
improves security for both users and the entities that utilize 
websites in communicating with users. 
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
The present invention provides a method, system and pro 
gram product to improve website authentication. In particu 
lar, the present invention allows users to authenticate the 
website that they are visiting. 
In a first aspect, the invention provides a method for web 
site authentication, using at least one computer hardware 
device for performing the steps of receiving a request from a 
user to view a website within a graphical user interface (GUI); 
generating a one time password (OTP); storing the generated 
OTP in a database; displaying the generated OTP on the GUI: 
Verifying an identity of the userby receiving an identification 
datum from a communication device; receiving an entered 
OTP from the user; comparing the entered OTP with the 
generated OTP; and communicating whether the website is 
authenticated. 
In a second aspect, the invention provides a website 
authentication system, including a computer hardware device 
comprising: a one time password (OTP) generator system for 
generating a OTP; a voice response unit (VRU) system for 
receiving at least one identification datum from a communi 
cation device; a user verification system for verifying an 
identity of the user by receiving an identification datum from 
the communication device; a comparison system for receiv 
ing an entered OTP from the user and comparing the entered 
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OTP with the generated OTP; and a security alert system for 
communicating whether the website is authenticated. 
In a third aspect, the invention provides a computer read 
able medium storing a program product for website authen 
tication, comprising: program code for receiving a request 
from a user to view a website within a graphical user interface 
(GUI); program code for generating a one time password 
(OTP); program code for storing the generated OTP in a 
database; program code for displaying the generated OTP on 
the GUI; program code for verifying an identity of the user by 
receiving an identification datum from a communication 
device; program code for receiving an entered OTP from the 
user; program code for comparing the entered OTP with the 
generated OTP; and program code for communicating 
whether the website is authenticated. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
The above and other objects, features and advantages of the 
invention will be better understood by reading the following 
more particular description of the invention in conjunction 
with the accompanying drawings. 
FIG.1 depicts one embodiment of a website authentication 
system in accordance with this invention. 
FIG. 2 is a flow chart of one embodiment of the main steps 
for website authentication in accordance with this invention. 
The drawings are not necessarily to scale. The drawings are 
merely schematic representations, not intended to portray 
specific parameters of the invention. The drawings are 
intended to depict only typical embodiments of the invention, 
and therefore should not be considered as limiting the scope 
of the invention. In the drawings, like numbering represents 
like elements. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION 
FIG. 1 shows an illustrative embodiment of the invention in 
which a computer system 10 having a web server 40 provides 
web pages to a user 16 via a graphical user interface (GUI)32. 
In addition to web server 40, a website authentication system 
20 is also provided to allow user 16 to authenticate content 
allegedly being served from web server 40. Website authen 
tication system 20, as well as web server 40, may be imple 
mented as a Software program product that can be stored in 
memory 18 and be executed on any type of computer system 
10. A person skilled in the art will recognize that the invention 
may be implemented on one or more computer systems and 
this disclosure is not intended to limit such potential embodi 
ments. In this illustrative embodiment, website authentica 
tion system 20 includes a one time password (OTP) generator 
system 22; a voice response unit (VRU) system 24; a user 
Verification system 26; a comparison system 28; and a secu 
rity alert system 38. 
In operation, website authentication system 20 receives a 
request from the user 16 to view a website on the GUI 32. An 
input/output (I/O) system 14 is provided on the computer 
system 10 for communications with the user 16 via GUI 32 
and/or a communication device 34. Communication device 
34 may be implemented using any type of communication 
device including, for example, a telephone, a cell phone, a 
personal digital assistant (PDA) and a radio. GUI 32 may be 
implemented using any type of device or Software that per 
mits website access including, for example, a browser, a 
desktop computer, a laptop computer, a PDA, a cell phone. 
GUI 32 and communication device 34 may reside on different 
devices or the same device. 
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OTP generator system 22 generates a one time password 
(OTP) when the user 16 attempts to view the website. The 
generated OTP may include at least one number, letter, and 
other symbol. In one embodiment of the invention, the gen 
erated OTP is limited to numeric digits for easy phone keypad 
entry. The generated OTP is stored in a database 30 and 
displayed on the GUI 32. 
Once displayed, user 16 reads the generated OTP from the 
GUI 32 which can then be used to authenticate the website via 
the communication device 34. As used herein “reads' means 
accesses the generated OTP by visual, audio, tactile or any 
other communication method between GUI 32 and user 16. 
At some point after the OTP is generated, voice response 
unit system (VRU) 24 receives a communication, e.g., a tele 
phone call, from user 16 by communication device 34. In one 
embodiment, a VRU phone number is previously communi 
cated to user 16 through a communication channel other than 
the website thereby preventing the phishing attack from post 
ing a fake VRU phone number. VRU 24 may receive an 
identification datum from the communication device 34. The 
identification datum may include an identification datum 
automatically generated by the communication device or an 
identification datum input by the user 16. The identification 
datum may include a caller ID, an account number, a pass 
word or a first geographical location. VRU may prompt user 
16 to enter identification datum over the communication 
device 34, e.g., via a key pad, by speaking, etc. 
User verification system 26 can verify an identity of the 
user 16 in a number of ways. In one approach, user verifica 
tion system 26 may verify the user 16 by comparing at least 
one identification datum with a previously stored identifica 
tion datum in the database. User verification system 26 may 
determine a second geographical location by detecting the 
location of the GUI32 where the request from the user to view 
the website was made and then store the second geographical 
location in the database 30. In another approach, user verifi 
cation system 26 may verify the user 16 by comparing the first 
geographical location with the second geographical location. 
If user's 16 identity cannot be verified, user verification sys 
tem 26 notifies voice response unit 24 to terminate the com 
munication and notifies the security alert system38 of a failed 
user verification attempt. 
Ifuser's 16 identity is verified, user 16 enters the OTP that 
user reads from the GUI 32. Comparison system 28 receives 
the entered OTP from the user 16. Comparison system 28 
compares the entered OTP with the generated OTP in the 
database 30. 
If the entered OTP matches the generated OTP, then web 
site authentication system 20 communicates to the user 16 
that the website being viewed by the user 16 is authentic. If 
the entered OTP does not match the generated OTP, then 
website authentication system 20 communicates to the user 
16 via the communication device 34 that the website being 
viewed by the user is fake. In one embodiment, if the entered 
OTP does not match the generated OTP comparison system 
notifies the security alert system 38 that a fake website has 
been detected. 
In one embodiment if a fake website is detected, security 
alert system 38 may store the fake website in the database 30. 
Storing the fake website may include storing information 
about the fake website including the website address of the 
fake website and html coding of the fake website. Security 
alert system 38 may notify an authentic website administrator 
of the report of the fake website. 
Referring now to FIG. 2, one embodiment of the process of 
website authentication as defined by the present invention is 
described. The process starts at S1 when user 16 clicks on a 
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link in an email. Email is a common method for disseminating 
fake websites for purposes of deceiving users 16 into convey 
ing proprietary, personal and/or secure information. Clicking 
a link in an email is illustrative, the teachings of the invention 
apply to any means of a user 16 accessing a website. 
After the website is accessed, at S2 an OTP is generated 
and displayed on a GUI 32. Both an authentic website and a 
fake website could generate an OTP and display the OTP on 
a GUI32. At S3 the generated OTP is stored in a database 30. 
If at S4 an OTP is not displayed on a user's GUI 32 then at S5 
a fake website has been detected by the user 16. If at S4 an 
OTP is displayed, then at S6 user 16 telephones the VRU 24. 
At S7 VRU 24 receives a first identification datum. First 
identification datum may be an identification datum auto 
matically generated by the communication device 34. At S8, 
user identity is verified by comparing the first identification 
datum with known information in the database 30. If at S8 the 
user 16 is identified, then at S11 the user 16 will enter the OTP 
displayed on the GUI 32. If at S8 the user 16 is not identified, 
then at S9 the user 16 may be prompted for the second iden 
tification datum. Second identification datum may include, 
for example, an account number, a password, a personal iden 
tification number, date of birth, Social Security number or any 
number of identification data that would be previously stored 
in the database 30. If at S10 the second identification datum 
matches information in the user database, then user is identi 
fied. If at S10 the second identification datum does not match 
information in the user database, then user 16 is not identified. 
Second identification datum may include the first geographi 
cal location from where the call is being initiated. The second 
geographical location from the GUI 32 where the website was 
accessed may be detected and stored in the database 30. If at 
S10 the first geographical location matches the second geo 
graphical location, then user 16 is identified. If at S10 the first 
geographical location does not match the second geographi 
cal location, then user 16 is not identified. A person skilled in 
the art will readily recognize that any number of methods for 
verifying the identity of the user 16 may be used. A person 
skilled in the art will also recognize that the number of steps 
of verifying user identity could be added or subtracted 
depending upon the level of Security desired. 
At S11, after user 16 is identified, user 16 enters the OTP 
that is displayed on the website being accessed. The entered 
OTP is compared with the generated OTP in the database S12. 
If the entered OTP matches the generated OTP then the web 
site is authenticated S13. If the entered OTP does not match 
the generated OTP then a fake website is detected S5. 
Referring again to FIG. 1, a person skilled in the art will 
readily recognize that in the event of website authentication 
any number of communications could be generated to the user 
through the website on the GUI 32 or communication device 
34. In the event of a fake website being detected, any type of 
communication or warning could be generated to the user on 
the communication device 34 (as the website being viewed by 
the user 16 would be a fake website). Once the user 16 
received such a communication, the user 16 could immedi 
ately terminate interaction with the website. 
I/O 14 may comprise any system for exchanging informa 
tion to/from an external resource. External devices/resources 
may comprise any known type of external device, including a 
monitor/display, speakers, storage, another computer system, 
a hand-held device, keyboard, mouse, voice recognition sys 
tem, speech output system, printer, facsimile, pager, etc. Bus 
36 provides a communication link between each of the com 
ponents in the computer system 10 and likewise may com 
prise any known type of transmission link, including electri 
cal, optical, wireless, etc. Although not shown, additional 
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components, such as cache memory, communication sys 
tems, system Software, etc., may be incorporated into com 
puter system 10. 
Access to computer system 10 may be provided over a 
network such as the Internet, a local area network (LAN), a 
wide area network (WAN), a virtual private network (VPN), 
etc. Communication could occur via a direct hardwired con 
nection (e.g., serial port), or via an addressable connection 
that may utilize any combination of wireline and/or wireless 
transmission methods. Moreover, conventional network con 
nectivity, such as Token Ring, Ethernet, WiFi or other con 
ventional communications standards could be used. Still yet, 
connectivity could be provided by conventional TCP/IP sock 
ets-based protocol. In this instance, an Internet service pro 
vider could be used to establish interconnectivity. Further, as 
indicated above, communication could occur in a client 
server or server-server environment. 
It should be appreciated that the teachings of the present 
invention could be offered as a business method on a sub 
Scription or fee basis. For example, a computer system 10 
comprising a website authentication system 20 could be cre 
ated, maintained and/or deployed by a service provider that 
offers the functions described herein for customers. 
It is understood that in addition to being implemented as a 
system and method, the features may be provided as a pro 
gram product stored on a computer-readable medium, which 
when executed, enables computer system 10 to provide a 
website authentication system 20. To this extent, the com 
puter-readable medium may include program code, which 
implements the processes and systems described herein. It is 
understood that the term “computer-readable medium' com 
prises one or more of any type of physical embodiment of the 
program code. In particular, the computer-readable medium 
can comprise program code embodied on one or more por 
table storage articles of manufacture (e.g., a compact disc, a 
magnetic disk, a tape, etc.), on one or more data storage 
portions of a computing device, such as memory 18 and/or a 
Storage System. 
As used herein, it is understood that the terms “program 
code' and “computer program code' are synonymous and 
mean any expression, in any language, code or notation, of a 
set of instructions that cause a computing device having an 
information processing capability to perform a particular 
function either directly or after any combination of the fol 
lowing: (a) conversion to another language, code or notation; 
(b) reproduction in a different material form; and/or (c) 
decompression. To this extent, program code can be embod 
ied as one or more types of program products, such as an 
application/software program, component software/a library 
of functions, an operating system, a basic I/O System/driver 
for a particular computing and/or I/O device, and the like. 
Further, it is understood that terms such as “component” and 
“system” are synonymous as used herein and represent any 
combination of hardware and/or software capable of per 
forming some function(s). 
The block diagrams in the figures illustrate the architec 
ture, functionality, and operation of possible implementations 
of systems, methods and computer readable medium accord 
ing to various embodiments of the present invention. In this 
regard, each block in the block diagrams may represent a 
module, segment, or portion of code, which comprises one or 
more executable instructions for implementing the specified 
logical function(s). It should also be noted that the functions 
noted in the blocks may occur out of the order noted in the 
figures. For example, two blocks shown in Succession may, in 
fact, be executed substantially concurrently, or the blocks 
may sometimes be executed in the reverse order, depending 
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upon the functionality involved. It will also be noted that each 
block of the block diagrams can be implemented by special 
purpose hardware-based systems which perform the specified 
functions or acts, or combinations of special purpose hard 
ware and computer instructions. 
As used herein, an element or step recited in the singular 
and proceeded with the word “a” or “an' should be under 
stood as not excluding plural elements or steps, unless Such 
exclusion is explicitly stated. Furthermore, references to “one 
embodiment of the present invention are not intended to be 
interpreted as excluding the existence of additional embodi 
ments that also incorporate the recited features. Moreover, 
unless explicitly stated to the contrary, embodiments "com 
prising or “having an element or a plurality of elements 
having a particular property may include additional Such 
elements not having that property. 
Although specific embodiments have been illustrated and 
described herein, those of ordinary skill in the art appreciate 
that any arrangement which is calculated to achieve the same 
purpose may be substituted for the specific embodiments 
shown and that the invention has other applications in other 
environments. This application is intended to cover any adap 
tations or variations of the present invention. The following 
claims are in no way intended to limit the scope of the inven 
tion to the specific embodiments described herein. 
What is claimed is: 
1. A method for website authentication, using at least one 
computer hardware device for performing the steps of 
receiving a request from a user to view a website within a 
graphical user interface (GUI); 
generating, in response to the receiving a request, a one 
time password (OTP); 
storing the generated OTP in a database; 
displaying the generated OTP on the GUI over a first chan 
nel; 
communicating a number for the user to call on a commu 
nication device over a second channel; 
verifying an identity of the user by receiving an identifica 
tion datum from the communication device, wherein the 
user sends, in response to the displaying, the identifica 
tion datum using the communication device, wherein the 
Verifying compares the identification datum with a 
stored identification datum in the database, wherein the 
identification datum is at least one of a caller ID, an 
account number, a password and a first geographical 
location; 
determining a second geographical location from the 
request from the user to view the website and storing the 
second geographical location in the database; 
receiving, in response to the verifying, an entered OTP 
from the user; 
comparing the entered OTP with the generated OTP; and 
communicating whether the website is authenticated. 
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the identification datum 
includes at least one of an identification datum automatically 
generated by the communication device and an identification 
datum input by the user. 
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the communicating 
includes at least one of storing a fake website in the database 
and alerting an authentic website administrator of the fake 
website. 
4. A website authentication system, including a computer 
hardware device comprising: 
a one time password (OTP) generator system for receiving 
a request from a user to view a website within a graphical 
user interface (GUI), generating, in response to the 
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receiving a request, a OTP and displaying the generated 
OTP on the GUI over a first channel; 
a system for communicating a number for the user to call 
on a communication device over a second channel; 
a voice response unit (VRU) system for receiving at least 
one identification datum from a communication device, 
wherein the user sends, in response to the displaying, the 
identification datum using the communication device; 
a user verification system for verifying an identity of the 
user by receiving an identification datum from the com 
munication device, wherein the identification datum 
includes at least one of an identification datum automati 
cally generated by the communication device and an 
identification datum input by the user, wherein the iden 
tification datum is at least one of a caller ID, an account 
number, a password and a first geographical location, 
and wherein the OTP generator system determines a 
second geographical location from the request from the 
user to view the website and storing the second geo 
graphical location in the database; 
a comparison system for receiving, in response to the veri 
fying, an entered OTP from the user and comparing the 
entered OTP with the generated OTP; and 
a security alert System for communicating whether the 
website is authenticated. 
5. The system of claim 4, wherein the comparison system 
communicates whether the website is authenticated. 
6. The system of claim 4, wherein the OTP generator sys 
tem stores the generated OTP in a database. 
7. The system of claim 4, wherein the verification system 
compares the identification datum with a stored identification 
datum in the database. 
8. The system of claim 4, wherein the communicating 
includes at least one of storing a fake website in the database 
and alerting an authentic website administrator of the fake 
website. 
5 
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9. A non-transitory computer readable medium storing a 
program product including program code for website authen 
tication, which when executed by a computing device, is 
operable to carry out a method comprising: 
receiving a request from a user to view a website within a 
graphical user interface (GUI); 
generating, in response to the receiving a request, a one 
time password (OTP); 
storing the generated OTP in a database; 
displaying the generated OTP on the GUI over a first chan 
nel; 
communicating a number for the user to call on a commu 
nication device over a second channel; 
verifying an identity of the user by receiving an identifica 
tion datum from a communication device, wherein the 
user sends, in response to the displaying, the identifica 
tion datum using the communication device, wherein the 
Verifying compares the identification datum with a 
stored identification datum in the database, wherein the 
identification datum is at least one of a caller ID, an 
account number, a password and a first geographical 
location; 
determining a second geographical location from the 
request from the user to view the website: 
receiving, in response to the verifying, an entered OTP 
from the user; 
comparing the entered OTP with the generated OTP; and 
communicating whether the website is authenticated. 
10. The program product of claim 9, wherein the identifi 
cation datum includes at least one of an identification datum 
automatically generated by the communication device and an 
identification datum input by the user. 
k k k k k 
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1. 
MOBILE PHONE AND PADDRESS 
CORRELATION SERVICE 
FIELD OF THE INVENTION 
This disclosure is related generally to detecting man-in 
the-middle attacks, and more particularly to an authentication 
infrastructure having a third party location correlation service 
that ensures privacy protections. 
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
In certain instances it is useful to know if a physical loca 
tion of a mobile device associated with a user correlates to the 
location of a second device being used by the user. By com 
paring the geographical locations of the two devices, the user 
can be authenticated. If the two locations are not physically 
near each other, it may be assumed that a man-in-the-middle 
attack is underway as the transaction appears to emanate from 
a location that is distant from the actual user. 
One of the issues of utilizing location correlation is that it 
allows for tracking and collection of precise location details 
of individuals which, from a privacy perspective, may be 
undesirable. 
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
The present invention provides an authentication infra 
structure in which a third party location correlation service 
provider is implemented separately from a restricted item 
provider (i.e., provider) to ensure privacy for users. 
In one embodiment, there is a method for controlling 
access to a restricted item, comprising: receiving a request 
from a requester for access to a restricted item at a computer 
system associated with a provider, said request originating 
from a client system; determining an IP address of the client 
system; determining a mobile phone number of a mobile 
phone associated with the requester, transmitting to a third 
party service provider the IP address and mobile phone num 
ber; and receiving back from the third party service provider 
a confirmation message indicating whether or not the IP 
address and mobile phone are located within an acceptable 
range of each other. 
In a second embodiment, there is a system for controlling 
access to a restricted item, comprising: a login system for 
receiving a request from a requester to a restricted item, said 
request originating from a client system; a system for deter 
mining an IP address of the client system; a system for deter 
mining a mobile phone number of a mobile phone associated 
with the requester; a system for transmitting to a third party 
service provider the IP address and mobile phone number; 
and a system for inputting from the third party service pro 
videra confirmation message indicating whether or not the IP 
address and mobile phone are located within an acceptable 
range of each other. 
In a third embodiment, there is a computer readable storage 
medium having a program product for controlling access to a 
restricted item, comprising: program code for receiving a 
request from a requester to a restricted item, said request 
originating from a client system; program code for determin 
ing an IP address of the client system; program code for 
determining a mobile phone number of a mobile phone asso 
ciated with the requester, program code for transmitting to a 
third party service provider the IP address and mobile phone 
number, and program code for inputting from the third party 
service provider a confirmation message indicating whether 
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or not the IP address and mobile phone are located within an 
acceptable range of each other. 
In a fourth embodiment, there is a method for deploying a 
system for controlling access to a restricted item, comprising: 
providing a computer infrastructure being operable to: 
receive a request from a requester for access to a restricted 
item at a computer system associated with a provider, said 
request originating from a client system; determine an IP 
address of the client system; determine a mobile phone num 
ber of a mobile phone associated with the requester; transmit 
to a third party service provider the IP address and mobile 
phone number; and receive back from the third party service 
provider a confirmation message indicating whether or not 
the IP address and mobile phone are located within an accept 
able range of each other. 
A location correlation service as described herein could be 
offered by mobile phone providers to merchants, banks and 
other organizations for any authentication purposes, e.g., pro 
cessing credit cards for e-commerce, e-banking transactions, 
content access, etc. Companies could use the service to 
authenticate business partners accessing their organizations 
infrastructure via a VPN or extranet web site. The illustrative 
aspects of the present invention are designed to solve the 
problems herein described and other problems not discussed. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
These and other features of this invention will be more 
readily understood from the following detailed description of 
the various aspects of the invention taken in conjunction with 
the accompanying drawings. 
FIG. 1 depicts an illustrative authentication infrastructure 
in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. 
FIG.2 depicts a flow chart showing a method in accordance 
with an embodiment of the present invention. 
The drawings are merely schematic representations, not 
intended to portray specific parameters of the invention. The 
drawings are intended to depict only typical embodiments of 
the invention, and therefore should not be considered as lim 
iting the scope of the invention. In the drawings, like num 
bering represents like elements. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION 
The described embodiments provide solutions for main 
taining privacy when location information is required to 
authenticate a user attempting to access a restricted item over 
a network from a restricted item provider, i.e., “provider.” The 
provider may be any entity that controls access to restricted 
items, e.g., a bank, a business, a web site, a server, etc. In some 
authentication embodiments, such as that described in US 
2008/0318548 US1, published on Dec. 25, 2008, entitled 
“Method and System for Strong Authentication and Defense 
against Man-In-the-Middle Attacks, the contents of which 
are hereby incorporated by reference, the location of the 
user's mobile phone and the location of the user's computer 
IP address are examined by the restricted item provider to 
determine if the two are proximately located. 
The present approach provides a third party location cor 
relation service that can be tuned to limit the exposure of 
precise location details of the user while still providing the 
necessary information to authenticate the user to the 
restricted item provider. Namely, the third party location cor 
relation service may be utilized to provide only a yes/no 
confirmation as to whether a mobile phone is within a speci 
fied range of a given IP address. Thus, the restricted item 
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provider can thwart man-in-the-middle attacks without ever 
having to know any location information of the user. 
Referring now to FIG. 1, an illustrative embodiment of an 
authentication infrastructure is shown that generally includes 
a restrictive item provider 11, a token matching service 48 and 
a location correlation service 34. Restricted item provider 11 
generally comprises any entity that provides access to 
restricted item 24 via a network such as the World Wide Web 
(Web) to a user 26 via a client system 28. Client system 28 
may comprise any device, Software or system, such as a 
computer and browser, handheld device, ATM machine, 
transaction processor, etc., that utilizes a unique network 
identifier, such as an IP (Internet Protocol) address or the like 
to interface with the restricted item provider 11 via a provider 
Server 10. 
Within this infrastructure, authentication of user 26 by 
restricted item provider 11 is implemented as follows. Pro 
vider server 10 includes an authentication system 12, which 
may for example be implemented as any combination of 
hardware and Software (i.e., a computer system and/or a pro 
gram product). Authentication system 12 generally includes: 
a log in System 14; a token generation/verification system 15: 
a mobile phone number look-up system 16; an IP address 
collection system 18; an acceptable range setting system 20; 
and a correlation service interface system 22. When user 26 
seeks to access a restricted item 24 from restricted item pro 
vider 11, user 26 points their client system 28 to the provider 
server 12 (e.g., by entering a Web address into a browser). 
Restricted item 24 may comprise any item, e.g., data, object, 
program, communication channel, etc., for which authoriza 
tion is required. Common examples of restricted items 24 
include account data, transaction systems, Subscription 
based content, etc. 
When attempting to access the provider server 10, user 26 
is first presented with a log in System 14, where the user is 
Verified, e.g., by entering a user ID and password. Once the 
user's ID and password are verified, token generation/verifi 
cation system 15 generates a one-time token that is forwarded 
back to the user 26 via the client system 28. The user 26 is then 
prompted to enter the one time token into the user's mobile 
phone 32, which is forwarded to token matching service 48 
via a cellular network or the like. In a parallel process, a 
mobile phone number look-up system 16 retrieves a previ 
ously stored (i.e., pre-registered) mobile phone number of the 
user 26 from a phone database 25. The mobile phone number 
of the user 26 and the generated one time token are also 
forwarded to the token matching service 48 from the provider 
Server 10. 
A token server 50 provides a token processing system 52 
that compares the phone number (e.g., using caller ID) and 
token obtained from the user 26 via the mobile phone 32 with 
the phone number and token information separately obtained 
from the authentication system 12. If the data matches, this 
then verifies that the mobile phone 32 being used to submit 
the token belongs to the user 26. If the data does not match, 
this then indicates that a man-in-the-middle attack or other 
type of unauthorized access may be occurring since an unau 
thorized mobile phone was utilized to submit the token. Note 
that some or all of the processing being done by token match 
ing service 48 could be done by a third party provider or by the 
restricted item provider 11 itself, e.g., at the provider server 
10. In addition, it is understood that any type of token may be 
utilized, e.g., an alphanumeric code that user 26 types into 
their phone, a password that the user speaks, etc. A detailed 
description of token processing is disclosed in U.S. Pat. No. 
7,133,662 issued on Nov. 7, 2006 to Bravo et al., entitled 
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"Method and apparatus for restricting access of a user using a 
cellular telephone.” the contents of which is hereby incorpo 
rated by reference. 
Assuming the token is verified, a further authentication 
process is utilized to ensure that the mobile phone 32 is 
located proximate to the client system 28. To implement this, 
IP address collection system 18 collects the IP address 30 of 
the client system 28, e.g., during the log in procedure. An 
acceptable distance between the mobile phone 32 and the 
client system 28 may be set by acceptable range setting sys 
tem. 20. Given that current technology does not always allow 
for pinpointing an exact location of a mobile phone 32 or IP 
address 30 of client system 28, authentication system 12 
provides this mechanism for setting an acceptable range value 
(e.g., 10 miles). By allowing the restricted item provider 11 to 
set this value, provider 11 can dictate their own level of risk 
tolerance. 
Once the user's mobile phone number and IP address 30 
are determined, they are packaged and sent to location corre 
lation server 34 with the acceptable range value in a trans 
mission 54 by correlation service interface system 22. As 
noted herein, an aspect of this disclosure involves ensuring 
privacy for the user 26. More particularly, the user's location 
based on their mobile phone 32 should not be tracked and/or 
stored by the restricted item provider 11 or other third parties. 
Correlation service interface system 22 ensures this feature 
by utilizing a privacy policy 23 requiring a third party service 
to simply confirm whether or not the acceptable distance 
between the mobile phone 32 and the client system 28 is met. 
The privacy policy 23 does not allow for the collection of 
actual mobile phone location data by the restricted item pro 
vider 11 from the location correlation service 34. 
Accordingly, location correlation service 34 must be 
implemented as a separate disparate entity relative to 
restricted item provider 11. In one embodiment, location 
correlation service 34 may be implemented by a cellular 
provider as a service for organizations, such as banks and 
other businesses. Location correlation service 34 generally 
includes a location server 36 that has a correlation system 38 
for confirming whether a mobile phone is located proximate 
an IP address. Correlation system 38 includes an IP location 
system 40 for determining a geographic location of an IP 
address. Such systems are readily known (e.g., www.geo 
bytes.com/IPlocator.htm). Phone location system 42 utilizes 
any known means for locating a mobile phone based on the 
phone number. Examples include cell tower triangulation, 
GPS, etc. Once correlation system 38 ascertains the geo 
graphic location of both the IP address 30 and mobile phone 
32, distance calculation system 44 determines a distance 
between the two, e.g., based on longitude and latitude. Con 
firmation generation system 46 then determines if the calcu 
lated distance is less than the acceptable range value provided 
by the restricted item provider 11. A confirmation message 56 
(e.g., yes or no) is then returned to correlation service inter 
face system 22 of the restricted item provider 11. If the prox 
imity of the mobile phone 32 and the IP address 30 is con 
firmed as with the acceptable range, authentication system 12 
can then allow access to the restricted item 24 for the user 26. 
Otherwise, the user 26 is denied access. 
Confirmation generation system 46 may likewise include a 
privacy policy 47 that ensures that only a simple confirmation 
message 56 will be returned to the requesting party. Privacy 
policy 47 may also enforce other privacy measures, such that 
the information handled by the correlation system 38 will be 
disposed of in an acceptable manner. The privacy policies 23 
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and 47 may be exchanged using, e.g., P3P protocol, prior to, 
or as part of the transaction to ensure that the required level 
of privacy will be met. 
FIG. 2 depicts a flow chart showing an illustrative method 
of a user being authenticated by a provider. At S1, a log in 
request is obtained from a user at a provider's server, e.g., by 
pointing a browser at the log in page, where a user ID and 
password are collected from the user. At S2, a check is made 
to determine if the credentials (i.e., userID and password) are 
valid. If no, the session is terminated at S13. If yes, then the 
mobile number of the user is determined by the provider via 
a look-up, e.g., from a provider's database, at S3. At S4, the 
user is provided a one time token from the provider, which the 
user then enters into his or her mobile phone, e.g., using the 
keypad. At S5, a service (e.g., a cellular provider) receives the 
token and the user's phone number via caller ID, and com 
pares it with the phone number and token provided to the user 
by the provider. If they do not match, a man-in-the middle 
attack is Suspected since an invalid phone is being used to 
enter the token and the session is terminated at S13. If they do 
match, the mobile phone is deemed valid (i.e., it belongs to or 
is authorized for the user) and the IP address of the user's 
browser is collected at S6. Note that the IP address of the 
browser can be collected earlier, e.g., during log in. 
Next, at S7, the IP address, the mobile phone number and 
the acceptable range is sent to a location correlation service 
(LCS). The acceptable range is determined in this case by the 
provider based on a risk tolerance of the provider. However, it 
could be set by the LCS. As noted, because of the need for 
privacy, the LCS is a separate entity from the provider. The 
LCS determines the geographic location of the IP address and 
mobile phone at S8 and S9. A physical distance between the 
two is calculated by the LCS using any technique and a 
determination is then made whether the two are located 
within the acceptable range at S10. The acceptable range, as 
well as the determined distance between the two, may be 
provided/calculated in miles, kilometers, longitudinal/latitu 
dinal coordinates, etc. 
If the two are not within the acceptable range, an “out of 
range' indication is sent back to the provider at S14 and the 
session is terminated at S13. If the acceptable range is not 
exceeded, then a “within range' indication is sent to the 
provider at S11 and the user is fully authenticated and the 
session is allowed at S12. 
Note that while the embodiments are described with refer 
ence to a mobile phone, the invention may be implemented 
with any device that has a unique discoverable identifier (e.g., 
phone number, email address, IP address, etc.) and can trans 
mit a token to a token service provider. 
Referring again to FIG. 1, it is understood that each of the 
authentication system 12, token server 50 and location server 
36 may be implemented using any type of computing device 
(i.e., computer system). Such a computing device generally 
includes a processor, input/output (I/O), memory, and bus. 
The processor may comprise a single processing unit, or be 
distributed across one or more processing units in one or more 
locations, e.g., on a client and server. Memory may comprise 
any known type of data storage, including magnetic media, 
optical media, random access memory (RAM), read-only 
memory (ROM), a data cache, a data object, etc. Moreover, 
memory may reside at a single physical location, comprising 
one or more types of data storage, or be distributed across a 
plurality of physical systems in various forms. 
I/O may comprise any system for exchanging information 
to/from an external resource. External devices/resources may 
comprise any known type of external device, including a 
monitor/display, speakers, storage, another computer system, 
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a hand-held device, keyboard, mouse, voice recognition sys 
tem, speech output system, printer, facsimile, pager, etc. The 
bus provides a communication link between each of the com 
ponents in the computing device and likewise may comprise 
any known type of transmission link, including electrical, 
optical, wireless, etc. Although not shown, additional com 
ponents, such as cache memory, communication systems, 
system software, etc., may be incorporated. 
Access may be provided over a network Such as the Inter 
net, a local area network (LAN), a wide area network (WAN). 
a virtual private network (VPN), etc. Communication could 
occur via a direct hardwired connection (e.g., serial port), or 
via an addressable connection that may utilize any combina 
tion of wireline and/or wireless transmission methods. More 
over, conventional network connectivity, Such as TokenRing, 
Ethernet, WiFi or other conventional communications stan 
dards could be used. Still yet, connectivity could be provided 
by conventional TCP/IP sockets-based protocol. In this 
instance, an Internet service provider could be used to estab 
lish interconnectivity. Further, as indicated above, communi 
cation could occur in a client-server or server-server environ 
ment. 
It should be appreciated that the teachings of the present 
invention could be offered as a business method on a sub 
Scription or fee basis. For example, a computer system com 
prising a correlation system 38 and/or token processing sys 
tem 52 could be created, maintained and/or deployed by a 
service provider that offers the functions described hereinfor 
customers. That is, a service provider could offer to deploy or 
provide the ability to provide authentication as described 
above. 
It is understood that in addition to being implemented as a 
system and method, the features may be provided as one or 
more program products stored on computer-readable storage 
mediums, which when run, enables one or more computer 
systems to provide authentication as described. To this extent, 
the computer-readable storage medium may include program 
code, which implements the processes and systems described 
herein. It is understood that the term “computer-readable 
medium' comprises one or more of any type of physical 
embodiment of the program code. In particular, the computer 
readable medium can comprise program code embodied on 
one or more portable storage articles of manufacture (e.g., a 
compact disc, a magnetic disk, a tape, etc.), on one or more 
data storage portions of a computing device. Such as memory 
and/or a storage system. 
As used herein, it is understood that the terms “program 
code' and "computer program code' are synonymous and 
mean any expression, in any language, code or notation, of a 
set of instructions that cause a computing device having an 
information processing capability to perform a particular 
function either directly or after any combination of the fol 
lowing: (a) conversion to another language, code or notation; 
(b) reproduction in a different material form; and/or (c) 
decompression. To this extent, program code can be embod 
ied as one or more types of program products. Such as an 
application/software program, component software/a library 
of functions, an operating system, a basic I/O System/driver 
for a particular computing and/or I/O device, and the like. 
Further, it is understood that terms such as “component” and 
“system” are synonymous as used herein and represent any 
combination of hardware and/or software capable of per 
forming some function(s). 
The block diagrams in the figures illustrate the architec 
ture, functionality, and operation of possible implementations 
of systems, methods and computer program products accord 
ing to various embodiments of the present invention. In this 
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regard, each block in the block diagrams may represent a 
module, segment, or portion of code, which comprises one or 
more executable instructions for implementing the specified 
logical function(s). It should also be noted that the functions 
noted in the blocks may occur out of the order noted in the 
figures. For example, two blocks shown in Succession may, in 
fact, be run Substantially concurrently, or the blocks may 
Sometimes be run in the reverse order, depending upon the 
functionality involved. It will also be noted that each block of 
the block diagrams can be implemented by special purpose 
hardware-based systems which perform the specified func 
tions or acts, or combinations of special purpose hardware 
and computer instructions. 
Although specific embodiments have been illustrated and 
described herein, those of ordinary skill in the art appreciate 
that any arrangement which is calculated to achieve the same 
purpose may be substituted for the specific embodiments 
shown and that the invention has other applications in other 
environments. This application is intended to cover any adap 
tations or variations of the present invention. The following 
claims are in no way intended to limit the scope of the inven 
tion to the specific embodiments described herein. 
What is claimed is: 
1. A method for controlling access to a restricted item, the 
method comprising: 
receiving a request from a requester for access to a 
restricted item at a computer system associated with a 
provider, said request originating at a client system; 
determining an IP address of the client system using the 
computer system associated with the provider; 
receiving a telephonic communication from a mobile 
phone associated with the requester using the computer 
system associated with the provider, 
wherein the requester initiates the telephonic communica 
tion using the mobile phone; 
determining a geographical location of the mobile phone 
based on the requester-initiated telephonic communica 
tion using the mobile phone; 
determining a mobile phone number of the mobile phone 
associated with the requester using the computer system 
associated with the provider; 
transmitting to a third party service provider, distinct from 
the computer system associated with the provider, the IP 
address, the mobile phone number, the geographical 
location of the mobile phone and an acceptable range, 
wherein the acceptable range includes a predetermined 
distance between the mobile phone and the client sys 
tem; and 
receiving back from the third party service provider a con 
firmation message indicating whether the IP address and 
the mobile phone are located within the acceptable range 
of each other, wherein the third party service provider 
determines whether the IP address and the mobile phone 
are located within the acceptable range of each other 
based on the transmitted IP address, the geographical 
location of the mobile phone and the mobile phone num 
ber. 
2. The method of claim 1, further comprising: 
providing a token via the client system to the requester; 
prompting the requester to transmit said token via the 
mobile phone associated with the requester, 
verifying that the token was transmitted by the mobile 
phone associated with the requester. 
3. The method of claim 1, further comprising verifying a 
user ID and password of the requester. 
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4. The method of claim 1, further comprising: 
ensuring that a privacy policy is in place to guarantee that 
no location data of the mobile phone associated with the 
requester will be provided to the provider. 
5. The method of claim 1, wherein the mobile phone num 
ber of the mobile phone associated with the requester is 
pre-registered with the provider. 
6. The method of claim 1, further comprising authenticat 
ing the requester to allow access to the restricted item in 
response to a confirmation message that Verifies that the 
mobile phone and IP address are located within the accept 
able range of each other. 
7. A computer system comprising: 
at least one computing device configured to control access 
to a restricted item, by performing actions including: 
receiving a request from a requester to a restricted item, 
said request originating from a client system; 
determining an IP address of the client system; 
receiving a telephonic communication from a mobile 
phone associated with the requester using the com 
puter system associated with the provider, 
wherein the requester initiates the telephonic communi 
cation using the mobile phone; 
determining a geographical location of the mobile phone 
based on the requester-initiated telephonic communi 
cation using the mobile phone; 
determining a mobile phone number of the mobile 
phone associated with the requester, 
transmitting to a third party service provider, distinct 
from the at least one computing device, the IP address, 
the mobile phone number, the geographical location 
of the mobile phone and an acceptable range, 
wherein the acceptable range includes a predetermined 
distance between the mobile phone and the client 
system; and 
receiving, from the third party service provider, a con 
firmation message indicating whether the IP address 
and the mobile phone are located within the accept 
able range of each other, wherein the third party ser 
vice provider determines whether the IP address and 
the mobile phone are located within the acceptable 
range of each other based on the transmitted IP 
address, the geographical location of the mobile 
phone and the mobile phone number. 
8. The computer system of claim 7, further comprising: 
providing a token to the requester via the client system; 
prompting the requester to transmit said token via the 
mobile phone associated with the requester, and 
verifying that the token was transmitted by the mobile 
phone associated with the requester. 
9. The computer system of claim 7, further comprising 
Verifying a user ID and password of the requester. 
10. The computer system of claim 7, further comprising: 
a privacy policy that guarantees that no location data of the 
mobile phone associated with the requester will be pro 
vided to the provider. 
11. The computer system of claim 7, wherein the mobile 
phone number of the mobile phone associated with the 
requester is pre-registered with the provider. 
12. The computer system of claim 7, further comprising 
authenticating the requester to allow access to the restricted 
item in response to a confirmation message that Verifies that 
the mobile phone and IP address are located within the 
acceptable range of each other. 
13. A non-transitory computer readable medium having a 
program product for controlling access to a restricted item, 
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which when executed by at least one computing device, 
causes the at least one computing device to perform actions 
including: 
receiving a request from a requester to a restricted item, 
said request originating from a client system; 
determining an IP address of the client system; 
receiving a telephonic communication from a mobile 
phone associated with the requester using the computer 
system associated with the provider, 
wherein the requester initiates the telephonic communica 
tion using the mobile phone; 
determining a geographical location of the mobile phone 
based on the requester-initiated telephonic communica 
tion using the mobile phone; 
determining a mobile phone number of the mobile phone 
associated with the requester, 
transmitting to a third party service provider the IP address, 
the mobile phone number, the geographical location of 
the mobile phone and an acceptable range, 
wherein the acceptable range includes a predetermined 
distance between the mobile phone and the client sys 
tem; and 
receiving from the third party service provider a confirma 
tion message indicating whether the IP address and the 
mobile phone are located within the acceptable range of 
each other, wherein the third party service provider 
determines whether the IP address and the mobile phone 
are located within the acceptable range of each other 
based on the transmitted IP address, the geographical 
location of the mobile phone and the mobile phone num 
ber. 
14. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 
13, further causing the at least one computing device to per 
form actions including: 
providing a token to the requester via the client system; 
prompting the requester to transmit said token via the 
mobile phone associated with the requester, and 
verifying that the token was transmitted by the mobile 
phone associated with the requester. 
15. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 
13, further causing the at least one computing device to per 
form actions including: 
Verifying a user ID and password of the requester. 
16. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 
13, further causing the at least one computing device to per 
form actions including: 
a privacy policy that guarantees that no location data of the 
mobile phone associated with the requester will be pro 
vided to the provider. 
10 
15 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
10 
17. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 
13, wherein the mobile phone number of the mobile phone 
associated with the requester is pre-registered with the pro 
vider. 
18. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 
13, further causing the at least one computing device to per 
form actions including: 
authenticating the requester to allow access to the restricted 
item in response to a confirmation message that Verifies 
that the mobile phone and IP address are located within 
the acceptable range of each other. 
19. A method for deploying a system for controlling access 
to a restricted item, comprising: 
providing a computer infrastructure being operable to: 
receive a request from a requester for access to a 
restricted item at a computer system associated with a 
provider, said request originating from a client sys 
tem; 
determine an IP address of the client system; 
receive a telephonic communication from a mobile 
phone associated with the requester using the com 
puter system associated with the provider, 
wherein the requester initiates the telephonic communi 
cation using the mobile phone; 
determine a geographical location of the mobile phone 
based on the requester- initiated telephonic commu 
nication using the mobile phone; 
determine a mobile phone number of the mobile phone 
associated with the requester, 
transmit to a third party service provider, distinct from 
the computer infrastructure, the IP address, the 
mobile phone number, the geographical location of 
the mobile phone, and an acceptable range, 
wherein the acceptable range includes a predetermined 
distance between the mobile phone and the client 
system; and 
receive back from the third party service provider a 
confirmation message indicating whether the IP 
address and the mobile phone are located within the 
acceptable range of each other, wherein the third party 
service provider determines whether the IP address 
and the mobile phone are located within the accept 
able range of each other based on the transmitted IP 
address, the geographical location of the mobile 
phone and the mobile phone number. 
k k k k k 
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1. 
DETECTING MAN-IN-THE-MDDLE 
ATTACKS IN ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS 
USING PROMPTS 
BACKGROUND 
1. Technical Field 
The subject matter disclosed herein relates generally to a 
transaction authentication system. Specifically, the Subject 
matter disclosed herein relates to detecting man-in-the 
middle attacks in electronic transactions using prompts. 
2. Related Art 
Use of electronic media has quickly become the preferred 
means for a user to conduct electronic transactions. Users 
utilize transactions like, online-banking and Internet shop 
ping every day, in order to avoid having to visit a physical 
location to conduct these transactions. However, these elec 
tronic transactions come with a heightened risk, as electronic 
transactions usually involve proprietary or sensitive informa 
tion (e.g., bank account numbers, credit card numbers, etc.), 
collectively known as restricted user information. If a third 
party were to obtain this restricted user information, that party 
would be able to conduct transactions, which would typically 
be restricted, to simultaneously benefit the third party while 
harming the true owner of that restricted user information. 
Third parties may obtain Such information by conducting 
what is called a “man-in-the-middle' attack on an electronic 
transaction. A man-in-the-middle attack occurs when anthird 
party computer system interposes itself between a user's 
computer system, used to conduct an electronic transaction, 
and a service provider's computer system, for providing the 
service involved in the electronic transaction. While inter 
posed between the user and service provider systems, the 
third party computer system intercepts the restricted user 
information and electronic transaction information from the 
user's computer system, forwards along the gathered infor 
mation to obtain access to the service providers system using 
the restricted user information, and conducts a distinct elec 
tronic transaction to benefit the third party and not the user. To 
keep the user from noticing the user's transaction has been 
interrupted by a man-in-the-middle attack, the third party 
system sends the user a fraudulent confirmation message or 
webpage confirming the user's electronic transaction infor 
mation, when, in fact, a distinct electronic transaction has 
taken place. When a man-in-the-middle attack occurs, the 
user has no way of knowing until after the fraudulent elec 
tronic transaction has taken place, and the user desired elec 
tronic transaction has been discarded by the third party sys 
tem. 
BRIEF SUMMARY 
A transactional authentication system is disclosed. One 
embodiment includes a method for authenticating an elec 
tronic transaction. The method includes: receiving an elec 
tronic transaction request from a user, the electronic transac 
tion request originating at a client system; determining an IP 
address associated with the client system from which the 
received electronic transaction request originates; providing 
the user with a one time password associated with the elec 
tronic transaction request; receiving a telephonic communi 
cation from a telephonic device associated with the user; 
prompting the user, via a Voice response unit, to input the 
password using the telephonic device; authenticating the user 
based on a comparison of the inputted password and the 
provided one time password; determining a probable location 
of the user based on the determined IP address of the client 
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2 
system; communicating to the user, via the Voice response 
unit, the probable location of the user based on the determined 
IP address associated with the client system; and prompting 
the user to confirm the probable location of the user based on 
the IP address associated with the client system. 
A first aspect of the invention includes a method for authen 
ticating an electronic transaction. The method includes: 
receiving an electronic transaction request from a user, the 
electronic transaction request originating at a client system; 
determining an IP address associated with the client system 
from which the received electronic transaction request origi 
nates; providing the user with a one time password associated 
with the electronic transaction request; receiving a telephonic 
communication from a telephonic device associated with the 
user, prompting the user, via a Voice response unit, to input 
the password using the telephonic device; authenticating the 
user based on a comparison of the inputted password and the 
provided one time password; determining a probable location 
of the user based on the determined IP address of the client 
system; communicating to the user, via the Voice response 
unit, the probable location of the user based on the determined 
IP address associated with the client system; and prompting 
the user to confirm the probable location of the user based on 
the IP address associated with the client system. 
A second aspect of the invention includes a computer sys 
tem having: at least one computing device configured to 
authenticate a transaction by performing actions including: 
receiving an electronic transaction request from a user, the 
electronic transaction request originating at a client system; 
determining an IP address associated with the client system 
from which the received electronic transaction request origi 
nates; providing the user with a one time password associated 
with the electronic transaction request; receiving a telephonic 
communication from a telephonic device associated with the 
user, prompting the user, via a Voice response unit, to input 
the password using the telephonic device; authenticating the 
user based on a comparison of the inputted password and the 
provided one time password; determining a probable location 
of the user based on the determined IP address of the client 
system; communicating to the user, via the Voice response 
unit, the probable location of the user based on the determined 
IP address associated with the client system; and prompting 
the user to confirm the probable location of the user based on 
the IP address associated with the client system. 
A third aspect of the invention includes a computer pro 
gram product for authenticating an electronic transaction, the 
computer program product comprising a computer readable 
storage medium having program code embodied therewith, 
the program code executable by at least one computer system 
to perform a method. The method includes: receiving an 
electronic transaction request from a user, the electronic 
transaction request originatingata client system; determining 
an IP address associated with the client system from which 
the received electronic transaction request originates; provid 
ing the user with a one time password associated with the 
electronic transaction request; receiving a telephonic com 
munication from a telephonic device associated with the user; 
prompting the user, via a Voice response unit, to input the 
password using the telephonic device; authenticating the user 
based on a comparison of the inputted password and the 
provided one time password; determining a probable location 
of the user based on the determined IP address of the client 
system; communicating to the user, via the Voice response 
unit, the probable location of the user based on the determined 
IP address associated with the client system; and prompting 
the user to confirm the probable location of the user based on 
the IP address associated with the client system. 
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BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
These and other features of this invention will be more 
readily understood from the following detailed description of 
the various aspects of the invention taken in conjunction with 
the accompanying drawings that depict various embodiments 
of the invention, in which: 
FIG. 1 shows a schematic depiction of a transactional 
authentication environment according to embodiments of the 
invention. 
FIGS. 2A-2B show a flow diagram illustrating a method 
according to embodiments of the invention. 
It is noted that the drawings of the invention are not nec 
essarily to scale. The drawings are intended to depict only 
typical aspects of the invention, and therefore should not be 
considered as limiting the scope of the invention. In the draw 
ings, like numbering represents like elements between the 
drawings. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
As described herein, aspects of the invention relate to a 
transaction authentication system. Specifically, as described 
herein, aspects of the invention relate to a system for authen 
ticating transactions by Verifying a user's transactional 
request location. 
The described embodiments provide superior security for 
electronic transactions which involves a user's restricted 
information. More specifically, the authentication of the elec 
tronic transaction involving a service provider in the embodi 
ments as described herein provides greater security than con 
ventional authentication systems. In some authentication 
embodiments, such as that described in US 2008/0318548, 
published on Dec. 25, 2008, entitled “Method and System for 
Strong Authentication and Defense against Man-in-the 
Middle Attacks, the contents of which are hereby incorpo 
rated by reference, the location of the user's computer IP 
address are examined by the restricted item provider to deter 
mine if the two are proximately located. The service provider, 
as described herein, and the restricted item provider, as 
described by the incorporated reference, may be any entity 
that provides goods and/or services, and controls access to 
restricted or user sensitive information, e.g., bank, business, 
website, server, etc. 
Turning to FIG. 1, a schematic depiction of a transactional 
authentication environment according to embodiments of the 
invention is provided. The transactional authentication envi 
ronment includes a service provider 100 and a third party 
verification service provider 200. As discussed above, service 
provider 100 may include any entity that provides goods 
and/or services, and controls access to restricted or user 
sensitive information. User 10 may access the goods and/or 
services of service provider 100 using a client system 12. 
More specifically, user 10 may utilize client system 12 to 
access the goods and/or services of service provider 100 by 
communicating with a service provider server 102 of service 
provider 100 over a network. Client system 12 may include 
any device, software or system, such as a World Wide Web 
(web) browser included on a personal computer system, a 
handheld device, a Smart-phone, an ATM machine, etc., 
which may include a unique network identifier. In an embodi 
ment, as shown in FIG. 1, the unique network identifier of 
client system 12 may include an Internet Protocol (IP) 
address 14. Service provider server 102 may provide user 10 
with an interactive website or any other conventional elec 
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tronic medium in which user 10 may utilize client system 12 
to conduct electronic transactions offered by service provider 
1OO. 
For example, service provider 100 may be a bank, and 
service provider server 102 may provide client system 12 
with a banking website capable of processing banking trans 
actions. Specifically in the example, service provider server 
102 may provider client system 12 with a website, which may 
allow user 10, a member of the bank associated with service 
provider 100, to conduct electronic banking transactions 
using client system 12. 
With respect to the authentication environment, authenti 
cation of user's 10 electronic transaction request of service 
provider 100 is provided below. In an embodiment, as shown 
in FIG. 1, service provider server 102 may include an authen 
tication system 104 which may be implemented as any com 
bination of hardware and Software (i.e., a computer system 
and/or a program product). Authentication system 104 may 
further include Sub-components for, at least in part, authen 
ticating an electronic transaction request made by user 10. As 
shown in FIG. 1, authentication system 104 may include a 
log-in system 106. As a result of user 10 attempting to access 
service provider server 102 via client system 12, log-in sys 
tem 106 may provide user 10 with a log-in mechanism to 
Verify the specific user 10 attempting to access service pro 
vider server 102. More specifically, log-in system 106 may 
prompt user 10 to enter user 10 specific log-in information, 
e.g., user ID, user name, user e-mail, user password, etc., to 
Verify the specific user 10 attempting to access service pro 
vider server 102. 
In continuing the example embodiment above, user 10 may 
direct client system 12 to a bank website (e.g., service pro 
vider server 102) in order to conduct electronic banking trans 
actions. After directing client system 12 to the bank website, 
log-in system 106 of authentication system 104 may prompt 
user 10 to enter a user ID and associated password to verify 
that user 10 is a member of the bank (e.g., service provider 
100). 
Authentication system 104 may also include a transaction 
system 108 which may collect information relating to elec 
tronic transaction requests made by user 10. More specifi 
cally, transaction system 108 may be configured to receive the 
electronic transaction requests made by user 10 requesting to 
access restricted service information 110. Restricted service 
information 110 may include any type of information for 
which authorization is required. 
Continuing the example embodiment, after user 10 has 
successfully logged into service provider server 102, user 10, 
via client system 12, may send an electronic transaction 
request to service provider server 102. For example, user 10 
may send an electronic transaction requesting to transfer 
S500 USD from user's 10 checking account to user's 10 
savings account, both of which may be accounts held by the 
bank (e.g., service provider 100). The account numbers asso 
ciated with each of user's 10 accounts are restricted service 
information 110, and may be required to Successfully process 
the electronic transaction request. Furthermore, the account 
numbers (e.g., restricted service information 110) may 
require further authorization before any transfer of user's 10 
funds may be made. 
Authentication system 104 may also include a password 
generation system 112. Password generation system 112 may 
be configured to generate a password for user 10 for, in part, 
authenticating user 10 electronic transaction request involv 
ing service provider 100. More specifically, password gen 
eration system 112 may generated a one-time password 
(OTP), and may relay the OTP to user 10 via service provider 
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server 102. Additionally, service provider server 102 may 
prompt user 10 to contact and provide third party verification 
service 200 with the OTP generated by password generation 
system 112. In an embodiment, service provider server 102 
may send the OTP to user 10 via client system 12. In an 
alternative embodiment, service provider server 102 may 
send the OTP to a telephonic device 16 unique to user 10. 
Telephonic device 16 may include, for example, any now 
known or later developed mobile device or local area network 
(LAN) telephone capable of telephonic communication. In an 
embodiment, telephonic device 16 associated with user 10 
may include a phone number pre-registered with service pro 
vider 100, and may be stored in a phone number database 114 
in communication with service provider server 102. More 
specifically, a phone number unique to telephonic device 16 
may be stored in phone number database 114, and may be 
used, in part, for authentication of user's 10 electronic trans 
action request, as discussed below. In an alternative embodi 
ment, the pre-registered phone number of telephonic device 
16 may be registered with third party verification service 
provider 200 or any other third party service provider used in 
the authentication process of the embodiments described 
herein. 
In the example, after user 10 submits an electronic trans 
action request to service provider server 102 via client system 
12, and authentication system 104 recognizes the electronic 
transaction request requires further authentication, password 
generation system 112 may generate a multi-digit OTP 
(“0123456789') associated with user's 10 electronic transac 
tion request of transferring $500 between accounts. The OTP 
generated by password generation system 112 may be pro 
vided to user 10 via service provider server's 102 banking 
website that is displayed on client system 12. Along with the 
OTP password generated by password generation system 
112, service provider server 102 may prompt user 10 to call 
third party verification service provider 200 using telephonic 
device 16, and enter the OTP using telephonic device 16 when 
prompted. 
In the embodiment, as shown in FIG. 1, authentication 
system 104 may also include a telephonic device identifica 
tion system 116. Telephonic device identification system 116 
may be configured to determine the pre-registered phone 
number of telephonic device 16 associated with user 10. More 
specifically, telephonic device identification system 116 may 
obtain the log-in information to identify specific user 10, and 
obtain the pre-registered phone number associated with 
user's 10 telephonic device 16 from phone number database 
114. Telephonic device identification system 116 may also be 
configured to provide third party verification service provider 
200 with the pre-registered phone number stored in phone 
number database 114 for, in part, authenticating user's 10 
electronic transaction request. 
Continuing the example, after user 10 receives the OTP 
generated by password generation system 112, telephonic 
device identification system 116 may determine the pre-reg 
istered phone number of telephonic device 16 that may be 
associated with user 10. That is, telephonic device identifica 
tion system 116 may utilize user's 10 specific log-in infor 
mation and obtain the pre-registered phone number of tele 
phonic device 16 associated with user 10. Specifically, 
telephonic device identification system 116 may determine 
that user's 10 pre-registered phone number is "555-555 
5555. Once telephonic device identification system 116 
obtains user's 10 pre-registered phone number for telephonic 
device 16, telephonic device identification system 116 may 
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send the user's 10 pre-registered phone number to third party 
verification service provider 200 using service provider 
Server 102. 
Further in an embodiment, as shown in FIG. 1, Authenti 
cation system 104 may include an IP address identification 
system 118. IP address identification system 118 may be 
configured to determine IP address 14 associated with client 
system 12 from which the electronic transaction request may 
originate. More specifically, IP address identification system 
118 may obtain user's 10 electronic transaction request infor 
mation which may include IP address 14 associated with 
client system 12 from which the electronic transaction 
request originated. IP address identification system 118 may 
include an IP address location system 120 which may take IP 
address 14 associated with client system 12 from which 
user's 10 electronic transaction request originated, and may 
determine a probable geographic location of client system 12. 
Systems for determining a probable geographic location of 
client system 12 based on IP address 14, such as IP address 
location system 120, are readily known in the art (e.g., www 
.geobytes.com/IPlocator.htm). Further explanation of this 
system is omitted for clarity. IP address identification system 
118 may also provide third party verification service provider 
200 with the probable geographic location of client system 12 
determined by IP address location system 120. The probable 
geographic location may be used, in part, to authentication 
the electronic transaction requested by user 10. In an alterna 
tive embodiment, IP address location system 120, or a system 
configured to perform similar functions, may be implemented 
by third party verification service provider 200, rather than 
service provider 100. More specifically, IP address identifi 
cation system 118 of authentication system 104 may be con 
figured to obtain IP address 14, and a system of third party 
verification service provider 200 may be configured to obtain 
IP address 14 from authentication system 104 and determine 
a probable geographic location of client system 12 based on 
the obtained IP address 14. 
Continuing the example embodiment, IP address identifi 
cation system 118 may determine IP address 14 associated 
with client system 12 from which the electronic transaction 
request originated. Specifically, IP address identification sys 
tem 118 may determine IP address 14 is 12.34.567.89. IP 
address location system 120 may then take IP address 14 
associated with client system 12 (e.g., IP address 
12.34.567.89) and determine that client systems 12 probable 
geo-location is Washington, D.C. Utilizing service provider 
server 102, IP address identification system 118 may then 
transfer the probable geographic location of client system 12 
(e.g., Washington, D.C.) to third party verification service 
provider 200 for, in part, authentication of the electronic 
transaction request (e.g., S500 bank account transfer) from 
user 10. 
Although described in series above, it is understood that 
password generation system 112, telephonic device identifi 
cation system 116 and/or IP address identification system 118 
may perform each of their respective processes in parallel. 
For example, password generation system 118 may generate 
a OTP unique to user's 10 electronic transaction request in 
parallel to IP address identification system 118 determining 
IP address 14 associated with client system 12. 
In an embodiment, as shown in FIG. 1, user 10 may verify 
information relating to the electronic transaction request by 
communicating with a verification server 202 of third party 
verification service provider 200. More specifically, user 10 
may use telephonic device 16 to contact verification server 
202 of third party verification service provider 200 to provide 
information (e.g., OTP etc.) so service provider 100 may 
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Successfully authenticate and process user's 10 electronic 
transaction request. Verification server 202 may be config 
ured as any conventional server now know or later developed, 
capable of receiving information for a remote device (e.g., 
pre-registered telephonic device 16, client system 12, etc.) 
over a network. 
As shown in FIG. 1, verification server 202 may include a 
verification system 204 which may be implemented as any 
combination of hardware and Software (i.e., a computer sys 
tem and/or a program product). Similar to authentication 
system 104 as discussed above, verification system 204 may 
further include Sub-components for, at least in part, Verifying 
user 10 information so service provider 100 may authenticate 
an electronic transaction of user 10. As shown in FIG. 1, 
Verification system 204 may include a Voice response unit 
(VRU) 206. In an embodiment, VRU 206 of verification 
system 204 may be configured to prompt user 10 to input the 
OTP using telephonic device 16 after user 10 calls third party 
verification service provider 200. More specifically, VRU 206 
may ask user 10, using computer simulated speech or a 
recording, to input the OTP generated by password genera 
tion system 112 of authentication system 104 using tele 
phonic device 16. 
Continuing the example above, once user 10 receives the 
OTP and is prompted to call the provided number for third 
party verification service provider 200 by the bank (e.g., 
service provider 100), user 10 calls third party verification 
service provider 200 using his cell phone (e.g., telephonic 
device 16). User 10 may then be connected to verification 
server 202. Once connected, VRU 206 provides user 10 with, 
for example, the following simulated speech: "Please input 
the 10-digit one time password now.” User 10 is able to hear 
this recording over user's 10 cellphone speaker and may then 
input the OTP using the number pad on his cell phone. 
Verification system 204 may also include password pro 
cessing system 208. Password processing system 208 may 
compare the inputted OTP by user 10 with the OTP generated 
by password generation system 112. More specifically, pass 
word processing system 208 may be configured to receive the 
OTP generated by password processing system 112 for user's 
10 electronic transaction request and receive the OTP input 
ted by user 10 using telephonic device 16 to verify or authen 
ticate that the inputted OTP is identical to the generated OTP. 
In an embodiment, if password processing system 208 Veri 
fies that user 10 inputted OTP is identical to the generated 
OTP password processing system 208 may provide verifica 
tion system 204 with instructions to continue the user 10 
Verification processes. In the alternative, if password process 
ing system 208 determines that user 10 inputted OTP is not 
identical to the generated OTP password processing system 
208 may inform notification system 210 of verification sys 
tem 204 that the inputted OTP is not identical to the generated 
OTP. Notification system 210 may be configured to provide 
service provider 100 with an “alert,” which indicates that 
verification system 204 may have determined that user 10 
may not be verified based on the information provided to third 
party verification service provider 200. As a result of the alert 
from notification system 210, user 10 may not be verified and 
user's 10 electronic transaction request may not be authenti 
cated by servicer provider 100. In an embodiment, notifica 
tion system 210 may alert service provider 100 that user 10 
inputted OTP was not identical to the generated OTP. In an 
alternative embodiment, and as discussed in more detail 
below, notification system 210 may alert service provider 100 
that the phone number associated with the telephonic device 
utilized to call third party verification service provider 200 
was not identical to the pre-registered phone number associ 
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ated with telephonic device 16. In another alternative embodi 
ment, notification system 210 may alert service provider 100 
that user 10 did not confirm that the probable geographic 
location of user 10 and/or client system 12 based on IP 
address 14 is substantially similar to the actual location of 
user 10 and/or client system 12. 
In the example, after user 10 enters the multi-digit pass 
word ("0123456789') associated with the electronic transac 
tion request (e.g. S500 account transfer) with the bank (e.g., 
servicer provider 100) using user's 10 cellphone (e.g., tele 
phonic device 16), password verification system 208 may 
verify that user 10 inputted password is identical to the pass 
word provided to verification system 208 by authentication 
system 104 of the bank. In the example, password verification 
system 208 obtains user's 10 inputted password of 
“0123456789. Additionally, password verification may pre 
viously obtain a generated password of “0123456789 from 
banks (e.g., servicer provider 100) authentication system 
104. Password verification system 208 may then compare 
user 10 inputted password to the generated password and 
determine whether the two passwords are identical. As a 
result, password Verification system 208 may communicate 
with verification system 204 to continue user 10 verification 
process. 
In the embodiment, as shown in FIG. 1, verification system 
204 may include a phone number verification system 212. 
Phone number verification system 212 may be configured to 
verify the phone number associated with the telephonic 
device user 10 utilizes to contact third party verification ser 
vice provider 200. More specifically, phone number verifica 
tion system 212 may obtain the pre-registered phone number 
associated with telephonic device 16 of user 10 from authen 
tication 104, and determine if the obtained phone number is 
identical to the phone number associated with the telephonic 
device user 10 utilized to call third party verification service 
provider 200. In an embodiment, phone number verification 
system may obtain the phone number associated with the 
telephonic device used by user 10 by any now know or later 
developed process, e.g., caller ID, cell phone provider look 
up, etc. In an embodiment, phone number verification system 
212 may determine if the obtained pre-registered phone num 
ber is identical to the phone number associated with the 
telephonic device user 10 utilized to call third party verifica 
tion service provider 200 after password verification system 
208 determines user 10 inputted password is identical to the 
password generated by password generation system 112. In 
an alternative embodiment, phone number verification sys 
tem 212 may determine if the obtained pre-registered phone 
number is identical to the phone number associated with the 
telephonic device user 10 utilizes to call third party verifica 
tion service provider 200 immediately after user 10 calls third 
party verification service provider 200. In a further alternative 
embodiment, phone number verification system 212 may 
determine if the obtained pre-registered phone number is 
identical to the phone number associated with the telephonic 
device user 10 utilized to call third party verification service 
provider 200 in parallel to password verification system 208 
determining that user 10 inputted password is identical to the 
password generated by password generation system 112. 
Similar to password verification system 208, phone num 
ber verification system 212 may inform notification system 
210 when the obtained pre-registered phone number associ 
ated with telephonic device 16 is not identical to the telephone 
number associated with the telephonic device utilized by user 
10 to call third party verification servicer provider 200. As 
discussed above, notification system 210 may be configured 
to provide service provider 100 with an “alert,” which indi 
 
 
 89 
 
  
US 8,917,826 B2 
9 
cates that verification system 204 may have determined that 
user 10 may not be verified based on the information provided 
to third party verification service provider 200. As a result of 
the alert from notification system 210, user 10 may not be 
Verified and user's 10 electronic transaction request may not 
be authenticated by servicer provider 100. In an alternative 
embodiment, verification system 204 may continue the veri 
fication of user 10 even though the obtained pre-registered 
phone number associated with telephonic device 16 is not 
identical to the telephone number associated with the tele 
phonic device utilized by user 10 to call third party verifica 
tion service provider 200. More specifically, the alert from 
notification system 210, may prompt verification system 204 
to utilize VRU 206, so user 10 may verify the pre-registered 
telephone number associated with user 10 is correct, or for 
user 10 to confirm the telephonic device utilized by user 10 
has a number distinct from the pre-registered telephone num 
ber associated with user's 10 telephonic device 16. As a 
result, user 10 may by-pass this step of verification performed 
by verification system 204 and may continue with the verifi 
cation process to Successfully complete the electronic trans 
action. In the embodiment, phone number verification system 
212 may obtain the pre-registered phone number associated 
with user's 10 telephonic device 16 from authentication sys 
tem 104 in a electronic message between the two servers over 
a network. More specifically, authentication system 104 may 
send the generated OTP associated phone number and IP 
address 14 of client system 12 (discussed below), in a single 
message to Verification system 204. In an alternative embodi 
ment, authentication system 104 may send each user's 10 
information (e.g., pre-registered phone number, IP address 
14, generated OTP, etc.) in distinct messages to verification 
system 204. 
Continuing the example above, after user 10 has input an 
identical multi-digit password to the generated multi-digit 
password, phone number verification system 212 may deter 
mine ifuser's 10 cellphone includes a phone number identical 
to the pre-registered phone number associated with user's 10 
telephonic device 16 stored on phone number database 114 of 
the bank’s server (e.g., service provider server 102). In the 
example, phone number Verification system 212 may obtain 
the phone number associated with the cellphone user 10 uti 
lizes to call third party verification service provider 200 using 
a caller ID system (not shown), to determine user's 10 cell 
phone number is "555-555-5555. Phone number verification 
system 212 may then compare the determined cellphone 
number to the previously received pre-registered phone num 
ber associated with telephonic device 16, "555-555-5555.” 
As a result of phone number verification system 212 deter 
mining the phone numbers are identical, phone number veri 
fication system 212 may communicate with verification sys 
tem 204 to continue user 10 verification process. 
In an embodiment, as best shown in FIG. 1, verification 
system 204 may also include an IP address verification sys 
tem 214. IP address verification system 214 may be config 
ured to provide the probable geographic location of client 
system 12 to user 10 from authentication system 104. More 
specifically, IP address verification system 214 may obtain a 
probable geographic location of client system 12 from IP 
address location system 120 of authentication system 104 and 
provide the probably geographic location to VRU 206 to be 
audibly provided to user 10 via telephonic device 16. In an 
embodiment, the computer simulated speech of VRU 206 
may tell user 10 that client system 12 may be located in a 
probable geographic location, previously determined by IP 
address location system 120. Additionally, VRU 206 may 
prompt user 10 to confirm the probable geographic location 
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of user 10 and/or client system 12 is correct. If user 10 
confirms the probable geographic location of user 10 and/or 
client system 12, IP address verification system 214 may 
communicate with verification system 204 that probable geo 
graphic location of client system 12 has been verified and the 
verification process of user 10 may continue. However, if user 
10 does not confirm the probable geographic location of user 
10 and/or client system 12 is the actual (approximate) loca 
tion of user 10 and/or client system 12, IP address verification 
system 214 may inform notification system 210 of this denial 
in confirmation. As discussed above, as a result of the alert 
from notification system 210, user 10 may not be verified and 
user's 10 electronic transaction request may not be authenti 
cated by servicer provider 100. 
In an alternative embodiment, where client system 12 is a 
component of a computing network, IP address verification 
system 214 of verification system 204 may also include an IP 
address exception database 216. IP address exception data 
base 216 may include a list of pre-registered IP addresses 
which may be associated with proxies, or servers of the com 
puting network which includes client system 12. As a result of 
the use of the computing network, each client system 12 of 
computing network may include the IP address associated 
with the proxies or servers of computing network, and not 
necessarily the IP address associated with the actual location 
of client system 12. In an embodiment, IP address verification 
system 214 may obtain IP address 14 from authentication 
system 104, and may determine IP address 14 is included in 
the pre-registered IP addresses stored on IP address exception 
database 216. As a result, the verification of the probable 
geographic location of user 10 and/or client system 12 per 
formed by IP address verification system 214 may be skipped 
by third party verification service provider 200. In an alter 
native embodiment, if user 10 is aware that IP address 14 of 
client system 12 may be directed to a probable location of a 
server or proxy of the computing network, and not the actual 
location ofuser 10 and/or client system 12, user 10 may verify 
the probable geographic location of the server or proxy of 
computing network with verification system 204. That is, user 
10 may verify the probable location based on IP address 14, 
even though user 10 may be located in an actual geographic 
location distinct from the probable geographic location. 
In the example, after verification system 204 has verified 
both the user 10 inputted password and the phone number 
associated with the cellphone user 10 utilized to call third 
party verification service provider 200, IP address verifica 
tion system 214 may provide the probable location of user 10 
and/or client system 12 (e.g., Washington, D.C.) to VRU 206 
to audibly provide the probable location, so user 10 may 
confirm or deny the location. That is VRU 206 may provide 
user 10 with the following record: “Based on the detected IP 
address, you probable geographical location is Washington, 
D.C. Is this correct? User 10 may speak his answer (e.g., yes 
or no) or may press a key using telephonic device 16 (e.g., 
cellphone) to confirm or deny that user 10 and/or client sys 
tem 12 is actually locate in or near Washington, D.C. Once 
user 10 confirms the probable location, third party verifica 
tion service provider 200 via verification server 202 may send 
a confirmation message to the bank (e.g., service provider 
100), indicating that user 10 has been verified, and user's 10 
electronic transaction request may be authenticated and Suc 
cessfully processed. Transaction system 108 of Authentica 
tion system 104 may then process user's 10 electronic trans 
action request, or in the example, transfer S500 between 
user's 10 checking account and savings account, both held by 
the bank (e.g., service provider 100). 
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Turning to FIGS. 2A-2B, a flow diagram illustrating a 
method according to embodiments of the invention is dis 
closed. At 51, a log-in request by user 10 is obtained (e.g., 
accessing service provider 100 website), where log-in infor 
mation is provided by user 10. At S2, it is determined if the 
log-in information provided by user 10 is valid. If no, the 
session is terminated S17. If yes, an electronic transaction 
request from user's 10 client system 12 is received, at S3. At 
S4, an IP address 14 associated with client system 12 from 
which the received electronic transaction request originated is 
determined. At S5, a pre-registered telephone number asso 
ciated with telephonic device 16 of user 10 is determined. At 
S6, user 10 is provided with a OTP and is prompted to utilize 
telephonic device 16 to confirm the OTP with third party 
verification service provider 200. 
At S7, a third party verification service provider 200 
receives a telephonic communication from telephonic device 
16 associated with user 10. At S8, VRU 206 of third party 
verification service provider 200 prompts user 10 to input the 
OTP using telephonic device 16. At S9, it is determined if the 
inputted OTP is identical to the password provided to user 10 
at S6. If no, the session is terminated S17. If yes, it is deter 
mined if the phone number associated with the telephonic 
device used by user 10 to call third party verification service 
provider 200 is identical to the pre-registered phone number 
associated with user's 10 telephonic device 16, at S10. If no. 
user 10 may by-pass S10 and proceed to S12 by confirming 
the number of the pre-registered associated with user's 10 
telephonic device 16, or confirming user 10 would like to 
proceed in the verification process at S11. In an optional 
feature, if no at S10, the session is terminated S17. If yes at 
510 or user 10 by-passes 510, a probable location of user 10 
and/or system client 12 is determined based on the deter 
mined IP address 14 of client system 12, at S12. At S13, VRU 
206 communicates the probable location of user 10 and/or 
client system 12 using telephonic device 16. At S14, user 10 
is prompted to confirm or deny the probable location of user 
10 and/or client system 12 based on user's 10 or client sys 
tem’s 12 actual location. If denied, the session is terminated 
S17. If probable location is confirmed, third party verification 
service provider 200 verifies user 10 and notifies service 
provider 100 of user's 10 successful verification, at S15. At 
S16, service provider 100 authenticates and processes user's 
electronic transaction request. 
Note that while the embodiments are described with refer 
ence to a telephonic device, the invention may be imple 
mented with any device that has a unique discoverable iden 
tifier (e.g., phone number, email address, IP address, etc.) and 
can transmit a token to a third party verification service pro 
vider 200. 
Referring again to FIG. 1, it is understood that each of the 
authentication system 104 and verification server 202 may be 
implemented using any type of computing device (i.e., com 
puter system). Such a computing device generally includes a 
processor, input/output (I/O), memory, and bus. The proces 
Sor may comprise a single processing unit, or be distributed 
across one or more processing units in one or more locations, 
e.g., on a client and server. Memory may comprise any known 
type of data storage, including magnetic media, optical 
media, random access memory (RAM), read-only memory 
(ROM), a data cache, a data object, etc. Moreover, memory 
may reside at a single physical location, comprising one or 
more types of data storage, or be distributed across a plurality 
of physical systems in various forms. 
I/O may comprise any system for exchanging information 
to/from an external resource. External devices/resources may 
comprise any known type of external device, including a 
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monitor/display, speakers, storage, another computer system, 
a hand-held device, keyboard, mouse, voice recognition sys 
tem, speech output system, printer, facsimile, pager, etc. The 
bus provides a communication link between each of the com 
ponents in the computing device and likewise may comprise 
any known type of transmission link, including electrical, 
optical, wireless, etc. Although not shown, additional com 
ponents, such as cache memory, communication systems, 
system software, etc., may be incorporated. 
Access may be provided over a network Such as the Inter 
net, a local area network (LAN), a wide area network (WAN). 
a virtual private network (VPN), etc. Communication could 
occur via a direct hardwired connection (e.g., serial port), or 
via an addressable connection that may utilize any combina 
tion of wireline and/or wireless transmission methods. More 
over, conventional network connectivity, Such as TokenRing, 
Ethernet, WiFi or other conventional communications stan 
dards could be used. Still yet, connectivity could be provided 
by conventional TCP/IP sockets-based protocol. In this 
instance, an Internet service provider could be used to estab 
lish interconnectivity. Further, as indicated above, communi 
cation could occur in a client-server or server-server environ 
ment. 
It should be appreciated that the teachings of the present 
invention could be offered as a business method on a sub 
Scription or fee basis. For example, a computer system com 
prising authentication system 104 and/or verification system 
204 could be created, maintained and/or deployed by a ser 
vice provider that offers the functions described herein for 
customers. That is, a service provider could offer to deploy or 
provide the ability to provide authentication as described 
above. 
It is understood that in addition to being implemented as a 
system and method, the features may be provided as one or 
more program products stored on computer-readable storage 
mediums, which when run, enables one ore more computer 
systems to provide authentication as described. To this extent, 
the computer-readable storage medium may include program 
code, which implements the processes and systems described 
herein. It is understood that the term “computer-readable 
medium' comprises one or more of any type of physical 
embodiment of the program code. In particular, the computer 
readable medium can comprise program code embodied on 
one or more portable storage articles of manufacture (e.g., a 
compact disc, a magnetic disk, a tape, etc.), on one or more 
data storage portions of a computing device. Such as memory 
and/or a storage system. 
As used herein, it is understood that the terms “program 
code' and "computer program code' are synonymous and 
mean any expression, in any language, code or notation, of a 
set of instructions that cause a computing device having an 
information processing capability to perform a particular 
function either directly or after any combination of the fol 
lowing: (a) conversion to another language, code or notation; 
(b) reproduction in a different material form; and/or (c) 
decompression. To this extent, program code can be embod 
ied as one or more types of program products. Such as an 
application/software program, component software/a library 
of functions, an operating system, a basic I/O System/driver 
for a particular computing and/or I/O device, and the like. 
Further, it is understood that terms such as “component” and 
“system” are synonymous as used herein and represent any 
combination of hardware and/or software capable of per 
forming some function(s). 
The block diagrams in the figures illustrate the architec 
ture, functionality, and operation of possible implementations 
of systems, methods and computer program products accord 
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ing to various embodiments of the present invention. In this 
regard, each block in the block diagrams may represent a 
module, segment, or portion of code, which comprises one or 
more executable instructions for implementing the specified 
logical function(s). It should also be noted that the functions 
noted in the blocks may occur out of the order noted in the 
figures. For example, two blocks shown in Succession may, in 
fact, be run Substantially concurrently, or the blocks may 
Sometimes be run in the reverse order, depending upon the 
functionality involved. It will also be noted that each block of 
the block diagrams can be implemented by special purpose 
hardware-based systems which perform the specified func 
tions or acts, or combinations of special purpose hardware 
and computer instructions. 
Although specific embodiments have been illustrated and 
described herein, those of ordinary skill in the art appreciate 
that any arrangement which is calculated to achieve the same 
purpose may be substituted for the specific embodiments 
shown and that the invention has other applications in other 
environments. This application is intended to cover any adap 
tations or variations of the present invention. The following 
claims are in no way intended to limit the scope of the inven 
tion to the specific embodiments described herein. 
What is claimed is: 
1. A method of authenticating an electronic banking trans 
action, the method comprising: 
receiving an electronic banking transaction request from a 
user, the electronic transaction request originating at a 
client system; 
determining an Internet Protocol (IP) address associated 
with the client system from which the received elec 
tronic banking transaction request originates; 
providing the user with a one time password associated 
with the electronic banking transaction request; 
providing the user with a third party verification number 
associated with the electronic banking transaction 
request; 
receiving a telephonic communication to the third party 
verification number from a telephonic device associated 
with the user; 
prompting the user, via a voice response unit, to input the 
password using the telephonic device, the telephonic 
device having a user number, 
authenticating the user based on a comparison of the input 
ted password and the provided one time password and 
the user number where the authenticating is performed 
by a third-party service provider, wherein the third-party 
provider is not a participant in the electronic banking 
transaction; 
determining a probable location of the user based on the 
determined IP address of the client system; 
communicating to the user, via the Voice response unit, the 
probable location of the user based on the determined IP 
address associated with the client system; and 
prompting the user to confirm the probable location of the 
user based on the IP address associated with the client 
system. 
2. The method of claim 1, further comprising processing 
the electronic banking transaction request for the user in 
response to the user confirming the probable location of the 
user based on the determined IP address is substantially simi 
lar to an actual location of the user. 
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the telephonic device 
includes at least one of a mobile device or a telephone. 
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the user number is 
pre-registered with the third-party service provider. 
10 
15 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
65 
14 
5. The method of claim 1, further comprising cancelling the 
electronic banking transaction request in response to one of 
receiving a telephonic communication from a distinct tele 
phonic device that is not associated with the user, 
determining the inputted one time password differs from 
the provided one time password, or 
receiving a notification from the user indicating the user 
has cancelled the electronic banking transaction request 
in response to the probable location of the user differing 
from an actual location of the user. 
6. The method of claim 1, further comprising: 
determining if the IP address associated with the client 
system is included on a server proxies list; and 
performing one of: 
excluding the user from confirming the probable loca 
tion of the user based on the IP address in response to 
determining the IP address associated with the client 
system is included on the server proxies list, or 
allowing the user to confirm the probable location of the 
user, independent of an actual location of the user, in 
response to determining the IP address associated 
with the client system is included on the server prox 
ies list. 
7. The method of claim 1, wherein the determining of the 
probable location of the user based on the determined IP 
address associated with the client system is performed by a 
third party service provider who is not a participant in the 
electronic banking transaction. 
8. A computer system comprising: 
at least one computing device configured to authenticate an 
electronic banking transaction by performing actions 
including: 
receiving an electronic banking transaction request from 
a user, the electronic banking transaction request 
originating at a client system; 
determining an Internet Protocol (IP) address associated 
with the client system from which the received elec 
tronic banking transaction request originates; 
providing the user with a one time password associated 
with the electronic banking transaction request; 
providing the user with a third party verification number 
associated with the electronic banking transaction 
request; 
receiving a telephonic communication to the third party 
Verification number from a telephonic device associ 
ated with the user; 
prompting the user, via a Voice response unit, to input the 
password using the telephonic device, the telephonic 
device having a user number; 
authenticating the user based on a comparison of the 
inputted password and the provided password and the 
user number where the authenticating is performed by 
a third-party service provider, wherein the third-party 
provider is not a participant in the electronic banking 
transaction; 
determining a probable location of the user based on the 
determined IP address of the client system; 
communicating to the user, via the Voice response unit, 
the probable location of the user based on the deter 
mined IP address associated with the client system; 
and 
prompting the user to confirm the probable location of 
the user based on the IP address associated with the 
client system. 
9. The computer system of claim 8, further comprising: 
processing the electronic banking transaction request for 
the user in response to the user confirming the probable 
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location of the user based on the determined IP address 
is Substantially similar to an actual location of the user. 
10. The computer system of claim 8, wherein the tele 
phonic device includes at least one of a mobile device or a telephone. 
11. The computer system of claim 8, wherein the user 
number is pre-registered with the third-party service provider. 
12. The computer system of claim 8, further comprising: 
cancelling the electronic banking transaction request in 
response to one of: 
receiving a telephonic communication from a distinct 
telephonic device that is not associated with the user, 
determining the inputted one time password differs from 
the provided one time password, or 
receiving a notification from the user indicating the user 
has cancelled the electronic banking transaction 
requestin response to the probable location of the user 
differing from an actual location of the user. 
13. The computer system of claim 8, further comprising: 
determining if the IP address associated with the client 
system is included on a server proxies list; and 
performing one of: 
excluding the user from confirming the probable loca 
tion of the user based on the IP address in response to 
determining the IP address associated with the client 
system is included on the server proxies list, or 
allowing the user to confirm the probable location of the 
user, independent of an actual location of the user, in 
response to determining the IP address associated 
with the client system is included on the server prox 
ies list. 
14. The computer system of claim 8, wherein the determin 
ing of the probable location of the user based on the deter 
mined IP address associated with the client system is per 
formed by the third party service provider who is not a 
participant in the electronic banking transaction. 
15. A computer program product for authenticating an 
electronic banking transaction, the computer program prod 
uct comprising a non-transitory computer readable medium 
having program code embodied therewith, the program code 
executable by at least one computer system to perform a 
method comprising: 
receiving an electronic banking transaction request from a 
user, the electronic transaction request originating at a 
client system; 
determining an Internet Protocol (IP) address associated 
with the client system from which the received elec 
tronic banking transaction request originates; 
providing the user with a one time password associated 
with the electronic banking transaction request; 
providing the user with a third party verification number 
associated with the electronic banking transaction 
request; 
receiving a telephonic communication to the third party 
verification number from a telephonic device associated 
with the user; 
prompting the user, via a voice response unit, to input the 
password using the telephonic device, the telephonic 
device having a user number, 
authenticating the user based on a comparison of the input 
ted password and the provided password and the user 
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number where the authenticating is performed by a 
third-party service provider, wherein the third-party pro 
vider is not a participant in the electronic banking trans 
action; 
determining a probable location of the user based on the 
determined IP address of the client system; 
communicating to the user, via the Voice response unit, the 
probable location of the user based on the determined IP 
address associated with the client system; and 
prompting the user to confirm the probable location of the 
user based on the IP address associated with the client 
system. 
16. The computer program product of claim 15 further 
comprises: 
processing the electronic banking transaction request for 
the user in response to the user confirming the probable 
location of the user based on the determined IP address 
is Substantially similar to an actual location of the user. 
17. The computer program product of claim 15, wherein 
the telephonic device includes at least one of a mobile device 
or a telephone. 
18. The computer program product of claim 15, wherein 
the user number is pre-registered with the third-party service 
provider. 
19. The computer program product of claim 15 further 
comprises: 
cancelling the electronic banking transaction request in 
response to one of: 
receiving a telephonic communication from a distinct 
telephonic device that is not associated with the user, 
determining the inputted one time password differs from 
the provided one time password, or 
receiving a notification from the user indicating the user 
has cancelled the electronic banking transaction 
requestin response to the probable location of the user 
differing from an actual location of the user. 
20. The computer program product of claim 15 further 
comprises: 
determining if the IP address associated with the client 
system is included on a server proxies list; and 
performing one of: 
excluding the user from confirming the probable loca 
tion of the user based on the IP address in response to 
determining the IP address associated with the client 
system is included on the server proxies list, or 
allowing the user to confirm the probable location of the 
user, independent of an actual location of the user, in 
response to determining the IP address associated 
with the client system is included on the server prox 
ies list. 
21. The computer program product of claim 15, wherein 
the determining of the probable location of the user based on 
the determined IP address associated with the client system is 
performed by a third party service provider who is not a 
participant in the electronic banking transaction. 
k k k k k 
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identifies a location requirement for the user attempting to 
access the resource, wherein the location requirement origi 
nates from an entry indicating an expected location of the 
user within the timeframe, and wherein the entry is unmodi- 
fiable by the user. A processor determines whether the 
expected location of the user matches, within a threshold, 
the received location of the user attempting to access the 
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EXPECTED LOCATION-BASED ACCESS 
CONTROL
FIELD OF THE INVENTION
The present invention relates generally to access control, 
and more particularly to geographically-based access con 
trol.
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
Computer networks, particularly those with global reach 
such as the Internet, have greatly influenced the way trans 
actions are conducted and the way data is stored and 
retrieved. With the growth of the Internet, user authentica 
tion has become increasingly important for both computer 
systems and networks. Secure access to computer systems 
and computer networks has been traditionally implemented 
using a user identification (userid) and password pair. This 
requires the user to protect their userid and password from 
unauthorized use. If the userid and password are not pro 
tected, accounts and files can be compromised. For example, 
if a first user knows the userid and password of a second 
user, then the first user may easily access the second user’s 
account information without being authorized to do so.
SUMMARY
Aspects of an embodiment of the present invention dis 
close a method, computer program product, and computing 
system for authenticating a user attempting to access to a 
resource. A processor receives an indication of a user 
attempting to access a resource within a timeframe, wherein 
the indication includes a location of the user. A processor 
identifies a location requirement for the user attempting to 
access the resource, wherein the location requirement origi 
nates from an entry indicating an expected location of the 
user within the timeframe, and wherein the entry is unmodi- 
fiable by the user. A processor determines whether the 
expected location of the user at least matches, within a 
threshold, the received location of the user attempting to 
access the resource.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE SEVERAL 
VIEWS OF THE DRAWINGS
FIG. 1 is a functional block diagram illustrating a distrib 
uted data processing environment, in accordance with one 
embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 2 is a flowchart depicting operational steps of an 
expected location program, executing within the environ 
ment of FIG. 1, for determining whether a current location 
of a user matches an expected location of a user, in accor 
dance with one embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 3 depicts a block diagram of components of the 
server computer and the client computer of FIG. 1, in 
accordance with one embodiment of the present invention.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
The present invention will now be described in detail with 
reference to the Figures. FIG. 1 depicts a diagram of 
distributed data processing environment 10, in accordance 
with one embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 1 
provides only an illustration of one embodiment and does 
not imply any limitations with regard to the environments in 
which different embodiments may be implemented.
i
Distributed data processing environment 10 includes cli 
ent computer 30 and server computer 40 interconnected over 
network 20. Network 20 may be a local area network (LAN), 
a wide area network (WAN) such as the Internet, a combi 
nation of the two or any combination of connections and 
protocols that will support communications between client 
computer 30 and server computer 40, in accordance with 
embodiments of the present invention. Network 20 may 
include wired, wireless, or fiber optic connections. Distrib 
uted data processing environment 10 may include additional 
server computers, client computers, or other devices not 
shown.
Client computer 30 may be a desktop computer, laptop 
computer, tablet computer, personal digital assistant (PDA), 
or smart phone. In general, client computer 30 may be any 
electronic device or computing system capable of processing 
computer program instructions, sending and receiving data, 
and communicating with server computer 40 over network 
20, in accordance with embodiments of the present inven 
tion. In the depicted embodiment, client computer 30 
includes secure resource interface program 50 and schedul 
ing client program 60. In one embodiment, client computer 
30 includes components described in reference to FIG. 3.
Server computer 40 may be a management server, a web 
server, or any other electronic device or computing system 
capable of processing computer program instructions and 
receiving and sending data. In the depicted embodiment, 
server computer 40 may represent a server computing sys 
tem utilizing multiple computers as a server system, such as 
in a cloud computing environment. In the depicted embodi 
ment, server computer 40 includes secure resource 70, 
scheduling server program 80, scheduling storage 90, user 
authentication program 100, user identification (userid) and 
password repository 110, and expected location program 
120. In one embodiment, server computer 40 includes 
components described in reference to FIG. 3.
Secure resource 70 may be a website, a database, a data 
structure, or any computer resource or device that requires 
user authentication to access. In the depicted embodiment, 
secure resource 70 resides on server computer 40. In other 
embodiments, secure resource 70 may reside on another 
server or another computing device, provided that secure 
resource 70 is accessible to secure resource interface pro 
gram 50 and user authentication program 100.
Secure resource interface program 50 operates to visual 
ize content, such as menus and icons, and to allow a user to 
interact with applications or resources accessible to client 
computer 30, such as secure resource 70 on server computer 
40, over network 20. In one embodiment, secure resource 
interface program 50 may be a web browser. In other 
embodiments, secure resource interface program 50 may be 
an application on a smart phone, a security system program, 
or any other program or application capable of visualizing 
content and allowing a user to interact with applications or 
resources accessible to client computer 30, such as secure 
resource 70 on server computer 40, over network 20.
Scheduling client program 60 may be a dedicated client 
scheduling program, a function integrated within another 
program, or any other program or function that can com 
municate with scheduling server program 80 over network 
20 to provide a user interface for creating, receiving and 
responding to schedules and/or entries. In one embodiment, 
a schedule or entry may be a document that includes at least 
one scheduled activity. For example, a scheduled activity 
may be a meeting, appointment, travel plan, or any other 
event. A schedule or entry may include dates and times for 
scheduled activities. In addition, a schedule or entry may
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include at least one geographic location at which each 
respective scheduled activity is intended to take place. A 
schedule or entry may also include regularly scheduled 
activities, such as a work schedule of a user. In some 
embodiments, when adding a scheduled activity to a sched 
ule or entry, the user may include at least one geographic 
location indicating where the scheduled activity takes place. 
In some embodiments, schedules and entries may be man 
aged by a third party, such as an employer, hotel, travel 
agency, or other entity. In some embodiments, the user may 
not have the ability to alter the schedule. For example, a user 
may not be able to change the entry indicating the user’s 
work schedule. Such an entry may need to be changed by the 
user’s employer. In one embodiment, scheduling client 
program 60 resides on client computer 30. In other embodi 
ments, scheduling client program 60 may reside on another 
server or another computing device, provided that schedul 
ing server program 60 can communicate with scheduling 
server program 80.
A user at client computer 30 may use scheduling client 
program 60 to add, remove, or modify a scheduled activity. 
In one embodiment, a user at client computer 30 uses 
scheduling client program 60 to modify his or her schedule. 
For example, the user may add an appointment to his or her 
schedule. In another example, a user may add regularly 
scheduled activities to his or her schedule, such as his or her 
work schedule. In yet another embodiment, scheduling 
client program 60 automatically receives the schedule of the 
user from another program (not shown). In yet another 
embodiment, scheduling client program 60 accesses a 
schedule stored by another program (not shown). In some 
embodiments, a user may have the ability to view his or her 
schedule, but the user may not have the ability to modify his 
or her schedule. In such an embodiment, a third party may 
be responsible for modifying the schedule. For example, an 
employer may establish and populate a work schedule 
and/or vacation schedule, and a travel agency may manage 
a travel itinerary. In such examples, the schedule/itinerary 
may be unmodifiable by the user.
In some embodiments, a user at client computer 30 may 
use scheduling client program 60 to modify a schedule of a 
second user. For example, the user may be a travel agent, and 
the travel agent may modify the schedule for a client. In such 
an example, the user may use scheduling client program 60 
to modify the schedule of the second user to include travel 
plans of the second user. For example, the user adds a travel 
itinerary to the second user’s schedule. In another example, 
the user enters a work schedule and associated location of a 
second user. In such an embodiment, the second user may 
not have the authority or privilege to independently adjust 
their schedule. A scheduling user may have an interest in 
securing secure resource 70, and by controlling the schedule 
of a second user, the scheduling user may limit the locations 
from which the second user can access secure resource 70. 
Scheduling client program 60 may periodically send updated 
schedules to scheduling server program 80 over network 20. 
In another embodiment, scheduling client program 60 peri 
odically sends schedules of users to expected location pro 
gram 120 over network 20. For example, scheduling client 
program 60 sends a modified schedule of a user to expected 
location program 120 over network 20.
Scheduling server program 80 operates to receive, for 
ward, and manage schedules received from scheduling client 
programs, such as scheduling client program 60, located on 
client computer 30 and/or other client computers (not 
shown). In one embodiment, scheduling server program 80 
stores scheduling events managed by scheduling server
3
program 80 to scheduling storage 90. In one embodiment, 
scheduling server program 80 periodically sends schedules 
of one or more users to expected location program 120. For 
example, scheduling server program 80 may send a modified 
schedule of a user to expected location program 120. In one 
embodiment, scheduling server program 80 resides on 
server computer 40. In other embodiments, scheduling 
server program 80 may reside on another server or another 
computing device, provided that scheduling server program 
80 can communicate with scheduling client program 60, 
scheduling storage 90, and expected location program 120.
Scheduling storage 90 is a repository that may be written 
and read by scheduling server program 80 and may be 
accessible to scheduling server program 80, user authenti 
cation program 100, and expected location program 120. In 
one embodiment, scheduling storage 90 stores schedules 
and/or entries associated with users of scheduling server 
program 80. In some embodiments, scheduling storage 90 is 
a database. In other embodiments, scheduling storage 90 is 
a file. In some embodiment, scheduling storage 90 is located 
on server computer 40. In other embodiments, scheduling 
storage 90 may be located on another server computer or 
another computing device, provided that scheduling storage 
90 is accessible to scheduling server program 80, user 
authentication program 100, and expected location program 
120.
User authentication program 100 operates to determine 
whether to grant or deny a current user of client computer 30 
access to secure resource 70 by determining if a userid and 
password, received from secure resource interface program 
50, matches a stored userid and password of a user autho 
rized to access secure resource 70. In one embodiment, user 
authentication program 110 accesses userid and password 
repository 110 and compares the userid and password sent 
by secure resource interface program 50 to the userids and 
corresponding passwords stored in userid and password 
repository 110. In one embodiment, user authentication 
program 100 is a program residing on server computer 40. 
In other embodiments, user authentication program 100 may 
reside on another server or another computing device, pro 
vided that user authentication program 100 is accessible to 
secure resource interface program 50 and secure resource 70 
and has access to userid and password repository 110 and 
expected location program 120.
Userid and password repository 110 is a repository that 
may be written to and read by user authentication program 
110. Userid and password repository 110 operates to store 
userids and corresponding passwords for users authorized to 
access secure resource 70. In one embodiment, userid and 
password repository 110 is a database. In one embodiment, 
userid and password repository 110 is located on server 
computer 40. In other embodiments, userid and password 
repository 110 may be located on another server computer or 
another computing device, provided that userid and pass 
word repository 110 is accessible to user authentication 
program 100.
Expected location program 120 operates to determine 
whether a current location of a user matches an expected 
location of the user. In one embodiment, expected location 
program 120 receives an indication from user authentication 
program 100 that a user at client computer 30 is attempting 
to access secure resource 70. In one embodiment, the 
indication includes the userid of the user. In some embodi 
ments, the indication also includes the current geographic 
location of the user. In some embodiments, the indication is 
a geographic coordinate of the location of the user. In one 
embodiment, expected location program 120 is a function of
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user authentication program 110. In another embodiment, 
expected location program 120 is a stand-alone program. In 
one embodiment, expected location program 120 is located 
on server computer 40. In other embodiments, expected 
location program 120 may be located on another server 
computer or another computing device, provided that 
expected location program 120 has access to secure resource 
70, scheduling storage 90, and userid and password reposi 
tory 110.
In one embodiment, expected location program 120 
accesses scheduling storage 90. In such an embodiment, 
expected location program 120 may parse through schedules 
or entries stored by scheduling storage 90. Expected location 
program 120 may identify a schedule or entry for the user 
associated with the received userid. Expected location pro 
gram 120 may determine the geographic location where the 
user is scheduled to be based on the identified schedule or 
entry. For example, expected location program 120 deter 
mines from a schedule provided by a travel agency or 
employer that a user has travel plans and is scheduled to be 
in Spain during a specified timeframe. Expected location 
program 120 compares the user’s current location (e.g. 
Madrid, Spain) to the users expected location (e.g. Spain). 
Expected location program 120 may determine that the 
user’s current location matches the user’s expected location. 
In some embodiments, expected location program 120 may 
determine that the user’s current location matches the user’s 
expected location within a predefined threshold. The pre 
defined threshold may indicate a set of coordinates, location, 
or other location identifying means around the expected 
location within which, the user is considered to match, or 
partially match the expected location. Expected location 
program 120 may send an indication to user authentication 
program 100 indicating that the user’s current location 
matches, or substantially matches, the user’s expected loca 
tion.
FIG. 2 depicts a flowchart of the steps of expected 
location program 120 for determining whether a current 
location of a user matches an expected location of a user, in 
accordance with one embodiment of the present invention.
Initially, in one embodiment, a user at client computer 30 
uses secure resource interface program 50 to attempt to 
access secure resource 70 over network 20. In some embodi 
ments, the user enters a userid and password. Secure 
resource interface program 50 sends the userid and password 
for the user to user authentication program 100 over network 
20. In one embodiment, secure resource interface program 
50 further includes information indicating the geographic 
location of the computing device associated with the user, 
such as client computer 30. In one embodiment, secure 
resource interface program 50 sends an IP address of the user 
to user authentication program 100. In other embodiments, 
secure resource interface program 50 may send GPS coor 
dinates, RFID tag information, or utilize triangulation tech 
niques to indicate the geographic location of client computer 
30.
User authentication program 100 receives the userid, 
password, and IP address (or other information used to 
locate the current geographic location of the user). In one 
embodiment, user authentication program 100 accesses 
userid and password repository 110 and compares the 
received password to the stored password for the received 
userid. User authentication program 100 determines that the 
received password matches the stored password for the 
userid. In one embodiment, user authentication program 100 
sends an access request to expected location program 120. In 
another embodiment, user authentication program 100 sends
l
an access request to expected location program 120 before 
user authentication program 100 authenticates the userid and 
password of the user.
In step 200, expected location program 120 receives an 
access request. In one embodiment, expected location pro 
gram 120 receives an access request from user authentica 
tion program 100. The access request can include the userid 
and a geographic location of the user at client computer 30.
In step 210, expected location program 120 determines a 
current geographic location of the user. In one embodiment, 
expected location program 120 uses the received IP address 
to determine the current geographic location of the user. 
Expected location program 120 may determine the geo 
graphic location of client computer 30 and the user based on 
a received IP address. An IP address is a numerical label 
assigned to a device (e.g. client computer 30 or server 
computer 40) in a computer network (e.g. network 20) that 
uses the Internet Protocol for communication. An IP address 
serves two principal functions: 1) network interface identi 
fication, and 2) geographic location addressing. In one 
example, expected location program 120 determines, from 
the received IP address, that the current geographic location 
of the user is Los Angeles, Calif.
In other embodiments, expected location program 120 
determines the location using global positioning system 
(GPS) coordinates received from client computer 30, when 
client computer 30 is a computing device with GPS capa 
bilities, such as a smartphone or tablet. In another embodi 
ment, client computer 30 may not have GPS capabilities, 
and expected location program 120 receives GPS coordi 
nates of the user from an external device in the user’s 
possession, such as a GPS receiver, cell phone, tablet, or 
other external device capable of communicating with client 
computer 30. In yet another embodiment, when client com 
puter 30 is connected to a cellular network, expected loca 
tion program 120 may receive the geographic location of a 
user gathered via the multilateration of radio signals 
between radio towers of the network and client computer 30. 
In yet another embodiment, expected location program 120 
receives information and determines the geographic location 
of a user from a badging or check-in system. For example, 
an RFID system may be implemented within an office 
building that can communicate with server 30 based on 
active or passive RFID tags located on a user’s badge, client 
device, or any other object or device compatible with an 
RFID tag. Multiple RFID tag readers may be positioned 
throughout the office building so that the location of the user 
can be determined. In other embodiments, expected location 
program 120 determines the current geographic location of 
the user from connections to specific networks. In other 
embodiments expected location program 120 determines the 
current geographic location of the user from telephone 
numbers or connections to specific networks.
In decision 220, expected location program 120 deter 
mines if client computer 30, and therefore the user, is at an 
expected location. The expected location may be a location 
requirement for the user to access secure resource 70. In 
some embodiments, the expected location originates from a 
schedule or entry. In one embodiment, expected location 
program 120 accesses scheduling storage 90 and identifies a 
schedule, travel itinerary, calendar, or other document speci 
fying dates and locations where the user is expected, asso 
ciated with the userid received from client computer 30. In 
some embodiments, the schedule or other entry was created, 
modified, and/or maintained by the user. In other embodi 
ments, the schedule or other entry was created, modified, 
and/or maintained by a third party, such as an employer,
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travel agency, or other entity, and the user does not have 
access to adjust or otherwise modify the schedule or entry. 
In such an embodiment, the third party may have an interest 
in limiting access to secure resource 70. For example, an 
employer may want to make sure an employee, with legiti 
mate purpose, is accessing secure resource 70 during actual 
business hours or at particular business locations. In addi 
tion, denying a user the ability to modify the schedule or 
entry may prevent fraudulent access by another individual 
attempting to modify the schedule to their present location 
in order to gain access to secure resource 70.
In one embodiment, expected location program 120 uses 
text analytics to parse through the schedule or other docu 
ment. Using natural language processing and at least one set 
of dictionaries and rules, expected location program 120 can 
perform text analytics on the schedule or other document. 
Text analytics can be performed using an Unstructured 
Information Management Architecture (UIMA) application 
configured to analyze unstructured information to discover 
patterns relevant to expected location program 120 by 
processing plain text and identifying entities or relations.
In another embodiment, expected location program 120 
accesses an e-mail repository to identify e-mail correspon 
dence associated with the received userid. Expected location 
program 120 may use text analytics to parse through the 
e-mail correspondence. In one embodiment, expected loca 
tion program 120 uses natural language processing and at 
least one set of dictionaries and rules to determine the user’s 
expected location from the user’s e-mail correspondence. 
For example, expected location program 120 determines 
from the e-mail correspondence that the user has travel plans 
to visit a friend in Los Angeles, Calif, on the current date.
In yet another embodiment, expected location program 
120 accesses a cell phone memory repository, such as a 
memory card associated with the received userid. Expected 
location program 120 uses text analytics to parse through a 
text message correspondence. In one embodiment, expected 
location program 120 uses natural language processing and 
at least one set of dictionaries and rules to determine the 
user’s expected location from the user’s text message cor 
respondence. For example, expected location program 120 
determines from the text message correspondence that the 
user has travel plans to visit a friend in Los Angeles, Calif, 
on the current date.
In another embodiment, expected location program 120 
receives the expected location of the user from scheduling 
server program 80. In another embodiment, expected loca 
tion program 120 receives the expected location of the user 
from scheduling client program 60. In yet another embodi 
ment, expected location program 120 accesses information 
stored by a scheduling program, such as scheduling server 
program 80 to scheduling storage 90, and retrieves a list of 
expected locations and corresponding dates and/or times 
within which the user is anticipated to be at the expected 
location. In such an embodiment, scheduling server program 
80 may analyze entry information to determine a location 
and date or time associated with the entry using text analytic 
techniques previously described and/or information located 
in fields of the entry associated with location and date and/or 
time.
Expected location program 120 compares the user’s cur 
rent location (determined in step 210) to the one or more 
expected locations of the user. In decision 220, expected 
location program 120 determines if the user’s current loca 
tion matches the user’s expected location. In one embodi 
ment, expected location program 120 determines if the 
user’s current location exactly matches the user’s expected
7
location. In another embodiment, expected location program 
120 determines if the user’s current location is within a 
pre-defined threshold, such as a radius, of the user’s 
expected location. For example, expected location program 
120 determines if the user’s current location is within a 50 
mile radius of the user’s expected location. Alternatively, 
expected location program 120 may determine if the user’s 
current location is within a certain set of GPS coordinates 
that define a boundary of a specified distance around the 
expected location. In another embodiment, expected loca 
tion program 120 may determine if the IP address associated 
with the user matches an IP address corresponding to an 
expected location, such as a town or city. If expected 
location program 120 determines that the user’s current 
location matches the user’s expected location, expected 
location program 120 proceeds to step 230 (decision 220, 
yes branch). If expected location program 120 determines 
that the user’s current location does not match the user’s 
expected location, expected location program 120 proceeds 
to step 240 (decision 220, no branch).
In step 230, expected location program 120 sends an 
indication that the current location of the user matches the 
expected location of the user. In one embodiment, expected 
location program 120 sends an indication that the current 
location of the user matches the expected location of the user 
to user authentication program 100. In one embodiment, 
user authentication program 100 allows the user to access 
secure resource 70. In another embodiment, user authenti 
cation program 100 compares the received userid and pass 
word to the userid(s) and password(s) stored by userid and 
password repository 110. In yet another embodiment, 
expected location program 120 allows the user to access 
secure resource 70.
In step 240, expected location program 120 sends an 
indication that the current location of the user does not 
match the expected location of the user. In one embodiment, 
expected location program 120 sends an indication that the 
current location of the user does not match the expected 
location of the user to user authentication program 100. In 
one embodiment, user authentication program 100 does not 
allow the user to access secure resource 70. In another 
embodiment, expected location program 120 does not allow 
the user to access secure resource 70. In yet another embodi 
ment, expected location program 120 alerts the host or 
administrator of secure resource 70 that the user has 
attempted to access secure resource 70 from an unexpected 
location. In yet another embodiment, expected location 
program 120 requires the user to provide additional authen 
tication. For example, expected location program 120 may 
prompt the user to enter personal information, such as the 
date of birth of the user. In another embodiment, expected 
location program 120 prompts the user to enter a second 
password. In yet another embodiment, expected location 
program 120 requires the user to provide biometric authen 
tication. For example, expected location program 120 
prompts the user to speak into a microphone. In such an 
embodiment, expected location program 120 compares the 
user’s voice to a stored voice associated with the userid and 
password combination entered by the user. In another 
embodiment, expected location program 120 requires a 
security token, or software token, as additional authentica 
tion. A software token is a type of two-factor authentication 
security device that may be used to authorize the use of 
computer services. Software tokens can be stored on a 
general-purpose electronic device such as a desktop com 
puter, laptop, PDA, or mobile phone and can be duplicated.
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FIG. 3 depicts a block diagram of components of client 
computer 30 and server computer 40 in accordance with one 
embodiment of the present invention. It should be appreci 
ated that FIG. 3 provides only an illustration of one imple 
mentation and does not imply any limitations with regard to 
the environments in which different embodiments may be 
implemented. Many modifications to the depicted environ 
ment may be made.
Client computer 30 and server computer 40 can each 
include communications fabric 302, which provides com 
munications between computer processor(s) 304, memory 
306, persistent storage 308, communications unit 310, and 
input/output (I/O) interface(s) 312. Communications fabric 
302 can be implemented with any architecture designed for 
passing data and/or control information between processors 
(such as microprocessors, communications and network 
processors, etc.), system memory, peripheral devices, and 
any other hardware components within a system. For 
example, communications fabric 302 can be implemented 
with one or more buses.
Memory 306 and persistent storage 308 are computer- 
readable storage media. In this embodiment, memory 306 
includes random access memory (RAM) 314 and cache 
memory 316. In general, memory 306 can include any 
suitable volatile or non-volatile computer-readable storage 
media.
Secure resource interface program 50 and scheduling 
client program 60 is stored in persistent storage 308 of client 
computer 30 for execution by one or more of the respective 
computer processors 304 of client computer 30 via one or 
more memories of memory 306 of client computer 30. 
Secure resource 70, scheduling server program 80, sched 
uling storage 90, user authentication program 100, userid 
and password repository 110, and expected location program 
120 are stored in persistent storage 308 of server computer 
40 for execution and/or access by one or more of the 
respective computer processors 304 of server computer 40 
via one or more memories of memory 306 of server com 
puter 40. In this embodiment, persistent storage 308 includes 
a magnetic hard disk drive. Alternatively, or in addition to a 
magnetic hard disk drive, persistent storage 308 can include 
a solid state hard drive, a semiconductor storage device, 
read-only memory (ROM), erasable programmable read 
only memory (EPROM), flash memory, or any other com 
puter-readable storage media capable of storing program 
instructions or digital information.
The media used by persistent storage 308 may also be 
removable. For example, a removable hard drive may be 
used for persistent storage 308. Other examples include 
optical and magnetic disks, thumb drives, and smart cards 
inserted into a drive for transfer onto another computer- 
readable storage medium that is also part of persistent 
storage 308.
Communications unit 310, in these examples, provides 
for communications with other servers or devices. In these 
examples, communications unit 310 includes one or more 
network interface cards. Communications unit 310 may 
provide communications through the use of either or both 
physical and wireless communications links. Secure 
resource interface program 50 and scheduling client pro 
gram 60 may be downloaded to persistent storage 308 of 
client computer 30 through the communications unit 310 of 
client computer 30. Secure resource 70, scheduling server 
program 80, scheduling storage 90, user authentication 
program 100, userid and password repository 110, and 
expected location program 120 may be downloaded to
i
persistent storage 308 of server computer 40 through the 
communications unit 310 of server computer 40.
I/O interface(s) 312 allows for input and output of data 
with other devices that may be connected to client computer 
30 or server computer 40. For example, I/O interface 312 
may provide a connection to external devices 318 such as a 
keyboard, keypad, a touch screen, and/or some other suit 
able input device. External devices 318 can also include 
portable computer-readable storage media such as, for 
example, thumb drives, portable optical or magnetic disks, 
and memory cards. Software and data used to practice 
embodiments of the present invention, e.g., secure resource 
interface program 50 and scheduling client program 60, can 
be stored on such portable computer-readable storage media 
and can be loaded onto persistent storage 308 of client 
computer 30, respectively, via the respective I/O interface(s) 
312 of client computer 30. Software and data used to 
practice embodiments of the present invention, e.g. Secure 
resource 70, scheduling server program 80, scheduling stor 
age 90, user authentication program 100, userid and pass 
word repository 110, and expected location program 120, 
can be stored on such portable computer-readable storage 
media and can be loaded onto persistent storage 308 of 
server computer 40 via I/O interface(s) 312 of server com 
puter 40.
The programs described herein are identified based upon 
the application for which they are implemented in a specific 
embodiment of the invention. However, it should be appre 
ciated that any particular program nomenclature herein is 
used merely for convenience, and thus the invention should 
not be limited to use solely in any specific application 
identified and/or implied by such nomenclature.
The present invention may be a system, a method, and/or 
a computer program product. The computer program prod 
uct may include a computer readable storage medium (or 
media) having computer readable program instructions 
thereon for causing a processor to carry out aspects of the 
present invention.
The computer readable storage medium can be a tangible 
device that can retain and store instructions for use by an 
instruction execution device. The computer readable storage 
medium may be, for example, but is not limited to, an 
electronic storage device, a magnetic storage device, an 
optical storage device, an electromagnetic storage device, a 
semiconductor storage device, or any suitable combination 
of the foregoing. A non-exhaustive list of more specific 
examples of the computer readable storage medium includes 
the following: a portable computer diskette, a hard disk, a 
random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory 
(ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory 
(EPROM or Flash memory), a static random access memory 
(SRAM), a portable compact disc read-only memory (CD- 
ROM), a digital versatile disk (DVD), a memory stick, a 
floppy disk, a mechanically encoded device such as punch- 
cards or raised structures in a groove having instructions 
recorded thereon, and any suitable combination of the fore 
going. A computer readable storage medium, as used herein, 
is not to be construed as being transitory signals per se, such 
as radio waves or other freely propagating electromagnetic 
waves, electromagnetic waves propagating through a wave 
guide or other transmission media (e.g., light pulses passing 
through a fiber-optic cable), or electrical signals transmitted 
through a wire.
Computer readable program instructions described herein 
can be downloaded to respective computing/processing 
devices from a computer readable storage medium or to an 
external computer or external storage device via a network,
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for example, the Internet, a local area network, a wide area 
network and/or a wireless network. The network may com 
prise copper transmission cables, optical transmission fibers, 
wireless transmission, routers, firewalls, switches, gateway 
computers and/or edge servers. A network adapter card or 
network interface in each computing/processing device 
receives computer readable program instructions from the 
network and forwards the computer readable program 
instructions for storage in a computer readable storage 
medium within the respective computing/processing device.
Computer readable program instructions for carrying out 
operations of the present invention may be assembler 
instructions, instruction-set-architecture (ISA) instructions, 
machine instructions, machine dependent instructions, 
microcode, firmware instructions, state-setting data, or 
either source code or object code written in any combination 
of one or more programming languages, including an object 
oriented programming language such as Smalltalk, C++ or 
the like, and conventional procedural programming lan 
guages, such as the “C” programming language or similar 
programming languages. The computer readable program 
instructions may execute entirely on the user’s computer, 
partly on the user’s computer, as a stand-alone software 
package, partly on the user’s computer and partly on a 
remote computer or entirely on the remote computer or 
server. In the latter scenario, the remote computer may be 
connected to the user’s computer through any type of 
network, including a local area network (LAN) or a wide 
area network (WAN), or the connection may be made to an 
external computer (for example, through the Internet using 
an Internet Service Provider). In some embodiments, elec 
tronic circuitry including, for example, programmable logic 
circuitry, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA), or pro 
grammable logic arrays (PLA) may execute the computer 
readable program instructions by utilizing state information 
of the computer readable program instructions to personalize 
the electronic circuitry, in order to perform aspects of the 
present invention.
Aspects of the present invention are described herein with 
reference to flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams of 
methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program prod 
ucts according to embodiments of the invention. It will be 
understood that each block of the flowchart illustrations 
and/or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks in the 
flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams, can be imple 
mented by computer readable program instructions.
These computer readable program instructions may be 
provided to a processor of a general purpose computer, 
special purpose computer, or other programmable data pro 
cessing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the 
instructions, which execute via the processor of the com 
puter or other programmable data processing apparatus, 
create means for implementing the functions/acts specified 
in the flowchart and/or block diagram block or blocks. These 
computer readable program instructions may also be stored 
in a computer readable storage medium that can direct a 
computer, a programmable data processing apparatus, and/ 
or other devices to function in a particular manner, such that 
the computer readable storage medium having instructions 
stored therein comprises an article of manufacture including 
instructions which implement aspects of the function/act 
specified in the flowchart and/or block diagram block or 
blocks.
The computer readable program instructions may also be 
loaded onto a computer, other programmable data process 
ing apparatus, or other device to cause a series of operational 
steps to be performed on the computer, other programmable
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apparatus or other device to produce a computer imple 
mented process, such that the instructions which execute on 
the computer, other programmable apparatus, or other 
device implement the functions/acts specified in the flow 
chart and/or block diagram block or blocks.
The flowchart and block diagrams in the Figures illustrate 
the architecture, functionality, and operation of possible 
implementations of systems, methods, and computer pro 
gram products according to various embodiments of the 
present invention. In this regard, each block in the flowchart 
or block diagrams may represent a module, segment, or 
portion of instructions, which comprises one or more 
executable instructions for implementing the specified logi 
cal function(s). In some alternative implementations, the 
functions noted in the block may occur out of the order noted 
in the figures. For example, two blocks shown in succession 
may, in fact, be executed substantially concurrently, or the 
blocks may sometimes be executed in the reverse order, 
depending upon the functionality involved. It will also be 
noted that each block of the block diagrams and/or flowchart 
illustration, and combinations of blocks in the block dia 
grams and/or flowchart illustration, can be implemented by 
special purpose hardware-based systems that perform the 
specified functions or acts or carry out combinations of 
special purpose hardware and computer instructions.
What is claimed is:
1. A method for authenticating a user attempting to access 
to a resource, the method comprising:
receiving a schedule indicating an expected location of a 
user within a timeframe, wherein: 
text contained in the schedule was populated by an 
entity and the schedule is unmodifiable by the user; 
and
the schedule is associated with a user identification 
unique to the user;
connecting a computing device of the user to a network;
receiving, from the computing device connected to the 
network, an indication, via the network, of the user 
attempting to access an electronic resource at a storage 
location that is accessible via the network, within the 
timeframe, wherein the indication includes the user 
identification unique to the user and a password;
determining, by one or more hardware processors, a 
location of the first user utilizing a radio-frequency 
identification (RFID) system and receiving RFID tag 
information associated with the user, wherein the RFID 
tag information was obtained from an RFID tag reader 
of the RFID system;
determining that the entity has authorized the user to 
access the electronic resource based on the user iden 
tification unique to the user and the password;
extracting an expected location of the user within the 
timeframe from unstructured text of the schedule using 
text analytics on the unstructured text of the schedule;
subsequent to determining that the user is a user autho 
rized to access the electronic resource, determining 
whether the expected location of the user matches, 
within a threshold, the received location of the user 
attempting to access the electronic resource; and
performing an action based on the determination.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein, responsive to deter 
mining that the expected location of the user matches, within 
the threshold, the received location of the user attempting to 
access the electronic resource, the action comprises causing 
the user to be granted access to the electronic resource.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein, responsive to deter 
mining that the expected location of the user does not match,
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within the threshold, the received location of the user 
attempting to access the electronic resource, the action 
comprises causing the user to be denied access to the 
electronic resource.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein, responsive to deter 
mining that the expected location of the user does not match, 
within the threshold, the received location of the user 
attempting to access the electronic resource, the action 
comprises causing a biometric authentication requirement to 
be presented to the user, wherein the biometric authentica 
tion requirement includes, at least, a prompt for the user to 
speak into a microphone to compare the user’s voice to a 
stored voice associated with the user identification.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein, responsive to deter 
mining that the expected location of the user does not match, 
within the threshold, the received location of the user 
attempting to access the electronic resource, causing an alert 
to be provided to a host of the electronic resource.
6. A computer program product for securing access to a 
resource, the computer program product comprising:
one or more computer readable hardware storage devices 
and program instructions stored on the one or more 
computer readable hardware storage devices, the pro 
gram instructions comprising:
program instructions to receive a schedule indicating an 
expected location of a user within a timeframe, 
wherein:
text contained in the schedule was populated by an 
entity and the schedule is unmodifiable by the user; 
and
the schedule is associated with a user identification 
unique to the user;
program instructions to connect a computing device of the 
user to a network;
program instructions to receive, from the computing 
device connected to the network, an indication, via the 
network, of the user attempting to access an electronic 
resource at a storage location that is accessible via the 
network, within the timeframe, wherein the indication 
includes the user identification unique to the user and a 
password;
program instructions to determine a location of the first 
user utilizing a radio-frequency identification (RFID) 
system and receiving RFID tag information associated 
with the user, wherein the RFID tag information was 
obtained from an RFID tag reader of the RFID system;
program instructions to determine that the entity has 
authorized the user to access the electronic resource 
based on the user identification unique to the user and 
the password;
program instructions to extract an expected location of the 
user within the timeframe from unstructured text of the 
schedule using text analytics on the unstructured text of 
the schedule;
program instructions to, subsequent to determining that 
the user is a user authorized to access the electronic 
resource, determine whether the expected location of 
the user matches, within a threshold, the received 
location of the user attempting to access the electronic 
resource; and
program instructions to perform an action based on the 
determination.
7. The computer program product of claim 6, wherein, 
responsive to determining that the expected location of the 
user matches, within the threshold, the received location of
13
the user attempting to access the electronic resource, the 
action comprises causing the user to be granted access to the 
electronic resource.
8. The computer program product of claim 6, wherein, 
responsive to determining that the expected location of the 
user does not match, within the threshold, the received 
location of the user attempting to access the electronic 
resource, the action comprises causing the user to be denied 
access to the electronic resource.
9. The computer program product of claim 6, wherein, 
responsive to determining that the expected location of the 
user does not match, within the threshold, the received 
location of the user attempting to access the electronic 
resource, the action comprises causing a biometric authen 
tication requirement to be presented to the user, wherein the 
biometric authentication requirement includes, at least, a 
prompt for the user to speak into a microphone to compare 
the user’s voice to a stored voice associated with the user 
identification.
10. The computer program product of claim 6, wherein, 
responsive to determining that the expected location of the 
user does not match, within the threshold, the received 
location of the user attempting to access the electronic 
resource, the action comprises causing an alert to be pro 
vided to a host of the electronic resource.
11. A computer system for securing access to a resource, 
the computer system comprising:
one or more computer processors, one or more computer 
readable storage devices, and program instructions 
stored on the computer readable storage devices for 
execution by at least one of the one or more computer 
processors, the program instructions comprising:
program instructions to receive a schedule indicating an 
expected location of a user within a timeframe, 
wherein:
text contained in the schedule was populated by an 
entity and the schedule is unmodifiable by the user; 
and
the schedule is associated with a user identification 
unique to the user;
program instructions to connect a computing device of the 
user to a network;
program instructions to receive, from the computing 
device connected to the network, an indication, via the 
network, of the user attempting to access an electronic 
resource at a storage location that is accessible via the 
network within the timeframe, wherein the indication 
includes the user identification unique to the user and a 
password;
program instructions to determine a location of the first 
user utilizing a radio-frequency identification (RFID) 
system and receiving RFID tag information associated 
with the user, wherein the RFID tag information was 
obtained from an RFID tag reader of the RFID system;
program instructions to determine that the entity has 
authorized the user to access the electronic resource 
based on the user identification unique to the user and 
the password;
program instructions to extract an expected location of the 
user within the timeframe from unstructured text of the 
schedule using text analytics on the unstructured text of 
the schedule, wherein program instructions to extract 
the expected location of the user within the timeframe 
from the unstructured text of the schedule using text 
analytics on the unstructured text of the schedule 
comprise:
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program instructions to parse the unstructured text of 
the schedule to identify at least the expected location 
of the user within the timeframe; 
program instructions to, subsequent to determining that 
the user is a user authorized to access the electronic 
resource, determine whether the expected location of 
the user matches, within a threshold, the received 
location of the user attempting to access the resource; 
and
responsive to determining that the expected location of 
the user does not match, within the threshold, the 
received location of the user attempting to access the 
resource:
causing an alert to be provided to a host of the resource; 
and
causing a biometric authentication requirement to be 
presented to the user, wherein the biometric authen 
tication requirement includes, at least, a prompt for 
the user to speak into a microphone to compare the 
user’s voice to a stored voice associated with the user 
identification.
15
12. The computer system of claim 11, wherein, responsive 
to determining that the expected location of the user 
matches, within the threshold, the received location of the 
user attempting to access the resource, the action comprises 
causing the user to be granted access to the resource.
13. The computer system of claim 11, wherein, responsive 
to determining that the expected location of the user does not 
match, within the threshold, the received location of the user 
attempting to access the resource, the action comprises 
causing the user to be denied access to the resource.
14. The method of claim 1, wherein the resource is a 
database.
15. The method of claim 1, wherein the resource is a 
website.
16. The method of claim 1, wherein extracting the 
expected location of the user within the timeframe from the 
unstructured text of the schedule using text analytics on the 
unstructured text of the schedule comprises:
parsing the unstructured text of the schedule to identify at 
least the expected location of the user within the 
timeframe.
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1. 
VERIFICATION OF TRANSACTIONAL 
INTEGRITY 
REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATION 
The current application is related to co-owned U.S. Pat. 
No. 7,715,823 B2, filed on Sep. 20, 2006, and entitled “Meth 
ods and Apparatus for Restricting Access of a User Using a 
Cellular Telephone” and co-owned U.S. Patent Pub. No. 
2008/0318548, filed on Jun. 17, 2007, and entitled “Method 
and System for Strong Authentication and Defense Against 
Man-in-the-Middle Attacks, each of which is hereby incor 
porated herein by reference. 
FIELD OF THE INVENTION 
The subject matter of this invention relates generally to 
transaction verification. More specifically, aspects of the 
present invention provide a system and method for Verifying 
the integrity of a commercial transaction. 
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
There is an increasing use of electronic media in conduct 
ing commercial transactions. These transactions can include 
Such types of transactions as internet banking and electronic 
commerce, to name a few. However, with the increase of these 
transactions comes an increased risk that entities without 
authorization will be able to use the electronic data used in 
these transactions to benefit themselves and/or harm one or 
more of the authorized members of the transaction. 
Current security solutions attempt to eliminate these unau 
thorized transactions, but these solutions are deficient with 
respect to certain type of attack. For example, in one particu 
lar type of man-in-the-middle (MITM) type attack, an unau 
thorized computer program (malware) that has been covertly 
loaded on a user's computer system or elsewhere along the 
chain of the transaction could be used to alter the details of a 
transaction after it has been approved by the user. For 
example, the malware could alter the details of an online 
banking transaction that authorized payment of S100 to the 
electric company in Such a way that the new transaction paid 
S10,000 to the entity that circulated the malware. 
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
In general, aspects of the present invention provide a solu 
tion for verifying the integrity of a transaction. In response to 
receipt of a confirmed electronic transaction from a user, a 
one time password is forwarded to the user. The user then 
initiates a telephonic communication with a verifier on the 
users wireless device and provides the one time password to 
the verifier. The verifier authenticates the mobile telephonic 
device based on the device's caller identification number and 
determines whether the one time password provided by the 
user matches the one forwarded to the user. After the user is 
authenticated, the verifier communicates the details of the 
transaction that were received and the user confirms whether 
the details match those originally entered. 
A first aspect of the invention provides a system for veri 
fying the integrity of a transaction, comprising: a password 
communication module that forwards a one time password to 
a user upon receipt of a confirmed electronic transaction from 
the user, an authenticator module that, in response to a tele 
phonic communication from the user regarding the transac 
tion, authenticates a mobile telephonic device used to initiate 
the telephonic communication based on a caller identification 
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2 
of the mobile telephonic device and authenticates an inputted 
one time password entered by the user via the telephonic 
communication based on the forwarded one time password; a 
detail communication module that facilitates communication 
of details of the confirmed electronic transaction to the user 
via the telephonic communication based on the authentica 
tion; and a verification module that verifies the transaction 
based on an indication via the telephonic communication 
from the user as to whether the details match originally sent 
details from the user. 
A second aspect of the invention provides a method for 
Verifying the integrity of a transaction, comprising: forward 
ing, upon receipt of a confirmed electronic transaction from a 
user, a one time password to the user; receiving a telephonic 
communication from a mobile telephonic device of the user; 
authenticating the mobile telephonic device as being associ 
ated with the user using a caller identification number of the 
mobile telephonic device; receiving an input of the one time 
password from the user via the telephonic communication; 
authenticating an identity of the user based on a comparison 
of the input one time password with the forwarded one time 
password; communicating, based on the authenticating, 
details of the confirmed electronic transaction to the user via 
the telephonic communication; and Verifying the transaction 
based on an indication via the telephonic communication 
from the user as to whether the details match originally sent 
details from the user. 
A third aspect of the invention provides a computer pro 
gram product embodied in a computer readable medium for 
implementing a method for verifying the integrity of a trans 
action, the method comprising: forwarding, upon receipt of a 
confirmed electronic transaction from a user, a one time pass 
word to the user, receiving a telephonic communication from 
a mobile telephonic device of the user; authenticating the 
mobile telephonic device as being associated with the user 
using a caller identification number of the mobile telephonic 
device; receiving an input of the one time password from the 
user via the telephonic communication; authenticating an 
identity of the user based on a comparison of the input one 
time password with the forwarded one time password; com 
municating, based on the authenticating, details of the con 
firmed electronic transaction to the user via the telephonic 
communication; and Verifying the transaction based on an 
indication via the telephonic communication from the user as 
to whether the details match originally sent details from the 
USC. 
A fourth aspect of the present invention provides a method 
for deploying an application for verifying the integrity of a 
transaction, comprising, providing a computer system oper 
able to: forward, upon receipt of a confirmed electronic trans 
action from a user, a one time password to the user, receive a 
telephonic communication from a mobile telephonic device 
of the user; authenticate the mobile telephonic device as being 
associated with the user using a caller identification number 
of the mobile telephonic device; receive an input of the one 
time password from the user via the telephonic communica 
tion; authenticate an identity of the user based on a compari 
son of the input one time password with the forwarded one 
time password; communicate, based on the authenticating, 
details of the confirmed electronic transaction to the user via 
the telephonic communication; and Verify the transaction 
based on an indication via the telephonic communication 
from the user as to whether the details match originally sent 
details from the user. 
Still yet, any of the components of the present invention 
could be deployed, managed, serviced, etc., by a service 
provider who offers to control electricity to a device. 
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Embodiments of the present invention also provide related 
systems, methods and/or program products. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
These and other features of this invention will be more 
readily understood from the following detailed description of 
the various aspects of the invention taken in conjunction with 
the accompanying drawings in which: 
FIG. 1 shows a data processing system suitable for imple 
menting an embodiment of the present invention. 
FIG.2 shows an environment in which transaction integrity 
is verified according to an embodiment of the present inven 
tion. 
The drawings are not necessarily to Scale. The drawings are 
merely schematic representations, not intended to portray 
specific parameters of the invention. The drawings are 
intended to depict only typical embodiments of the invention, 
and therefore should not be considered as limiting the scope 
of the invention. In the drawings, like numbering represents 
like elements. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION 
As indicated above, aspects of the present invention pro 
vide a solution for verifying the integrity of a transaction. In 
response to receipt of a confirmed electronic transaction from 
a user, a one time password is forwarded to the user. The user 
then initiates a telephonic communication with a verifier on 
the users wireless device and provides the one time password 
to the verifier. The verifier authenticates the mobile tele 
phonic device based on the device's caller identification num 
ber and determines whether the one time password provided 
by the user matches the one forwarded to the user. After the 
user is authenticated, the verifier communicates the details of 
the transaction that were received and the user confirms 
whether the details match those originally entered. 
As a result, the current invention provides greater security 
for electronic transactions. Specifically, the verification of the 
details of the transaction by the user provides greater security 
than those provided by simple provider-based assess verifi 
cation systems currently in existence. This verification as part 
of the current invention foils man-in-the-middle (MITM) 
attacks that would have otherwise succeeded under previous 
Solutions. 
Turning to the drawings, FIG. 1 shows an illustrative envi 
ronment 10 for verifying the integrity of a transaction accord 
ing to an embodiment. To this extent, environment 10 
includes a computer system 12 that can perform a process 
described herein in order to verify the integrity of a transac 
tion. In particular, computer system 12 is shown including a 
computing device 14 that includes a transaction integrity 
Verification program 30, which makes computing device 14 
operable to Verify the integrity of a transaction by performing 
a process described herein. 
Computing device 14 is shown including a processing 
component 20 (e.g., one or more processors), a memory 22, a 
storage system 29 (e.g., a storage hierarchy), an input/output 
(I/O) interface component 24 (e.g., one or more I/O interfaces 
and/or devices), and a communications pathway 26. In gen 
eral, processing component 20 executes program code. Such 
as transaction integrity verification program 30, which is at 
least partially fixed in memory 22. While executing program 
code, processing component 20 can process data, which can 
result in reading and/or writing transformed data from/to 
memory 22 and/or I/O interface component 24 for further 
processing. Pathway 26 provides a communications link 
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between each of the components in computer system 12. I/O 
interface component 24 can comprise one or more peripheral 
I/O devices, which enable communications with an external 
device 26. Additionally, or in the alternative, I/O interface 
component 24 can comprise one or more human I/O devices, 
which enable a human user 16 to interact with computer 
system 12 and/or one or more communications devices to 
enable a system user 16 to communicate with computer sys 
tem 12 using any type of communications link. To this extent, 
transaction integrity verification program 30 can manage a set 
of interfaces (e.g., graphical user interface(s), application 
program interface, and/or the like) that enable human and/or 
system users 16 to interact with transaction integrity verifi 
cation program 30. Further, transaction integrity verification 
program 30 can manage (e.g., store, retrieve, create, manipu 
late, organize, present, etc.) the data, Such as mobile device 
data 40 and/or transaction details 42, using any solution. 
In any event, computer system 12 can comprise one or 
more general purpose computing articles of manufacture 14 
(e.g., computing devices) capable of executing program code, 
Such as transaction integrity verification program 30, 
installed thereon. As used herein, it is understood that “pro 
gram code” means any collection of instructions, in any lan 
guage, code or notation, that cause a computing device having 
an information processing capability to perform a particular 
action either directly or after any combination of the follow 
ing: (a) conversion to another language, code or notation; (b) 
reproduction in a different material form; and/or (c) decom 
pression. To this extent, transaction integrity verification pro 
gram 30 can be embodied as any combination of system 
Software and/or application Software. In any event, the tech 
nical effect of computer system 12 is to provide processing 
instructions to computing device 14 in order to Verify the 
integrity of a transaction. 
Further, transaction integrity verification program 30 can 
be implemented using a set of modules 32-38. In this case, a 
module 32-38 can enable computer system 12 to perform a set 
of tasks used by transaction integrity verification program 30, 
and can be separately developed and/or implemented apart 
from other portions of transaction integrity verification pro 
gram 30. As used herein, the term “component’ means any 
configuration of hardware, with or without software, which 
implements the functionality described in conjunction there 
with using any solution, while the term “module” means 
program code that enables a computer system 12 to imple 
ment the actions described in conjunction therewith using any 
solution. When fixed in a memory 22 of a computer system 12 
that includes a processing component 20, a module is a Sub 
stantial portion of a component that implements the actions. 
Regardless, it is understood that two or more components, 
modules, and/or systems may share somefall of their respec 
tive hardware and/or software. Further, it is understood that 
Some of the functionality discussed herein may not be imple 
mented or additional functionality may be included as part of 
computer system 12. 
When computer system 12 comprises multiple computing 
devices 14, each computing device can have only a portion of 
transaction integrity verification program 30 fixed thereon 
(e.g., one or more modules 32-38). However, it is understood 
that computer system 12 and transaction integrity verification 
program 30 are only representative of various possible 
equivalent computer systems that may perform a process 
described herein. To this extent, in other embodiments, the 
functionality provided by computer system 12 and transac 
tion integrity verification program 30 can be at least partially 
implemented by one or more computing devices that include 
any combination of general and/or specific purpose hardware 
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with or without program code. In each embodiment, the hard 
ware and program code, if included, can be created using 
Standard engineering and programming techniques, respec 
tively. 
Regardless, when computer system 12 includes multiple 
computing devices 14, the computing devices can communi 
cate over any type of communications link. Further, while 
performing a process described herein, computer system 12 
can communicate with one or more other computer systems 
using any type of communications link. In either case, the 
communications link can comprise any combination of vari 
ous types of wired and/or wireless links; comprise any com 
bination of one or more types of networks; and/or utilize any 
combination of various types of transmission techniques and 
protocols. 
As discussed herein, transaction integrity verification pro 
gram 30 enables computer system 20 to verify the integrity of 
a transaction. To this extent, transaction integrity verification 
program 30 is shown including a password communication 
module 32, an authenticator module 34, a detail communica 
tion module 36, and a verification module 38. 
Referring now to FIG. 2, an environment 100, in which the 
integrity of a transaction 130 can be verified, is shown. As 
shown, environment 100 includes a user 116, having both a 
computer transaction device 112 for conducting transaction 
130 and a mobile telephonic device 114 for initiating a tele 
phonic communication 134. User 116 communicates with a 
transaction partner 110 over a network 120. Transaction part 
ner 110 can include any combination of hardware, software, 
etc., now known or later developed that is capable of carrying 
out transaction 130 with user 116, including, but not limited 
to a transaction 130 involving online banking, electronic 
commerce, etc. Network 120 can include any network for 
carrying data, Such as transaction 130, including wired, wire 
less, internet, intranet, etc. Further, while computer transac 
tion device 112 and mobile telephonic device 114 are shown 
as being different devices, it should be understood by those 
skilled in the art, that the functions of computer transaction 
device 112 and mobile telephonic device 114 could be per 
formed by the same device. For example, this could occur in 
the case that mobile telephonic device 114 also had compu 
tational features, including, but not limited to network access 
features that allowed mobile telephonic device 114 to com 
municate over a network 120 to perform a transaction 130. 
Environment 100 also includes a voice response unit 140 
that verifies the integrity of transaction 130. As shown, voice 
response unit 140 includes an operator 142 and a verification 
computer device 144 that enables operator 142 to verify the 
integrity of transaction 130. Voice response unit 140 can be, 
as illustrated, a third party entity that is separate from trans 
action partner 110, including, but not limited to a telephone 
carrier that provides service for mobile telephonic device 
114. In the alternative, voice response unit 140 could be 
associated with transaction partner 110 in, for example, the 
same company, location, etc. While environment 100, as 
illustrated, shows a human operator 142, it should be under 
stood, that in some embodiments, the functions of operator 
142 could be performed by a computer, such as an automated 
answering service, working in conjunction with verification 
computer device 144. 
In any case, referring now to FIG. 1 in conjunction with 
FIG. 2, computer system 12 (e.g., password communication 
module 32) communicates a one time password 132 to a user 
116 upon receipt of electronic transaction 130 that has been 
completed. Specifically, prior to communication of one time 
password 132, user 116 accesses transaction partner 110 
using computer transaction device 112 over network 120. 
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This access can be performed by any solution now known or 
later developed for a device to establish a communication 
with another device, including but not limited to, a web page, 
a web portal, an electronic mail message, a dedicated pipe 
line, etc. In any case, user 116 can establish user's 116 iden 
tity with transaction partner 110 with a login or other known 
Solution, and user 116 can communicate with transaction 
partner 110 to provide transaction partner 110 with details of 
transaction 130. For example, if transaction 110 is a banking 
transaction to pay a bill of user 116, user 116 could specify an 
amount for payment (e.g., S100) and information indicating 
to whom the payment should be made (e.g., WOW Electric). 
Details of transaction 130 could have any number of items 
and could include any items that can be used to facilitate a 
transaction, Such as transaction amount, transaction destina 
tion, transaction Source account, transaction destination 
account, transaction Source institution, transaction currency 
used, transaction date, etc. 
In any event, after the details have been entered by user 
116, user 116 will communicate the details to transaction 
partner 110 along with a confirmation for processing trans 
action 130. In response, transaction partner 110 communi 
cates one time password 132 to user 116 via network 120. One 
time password 132 is unique to transaction 130. As such, one 
time password 132 can only be used to verify the particular 
transaction 130 for the particular user 116 to which transac 
tion partner 110 has communicated it. In one environment, 
one time password 132 is an alphabetic, numeric, or alpha 
numeric string, although other embodiments are envisioned. 
Transaction partner 110 can also forward a telephonic iden 
tifier to user 116 that user 116 can use to contact voice 
response unit 140. This telephonic identifier could be a stan 
dard telephone number having 7, 10 or other standard number 
of digits. In the alternative, the telephonic identifier could a 
mobile telephone carrier based service message. In this case, 
a number, which is often preceded by a character, such as “*” 
or “if” is routed directly by the telephone carrier that user 116 
uses in conjunction with mobile telephonic device 114 to a 
predetermined location associated with Voice response unit 
140. 
Transaction partner 110 also, upon receipt of the confirmed 
transaction 130, can forward one time password 132 and 
transaction details 136 of the confirmed transaction 130 to 
voice response unit 140. As shown, one time password 132 
and/or transaction details 136 could be communicated to 
voice response unit 140 over network 120, or, in the alterna 
tive one or both could be communicated by an alternate solu 
tion, Such as an internal network, dedicated connection 
between transaction partner 110 and voice response unit 140, 
or other secure manner of communication. It should be under 
stood the one time password 132 that is communicated from 
transaction partner 110 to voice response unit 140 corre 
sponds to one time password 132 that has been communicated 
to user 116. To this extent, each of the one time passwords 132 
associated with transaction 130 could be identical. In the 
alternative, the one time password 132 forwarded to user 116 
could include a key that decrypts the one time password 132 
forwarded to voice response unit 140, or vice versa. It should 
also be understood that in most cases transaction details for 
warded from transaction partner 110 to voice response unit 
140 would match the details of transaction 130 communi 
cated from user 116 to transaction partner 110. However, in 
the case that the details of transaction 130 have been altered 
subsequent to confirmation by user 116 but prior to receipt by 
transaction partner 110, the details will be different from 
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transaction details 136 received by transaction partner 110 
and forwarded from transaction partner 110 to voice response 
unit 140. 
Referring still to FIG. 1 in conjunction with FIG. 2, com 
puter system 12 (e.g., authenticator module 34) authenticates 
the identity of user 116 at voice response unit 140. Specifi 
cally, user 116 uses the telephonic identifier previously for 
warded to user 116 from transaction partner 110 to initiate 
telephonic communication 134 with voice response unit 140 
using mobile telephonic device 114. Upon receipt of tele 
phonic communication 134 by voice response unit 140, 
authenticator module 34 authenticates mobile telephonic 
device 114. This can be accomplished by comparing the caller 
identification information that identifies the incoming tele 
phone number of mobile telephonic device 114 in telephonic 
communication 134 with mobile device data 40 that is on 
record with voice response unit 140, such as in mobile device 
data 42 of storage system 29 (FIG. 1), as being associated 
with user 116. The fact that mobile telephonic device 114 is a 
mobile device (e.g., a cellular telephone) makes the authen 
tication of telephonic communication 134 as originating with 
user 116 that is performed by authenticator module 34 more 
accurate. This is because it is currently more difficult to spoof, 
or impersonate the identity of a caller when the telephonic 
device is a mobile phone than when it is a land line. Further 
more, the fact that mobile telephonic device 114 is unique to 
user 116 and carried by user 116 makes mobile telephonic 
device a more secure source of authentication that a land line, 
which can often be shared. In addition the portability associ 
ated with mobile telephonic device provides added conve 
nience to user 116 during the validation process. 
Authenticator module 34 can then authenticate user 116 on 
a transaction 130 level using one time password 132. To 
accomplish this, user 116 can be prompted to enter the one 
time password 132 that transaction partner 110 previously 
sent to user 116 upon confirmation of transaction 130. 
Authenticator module 34 can then compare the input one time 
password 132 with the one time password that was sent from 
transaction partner 110 to voice response unit 140. If the one 
time password 132 provided by user 116 corresponds to the 
one time password sent from transaction partner 110, Voice 
response unit 140 can authenticate user 116 for transaction 
130. 
Once user 116 is authenticated, computer system 12 (e.g., 
detail communication module 36) facilitates communication 
of transaction details 136 of confirmed transaction 130 to user 
116 on mobile telephonic device 114 via telephonic commu 
nication 134. To accomplish this, voice response unit 140 can 
access stored transaction details 136 that were previously 
communicated to Voice response unit 140 from transaction 
partner 110 and stored. These transaction details 136 can be 
retrieved using verification computer device 144, by search 
ing stored transaction details 42 using one time password 132 
as a key. Once retrieved by voice response unit 140, transac 
tion details 136 can be communicated to user 116 by a human 
operator 142, or, in the alternative, by a computerized opera 
tor 142 utilizing a speech simulator to convert stored trans 
action details 42 to speech and communicating transaction 
details 136 to mobile telephonic device 114 of user 116 over 
telephonic communication 134. In an alternative embodi 
ment, detail communication module 36 can receive a com 
munication from user 116 over telephonic communication 
134 that reiterates transaction details 136 of transaction 130 
rather than Voice response unit 140 communicating stored 
transaction details 42 to user 116. 
After transaction details 136 have been communicated, 
computer system 12 (e.g., verification module 38) verifies the 
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integrity of confirmed transaction 130. A comparison is made 
over telephonic communication 134 between transaction 
details 136 from user 116 and stored transaction details 42 
that have been sent from transaction partner 110 to voice 
response unit 140. Based on the comparison, an indication 
can be made as to whether stored details 42 match transaction 
details 136 originally received from user 116. In an embodi 
ment in which stored transaction details 42 have been com 
municated to user 116, it could be user 116 that performs the 
Verification and makes the indication to Voice response unit 
140. In the alternative, in the case that user 116 communicates 
transaction details 136 to voice response unit 140, voice 
response unit 140 could perform the verification and make the 
indication. Furthermore, in either embodiment, the verifica 
tion and indication could be performed by a combination of 
user 116 and voice response unit 140. 
For example, assume original transaction details 136 
include: 
Pay from bank account; 
Amount of S100; and 
To WOW Energy. 
Then, if transaction 130 has not been altered, stored transac 
tion details 42 will match original transaction details 136 and 
there will be an indication from verification module 38 to that 
effect. This indication could be made by user 116 and/or 
operator 140 via telephonic communication 134. Based on 
the indication, verification module 38 could complete the 
transaction. 
However, if, in the alternative, stored transaction details 42 
are as follows: 
Transfer from bank account; 
Amount of S10,000; and 
To Nefarian Co., 
then the indication from verification module 38 would be that 
there is no match. In this case, the details of transaction 130 
have been altered subsequent to confirmation by user 116 but 
prior to receipt by transaction partner 110. Thus, the details 
will be different from transaction details 136 received by 
transaction partner 110 and forwarded from transaction part 
ner 110 to voice response unit 140. User 116 could be given 
the opportunity to abort the transaction (such as by pressing 
the digit 1 to cancel via telephonic communication 134, for 
example). It could then be deduced from this indication that 
data had been modified by a MITM attack, transaction 130 
could be aborted, and further investigation as to the source 
could be conducted. 
While shown and described herein as a method and system 
for verifying the integrity of a transaction, it is understood that 
aspects of the invention further provide various alternative 
embodiments. For example, in one embodiment, the inven 
tion provides a computer program fixed in at least one com 
puter-readable medium, which when executed, enables a 
computer system to Verify the integrity of a transaction. To 
this extent, the computer-readable medium includes program 
code, such as transaction integrity verification program 30 
(FIG.1), which implements some or all of a process described 
herein. It is understood that the term “computer-readable 
medium' comprises one or more of any type of tangible 
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from 
which a copy of the program code can be perceived, repro 
duced, or otherwise communicated by a computing device. 
For example, the computer-readable medium can comprise: 
one or more portable storage articles of manufacture; one or 
more memory/storage components of a computing device; 
paper, and/or the like. 
In another embodiment, the invention provides a method of 
providing a copy of program code, such as transaction integ 
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rity verification program 30 (FIG. 1), which implements 
Some or all of a process described herein. In this case, a 
computer system can process a copy of program code that 
implements some or all of a process described herein to 
generate and transmit, for reception at a second, distinct loca 
tion, a set of data signals that has one or more of its charac 
teristics set and/or changed in Such a manner as to encode a 
copy of the program code in the set of data signals. Similarly, 
an embodiment of the invention provides a method of acquir 
ing a copy of program code that implements some or all of a 
process described herein, which includes a computer system 
receiving the set of data signals described herein, and trans 
lating the set of data signals into a copy of the computer 
program fixed in at least one computer-readable medium. In 
either case, the set of data signals can be transmitted/received 
using any type of communications link. 
In still another embodiment, the invention provides a 
method of generating a system for verifying the integrity of a 
transaction. In this case, a computer system, such as computer 
system 12 (FIG. 1), can be obtained (e.g., created, main 
tained, made available, etc.) and one or more components for 
performing a process described herein can be obtained (e.g., 
created, purchased, used, modified, etc.) and deployed to the 
computer system. To this extent, the deployment can com 
prise one or more of: (1) installing program code on a com 
puting device; (2) adding one or more computing and/or I/O 
devices to the computer system; (3) incorporating and/or 
modifying the computer system to enable it to perform a 
process described herein; and/or the like. 
The terms “first,” “second, and the like, herein do not 
denote any order, quantity, or importance, but rather are used 
to distinguish one element from another, and the terms 'a' 
and “an herein do not denote a limitation of quantity, but 
rather denote the presence of at least one of the referenced 
item. The modifier “approximately used in connection with 
a quantity is inclusive of the stated value and has the meaning 
dictated by the context, (e.g., includes the degree of error 
associated with measurement of the particular quantity). The 
suffix "(s)' as used herein is intended to include both the 
singular and the plural of the term that it modifies, thereby 
including one or more of that term (e.g., the metal(s) includes 
one or more metals). Ranges disclosed herein are inclusive 
and independently combinable (e.g., ranges of “up to 
approximately 25 wt %, or, more specifically, approximately 
5 wt % to approximately 20 wt %', is inclusive of the end 
points and all intermediate values of the ranges of “approxi 
mately 5 wt % to approximately 25 wt %.” etc). 
The foregoing description of various aspects of the inven 
tion has been presented for purposes of illustration and 
description. It is not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the 
invention to the precise form disclosed, and obviously, many 
modifications and variations are possible. Such modifications 
and variations that may be apparent to an individual in the art 
are included within the scope of the invention as defined by 
the accompanying claims. 
We claim: 
1. A system for preventing man-in-the-middle (MITM) 
attacks, the system comprising at least one computer device 
that performs a method comprising: 
forwarding a transaction-specific onetime password and a 
telephonic identifier to a user upon receipt of a con 
firmed electronic transaction from the user, wherein the 
telephonic identifier includes an authentication tele 
phone number routed directly to a predetermined loca 
tion; 
storing a set of confirmed details for the transaction, 
wherein the set of confirmed details includes the trans 
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action-specific onetime password, a confirmed transac 
tion source, and a confirmed transaction destination; 
in response to a telephonic communication from the user 
regarding the transaction, authenticating a mobile tele 
phonic device used to initiate the telephonic communi 
cation based on a caller identification of the mobile 
telephonic device and the telephonic identifier; 
authenticating an inputted one time password entered by 
the user via the telephonic communication based on the 
forwarded transaction-specific onetime password; 
facilitating verbal communication of user-Submitted 
details of the confirmed electronic transaction from the 
user via the telephonic communication based on the 
authentication, wherein the user-submitted details 
include a Submitted transaction Source and a Submitted 
transaction destination; 
identifying the set of confirmed details for the transaction 
by reference to the transaction-specific onetime pass 
word; and 
verifying the transaction based on an indication via the 
telephonic communication and the Verbal communica 
tion from the user as to whether the user-submitted 
details from the user match the confirmed details for the 
transaction. 
2. The system of claim 1, the method further comprising 
the electronic transaction if the indication is that the details 
match, and aborting the electronic transaction if the indica 
tion is that the details do not match. 
3. The system of claim 1, wherein the telephonic commu 
nication is performed using a mobile telephonic carrier-based 
Service message. 
4. The system of claim 1, wherein the authenticating is 
performed by a third party who is not a participant in the 
electronic transaction. 
5. The system of claim 1, wherein the electronic transaction 
is selected from the group comprising: an online banking 
transaction or an electronic commerce transaction. 
6. The system of claim 1, wherein the forwarded one time 
password further comprises a decryption key, and the com 
parison of the input one time password with the forwarded 
one time password includes decrypting the input one time 
password. 
7. The system of claim 1, wherein the verifying is per 
formed using a voice response unit having an operator and a 
Verification computer device. 
8. The system of claim 1, wherein the facilitating includes 
verbal communication of details of the confirmed electronic 
transaction both from the user and to the user via the tele 
phonic communication based on the authentication, and the 
Verifying is based on the indication via the telephonic trans 
action and the verbal communication of details of the con 
formed electronic transaction both from the user and to the 
USC. 
9. A method for preventing man-in-the-middle (MITM) 
attacks, the method comprising: 
forwarding, upon receipt of a confirmed electronic trans 
action from a user, a transaction-specific onetime pass 
word and a telephonic identifier to the user, wherein the 
telephonic identifier includes an authentication tele 
phone number routed directly to a predetermined loca 
tion; 
storing a set of confirmed details for the transaction, 
wherein the set of confirmed details includes the trans 
action-specific onetime password, a confirmed transac 
tion source, and a confirmed transaction destination; 
receiving a telephonic communication from a mobile tele 
phonic device of the user; 
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authenticating the mobile telephonic device as calling the 
authentication telephone number and being associated 
with the user using a caller identification number of the 
mobile telephonic device; 
receiving an input of the transaction-specific onetime pass 
word from the user via the telephonic communication; 
authenticating an identity of the user based on a compari 
son of the input one time password with the forwarded 
one time password; 
receiving a verbal communication from the user of user 
submitted details of the confirmed electronic transaction 
via the telephonic communication, wherein the user 
Submitted details include a Submitted transaction Source 
and a Submitted transaction destination; 
identifying the set of confirmed details for the transaction 
by reference to the transaction-specific onetime pass 
word; and 
Verifying the transaction based on an indication via the 
telephonic communication and the Verbal communica 
tion from the user as to whether the user-submitted 
details match the confirmed details for the transaction. 
10. The method of claim 9, wherein the electronic transac 
tion is completed if the indication is that the details match, 
and wherein the electronic transaction is aborted if the indi 
cation is that the details do not match. 
11. The method of claim 9, wherein the telephonic com 
munication is performed using a mobile telephonic carrier 
based service message. 
12. The method of claim 9, wherein the authenticating is 
performed by a third party who is not a participant in the 
electronic transaction. 
13. The method of claim 9, wherein the electronic transac 
tion is selected from the group comprising: an online banking 
transaction or an electronic commerce transaction. 
14. The method of claim 9, wherein the forwarded one time 
password further comprises a decryption key, and the com 
parison of the input one time password with the forwarded 
one time password includes decrypting the input one time 
password. 
15. A computer program product embodied in a computer 
readable storage medium for implementing a method for 
preventing man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, the method comprising: 
forwarding, upon receipt of a confirmed electronic trans 
action from a user, a transaction-specific onetime pass 
word and a telephonic identifier to the user, wherein the 
telephonic identifier includes an authentication tele 
phone number routed directly to a predetermined loca 
tion; 
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12 
storing a set of confirmed details for the transaction, 
wherein the set of confirmed details includes the trans 
action-specific onetime password, a confirmed transac 
tion source, and a confirmed transaction destination; 
receiving a telephonic communication from a mobile tele 
phonic device of the user; 
authenticating the mobile telephonic device as calling the 
authentication telephone number and being associated 
with the user using a caller identification number of the 
mobile telephonic device: 
receiving an input of the transaction-specific onetime pass 
word from the user via the telephonic communication; 
authenticating an identity of the user based on a compari 
son of the input one time password with the forwarded 
one time password; 
receiving a verbal communication from the user of user 
submitted details of the confirmed electronic transaction 
via the telephonic communication, wherein the user 
Submitted details include a Submitted transaction Source 
and a Submitted transaction destination; 
identifying the set of confirmed details for the transaction 
by reference to the transaction-specific onetime pass 
word; and 
verifying the transaction based on an indication via the 
telephonic communication and the Verbal communica 
tion from the user as to whether the user-submitted 
details match the confirmed details for the transaction. 
16. The program product of claim 15, wherein the elec 
tronic transaction is completed if the indication is that the 
details match, and wherein the electronic transaction is 
aborted if the indication is that the details do not match. 
17. The program product of claim 15, wherein the tele 
phonic communication is performed using a mobile tele 
phonic carrier-based service message. 
18. The program product of claim 15, wherein the authen 
ticating is performed by a third party who is not a participant 
in the electronic transaction. 
19. The program product of claim 15, wherein the elec 
tronic transaction is selected from the group comprising: an 
online banking transaction or an electronic commerce trans 
action. 
20. The program product of claim 15, wherein the for 
warded one time password further comprises a decryption 
key, and the comparison of the input one time password with 
the forwarded one time password includes decrypting the 
input one time password. 
k k k k k 
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VERIFYING ONLINE TRANSACTION 
INTEGRITY AND AUTHENTICATION WITH 
QR CODES 
FIG . 4 is a block diagram of internal and external com 
ponents of a computing device , in accordance with an 
embodiment of the present invention . 
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
The present invention relates generally to the field of Online transactions may be at risk of tampering due to the 
online transactions , and more particularly to securing the actions of a man - in - the - middle ( MITM ) , who is positioned 
integrity of online transactions using out of band commu - between the user and the transaction server . In such a 
nication . 10 scenario , the server believes it is communicating directly 
In cryptography and computer security , a man - in - the with the user and the user directly with the server . However , 
middle ( MITM ) attack is an attack where the attacker both parties are actually interacting with the MITM , who is 
secretly relays , and possibly alters , the communication intercepting and potentially modifying details of the trans 
between two parties who believe they are directly commu action . Embodiments of the present invention provide sys 
nicating with each other . One example is active eavesdrop - 15 tems and methods for a user to verify transaction details 
ping , in which the attacker makes independent connections ndependent connections using Quick Response ( QR ) codes that exposes tampering 
with the victims and relays messages between them to make by an MITM . 
them believe they are talking directly to each other over a The present invention will now be described in detail with 
private connection , when in fact the entire conversation is reference to the figures . FIG . 1 is a functional block diagram 
controlled by the attacker . 20 illustrating an online transaction verification environment , 
Quick Response ( OR ) Codes are a type of matrix barcode generally designated 100 , in accordance with one embodi 
( or two - dimensional barcode ) . A barcode is a machine - ment of the present invention . FIG . 1 provides only an 
readable optical label that contains information about the illustration of one implementation , and does not imply any 
item to which it is attached . A OR code uses four standard - limitations with regard to the environments in which differ 
ized encoding modes ( numeric , alphanumeric , byte / binary , 25 ent embodiments may be implemented . Many modifications 
and kanji ) to efficiently store data ; extensions may also be to the depicted environment may be made by those skilled 
used . The QR Code system has become popular due to its in the art without departing from the scope of the invention 
fast readability and greater storage capacity compared to as recited by the claims . In an exemplary embodiment , 
standard Universal Product Code ( UPC ) barcodes . Applica - online transaction verification environment 100 includes 
tions include product tracking , item identification , time 30 computing device 120 and computing device 130 connected 
tracking , document management , and general marketing . A to transaction server 140 over network 110 . 
OR code consists of black modules ( square dots ) arranged in Network 110 can be , for example , a local area network 
a square grid on a white background , which can be read by ( LAN ) , a wide area network ( WAN ) such as the Internet , or 
an imaging device ( such as a camera ) and processed using a combination of the two , and can include wired , wireless , 
Reed - Solomon error correction until the image can be 35 or fiber optic connections . In general , network 110 can be 
appropriately interpreted . The required data are then any combination of connections and protocols that will 
extracted from patterns present in both horizontal and ver support communication between transaction server 140 and 
tical components of the image . computing devices 120 and 130 . 
Computing device 120 and computing device 130 may be 
SUMMARY 40 a computing device , such as a laptop computer , a tablet 
computer , a netbook computer , a personal computer ( PC ) , a 
A method , computer program product , and computer desktop computer , a personal digital assistant ( PDA ) , a 
system for verifying transactions over a network are pro smart phone or wearable device , a thin client , or any 
vided , comprising : providing , by a registered user , details of programmable electronic device capable of communicating 
a proposed transaction to a transaction server ; providing , by 45 with transaction server 140 via network 110 . In other 
the transaction server , to the registered user , a QR code , embodiments , computing device 120 and computing device 
wherein the QR code comprises encoded details of the 130 may be a management server , a web server , or any other 
proposed transaction ; scanning , by a first computing device , electronic device or computing system capable of receiving 
the QR code ; decoding , by an application of the first and sending data . Computing device 120 and computing 
computing device , the QR code ; comparing , by one or more 50 device 130 may include internal and external hardware 
computer processors , a set of transaction details associated components , as depicted and described in further detail with 
with the decoded QR code to the details of the proposed respect to FIG . 4 . In this exemplary embodiment , computing 
transaction ; and confirming , by a separate communication device 120 includes a web browser capable of displaying a 
channel , the proposed transaction . QR code . In another embodiment , computing device 120 is 55 an automated teller machine ( ATM ) capable of displaying a 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS QR code . 
Computing device 130 includes verification program 132 
FIG . 1 is a functional block diagram illustrating an online and is pre - registered with transaction server 140 . Transac 
transaction verification environment , in accordance with an tion server 140 associates a user with a specific computing 
embodiment of the present invention ; 60 device 130 and stores this data in authentication database 
FIG . 2 is a flowchart depicting operational steps for 142 . Verification program 132 is capable of decoding QR 
setting up an online transaction verification program , in codes , presenting the decoded details to the user , and 
accordance with an embodiment of the present invention ; prompting the user to confirm or abort the transaction . In this 
FIG . 3 is a flowchart depicting operational steps for exemplary embodiment , verification program 132 processes 
verifying online transaction integrity and authentication , in 65 requests from transaction server 140 . 
accordance with an embodiment of the present invention ; Transaction server 140 sends QR codes to computing 
and device 120 and includes authentication database 142 . Trans 
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action server 140 may be a management server , a web request . The transaction details displayed on computing 
server , or any other electronic device or computing system device 130 are consistent with the original transaction when 
capable of receiving and sending data . In other embodiments each object of the original transaction can be matched to a 
of the present invention , transaction server 140 can represent displayed transaction detail from the scanned and decoded 
a computing system utilizing clustered computers and com - 5 QR code . 
ponents to act as a single pool of seamless resources when If , in step 304 , the user confirms the transaction details 
accessed through a network . In this exemplary embodiment , displayed on computing device 130 are consistent with the 
transaction server 140 is capable of receiving requests for original transaction request , then in step 306 , verification 
data from computing device 120 and computing device 130 , program 132 sends a confirmation message to transaction 
via network 110 . Transaction server 140 may include inter - 10 server 140 using an out of band channel ( i . e . , the mobile 
nal and external hardware components , as depicted and device ' s data connection , SMS , initiate a call back , etc . ) . In 
described in further detail with respect to FIG . 4 . this exemplary embodiment , as verification program 132 
Authentication database 142 is a central storage for a set uses an alternate communication path to transmit confirma 
of user registered device data . Authentication database 142 tion , any possible MITM would be avoided during the 
can be implemented using any non - volatile storage medium 15 confirmation step ( step 304 ) . The MITM cannot access the 
known in the art . For example , authentication database can out of band channel because the out of band channel is not be implemented with a tape library , optical library , one or directly associated with the access path to the application or 
more independent hard disk drives , or multiple hard disk data used in the online transaction . In addition , as computing 
drives in a redundant array of independent disks ( RAID ) . In device 130 is pre - registered with transaction server 140 , the 
this exemplary embodiment , authentication database 142 20 confirmation message from verification program 132 pro 
contains the computing device information for each regis vides an additional authentication . For example , when using 
tered user . For example , authentication database 142 may computing device 120 to conduct an online banking trans 
contain the serial number of a mobile cellular device and the action , transaction server 140 prompts the user for authen 
name of the user who registered it . tication ( i . e . , username and password ) . Thus , sending con 
FIG . 2 is a flowchart , 200 , depicting operational steps for 25 firmation using computing device 130 , which is pre 
setting up an online transaction verification program , in registered with transaction server 140 , provides an 
accordance with an embodiment of the present invention . additional authentication ( in addition to username and pass 
In step 202 , verification program 132 is installed on word authentication ) . In this exemplary embodiment , trans 
computing device 130 . In this exemplary embodiment , veri action server 140 encrypts transaction details with its private 
fication program 132 must be installed on computing device 30 key before generating the QR code and verification program 
130 prior to performing the transaction . 132 decrypts transaction details with transaction server 140 
In step 204 , computing device 130 is registered with corresponding public key before displaying . 
transaction server 140 . In this exemplary embodiment , this In step 308 , verification program 132 receives a response 
registration step allows transaction server 140 to associate that the transaction has been completed from transaction the user with the specific computing device 130 . 35 server 140 . In this exemplary embodiment , transaction 
In step 206 , transaction server 140 stores the registration server 140 completes the original requested transaction 
data in authentication database 142 . when it receives the confirmation message from computing FIG . 3 is a flowchart , 300 , depicting operational steps for device 130 ( step 306 ) . 
verifying online transaction integrity and authentication , in If , in step 304 , the transaction details displayed on com 
accordance with an embodiment of the present invention . 40 puting device 130 are not consistent with the original 
In step 302 , verification program 132 receives informa - transaction request , then in step 310 , verification program 
tion associated with a QR code scan and displays the 132 sends an abort message to transaction server 140 using 
transaction details on computing device 130 . In this exem - an out of band channel responsive to the user selecting an 
plary embodiment , computing device 120 receives a QR abort button . 
code containing encoded transaction details from transaction 45 In step 312 , verification program 132 receives a response 
server 140 , via network 110 for the current online transac - that the transaction has been aborted from transaction server 
tion being performed between computing device 120 and 140 . In this exemplary embodiment , transaction server 140 
transaction server 140 . The online transaction is initiated by aborts the original requested transaction when it receives the 
a user on computing device 120 that is received by trans - abort message from computing device 130 ( step 310 ) . 
action server 140 . Transaction server 140 generates a QR 50 Accordingly , by performing the operational steps of FIG . 
code and sends it back to computing device 120 for verifi 2 , a secure transaction may be performed by a user , using an 
cation . It should be appreciated , that computing device 130 out - of - band channel to transmit a confirmation message for 
is preregistered with transaction server 140 , such that veri - the transaction , thus avoiding a MITM . By preregistering a 
fication program 132 associates computing device 130 with computing device with a transaction server , the confirmation 
a user . The QR code is scanned using computing device 130 , 55 message provides an additional authentication and ensures 
and verification program 132 decodes the transaction details . transactional integrity . 
For example , a transaction may involve a user request to FIG . 4 is a block diagram of internal and external com 
transfer money from a checking account to a savings ponents of computing device 400 , which is representative of 
account using computing device 120 . In this example , the computing devices of FIG . 1 , in accordance with an 
transaction server 140 is the bank server used to conduct 60 embodiment of the present invention . It should be appreci 
online banking transactions . In this exemplary embodiment , ated that FIG . 4 provides only an illustration of one imple 
the user can view the details of the online transaction mentation and does not imply any limitations with regard to 
between computing device 120 and transaction server 140 the environments in which different embodiments may be 
using computing device 130 . implemented . In general , the components illustrated in FIG . 
In step 304 , verification program 132 prompts the user to 65 4 are representative of any electronic device capable of 
determine whether the transaction details displayed on com - executing machine - readable program instructions . 
puting device 130 are consistent with the original transaction Examples of computer systems , environments , and / or con 
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figurations that may be represented by the components computer readable storage media such as , for example , 
illustrated in FIG . 4 include , but are not limited to , personal thumb drives , portable optical or magnetic disks , and 
computer systems , server computer systems , thin clients , memory cards . I / O interface 412 also connects to display 
thick clients , laptop computer systems , tablet computer 422 . 
systems , cellular telephones ( i . e . , smart phones ) , multipro - 5 Display 422 provides a mechanism to display data to a 
cessor systems , microprocessor - based systems , network user and can be , for example , a computer monitor . Display 
PCs , minicomputer systems , mainframe computer systems , 422 can also be an incorporated display and may function as 
and distributed cloud computing environments that include a touch screen , such as a built - in display of a tablet com 
any of the above systems or devices . puter . 
Computing device 400 includes communications fabric 10 The present invention may be a system , a method , and / or 
402 , which provides for communications between one or a computer program product . The computer program prod 
more processing units 404 , memory 406 , persistent storage uct may include a computer readable storage medium ( or 
408 , communications unit 410 , and one or more input / output media ) having computer readable program instructions 
( I / O ) interfaces 412 . Communications fabric 402 can be thereon for causing a processor to carry out aspects of the 
implemented with any architecture designed for passing data 15 present invention . 
and / or control information between processors ( such as The computer readable storage medium can be a tangible 
microprocessors , communications and network processors , device that can retain and store instructions for use by an 
etc . ) , system memory , peripheral devices , and any other instruction execution device . The computer readable storage 
hardware components within a system . For example , com - medium may be , for example , but is not limited to , an 
munications fabric 402 can be implemented with one or 20 electronic storage device , a magnetic storage device , an 
more buses . optical storage device , an electromagnetic storage device , a 
Memory 406 and persistent storage 408 are computer semiconductor storage device , or any suitable combination 
readable storage media . In this embodiment , memory 406 of the foregoing . A non - exhaustive list of more specific 
includes random access memory ( RAM ) 416 and cache examples of the computer readable storage medium includes 
memory 418 . In general , memory 406 can include any 25 the following : a portable computer diskette , a hard disk , a 
suitable volatile or non - volatile computer readable storage random access memory ( RAM ) , a read - only memory 
media . Software is stored in persistent storage 408 for ( ROM ) , an erasable programmable read - only memory 
execution and / or access by one or more of the respective ( EPROM or Flash memory ) , a static random access memory 
processors 404 via one or more memories of memory 406 . ( SRAM ) , a portable compact disc read - only memory ( CD 
Persistent storage 408 may include , for example , a plu - 30 ROM ) , a digital versatile disk ( DVD ) , a memory stick , a 
rality of magnetic hard disk drives . Alternatively , or in floppy disk , a mechanically encoded device such as punch 
addition to magnetic hard disk drives , persistent storage 408 cards or raised structures in a groove having instructions 
can include one or more solid state hard drives , semicon - recorded thereon , and any suitable combination of the fore 
ductor storage devices , read - only memories ( ROM ) , eras going . A computer readable storage medium , as used herein , 
able programmable read - only memories ( EPROM ) , flash 35 is not to be construed as being transitory signals per se , such 
memories , or any other computer readable storage media as radio waves or other freely propagating electromagnetic 
that is capable of storing program instructions or digital waves , electromagnetic waves propagating through a wave 
information . guide or other transmission media ( e . g . , light pulses passing 
The media used by persistent storage 408 can also be through a fiber - optic cable ) , or electrical signals transmitted 
removable . For example , a removable hard drive can be used 40 through a wire . 
for persistent storage 408 . Other examples include optical Computer readable program instructions described herein 
and magnetic disks , thumb drives , and smart cards that are can be downloaded to respective computing / processing 
inserted into a drive for transfer onto another computer devices from a computer readable storage medium or to an 
readable storage medium that is also part of persistent external computer or external storage device via a network , 
storage 408 . 45 for example , the Internet , a local area network , a wide area 
Communications unit 410 provides for communications network and / or a wireless network . The network may com 
with other computer systems or devices via a network . In prise copper transmission cables , optical transmission fibers , 
this exemplary embodiment , communications unit 410 wireless transmission , routers , firewalls , switches , gateway 
includes network adapters or interfaces such as a TCP / IP computers and / or edge servers . A network adapter card or 
adapter cards , wireless Wi - Fi interface cards , or 3G or 4G 50 network interface in each computing / processing device 
wireless interface cards or other wired or wireless commu receives computer readable program instructions from the 
nications links . The network can comprise , for example , network and forwards the computer readable program 
copper wires , optical fibers , wireless transmission , routers , instructions for storage in a computer readable storage 
firewalls , switches , gateway computers and / or edge servers . medium within the respective computing / processing device . 
Software and data used to practice embodiments of the 55 Computer readable program instructions for carrying out 
present invention can be downloaded to computing device operations of the present invention may be assembler 
400 through communications unit 410 ( i . e . , via the Internet , instructions , instruction - set - architecture ( ISA ) instructions , 
a local area network , or other wide area network ) . From machine instructions , machine dependent instructions , 
communications unit 410 , the software and data can be microcode , firmware instructions , state - setting data , or 
loaded onto persistent storage 408 . 60 either source code or object code written in any combination 
One or more I / O interfaces 412 allow for input and output of one or more programming languages , including an object 
of data with other devices that may be connected to com - oriented programming language such as Smalltalk , C + + or 
puting device 400 . For example , I / O interface 412 can the like , and conventional procedural programming lan 
provide a connection to one or more external devices 420 g uages , such as the “ C ” programming language or similar 
such as a keyboard , computer mouse , touch screen , virtual 65 programming languages . The computer readable program 
keyboard , touch pad , pointing device , or other human inter - instructions may execute entirely on the user ' s computer , 
face devices . External devices 420 can also include portable partly on the user ' s computer , as a stand - alone software 
su 
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15 herein . 
package , partly on the user ' s computer and partly on a specified functions or acts or carry out combinations of 
remote computer or entirely on the remote computer or special purpose hardware and computer instructions . 
server . In the latter scenario , the remote computer may be The descriptions of the various embodiments of the 
connected to the user ' s computer through any type of present invention have been presented for purposes of 
network , including a local area network ( LAN ) or a wide 5 illustration , but are not intended to be exhaustive or limited 
area network ( WAN ) , or the connection may be made to an to the embodiments disclosed . Many modifications and 
external computer ( for example , through the Internet using variations will be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the an Internet Service Provider ) . In some embodiments , elec art without departing from the scope and spirit of the tronic circuitry including , for example , programmable logic invention . The terminology used herein was chosen to best circuitry , field - programmable gate arrays ( FPGA ) , or pro - 10 explain the principles of the embodiment , the practical grammable logic arrays ( PLA ) may execute the computer application or technical improvement over technologies readable program instructions by utilizing state information 
of the computer readable program instructions to personalize found in the marketplace , or to enable others of ordinary 
the electronic circuitry , in order to perform aspects of the skill in the art to understand the embodiments disclosed 
present invention . 
Aspects of the present invention are described herein with reference to flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams of What is claimed is : methods , apparatus ( systems ) , and computer program prod 1 . A computer - implemented method for verifying trans 
ucts according to embodiments of the invention . It will be actions over a network comprising : 
understood that each block of the flowchart illustrations 20 providing , by a first computing device details of a pro 
and / or block diagrams , and combinations of blocks in the posed transaction to a transaction server ; 
flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams , can be imple receiving , by said first computing device a QR code , 
mented by computer readable program instructions . wherein the QR code comprises encoded details of the 
These computer readable program instructions may be proposed transaction , in response to said providing , by 
provided to a processor of a general purpose computer , 25 a first computing device details of a proposed transac 
special purpose computer , or other programmable data pro tion to a transaction server ; cessing apparatus to produce a machine , such that the scanning , by said first computing device , the QR code ; 
instructions , which execute via the processor of the com decoding , by an application of said first computing 
puter or other programmable data processing apparatus , device , the QR code ; create means for implementing the functions / acts specified 30 comparing , by one or more computer processors , a set of 
in the flowchart and / or block diagram block or blocks . These transaction details associated with the decoded QR computer readable program instructions may also be stored code to the details of the proposed transaction ; and 
in a computer readable storage medium that can direct a confirming , by a separate communication channel , the 
computer , a programmable data processing apparatus , and / proposed transaction , wherein the separate communi 
or other devices to function in a particular manner , such that 35 cation channel is out of band to an access path to the 
the computer readable storage medium having instructions application . 
stored therein comprises an article of manufacture including 2 . The method of claim 1 , wherein said proposed trans instructions which implement aspects of the function / act action is conducted between a second computing device and 
specified in the flowchart and / or block diagram block or said transaction server . 
blocks . 40 3 . The method of claim 1 , further comprising : 
The computer readable program instructions may also be registering , by one or more computer processors , the first 
loaded onto a computer , other programmable data process - computing device with said transaction server . 
ing apparatus , or other device to cause a series of operational 4 . The method of claim 1 , wherein said QR code contains 
steps to be performed on the computer , other programmable information associated with said transaction . 
apparatus or other device to produce a computer imple - 45 5 . The method of claim 1 , wherein confirming the pro 
mented process , such that the instructions which execute on posed transaction occurs between the first computing device 
the computer , other programmable apparatus , or other and said transaction server . 
device implement the functions / acts specified in the flow - 6 . The method of claim 1 , wherein confirming the pro 
chart and / or block diagram block or blocks . posed transaction comprises : 
The flowchart and block diagrams in the Figures illustrate 50 prompting , by one or more computer processors , a deter 
the architecture , functionality , and operation of possible mination of whether said set of transaction details 
implementations of systems , methods , and computer pro associated with the QR code matches the details of the 
gram products according to various embodiments of the proposed transaction ; and 
present invention . In this regard , each block in the flowchart responsive to receiving an indication that said set of 
or block diagrams may represent a module , segment , or 55 transaction details associated with the QR code 
portion of instructions , which comprises one or more matches the details of the proposed transaction , send 
executable instructions for implementing the specified logi ing , by one or more computer processors , a confirm 
cal function ( s ) . In some alternative implementations , the message to said transaction server confirming said 
functions noted in the block may occur out of the order noted proposed transaction . 
in the figures . For example , two blocks shown in succession 60 7 . The method of claim 1 , further comprising : 
may , in fact , be executed substantially concurrently , or the prompting , by one or more computer processors , a deter 
blocks may sometimes be executed in the reverse order , mination of whether said set of transaction details 
depending upon the functionality involved . It will also be associated with the QR code matches the details of the 
noted that each block of the block diagrams and / or flowchart proposed transaction ; and 
illustration , and combinations of blocks in the block dia - 65 responsive to receiving an indication that said set of 
grams and / or flowchart illustration , can be implemented by transaction details associated with the QR code does special purpose hardware - based systems that perform the not match the details of the proposed transaction , 
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10 
sending , by one or more computer processors , an abort transaction , send an abort message to said transaction 
message to said transaction server cancelling said pro server cancelling said proposed transaction . 
posed transaction . 15 . A computer system comprising : 8 . A computer program product comprising : one or more computer processors ; 
a computer readable storage medium and program 5 one or more computer readable storage media ; 
instructions stored on the computer readable storage program instructions stored on the computer readable storage media for execution by at least one of the one medium , the program instructions comprising : 
program instructions to provide details of a proposed or more computer processors , the program instructions 
transaction to a transaction server ; comprising : 
program instructions to receive , a QR code , wherein the 10 program instructions to provide details of a proposed 
QR code comprises encoded details of the proposed transaction to a transaction server ; 
transaction , in response to said program instructions to program instructions to receive a QR code , wherein the 
provide details of a proposed transaction to a transac QR code comprises encoded details of the proposed transaction , in response to said program instructions tion server ; 
program instructions to scan the QR code by a first 15 to provide details of a proposed transaction to a transaction server ; computing device ; 
program instructions to decode the QR code using an program instructions to scan the QR code by a first 
application of said first computing device ; computing device ; 
program instructions to compare a set of transaction program instructions to decode the QR code using an 
details associated with the decoded QR code to the 20 application of said first computing device ; 
details of the proposed transaction ; and program instructions to compare a set of transaction 
program instructions to confirm the proposed transaction details associated with the decoded QR code to the details of the proposed transaction ; and by a separate communication channel , wherein the 
separate communication channel is out of band to an program instructions to confirm the proposed transac 
access path to the application used in the transaction . 25 tion by a separate communication channel , wherein 
9 . The computer program product of claim 8 , wherein said the separate communication channel is out of band to 
proposed transaction is conducted between a second com the application used in the transaction . 16 . The computer system of claim puting device and said transaction server . 15 , wherein said 10 . The computer program product of claim 8 , further Felaim & further proposed transaction is conducted between a second com propo comprising : 30 puting device and said transaction server . 
program instructions to register the first computing device 17 . The computer system of claim 15 , further comprising : 
with said transaction server . program instructions to register the first computing device 11 . The computer program product of claim 8 , wherein with said transaction server . 
said QR code contains information associated with said 18 . The computer system of claim 15 , wherein the pro 
transaction . 35 gram instructions to confirm the proposed transaction occurs 
12 . The computer program product of claim 8 , wherein between the first computing device and said transaction 
the program instructions to confirm the proposed transaction server . 
occurs between the first computing device and said trans 19 . The computer system of claim 15 , wherein the pro 
action server . gram instructions to confirm the proposed transaction com 
13 . The computer program product of claim 8 , wherein 40 
the program instructions to confirm the proposed transaction program instructions to prompt a determination of 
comprise : whether said set of transaction details associated with 
program instructions to prompt a determination of the QR code matches the details of the proposed 
whether said set of transaction details associated with transaction ; and 
the QR code matches the details of the proposed 45 m ed 45 program instructions to , responsive to receiving an indi cation that said set of transaction details associated with transaction ; and 
program instructions to , responsive to receiving an indi the QR code matches the details of the proposed 
cation that said set of transaction details associated with transaction , send a confirm message to said transaction 
the QR code matches the details of the proposed server confirming said proposed transaction . 
transaction , send a confirm message to said transaction 50 20 . The computer system of claim 15 , further comprising : server confirming said proposed transaction . program instructions to prompt a determination of 
14 . The computer program product of claim 8 , further whether said set of transaction details associated with 
comprising : the QR code matches the details of the proposed 
program instructions to prompt a determination of transaction ; and whether said set of transaction details associated with 55 program instructions to , responsive to receiving an indi 
the QR code matches the details of the proposed cation that said set of transaction details associated with the QR code does not match the details of the proposed transaction ; and transaction , send an abort message to said transaction program instructions to , responsive to receiving an indi 
cation that said set of transaction details associated with server cancelling said proposed transaction . 
the QR code does not match the details of the proposed * 
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1. 
DETECTING AND DEFENDING AGAINST 
MAN-N-THE-MODLEATTACKS 
FIELD OF THE INVENTION 
This disclosure relates generally to protecting the integrity 
of network communications, and more particularly to a sys 
tem and method of detecting and defending against man-in 
the-middle (MITM) attacks. 
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
One of the most difficult network-based attacks to defend 
against is that of a class known as “man-in-the-middle’ 
(MITM) attacks. These scenarios involve the insertion by an 
attacker of an untrusted node into a session path. This MITM 
attack node then impersonates the identity of one session 
partner to the other while having access to and control overall 
transmissions between the partners resulting in the potential 
for eavesdropping and unauthorized modification of Session 
traffic. These attacks are particularly effective when com 
bined with “phishing” techniques which trick an end user into 
giving up personal information that later results in identity 
theft or fraud. 
FIG. 2 depicts an example of an MITM attack, in which a 
plurality of users 50 are unsuspectingly engaged in sessions 
with an MITM Web server 52, which sits between users 50 
and the legitimate target Web server 54. In this case, MITM 
Web server 52 has lured users 50 into believing that they are 
engaging in a session with the target Web server 54. 
Banks and other financial institutions have been particu 
larly hard hit by these attacks as customers are lured into 
logging onto a malicious MITM node thinking they are con 
necting to their bank, while the MITM node interacts with the 
legitimate web site and relays information to the user making 
the ruse even more believable. It is this last aspect that is 
particularly distressing to banks as they do not have a good 
way to detect that they are dealing with an MITM node rather 
than directly with their customer. Because the attacker's 
MITM machine looks and acts just like a real end user, the 
MITM machine acts as a conduit for sensitive information 
Such as userids and passwords and, potentially, for conduct 
ing transactions. 
While digital certificates could provide a reasonable mea 
Sure of protection in Such an instance, they have thus far 
proven to be difficult and expensive to deploy and manage 
across a large end user base especially when those users may 
have limited technical skills and may also be highly mobile, 
using many different nodes to conduct transactions. 
Another increasingly popular defense is to use "strong 
authentication mechanisms such as security tokens, Smart 
cards or biometrics to ensure that the end user is who they 
claim to be. The problem with these defenses is that in the 
MITM case, the digitized authentication data is simply passed 
directly through the intermediate node making it unnecessary 
for the attacker to actually possess the token, Smart card or 
physical characteristic being measured. 
Finally, another technique for alerting end users that they 
are being lured into logging into a bogus Web site involves the 
presentation of a graphical image pre-selected by the user. 
During login, if the user does not see the image they selected 
during registration (something which only they and the legiti 
mate Web site should know), then they know to abort the 
authentication process. However, in an MITM case, the target 
Web site presents the image to the MITM node thinking it is 
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the end user and the MITM node relays this image to the real 
end user leading them to believe that the attack node is legiti 
mate. 
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
The present invention relates to a system, method and 
program product for detecting man in the middle attacks. In 
one embodiment, there is a system for defending against man 
in the middle (MITM) attacks directed at a target server, 
comprising: an activity recording system that records an 
incoming IP address, userid, and time of each session occur 
ring with the target server; an activity analysis system that 
identifies Suspect IP addresses by determining if an unaccept 
able number of sessions are occurring from a single incoming 
IP address during a predefined time period; and a counter 
measure system for taking action against Suspect IP 
addresses. 
In a second embodiment, there is a computer program 
product stored on a computer readable medium, which when 
executed includes program instructions for defending against 
man in the middle (MITM) attacks directed at a target server, 
the program product comprising: program instructions for 
recording an incoming IP address, userid, and time of each 
session occurring with the target server, program instructions 
for identifying Suspect IP addresses by determining if an 
unacceptable number of sessions are occurring from a single 
incoming IP address during a predefined time period; and 
program instructions for taking defensive action against Sus 
pect IP addresses. 
In a third embodiment, there is method for defending 
against man in the middle (MITM) attacks directed at a target 
server, comprising: recording an incoming IP address, userid, 
and time of each session occurring with the target server; 
identifying Suspect IP addresses by determining if an unac 
ceptable number of Sessions are occurring from a single 
incoming IP address during a predefined time period; and 
taking defensive action against Suspect IP addresses. 
In a fourth embodiment, there is a method for deploying a 
system for defending against man in the middle (MITM) 
attacks directed at a target server, comprising: providing a 
computer infrastructure being operable to: record an incom 
ing IP address, userid, and time of each session occurring with 
the target server; identify suspect IP addresses by determining 
if an unacceptable number of Sessions are occurring from a 
single incoming IP address during a predefined time period; 
and take defensive action against Suspect IP addresses. 
MITM attacks of the sort described herein share a detect 
able characteristic that can be used to predict to Some reason 
able certainty that an attack is taking place. Once detected, 
defensive action can be taken, Such as sending a message that 
will be relayed by the MITM node to the user informing the 
user of the potential Vulnerability and ending the session. 
The observable characteristic shared by successful MITM 
attacks is that to the target server it will appear that a large 
number of different end users have for no apparent reason 
begun logging on from the same IP address, i.e., the address 
of the MITM proxy. If, for instance, certain definable thresh 
olds were exceeded such as N number of userids from a 
single, previously unknown address within a specific interval 
of time, then further investigation or even automated defenses 
would be warranted. 
Some advantages to this technique include: the thresholds 
can be tuned to Suit the risk tolerance of the target organiza 
tion; detection can be automated; countermeasures can be 
automated to limit further damage; automated detection and 
response allows for constant vigilance by providing a con 
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tinuous, 24x7 defense; the basic technique can be extended 
beyond web spoofing/phishing attacks to other types of 
MITM scenarios; the more “successful the attacker is at 
luring victims, the more likely the attack will be detected and 
repelled 
The illustrative aspects of the present invention are 
designed to solve the problems herein described and other 
problems not discussed. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
These and other features of this invention will be more 
readily understood from the following detailed description of 
the various aspects of the invention taken in conjunction with 
the accompanying drawings. 
FIG.1 depicts a computer system having an MITM defense 
system in accordance with an embodiment of the present 
invention. 
FIG. 2 depicts an example of an MITM attack. 
FIG. 3 depicts an example of a IP address/userid table in 
accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. 
FIG. 4 depicts a flow diagram showing an illustrative 
implementation of an embodiment of the present invention. 
The drawings are merely schematic representations, not 
intended to portray specific parameters of the invention. The 
drawings are intended to depict only typical embodiments of 
the invention, and therefore should not be considered as lim 
iting the scope of the invention. In the drawings, like num 
bering represents like elements. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION 
FIG. 1 depicts a computer system 10 that provides an 
MITM defense system 18 for a target server 32 communicat 
ing with a user38 via network node 40. In particular, MITM 
defense system 18 analyzes the IP address 42 of network node 
40 to determine whether network node 40 is a legitimate node 
associated with user38 oran MITM server that has interposed 
itself between the user 38 and target server 32. Note that in 
this illustrative embodiment, computer system 10 containing 
MITM defense system 18 is shown separated from target 
server 32. However, it is understood that MITM defense 
system 18 may be integrated with target server 32 in a single 
system. 
As noted above, an observable characteristic shared by 
successful MITM attacks is that it will appear to the target 
server 32 that a large number of different end users have for no 
apparent reason begun logging on from the same IP address 
42, i.e., the address of the MITM server. While this behavior 
alone will not conclusively indicate malicious activity, iden 
tifying and analyzing Such behavior can allow for further 
investigation or countermeasures to be taken. For instance, 
definable thresholds involving the allowed number of user 
IDS from a single, previously unknown address within a spe 
cific interval of time can be put in place to identify suspicious 
activity. When a threshold is exceeded, then further investi 
gation or even automated defenses can be implemented. 
As shown in this illustrative embodiment, MITM defense 
system 18 includes a list checking system 22, an activity 
recording system 24, an IP address activity analysis system 
26, and a countermeasure system 28. List checking system 22 
is utilized to compare an incoming IP address 42 with either 
or both a white list33 and a black list34. The white list33 may 
include a list of known IP addresses that are valid, and need 
not be analyzed (e.g., the IP address associated with a known 
legitimate proxy, etc.). The black list 34 may include a list of 
known IP addresses that are invalid (e.g., sites that are known 
10 
15 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
65 
4 
to have caused attacks in the past). When an IP address 42 is 
found on the black list 34, the session can, e.g., be immedi 
ately terminated. 
Activity recording system 24 is utilized to store IP 
addresses and timing information for sessions occurring with 
the target server 32. This information is stored in an IP 
address/userid table 36, which can then be used by IP address 
activity analysis system 26. IP address/userid table 36 may be 
implemented in any format that can track userids, login time, 
and IP addresses. 
One possible implementation would involve a hash tree 
that indexes IP addresses such that each address points to a 
linked list of userids (and associated login times) that have 
logged onto the particular IP address. FIG.3 depicts an illus 
trative embodiment of Such an implementation involving 
three linked lists 60 for IP Addr 1, IPAddr 2, and IP Addr3. 
As can be seen for the first IP address 62 (Addr 1), there have 
been two logins 64 by userid 9 and userid 2. For each login, 
there is an associated login time. 
IP address activity analysis system 26 (FIG. 1) is utilized to 
examine the IP address/userid table 36 to identify any IP 
addresses that have an unusually large number of logins dur 
ing some predefined time period. For example, threshold 
values may be utilized that would be customizable by the 
target organization based on their tolerance for risk (much 
like a biometric System or intrusion detection system must be 
tuned to minimize false positives while not overlooking real 
attacks). These observed values and associated thresholds 
could be expressed as follows: 
N=number of userids logging in from the given IP 
address 
Nt=threshold of acceptable number of userids logging 
in from any given IP address 
T=time interval over which logins from a given IP 
address have been attempted 
Tt time interval threshold triggering Suspicion 
Then, the following algorithm could be implemented: 
If N>Nt and Te Tt then 
suspect MITM attack 
otherwise 
proceed with login and record details. 
It is understood that the above is for illustrative purposes only, 
and more complex algorithms could be utilized, e.g., ones that 
take into account time of day, past usage history, analysis of 
the specific userids, etc. 
Countermeasure system 28 is utilized to respond to a Sus 
pected MITM attack by taking some defensive action. Any 
type of countermeasure could be implemented. For instance, 
in a case where a login is being attempted from a suspicious 
IP address, the login can simply be denied. In other cases, if a 
first session is currently underway and a large number of 
additional sessions are started from the same IP address, the 
first session could be terminated. In these cases, the Suspi 
cious IP address could be added to the black list 34. In still 
further cases, Suspect IP address can be simply outputted to a 
user for further investigation. 
FIG. 4 depicts a flow diagram of a process for implement 
ing MITM defense system 18 (FIG. 1) for a login procedure. 
At S1, a login request is received and the userid, password and 
IP address are recorded at S2. At S3, the login credentials are 
Subjected to Verification, and if they fail, an authentication 
failure message is returned at S18, and the session is termi 
nated at S19. If the login credentials succeed, then an MITM 
white list is searched to locate the incoming IP address at S5. 
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If it is found at S6, then defense processing is skipped and the 
session is allowed to continue at S7. Otherwise, an MITM 
black list is searched for the incoming IP address at step S8. If 
the IP address is found in the black list at S9, then an MITM 
failure message is returned at S15, and the session is termi 
nated at S17. 
If the incoming IP address is not found in the black list, then 
a search is made for previous login attempts from the incom 
ing IP address at S10. At S11, the number of userids originat 
ing from the IP address are determined, and the activity level 
is determined at S12 (e.g., how many during a particular time 
period). At S13, the number and activity level are compared 
against threshold values, and if exceeded, the IP address is 
added to the black list at S16, an MITM failure message is 
returned at S15, and the session is terminated at S17. If the 
threshold values are not exceeded, then at S14, the IP address, 
userid, and time are recorded in the IP address userid table, 
and the login continues. 
Referring again to FIG. 1, it is understood that computer 
system 10 may be implemented as any type of computing 
infrastructure. Computer system 10 generally includes a pro 
cessor 12, input/output (I/O) 14, memory 16, and bus 17. The 
processor 12 may comprise a single processing unit, or be 
distributed across one or more processing units in one or more 
locations, e.g., on a client and server. Memory 16 may com 
prise any known type of data storage and/or transmission 
media, including magnetic media, optical media, random 
access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), a data 
cache, a data object, etc. Moreover, memory 16 may reside at 
a single physical location, comprising one or more types of 
data storage, or be distributed across a plurality of physical 
systems in various forms. 
I/O 14 may comprise any system for exchanging informa 
tion to/from an external resource. External devices/resources 
may comprise any known type of external device, including a 
monitor/display, speakers, storage, another computer system, 
a hand-held device, keyboard, mouse, voice recognition sys 
tem, speech output system, printer, facsimile, pager, etc. Bus 
17 provides a communication link between each of the com 
ponents in the computer system 10 and likewise may com 
prise any known type of transmission link, including electri 
cal, optical, wireless, etc. Although not shown, additional 
components, such as cache memory, communication sys 
tems, system Software, etc., may be incorporated into com 
puter system 10. 
Access to computer system 10 may be provided over a 
network such as the Internet, a local area network (LAN), a 
wide area network (WAN), a virtual private network (VPN), 
etc. Communication could occur via a direct hardwired con 
nection (e.g., serial port), or via an addressable connection 
that may utilize any combination of wireline and/or wireless 
transmission methods. Moreover, conventional network con 
nectivity, such as Token Ring, Ethernet, WiFi or other con 
ventional communications standards could be used. Still yet, 
connectivity could be provided by conventional TCP/IP sock 
ets-based protocol. In this instance, an Internet service pro 
vider could be used to establish interconnectivity. Further, as 
indicated above, communication could occur in a client 
server or server-server environment. 
It should be appreciated that the teachings of the present 
invention could be offered as a business method on a sub 
Scription or fee basis. For example, a computer system 10 
comprising a MITM defense system 18 could be created, 
maintained and/or deployed by a service provider that offers 
the functions described herein for customers. That is, a ser 
vice provider could offer to deploy or provide the ability to 
identify and respond to MITM attacks as described above. 
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It is understood that in addition to being implemented as a 
system and method, the features may be provided as a pro 
gram product stored on a computer-readable medium, which 
when executed, enables computer system 10 to provide an 
MITM defense system 18. To this extent, the computer-read 
able medium may include program code, which implements 
the processes and systems described herein. It is understood 
that the term “computer-readable medium' comprises one or 
more of any type of physical embodiment of the program 
code. In particular, the computer-readable medium can com 
prise program code embodied on one or more portable Stor 
age articles of manufacture (e.g., a compact disc, a magnetic 
disk, a tape, etc.), on one or more data storage portions of a 
computing device, such as memory 16 and/or a storage sys 
tem, and/or as a data signal traveling over a network (e.g., 
during a wired/wireless electronic distribution of the program 
product). 
As used herein, it is understood that the terms “program 
code' and "computer program code' are synonymous and 
mean any expression, in any language, code or notation, of a 
set of instructions that cause a computing device having an 
information processing capability to perform a particular 
function either directly or after any combination of the fol 
lowing: (a) conversion to another language, code or notation; 
(b) reproduction in a different material form; and/or (c) 
decompression. To this extent, program code can be embod 
ied as one or more types of program products. Such as an 
application/software program, component software/a library 
of functions, an operating system, a basic I/O System/driver 
for a particular computing and/or I/O device, and the like. 
Further, it is understood that terms such as “component” and 
“system” are synonymous as used herein and represent any 
combination of hardware and/or software capable of per 
forming some function(s). 
The block diagrams in the figures illustrate the architec 
ture, functionality, and operation of possible implementations 
of systems, methods and computer program products accord 
ing to various embodiments of the present invention. In this 
regard, each block in the block diagrams may represent a 
module, segment, or portion of code, which comprises one or 
more executable instructions for implementing the specified 
logical function(s). It should also be noted that the functions 
noted in the blocks may occur out of the order noted in the 
figures. For example, two blocks shown in Succession may, in 
fact, be executed substantially concurrently, or the blocks 
may sometimes be executed in the reverse order, depending 
upon the functionality involved. It will also be noted that each 
block of the block diagrams can be implemented by special 
purpose hardware-based systems which perform the specified 
functions or acts, or combinations of special purpose hard 
ware and computer instructions. 
Although specific embodiments have been illustrated and 
described herein, those of ordinary skill in the art appreciate 
that any arrangement which is calculated to achieve the same 
purpose may be substituted for the specific embodiments 
shown and that the invention has other applications in other 
environments. This application is intended to cover any adap 
tations or variations of the present invention. The following 
claims are in no way intended to limit the scope of the inven 
tion to the specific embodiments described herein. 
What is claimed is: 
1. A system for defending against man in the middle 
(MITM) attacks directed at a target server, comprising: 
an activity recording system that records an incoming IP 
address, user id, and time of each session occurring with 
the target server; 
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a list checking system for performing the following: 
comparing a single incoming IP address with a white 
list; and 
comparing the single incoming IP address with a black 
list after the comparing of the single incoming IP 
address with the white list in the case that the single 
incoming IP address is not present on the white list; 
an activity analysis system that performs the following 
after the list checking system compares the single 
incoming IP address with the black list, in the case that 
the single incoming IP address is not present on the black 
list: 
searches for records of a previous login attempt from the 
single incoming IP address; 
determines a number of user ids occurring from the 
single incoming IP address during a predefined time 
period; 
compares the number of user ids occurring from the 
single incoming IP address to a predefined threshold 
number of user ids specific to the predefined time 
period; and 
identifies the single incoming IP address as a Suspect IP 
address in response to the number of user ids occur 
ring from the single incoming IP address exceeding 
the threshold within the predefined time period, 
wherein the activity analysis system includes a first 
value N that represents a number of Sessions along 
with a threshold value Ntanda second value T and its 
associated threshold value Tt that represents a time 
frame, and wherein if there are more than N sessions 
with the single incoming IP address during a time 
period less than T, the single incoming IP address is 
identified as a suspect IP address; and 
a countermeasure system for taking action against the Sus 
pect IP address. 
2. The system of claim 1, wherein the countermeasure 
system causes a login session to fail. 
3. The system of claim 1, wherein the countermeasure 
system causes a session to terminate in response to the iden 
tifying of the single incoming IP address as a suspect address. 
4. The system of claim 1, wherein the countermeasure 
system causes the Suspect IP address to be outputted. 
5. A computer program product stored on a non-transitory 
computer readable medium, which when executed includes 
program instructions for defending against man in the middle 
(MITM) attacks directed at a target server, the program prod 
uct comprising: 
program instructions for recording an incoming IP address, 
user id, and time of each session occurring with the 
target server; 
program instructions for comparing the incoming IP 
address with a white list; 
program instructions for comparing the incoming IP 
address with a black list after the comparing of the 
incoming IP address with the white list in the case that 
the incoming IP address is not present on the white list; 
program instructions for searching for records of a previ 
ous login attempt from the single incoming IP address; 
program instructions for identifying Suspect IP addresses 
by determining a number of user ids occurring from the 
single incoming IP address during a predefined time 
period after the comparing of the incoming IP address 
with the black list, in the case that the single incoming IP 
address is not present on the black list; 
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program instructions for comparing the number of user ids 
occurring from the single incoming IP address to a pre 
defined threshold number of user ids specific to the 
predefined time period; 
program instructions for identifying the single incoming IP 
address as a Suspect IP address in response to the number 
of user ids occurring from the single incoming IP 
address exceeding the threshold within the predefined 
time period, 
wherein a first value N represents a number of sessions 
along with a threshold value Ntanda second value Tand 
its associated threshold value Tt represents a time frame, 
and wherein if there are more than N sessions with the 
single incoming IP address during a time period less 
than T, the single incoming IP address is identified as a 
suspect IP address; and 
program instructions for taking defensive action against 
the suspect IP address. 
6. The program product of claim 5, wherein the defensive 
action causes a login session to fail. 
7. The program product of claim 5, wherein the defensive 
action causes a session to terminate in response to the iden 
tifying of the single incoming IP address as a Suspect address. 
8. The program product of claim 5, wherein the defensive 
action causes the Suspect IP address to be outputted. 
9. A computer-implemented method performed on at least 
one computing device for defending against man in the 
middle (MITM) attacks directed at a target server, the method comprising: 
recording an incoming IP address, user id, and time of each 
session occurring with the target server using the at least 
one computing device; 
comparing the incoming IP address with a white list; 
comparing the incoming IP address with a black list after 
the comparing of the incoming IP address with the white 
list in the case that the incoming IP address is not present 
on the white list; 
searching for records of a previous login attempt from the 
single incoming IP address; 
identifying Suspect IP addresses by determining a number 
of user ids occurring from the single incoming IP 
address during a predefined time period after the com 
paring of the incoming IP address with the black list, in 
the case that the single incoming IP address is not 
present on the black list; 
comparing the number of userids occurring from the single 
incoming IP address to a predefined threshold number of 
user ids specific to the predefined time period; 
identifying the single incoming IP address as a suspect IP 
address in response to the number of user ids occurring from 
the single incoming IP address exceeding the threshold 
within the predefined time period, 
wherein a first value N represents a number of sessions 
along with a threshold value Ntanda second value Tand 
its associated threshold value Tt represents a time frame, 
and wherein if there are more than N sessions with the 
single incoming IP address during a time period less 
than T, the single incoming IP address is identified as a 
suspect IP address; and 
taking defensive action against the Suspect IP address using 
the at least one computing device. 
10. The method of claim 9, wherein the defensive action 
causes a login session to fail. 
11. The method of claim 9, wherein the defensive action 
causes a session to terminate in response to the identifying of 
the single incoming IP address as a suspect address. 
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12. The method of claim 9, wherein the defensive action 
causes the suspect IP address to be outputted. 
13. A method for deploying a system for defending against 
man in the middle (MITM) attacks directed at a target server, comprising: 
providing a computer infrastructure being operable to: 
record an incoming IP address, user id, and time of each 
session occurring with the target server, 
compare the incoming IP address with a white list; 
compare the incoming IP address with a black list after 
the comparing of the incoming IP address with the 
white list in the case that the incoming IP address is 
not present on the white list; 
search for records of a previous login attempt from the 
single incoming IP address; 
identify suspect IP addresses by determining a number 
of user ids occurring from the single incoming IP 
address during a predefined time period after the com 
10 
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paring of the incoming IP address with the black list, 
in the case that the single incoming IP address is not 
present on the black list; 
compare the number of user ids occurring from the 
single incoming IP address to a predefined threshold 
number of user ids specific to the predefined time period; 
identify the single incoming IP address as a Suspect IP 
address in response to the number of user ids occur ring from the single incoming IP address exceeding 
the threshold within the predefined time period, 
wherein a first value N represents a number of sessions 
along with a threshold value Nt and a second value T 
and its associated threshold value Tt represents a time 
frame, and wherein if there are more than N sessions 
with the single incoming IP address during a time 
period less than T, the single incoming IP address is 
identified as a suspect IP address; and 
take defensive action against the Suspect IP address. 
k k k k k 
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1. 
DETECTING AND DEFENDING AGAINST 
MAN-N-THE-MODLEATTACKS 
CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED 
APPLICATION 
This Application is a continuation of currently pending 
U.S. patent application Ser. No. 1 1/753,673, which was filed 
on May 25, 2007 and is hereby incorporated by reference. 
FIELD OF THE INVENTION 
This disclosure relates generally to protecting the integrity 
of network communications, and more particularly to a sys 
tem and method of detecting and defending against man-in 
the-middle (MITM) attacks. 
BACKGROUND 
One of the most difficult network-based attacks to defend 
against is that of a class known as “man-in-the-middle’ 
(MITM) attacks. These scenarios involve the insertion by an 
attacker of an untrusted node into a session path. This MITM 
attack node then impersonates the identity of one session 
partner to the other while having access to and control overall 
transmissions between the partners resulting in the potential 
for eavesdropping and unauthorized modification of Session 
traffic. These attacks are particularly effective when com 
bined with “phishing” techniques which trick an end user into 
giving up personal information that later results in identity 
theft or fraud. 
FIG. 2 depicts an example of an MITM attack, in which a 
plurality of users 50 are unsuspectingly engaged in sessions 
with an MITM Web server 52, which sits between users 50 
and the legitimate target Web server 54. In this case, MITM 
Web server 52 has lured users 50 into believing that they are 
engaging in a session with the target Web server 54. 
Banks and other financial institutions have been particu 
larly hard hit by these attacks as customers are lured into 
logging onto a malicious MITM node thinking they are con 
necting to their bank, while the MITM node interacts with the 
legitimate web site and relays information to the user making 
the ruse even more believable. It is this last aspect that is 
particularly distressing to banks as they do not have a good 
way to detect that they are dealing with an MITM node rather 
than directly with their customer. Because the attacker's 
MITM machine looks and acts just like a real end user, the 
MITM machine acts as a conduit for sensitive information 
Such as userids and passwords and, potentially, for conduct 
ing transactions. 
While digital certificates could provide a reasonable mea 
Sure of protection in Such an instance, they have thus far 
proven to be difficult and expensive to deploy and manage 
across a large end user base especially when those users may 
have limited technical skills and may also be highly mobile, 
using many different nodes to conduct transactions. 
Another increasingly popular defense is to use "strong 
authentication mechanisms such as security tokens, Smart 
cards or biometrics to ensure that the end user is who they 
claim to be. The problem with these defenses is that in the 
MITM case, the digitized authentication data is simply passed 
directly through the intermediate node making it unnecessary 
for the attacker to actually possess the token, Smart card or 
physical characteristic being measured. 
Finally, another technique for alerting end users that they 
are being lured into logging into a bogus Web site involves the 
presentation of a graphical image pre-selected by the user. 
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During login, if the user does not see the image they selected 
during registration (something which only they and the legiti 
mate Web site should know), then they know to abort the 
authentication process. However, in an MITM case, the target 
Web site presents the image to the MITM node thinking it is 
the end user and the MITM node relays this image to the real 
end user leading them to believe that the attack node is legiti 
mate. 
BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
The present invention relates to a system, method and 
program product for detecting man in the middle attacks. In 
one embodiment, there is a system for defending against man 
in the middle (MITM) attacks directed at a target server, 
comprising: an activity recording system that records an 
incoming IP address, userid, and time of each session occur 
ring with the target server; an activity analysis system that 
identifies Suspect IP addresses by determining if an unaccept 
able number of sessions are occurring from a single incoming 
IP address during a predefined time period; and a counter 
measure system for taking action against Suspect IP 
addresses. 
In a second embodiment, there is a computer program 
product stored on a computer readable medium, which when 
executed includes program instructions for defending against 
man in the middle (MITM) attacks directed at a target server, 
the program product comprising: program instructions for 
recording an incoming IP address, userid, and time of each 
session occurring with the target server, program instructions 
for identifying Suspect IP addresses by determining if an 
unacceptable number of sessions are occurring from a single 
incoming IP address during a predefined time period; and 
program instructions for taking defensive action against Sus 
pect IP addresses. 
In a third embodiment, there is method for defending 
against man in the middle (MITM) attacks directed at a target 
server, comprising: recording an incoming IP address, userid, 
and time of each session occurring with the target server; 
identifying Suspect IP addresses by determining if an unac 
ceptable number of Sessions are occurring from a single 
incoming IP address during a predefined time period; and 
taking defensive action against Suspect IP addresses. 
In a fourth embodiment, there is a method for deploying a 
system for defending against man in the middle (MITM) 
attacks directed at a target server, comprising: providing a 
computer infrastructure being operable to: record an incom 
ing IP address, userid, and time of each session occurring with 
the target server; identify suspect IP addresses by determining 
if an unacceptable number of Sessions are occurring from a 
single incoming IP address during a predefined time period; 
and take defensive action against Suspect IP addresses. 
MITM attacks of the sort described herein share a detect 
able characteristic that can be used to predict to Some reason 
able certainty that an attack is taking place. Once detected, 
defensive action can be taken, Such as sending a message that 
will be relayed by the MITM node to the user informing the 
user of the potential Vulnerability and ending the session. 
The observable characteristic shared by successful MITM 
attacks is that to the target server it will appear that a large 
number of different end users have for no apparent reason 
begun logging on from the same IP address, i.e., the address 
of the MITM proxy. If, for instance, certain definable thresh 
olds were exceeded such as N number of userids from a 
single, previously unknown address within a specific interval 
of time, then further investigation or even automated defenses 
would be warranted. 
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Some advantages to this technique include: the thresholds 
can be tuned to Suit the risk tolerance of the target organiza 
tion; detection can be automated; countermeasures can be 
automated to limit further damage; automated detection and 
response allows for constant vigilance by providing a con 
tinuous, 24x7 defense; the basic technique can be extended 
beyond web spoofing/phishing attacks to other types of 
MITM scenarios; the more “successful the attacker is at 
luring victims, the more likely the attack will be detected and 
repelled 
The illustrative aspects of the present invention are 
designed to solve the problems herein described and other 
problems not discussed. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
These and other features of this invention will be more 
readily understood from the following detailed description of 
the various aspects of the invention taken in conjunction with 
the accompanying drawings. 
FIG.1 depicts a computer system having an MITM defense 
system in accordance with an embodiment of the present 
invention. 
FIG. 2 depicts an example of an MITM attack. 
FIG.3 depicts an example of an IP address/userid table in 
accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. 
FIG. 4 depicts a flow diagram showing an illustrative 
implementation of an embodiment of the present invention. 
The drawings are merely schematic representations, not 
intended to portray specific parameters of the invention. The 
drawings are intended to depict only typical embodiments of 
the invention, and therefore should not be considered as lim 
iting the scope of the invention. In the drawings, like num 
bering represents like elements. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
FIG. 1 depicts a computer system 10 that provides an 
MITM defense system 18 for a target server 32 communicat 
ing with a user38 via network node 40. In particular, MITM 
defense system 18 analyzes the IP address 42 of network node 
40 to determine whether network node 40 is a legitimate node 
associated with user38 oran MITM server that has interposed 
itself between the user 38 and target server 32. Note that in 
this illustrative embodiment, computer system 10 containing 
MITM defense system 18 is shown separated from target 
server 32. However, it is understood that MITM defense 
system 18 may be integrated with target server 32 in a single 
system. 
As noted above, an observable characteristic shared by 
successful MITM attacks is that it will appear to the target 
server 32 that a large number of different end users have for no 
apparent reason begun logging on from the same IP address 
42, i.e., the address of the MITM server. While this behavior 
alone will not conclusively indicate malicious activity, iden 
tifying and analyzing Such behavior can allow for further 
investigation or countermeasures to be taken. For instance, 
definable thresholds involving the allowed number of user 
IDS from a single, previously unknown address within a spe 
cific interval of time can be put in place to identify suspicious 
activity. When a threshold is exceeded, then further investi 
gation or even automated defenses can be implemented. 
As shown in this illustrative embodiment, MITM defense 
system 18 includes a list checking system 22, an activity 
recording system 24, an IP address activity analysis system 
26, and a countermeasure system 28. List checking system 22 
is utilized to compare an incoming IP address 42 with either 
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or both a white list33 and a black list34. The white list33 may 
include a list of known IP addresses that are valid, and need 
not be analyzed (e.g., the IP address associated with a known 
legitimate proxy, etc.). The black list 34 may include a list of 
known IP addresses that are invalid (e.g., sites that are known 
to have caused attacks in the past). When an IP address 42 is 
found on the black list 34, the session can, e.g., be immedi 
ately terminated. 
Activity recording system 24 is utilized to store IP 
addresses and timing information for sessions occurring with 
the target server 32. This information is stored in an IP 
address/userid table 36, which can then be used by IP address 
activity analysis system 26. IP address/userid table 36 may be 
implemented in any format that can track userids, login time, 
and IP addresses. 
One possible implementation would involve a hash tree 
that indexes IP addresses such that each address points to a 
linked list of userids (and associated login times) that have 
logged onto the particular IP address. FIG.3 depicts an illus 
trative embodiment of Such an implementation involving 
three linked lists 60 for IP Addr 1, IPAddr 2, and IP Addr3. 
As can be seen for the first IP address 62 (Addr 1), there have 
been two logins 64 by userid 9 and userid 2. For each login, 
there is an associated login time. 
IP address activity analysis system 26 (FIG. 1) is utilized to 
examine the IP address/userid table 36 to identify any IP 
addresses that have an unusually large number of logins dur 
ing some predefined time period. For example, threshold 
values may be utilized that would be customizable by the 
target organization based on their tolerance for risk (much 
like a biometric System or intrusion detection system must be 
tuned to minimize false positives while not overlooking real 
attacks). These observed values and associated thresholds 
could be expressed as follows: 
N=number of userids logging in from the given IP address 
Nt=threshold of acceptable number of userids logging in 
from any given IP address 
T-time interval over which logins from a given IP address 
have been attempted 
Tt time interval threshold triggering Suspicion 
Then, the following algorithm could be implemented: 
If N>Nt and Te Tt then 
suspect MITM attack 
otherwise 
proceed with login and record details. 
It is understood that the above is for illustrative purposes only, 
and more complex algorithms could be utilized, e.g., ones that 
take into account time of day, past usage history, analysis of 
the specific userids, etc. 
Countermeasure system 28 is utilized to respond to a Sus 
pected MITM attack by taking some defensive action. Any 
type of countermeasure could be implemented. For instance, 
in a case where a login is being attempted from a suspicious 
IP address, the login can simply be denied. In other cases, if a 
first session is currently underway and a large number of 
additional sessions are started from the same IP address, the 
first session could be terminated. In these cases, the Suspi 
cious IP address could be added to the black list 34. In still 
further cases, Suspect IP address can be simply outputted to a 
user for further investigation. 
FIG. 4 depicts a flow diagram of a process for implement 
ing MITM defense system 18 (FIG. 1) for a login procedure. 
At S1, a login request is received and the userid, password and 
IP address are recorded at S2. At S3, the login credentials are 
Subjected to Verification, and if they fail, an authentication 
failure message is returned at S18, and the session is termi 
nated at S19. If the login credentials succeed, then an MITM 
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white list is searched to locate the incoming IP address at S5. 
If it is found at S6, then defense processing is skipped and the 
session is allowed to continue at S7. Otherwise, an MITM 
black list is searched for the incoming IP address at step S8. If 
the IP address is found in the black list at S9, then an MITM 
failure message is returned at S15, and the session is termi 
nated at S17. 
If the incoming IP address is not found in the black list, then 
a search is made for previous login attempts from the incom 
ing IP address at S10. At S11, the number of userids originat 
ing from the IP address are determined, and the activity level 
is determined at S12 (e.g., how many during a particular time 
period). At S13, the number and activity level are compared 
against threshold values, and if exceeded, the IP address is 
added to the black list at S16, an MITM failure message is 
returned at S15, and the session is terminated at S17. If the 
threshold values are not exceeded, then at S14, the IP address, 
userid, and time are recorded in the IP address userid table, 
and the login continues. 
Referring again to FIG. 1, it is understood that computer 
system 10 may be implemented as any type of computing 
infrastructure. Computer system 10 generally includes a pro 
cessor 12, input/output (I/O) 14, memory 16, and bus 17. The 
processor 12 may comprise a single processing unit, or be 
distributed across one or more processing units in one or more 
locations, e.g., on a client and server. Memory 16 may com 
prise any known type of data storage and/or transmission 
media, including magnetic media, optical media, random 
access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), a data 
cache, a data object, etc. Moreover, memory 16 may reside at 
a single physical location, comprising one or more types of 
data storage, or be distributed across a plurality of physical 
systems in various forms. 
I/O 14 may comprise any system for exchanging informa 
tion to/from an external resource. External devices/resources 
may comprise any known type of external device, including a 
monitor/display, speakers, storage, another computer system, 
a hand-held device, keyboard, mouse, voice recognition sys 
tem, speech output system, printer, facsimile, pager, etc. Bus 
17 provides a communication link between each of the com 
ponents in the computer system 10 and likewise may com 
prise any known type of transmission link, including electri 
cal, optical, wireless, etc. Although not shown, additional 
components, such as cache memory, communication sys 
tems, system Software, etc., may be incorporated into com 
puter system 10. 
Access to computer system 10 may be provided over a 
network such as the Internet, a local area network (LAN), a 
wide area network (WAN), a virtual private network (VPN), 
etc. Communication could occur via a direct hardwired con 
nection (e.g., serial port), or via an addressable connection 
that may utilize any combination of wireline and/or wireless 
transmission methods. Moreover, conventional network con 
nectivity, such as Token Ring, Ethernet, WiFi or other con 
ventional communications standards could be used. Still yet, 
connectivity could be provided by conventional TCP/IP sock 
ets-based protocol. In this instance, an Internet service pro 
vider could be used to establish interconnectivity. Further, as 
indicated above, communication could occur in a client 
server or server-server environment. 
It should be appreciated that the teachings of the present 
invention could be offered as a business method on a sub 
Scription or fee basis. For example, a computer system 10 
comprising a MITM defense system 18 could be created, 
maintained and/or deployed by a service provider that offers 
the functions described herein for customers. That is, a ser 
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6 
vice provider could offer to deploy or provide the ability to 
identify and respond to MITM attacks as described above. 
It is understood that in addition to being implemented as a 
system and method, the features may be provided as a pro 
gram product stored on a computer-readable medium, which 
when executed, enables computer system 10 to provide an 
MITM defense system 18. To this extent, the computer-read 
able medium may include program code, which implements 
the processes and systems described herein. It is understood 
that the term “computer-readable medium' comprises one or 
more of any type of physical embodiment of the program 
code. In particular, the computer-readable medium can com 
prise program code embodied on one or more portable Stor 
age articles of manufacture (e.g., a compact disc, a magnetic 
disk, a tape, etc.), on one or more data storage portions of a 
computing device, such as memory 16 and/or a storage sys 
tem, and/or as a data signal traveling over a network (e.g., 
during a wired/wireless electronic distribution of the program 
product). 
As used herein, it is understood that the terms “program 
code' and "computer program code' are synonymous and 
mean any expression, in any language, code or notation, of a 
set of instructions that cause a computing device having an 
information processing capability to perform a particular 
function either directly or after any combination of the fol 
lowing: (a) conversion to another language, code or notation; 
(b) reproduction in a different material form; and/or (c) 
decompression. To this extent, program code can be embod 
ied as one or more types of program products. Such as an 
application/software program, component software/a library 
of functions, an operating system, a basic I/O System/driver 
for a particular computing and/or I/O device, and the like. 
Further, it is understood that terms such as “component” and 
“system” are synonymous as used herein and represent any 
combination of hardware and/or software capable of per 
forming some function(s). 
The block diagrams in the figures illustrate the architec 
ture, functionality, and operation of possible implementations 
of systems, methods and computer program products accord 
ing to various embodiments of the present invention. In this 
regard, each block in the block diagrams may represent a 
module, segment, or portion of code, which comprises one or 
more executable instructions for implementing the specified 
logical function(s). It should also be noted that the functions 
noted in the blocks may occur out of the order noted in the 
figures. For example, two blocks shown in Succession may, in 
fact, be executed substantially concurrently, or the blocks 
may sometimes be executed in the reverse order, depending 
upon the functionality involved. It will also be noted that each 
block of the block diagrams can be implemented by special 
purpose hardware-based systems which perform the specified 
functions or acts, or combinations of special purpose hard 
ware and computer instructions. 
Although specific embodiments have been illustrated and 
described herein, those of ordinary skill in the art appreciate 
that any arrangement which is calculated to achieve the same 
purpose may be substituted for the specific embodiments 
shown and that the invention has other applications in other 
environments. This application is intended to cover any adap 
tations or variations of the present invention. The following 
claims are in no way intended to limit the scope of the inven 
tion to the specific embodiments described herein. 
What is claimed is: 
1. A system comprising: 
at least one computing device configured to defend against 
man in the middle (MITM) attacks directed at a target 
server, the at least computing device comprising: 
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an activity recording system that records an incoming IP 
address, user id, and 
time of each session occurring with the target server; 
a list checking system for performing the following: 
comparing a single incoming IP address with a white 
list; and 
comparing the single incoming IP address with a 
black list after 
the comparing of the single incoming IP address with the 
white list and after determining that the single incom 
ing IP address is not present on the white list; 
an activity analysis system that performs the following 
after the list checking system compares the single 
incoming IP address with the black list, and after deter 
mining that the single incoming IP address is not present 
on the black list: 
searches for records of a previous login attempt from the 
single incoming IP address; 
determines a number of user ids occurring from the 
single incoming IP address during a predefined time 
period; 
compares the number of user ids occurring from the 
single incoming IP address to a predefined threshold 
number of user ids specific to the predefined time 
period; and 
identifies the single incoming IP address as a Suspect IP 
address in response to the number of user ids occur 
ring from the single incoming IP address exceeding 
the threshold within the predefined time period; and 
a countermeasure system for taking action against the Sus 
pect IP address. 
2. The system of claim 1, wherein the activity analysis 
system includes a first value N that represents a number of 
sessions along with a threshold value Ntanda second valueT 
and its associated threshold value Tt that represents a time 
frame, and wherein if there are more than N sessions with the 
single incoming IP address during a time period less than T. 
the single incoming IP address is identified as a Suspect IP 
address. 
3. The system of claim 1, wherein the countermeasure 
system causes a login session to fail. 
4. The system of claim 1, wherein the countermeasure 
system causes a session to terminate in response to the iden 
tifying of the single incoming IP address as a suspect address. 
5. The system of claim 1, wherein the countermeasure 
system causes the Suspect IP address to be outputted. 
6. A computer program product stored on a non-transitory 
computer readable medium, which when executed includes 
program instructions for defending against man in the middle 
(MITM) attacks directed at a target server, the program prod 
uct comprising: 
program instructions for recording an incoming IP address, 
user id, and time of each session occurring with the 
target server; 
program instructions for comparing the incoming IP 
address with a white list; 
program instructions for comparing the incoming IP 
address with a black list after the comparing of the 
incoming IP address with the white list and after deter 
mining that the incoming IP address is not present on the 
white list; 
program instructions for searching for records of a previ 
ous login attempt from the incoming IP address; 
program instructions for identifying Suspect IP addresses 
by determining a number of user ids occurring from the 
single incoming IP address during a predefined time 
period after the comparing of the incoming IP address 
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with the black list, and after determining that the single 
incoming IP address is not present on the black list; 
program instructions for comparing the number of user ids 
occurring from the single incoming IP address to a pre 
defined threshold number of user ids specific to the 
predefined time period; 
program instructions for identifying the single incoming IP 
address as a Suspect IP address in response to the number 
of user ids occurring from the single incoming IP 
address exceeding the threshold within the predefined 
time period; and 
program instructions for taking defensive action against 
the suspect IP address. 
7. The program product of claim 6, wherein a first value N 
represents a number of sessions along with a threshold value 
Nt and a second value T and its associated threshold value Tt 
represents a time frame, and wherein if there are more than N 
sessions with the single incoming IP address during a time 
period less than T, the single incoming IP address is identified 
as a suspect IP address. 
8. The program product of claim 6, wherein the defensive 
action causes a login session to fail. 
9. The program product of claim 6, wherein the defensive 
action causes a session to terminate in response to the iden 
tifying of the single incoming IP address as a Suspect address. 
10. The program product of claim 6, wherein the defensive 
action causes the Suspect IP address to be outputted. 
11. A computer-implemented method performed on at least 
one computing device for defending against man in the 
middle (MITM) attacks directed at a target server, the method comprising: 
recording an incoming IP address, user id, and time of each 
session occurring with the target server using the at least 
one computing device; 
comparing the incoming IP address with a white list; 
comparing the incoming IP address with a black list after 
the comparing of the incoming IP address with the white 
list and after determining that the incoming IP address is 
not present on the white list; 
searching for records of a previous login attempt from the 
incoming IP address; 
identifying Suspect IP addresses by determining a number 
of user ids occurring from the single incoming IP 
address during a predefined time period after the com 
paring of the incoming IP address with the black list, and 
after determining that the single incoming IP address is 
not present on the black list; 
comparing the number of userids occurring from the single 
incoming IP address to a predefined threshold number of 
user ids specific to the predefined time period; 
identifying the single incoming IP address as a suspect IP 
address in response to the number of user ids occurring 
from the single incoming IP address exceeding the 
threshold within the predefined time period; and 
taking defensive action against the Suspect IP address using 
the at least one computing device. 
12. The method of claim 11, wherein a first value N repre 
sents a number of sessions along with a threshold value Nt 
and a second value T and its associated threshold value Tt 
represents a time frame, and wherein if there are more than N 
sessions with the single incoming IP address during a time 
period less than T, the single incoming IP address is identified 
as a suspect IP address. 
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13. The method of claim 11, wherein the defensive action 
causes a login session to fail. 
14. The method of claim 11, wherein the defensive action 
causes a session to terminate in response to the identifying of 
the single incoming IP address as a suspect address. 
15. The method of claim 11, wherein the defensive action 
causes the suspect IP address to be outputted. 
16. A computer-implemented method for deploying a sys 
tem for defending against man in the middle (MITM) attacks 
directed at a target server, comprising: 
providing at least one computing device being operable to: 
record an incoming IP address, user id, and time of each 
session occurring with the target server, 
compare the incoming IP address with a white list; 
compare the incoming IP address with a black list after 
the comparing of the incoming IP address with the 
white list and after determining that the incoming IP 
address is not present on the white list; 
search for records of a previous login attempt from the 
incoming IP address; 
identify suspect IP addresses by determining a number 
of user ids occurring from the incoming IP address 
during a predefined time period after the comparing of 
the incoming IP address with the black list, and after 
determining that the single incoming IP address is not 
present on the black list; 
compare the number of user ids occurring from the 
single incoming IP address to a predefined threshold 
number of user ids specific to the predefined time 
period; 
identify the single incoming IP address as a suspect IP 
address in response to the number of user ids occur 
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the threshold within the predefined time period; and 
take defensive action against the Suspect IP address. 
17. The method of claim 1, wherein the activity recording 
system records the incoming IP address, the user id, and the 
time of each session occurring with the target server in a hash 
tree that indexes the incoming IP address with the user id and 
the time of each session. 
18. The method of claim 17, wherein the activity analysis 
system searches for the records of the previous login attempt 
from the single incoming IP address and determines the num 
ber of user ids occurring from the single incoming IP address 
using the hash tree. 
19. The computer program product of claim 6, wherein the 
incoming IP address, the user id, and the time of each session 
occurring with the target server are recorded inahashtree that 
indexes the incoming IP address with the user id and the time 
of each session. 
20. The computer program product of claim 19, wherein 
the program instructions for identifying Suspect IP addresses 
determines the number of user ids occurring from the single 
incoming IP address during the predefined time period using 
the hash tree. 
21. The computer implemented method of claim 11, 
wherein the incoming IP address, the user id, and the time of 
each session occurring with the target server are recorded in a 
hashtree that indexes the incoming IP address with the user id 
and the time of each session. 
22. The computer implemented method of claim 21, 
wherein the identifying of suspect IP addresses determines 
the number of user ids occurring from the single incoming IP 
address during the predefined time period using the hash tree. 
k k k k k 
 
 
 151 
9.8 SYSTEM FOR DETECTING THE PRESENCE OF ROGUE DOMAIN NAME SERVICE PROVIDERS 
THROUGH PASSIVE MONITORING 
 
 
US009225731B2 
(12) United States Patent (10) Patent No.: US 9.225,731 B2 
Crume (45) Date of Patent: Dec. 29, 2015 
(54) SYSTEM FOR DETECTING THE PRESENCE 7,873,993 B2 1/2011 King 
OF ROGUE DOMAN NAME SERVICE 8,055,768 B2 11/2011 Saunderson et al. 
8,069,483 B1 1 1/2011 Matlock PROVIDERS THROUGH PASSIVE 8.312,541 B2 11/2012 Levy-Abegnoli et al. 
MONITORING 8,370,933 B1* 2/2013 Buckler .......................... 726/22 
2004/0030796 A1 2/2004 Cooper et al. 
(75) Inventor: Jeffery L. Crume, Raleigh, NC (US) 2004/011 1640 A1 6/2004 Baum 
2006/0176822 A1* 8/2006 Doyle et al. .................. 370,241 
(73) Assignee: International Business Machines 2006/0253612 A1 11, 2006 Cheshire 
Corporation, Armonk, NY (US) 2007/0186276 A1 8, 2007 McRae et al. 
p s s 2007/0271220 A1* 11/2007 Carter ............................... 707/2 
2008, OO60.054 A1 3/2008 Srivastava 
(*) Notice: Subject to any disclaimer, the term of this 2008/0147837 A1* 6/2008 Klein et al. ................... 709,223 
patent is extended or adjusted under 35 2008/0307516 A1 12/2008 Levy-Abegnoli et al. 
U.S.C. 154(b) by 473 days. 2009,032.7487 A1 12/2009 Olson et al. 
(Continued) 
(21) Appl. No.: 13/479,412 
OTHER PUBLICATIONS 
(22) Filed: May 24, 2012 Torres-Diaz, Office Action Communication for U.S. Appl. No. 
(65) Prior Publication Data 13/479,418 dated Nov. 26, 2013, 11 pages. 
US 2013/0318170 A1 Nov. 28, 2013 (Continued) 
(51) Int. Cl. Primary Examiner —UZma Alam 
H04L 29/2 (2006.01) (74) Attorney, Agent, or Firm — Douglas A. Lashmit; 
H04L 29/06 (2006.01) Hoffman Warnick LLC 
H04L 2/26 (2006.01) 
(52) U.S. Cl. (57) ABSTRACT 
CPC ........ H04L 63/1408 (2013.01); H04L 61/1511 A method, system, and computer program product embodied 
(2013.01); H04L 63/1483 (2013.01); H04L in a computer readable storage medium are disclosed for 
43/00 (2013.01) identifying a rogue domain name service (DNS) server. 
(58) Field of Classification Search Embodiments include passively monitoring traffic on a target 
CPC ..... H04L 61/1511; HO4L 61/15; HO4L 63/04; network; and identifying a DNS resolution response in the 
H04L 43/00; HO4L 63/1483 traffic on the network. The DNS resolution response includes 
USPC .......................................................... 709/245 a mapping of a domain to an internet protocol (IP) address. 
See application file for complete search history. The DNS resolution response is compared with a preconfig 
ured list of known mappings of domains to IP addresses. 
(56) References Cited Based on the results of the comparison, it can be determined 
U.S. PATENT DOCUMENTS 
7,706,267 B2 * 4/2010 Ford et al. ..................... 370,230 
7,756.933 B2 7, 2010 Reshefet al. 
7,823,202 B1 10/2010 Nucci et al. 
Monitor passively monitors traffic 
whether the DNS resolution response is correct. In cases 
where the DNS resolution response is incorrect, the provider 
of the DNS resolution response is a rogue DNS server. 
15 Claims, 5 Drawing Sheets 
ower network. 
Requester requests DNS resolution 
DNS resolution response (DNSRR) sent to Requester, 
ldentify DNSRR among traffic over monitored network. 
DNS RR to preconfiguredlist of k 
addresses to domains. 
Compare mapping of IP address to domain contained in 
nown mappings of IP 
either domain or 
address in DNSRR 
appearin list? 
No 
Do they 
match? 
Determine that DNSRR is 
correct and the sending 
DNS server is authorized. 
K. Yes 
Yes 
Determine that DNSRR 
is not correct and the 
sending DNS server is 
not authorized is rogue. 
No 
Initiate alarm. 
  
    
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 152 
 
US 9.225,731 B2 
Page 2 
(56) References Cited 2013/0332986 A1* 12/2013 Sima et al. ........................ T26.1 
2013/0333038 A1* 12/2013 Chien ............................. T26/23 
U.S. PATENT DOCUMENTS OTHER PUBLICATIONS 
2010, OO31362 A1 2/2010 Himberger et al. 
2010, O142709 A1 6, 2010 Robert et al. Application No. DE 10 2013 208923.6, Office Action dated Jan. 27. 
2010, O262688 A1 10, 2010 Hussain et al. 2014, 12 pags. 
2010/029 1943 Al 1 1/2010 Mihaly et al. Torres-Diaz, Office Action Communication for U.S. Appl. No. 
2011/01069 19 A1 5, 2011 MaZur et al. 13/479,418 dated May 9, 2013, 17 pages. 
2011/019 1455 A1 8, 2011 Gardner ........................ 709,223 Torres-Diaz, Lizbeth, U.S. Appl. No. 13/479,418, Office Action 
2011/0208838 A1* 8, 2011 Thomas et al. ............... TO9,219 dated Jul. 2, 2014, 13 pages. 
2011/0214180 A1 9/2011 Gunawardena Torres-Diaz, Office Action Communication for U.S. Appl. No. 
2011/0231931 A1 9, 2011 Ma 13/479,418 dated Nov. 5, 2014, 14 pages. 
2011/0271345 A1 11/2011 Wolman et al. 
2012/O124087 A1* 5, 2012 Malan et al. .................. 707/770 * cited by examiner 
 
 
 153 
 
  
US 9.225,731 B2 
70] EOIAECINILOCHWOO
U.S. Patent 
?, "SOIH
  
 
 
 154 
 
  
US 9.225,731 B2 Sheet 2 of 5 Dec. 29, 2015 U.S. Patent 
  
 
 
 155 
 
  
US 9.225,731 B2 Sheet 3 of 5 Dec. 29, 2015 U.S. Patent 
9. "SDI
  
 
 
 156 
 
  
US 9.225,731 B2 Sheet 4 of 5 Dec. 29, 2015 U.S. Patent 
å T’ZZZZZZZZZ6JO‘||eue 
  
 
 
 157 
 
  
US 9.225,731 B2 Sheet 5 of 5 Dec. 29, 2015 U.S. Patent 
S3)\ON G "SDIH
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 158 
 
  
US 9,225,731 B2 
1. 
SYSTEM FOR DETECTING THE PRESENCE 
OF ROGUE DOMAN NAME SERVICE 
PROVIDERS THROUGH PASSIVE 
MONITORING 
CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED 
APPLICATION 
This patent application is related to commonly-assigned 
U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/479,418, filed concur 
rently with this application. 
TECHNICAL FIELD 
The invention relates generally to identifying untrusted or 
compromised sources for network information. More par 
ticularly, the invention relates to identifying rogue DNS serv 
ers via passive monitoring. 
BACKGROUND 
The Domain Name Service (DNS) resolves alphanumeric 
domain names into numeric IP addresses. This service is 
provided by a loose collection of servers scattered around the 
Internet as well as within local Intranets. If, however, the 
information Supplied through this service comes not from an 
authorized source, but rather, an attacker's system Supplying 
incorrect information or from an authorized source that has 
been compromised, network traffic could be impeded in a 
denial of service (DOS) attack or misrouted in a spoofing or 
man-in-the-middle attack. This could result insensitive traffic 
being delivered to untrusted systems or not being delivered at 
all. 
One way that these services could be subverted would be if 
an attacker set up an “evil twin' WiFi hotspot which imper 
Sonates a trusted wireless access point and establishes itself as 
a man-in-the-middle (MITM), which reroutes network traf 
fic. The MITM can examine and modify all traffic coming 
into and going out of the rogue network. Another way would 
be for the attacker to set up a rogue server which hijacks 
network services by broadcasting to all nodes in the network 
that it is online and available to process DNS requests. Yet 
another way would be for an attacker to compromise a trusted 
DNS server and cause it to produce erroneous results. In many 
cases, the last server to broadcast will be considered authori 
tative by other nodes in the network. 
One solution for detecting Such untrusted or compromised 
sources of network information is the use of a DNS watcher 
which performs a “health check” by polling a preconfigured 
list of trusted DNS servers to verify that they are operational 
and are returning proper results. There are several drawbacks 
to this method, however. Polling operations generate addi 
tional, superfluous network traffic, and may be discovered by 
an attacker's reconnaissance of the target network. A polling 
approach also only verifies whether known DNS servers are 
performing properly. By virtue of the active nature of polling 
specific known DNS servers, it is unable to verify the correct 
ness of DNS resolutions returned by hosts other than the 
known hosts being polled. Since rogue DNS providers would 
not be known in advance, they would go unchecked by a 
polling solution. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION 
In general, aspects of the present invention provide a pas 
sive monitoring solution for identifying a rogue DNS server 
in a network which does not generate additional network 
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traffic, and is able to monitor DNS resolutions provided by 
both known and unknown DNS servers. 
A first aspect of the disclosure provides a method for iden 
tifying a rogue domain name service (DNS) server. The 
method comprises: passively monitoring traffic on a network; 
identifying a DNS resolution response in the traffic on the 
network, wherein the DNS resolution response includes a 
mapping of a domain to an internet protocol (IP) address; 
comparing the DNS resolution response with a preconfigured 
list of known mappings of domains to IP addresses; and 
determining whether the DNS resolution response is correct 
based on the comparing. 
A second aspect of the disclosure provides a system for 
identifying a rogue domain name service (DNS) server. The 
system comprises: a monitoring component for passively 
monitoring traffic on a network; an identification component 
for identifying a DNS resolution response in the traffic on the 
network, wherein the DNS resolution response includes a 
mapping of a domain to an internet protocol (IP) address; a 
comparison component for comparing the DNS resolution 
response with a preconfigured list of known mappings of 
domains to IP addresses; and a determination component for 
determining whether the DNS resolution response is correct 
based on the comparing. 
A third aspect of the disclosure provides a computer pro 
gram product embodied in a computer readable storage 
medium which, when executed by a computing device, 
causes the computer system to implement a method for iden 
tifying a rogue domain name service (DNS) server. The 
method comprises: passively monitoring traffic on a network; 
identifying a DNS resolution response in the traffic on the 
network, wherein the DNS resolution response includes a 
mapping of a domain to an internet protocol (IP) address; 
comparing the DNS resolution response with a preconfigured 
list of known mappings of domains to IP addresses; and 
determining whether the DNS resolution response is correct 
based on the comparing. 
These and other aspects, advantages and salient features of 
the invention will become apparent from the following 
detailed description, which, when taken in conjunction with 
the annexed drawings, where like parts are designated by like 
reference characters throughout the drawings, disclose 
embodiments of the invention. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
FIG. 1 shows a data processing system Suitable for imple 
menting an embodiment of the invention. 
FIG. 2 shows a schematic data flow diagram illustrating 
monitoring of a network according to an embodiment of the 
invention. 
FIG. 3 shows a schematic data flow diagram illustrating 
identification of a rogue DNS server according to an embodi 
ment of the invention. 
FIG. 4 shows a preconfigured DNS resolution table in 
accordance with an embodiment of the invention. 
FIG. 5 shows a flow chart for a method of identifying a 
rogue DNS server in accordance with an embodiment of the 
invention. 
The drawings are not necessarily to scale. The drawings are 
merely schematic representations, not intended to portray 
specific parameters of the invention. The drawings are 
intended to depict only typical embodiments of the invention, 
and therefore should not be considered as limiting the scope 
of the invention. In the drawings, like numbering represents 
like elements. 
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DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION 
As indicated above, aspects of the present invention pro 
vide a solution for detecting the presence of rogue DNS 
servers through the use of a monitor which passively observes 
the flow of traffic across a network between nodes, and looks 
for spoofed DNS traffic in that network. In some embodi 
ments, the network may be a local Intranet, and in others, the 
network may be the Internet. 
Turning to the drawings, FIG. 1 shows an illustrative moni 
tor 100 for detecting the presence of rogue DNS servers 215 
that may be present in network 200. To this extent, monitor 
100 includes a computer system 102 that can perform a pro 
cess described herein in order to identify an invalid DNS 
resolution response from a rogue DNS server 215. In particu 
lar, computer system 102 is shown including a computing 
device 104 that includes a rogue DNS server identification 
program 140, which makes computing device 104 operable to 
identify a rogue DNS server 215 by performing a process 
described herein. 
Computing device 104 is shown including a processing 
unit 106 (e.g., one or more processors), a memory 110, a 
storage system 118 (e.g., a storage hierarchy), an input/output 
(I/O) interface component 114 (e.g., one or more I/O inter 
faces and/or devices), and a communications pathway 112. In 
general, processing unit 106 executes program code. Such as 
rogue DNS server identification program 140, which is at 
least partially fixed in memory 110. To this extent, processing 
unit 106 may comprise a single processing unit, or be distrib 
uted across one or more processing units in one or more 
locations. 
Memory 110 can also include local memory, employed 
during actual execution of the program code, bulk storage 
(storage 118), and/or cache memories (not shown) which 
provide temporary storage of at least Some program code in 
order to reduce the number of times code must be retrieved 
from bulk storage 118 during execution. As such, memory 
110 may comprise any known type of data storage and/or 
transmission media, including magnetic media, optical 
media, random access memory (RAM), read-only memory 
(ROM), a data cache, a data object, etc. Moreover, similar to 
processing unit 116, memory 110 may reside at a single 
physical location, comprising one or more types of data Stor 
age, or be distributed across a plurality of physical systems in 
various forms. 
While executing program code, processing component 106 
can process data, which can result in reading and/or writing 
transformed data from/to memory 110 and/or I/O component 
114 for further processing. Pathway 112 provides a director 
indirect communications link between each of the compo 
nents in computer system 102. I/O interface component 114 
can comprise one or more human I/O devices, which enable a 
human user 120 to interact with computer system 102 and/or 
one or more communications devices to enable a system user 
120 to communicate with computer system 102 using any 
type of communications link. 
To this extent, rogue DNS server identification program 
140 can manage a set of interfaces (e.g., graphical user inter 
face(s), application program interface, and/or the like) that 
enable human and/or system users 120 to interact with rogue 
DNS server identification program 140. Further, rogue DNS 
server identification program 140 can manage (e.g., store, 
retrieve, create, manipulate, organize, present, etc.) the data, 
such as data stored in table 220 (FIGS. 2-4), using any solu 
tion. 
In any event, computer system 102 can comprise one or 
more general purpose computing articles of manufacture 104 
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(e.g., computing devices) capable of executing program code, 
such as rogue DNS server identification program 140, 
installed thereon. As used herein, it is understood that “pro 
gram code” means any collection of instructions, in any lan 
guage, code or notation, that cause a computing device having 
an information processing capability to perform a particular 
action either directly or after any combination of the follow 
ing: (a) conversion to another language, code or notation; (b) 
reproduction in a different material form; and/or (c) decom 
pression. To this extent, rogue DNS server identification pro 
gram 140 can be embodied as any combination of system 
Software and/or application Software. In any event, the tech 
nical effect of computer system 102 is to provide processing 
instructions to computing device 104 in order to identify a 
rogue DNS server. 
Further, rogue DNS server identification program 140 can 
be implemented using a set of modules 142-150. In this case, 
a module 142-150 can enable computer system 102 to per 
form a set of tasks used by rogue DNS server identification 
program 140, and can be separately developed and/or imple 
mented apart from other portions of rogue DNS server iden 
tification program 140. As used herein, the term “component' 
means any configuration of hardware, with or without soft 
ware, which implements the functionality described in con 
junction therewith using any solution, while the term 'mod 
ule” means program code that enables a computer system 102 
to implement the actions described in conjunction therewith 
using any solution. When fixed in a memory 110 of a com 
puter system 102 that includes a processing component 106. 
a module is a Substantial portion of a component that imple 
ments the actions. Regardless, it is understood that two or 
more components, modules, and/or systems may share some/ 
all of their respective hardware and/or software. Further, it is 
understood that some of the functionality discussed herein 
may not be implemented or additional functionality may be 
included as part of computer system 102. 
When computer system 102 comprises multiple comput 
ing devices 104, each computing device 104 can have only a 
portion of rogue DNS server identification program 140 fixed 
thereon (e.g., one or more modules 142-150). However, it is 
understood that computer system 102 and rogue DNS server 
identification program 140 are only representative of various 
possible equivalent computer systems that may perform a 
process described herein. To this extent, in other embodi 
ments, the functionality provided by computer system 102 
and rogue DNS server identification program 140 can be at 
least partially implemented by one or more computing 
devices that include any combination of general and/or spe 
cific purpose hardware with or without program code. In each 
embodiment, the hardware and program code, if included, 
can be created using standard engineering and programming 
techniques, respectively. 
When computer system 102 includes multiple computing 
devices 104, the computing devices can communicate over 
any type of communications link. Further, while performing 
a process described herein, computer system 102 can com 
municate with one or more other computer systems using any 
type of communications link. In either case, the communica 
tions link can comprise any combination of various types of 
wired and/or wireless links; comprise any combination of one 
or more types of networks; and/or utilize any combination of 
various types of transmission techniques and protocols. 
As discussed herein, rogue DNS server identification pro 
gram 140 enables computer system 102 to implement identi 
fication of a rogue DNS server. To this extent, rogue DNS 
server identification program 140 is shown including a moni 
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toring module 142, an identifying module 144, a comparison 
module 146, a determination module 148, and an alarm mod 
ule 150. 
Referring now to FIGS. 2-3, the network environment 200 
in which monitor 100 may be used is depicted. As illustrated, 
network 200 may include a requester 205, which may be a 
client workstation operated by a user or a server. Additional 
requesters 205 may be included in network 200, but are omit 
ted from the depiction of network 200 in FIGS. 2-3 for sim 
plicity. Requester 205 may send a DNS resolution request 201 
for resolution of a particular hosts alphanumeric domain 
name into a numeric IP address. 
As shown in FIG. 2, under normal operating conditions, in 
which an attacker is not present in network 200, DNS reso 
lution request 201 is received and processed by authorized 
DNS server 210, which sends DNS resolution response 202. 
In that case, DNS resolution response 202 may contain a valid 
and accurate mapping of domain name to IP address. 
In other cases, as shown in FIG.3, an attacker's rogue DNS 
sever 215 may be present in network 200 with the purpose of 
impersonating another computing system. In this case, DNS 
resolution request 201 is received and processed by rogue 
DNS server 215, and DNS resolution response 202 is pro 
vided by rogue DNS server 215. Such a DNS resolution 
response 202 may contain an incorrect domain name to IP 
address mapping, resulting in either misrouting of network 
traffic in a spoofing attack in which sensitive traffic is deliv 
ered to an untrusted system, or impeding of network traffic in 
a denial of service (DOS) attack. 
In either case, monitor 100 is positioned at a strategic point 
in network 200 such that monitor 100 can observe the flow of 
network traffic between nodes on network 200. As discussed 
above with reference to FIG.1, monitor 100 includes modules 
142-150, which when executed by computer system 102. 
perform passive monitoring of traffic on network 200, includ 
ing, among other network traffic, DNS resolution requests 
201 and DNS resolution responses 202. 
Referring concurrently to FIGS. 1-3, monitoring module 
142, part of monitor 100, performs monitoring 143 of traffic 
across network 200, including DNS resolution requests 201 
and DNS resolution responses 202. Identification component 
144 can identify, in the traffic monitored on the network 200, 
a DNS resolution response 202. As mentioned previously, a 
DNS resolution response 202 includes a mapping of a domain 
name 225 to an IP address 230 in response to a DNS resolu 
tion request 201 sent by requester 205. 
Once a DNS resolution response 202 is identified, com 
parison module 146 can perform a comparison of the DNS 
resolution response 202 with the known mappings stored in a 
preconfigured list of known mappings of domain names and 
IP addresses contained in a known DNS resolution table 220. 
The mappings of domain names to IP addresses contained in 
table 220 are known to be valid. As shown in FIG. 4, the IP 
address 230 stored in table 220 may be expressed as a specific 
IP address, such as yyyyyyyyyyyy, the IP address of the 
domain mybank.com. In other embodiments, IP addresses 
230 stored in table 200 may be expressed as a range of IP 
addresses using at least one wildcard. A range of IP addresses 
may be broad, including several wild cards such as, for 
example, XXX.*.*.*, the IP address range for the domain com 
pany.com. In other embodiments the range of IP addresses 
may be narrower, for example having only one wildcard, Such 
as ZZZZZZ.ZZZ.1??, the IP address range for the domain 
email.org. 
According to embodiments of the invention, the list of 
mapped domain names 225 and IP addresses 230 stored in 
table 220 need not be an exhaustive list of domains that a user 
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of network 200 may access, or for which requester 205 may 
request DNS resolutions. Rather, a selected number of hosts 
may be included in table 220 as a representative sample. In 
Some embodiments, table 220 may include a preconfigured 
list of domains and their respective IP addresses whose selec 
tion for inclusion in table 220 is based on the domain hosting 
particularly sensitive information accessed by network users. 
In other embodiments, table 220 may include a preconfigured 
list of domains and their respective IP addresses whose selec 
tion for inclusion in table 220 is based on a high frequency of 
visits by users of network 200, and therefore a high likelihood 
of a large sample pool of DNS resolution requests and 
responses to monitor. 
Referring back to FIGS. 1-3, determination module 148 
performs a determination of whether the DNS resolution 
response 202 contains a correct and valid mapping of IP 
address to domain name. This determination is based on the 
comparison performed by comparison module 146. Where 
the mapping in DNS resolution response 202 matches the 
mapping for the respective domain name stored in table 220, 
DNS resolution response 202 is determined to be correct. 
This would indicate that DNS resolution response 202 may 
have been sent by authorized DNS server 210 (FIG.2). Where 
the mapping in DNS resolution response 202 does not match 
the mapping for the respective domain name in table 220, 
DNS resolution response 202 is determined to be invalid. This 
would indicate that DNS resolution response 202 may have 
been sent by rogue DNS server 215 (FIG.3), and may indicate 
the occurrence of either a spoof or DOS attack. In this case, 
alarm module 150 sends an alarm 240 to advise requester 205 
of the spoofed DNS traffic. In various embodiments, alarm 
240 may take the form of a message (email, SMS, etc.), a log 
entry, or other form of security event notification which docu 
ments and draws attention to the Suspicious behavior. 
The foregoing method is depicted in a flow chart in FIG. 5. 
As previously described, a monitor passively monitors traffic 
over a network. Over this network, a requesting workstation 
requests a DNS resolution of a particular domain. A DNS 
resolution response is returned to the Requester over the 
network by a DNS server. The DNS resolution response is 
identified by the monitor among the monitored network traf 
fic. Once identified, the mapping of an IP address to a domain 
contained in the DNS resolution response is compared to a 
preconfigured list of known mappings of IP addresses to 
domains. If neither the domain nor the IP address in the DNS 
resolution response appears in the preconfigured list of 
known mappings of IP addresses to domains, the monitor 
simply returns to monitoring the network. 
If either the domain or the IP address in the DNS resolution 
response appears in the preconfigured list of known mappings 
of IP addresses to domains, the mapping contained in the 
DNS resolution request is compared to the corresponding 
mapping in the preconfigured list of known mappings of IP 
addresses to domains. If the mapping matches, i.e. both the IP 
address and the respective domain are the same in the DNS 
resolution response and the preconfigured list of known map 
pings of IP addresses to domains, then it can be determined 
that the DNS resolution response is correct and the DNS 
server that sent it is authorized. If, however, the mapping does 
not match, i.e., the domain corresponds to different IP 
addresses in the DNS resolution response and the preconfig 
ured list of known mappings of IP addresses to domains (or 
the IP address corresponds to different domains in the DNS 
resolution response and the preconfigured list of known map 
pings of IP addresses to domains), then it can be determined 
that the DNS resolution response is invalid. In such a case, it 
can be concluded that the DNS server that sent it is not 
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authorized, and may be a rogue DNS server. In this instance, 
an alarm is initiated, alerting the requester to the security risk. 
While shown and described herein as a method and system 
for identifying a rogue DNS server, it is understood that 
aspects of the invention further provide various alternative 
embodiments. For example, in one embodiment, the inven 
tion provides a computer program fixed in at least one com 
puter-readable medium, which when executed, enables a 
computer system to implement identification of a rogue DNS 
server. To this extent, the computer-readable medium 
includes program code. Such as rogue DNS server identifica 
tion program 140 (FIG. 1), which implements some or all of 
a process described herein. It is understood that the term 
“computer-readable medium' comprises one or more of any 
type of tangible medium of expression, now known or later 
developed, from which a copy of the program code can be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated by a com 
puting device. For example, the computer-readable medium 
can comprise: one or more portable storage articles of manu 
facture; one or more memory/storage components of a com 
puting device; paper; and/or the like. 
In another embodiment, the invention provides a method of 
providing a copy of program code. Such as rogue DNS server 
identification program 140 (FIG. 1), which implements some 
or all of a process described herein. In this case, a computer 
system can process a copy of program code that implements 
Some or all of a process described herein to generate and 
transmit, for reception at a second, distinct location, a set of 
data signals that has one or more of its characteristics set 
and/or changed in Such a manner as to encode a copy of the 
program code in the set of data signals. Similarly, an embodi 
ment of the invention provides a method of acquiring a copy 
of program code that implements some or all of a process 
described herein, which includes a computer system receiv 
ing the set of data signals described herein, and translating the 
set of data signals into a copy of the computer program fixed 
in at least one computer-readable medium. In either case, the 
set of data signals can be transmitted/received using any type 
of communications link. 
In still another embodiment, the invention provides a 
method of generating a system for identifying a rogue DNS 
server. In this case, a computer system, Such as computer 
system 102 (FIG. 1), can be obtained (e.g., created, main 
tained, made available, etc.) and one or more components for 
performing a process described herein can be obtained (e.g., 
created, purchased, used, modified, etc.) and deployed to the 
computer system. To this extent, the deployment can com 
prise one or more of: (1) installing program code on a com 
puting device; (2) adding one or more computing and/or I/O 
devices to the computer system; (3) incorporating and/or 
modifying the computer system to enable it to perform a 
process described herein; and/or the like. 
As used herein, the terms “first,” “second, and the like, do 
not denote any order, quantity, or importance, but rather are 
used to distinguish one element from another, and the terms 
“a” and “an herein do not denote a limitation of quantity, but 
rather denote the presence of at least one of the referenced 
item. The modifier"about used in connection with a quantity 
is inclusive of the stated value and has the meaning dictated 
by the context (e.g., includes the degree of error associated 
with measurement of the particular quantity). The suffix "(s) 
as used herein is intended to include both the singular and the 
plural of the term that it modifies, thereby including one or 
more of that term (e.g., the server(s) includes one or more 
server). Ranges disclosed herein are inclusive and indepen 
dently combinable (e.g., ranges of “up to about 3 wildcards, 
or, more specifically, about 1 wild cards to about 3 wild 
5 
10 
15 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
65 
8 
cards,” is inclusive of the endpoints and all intermediate val 
ues of the ranges of “about 1 wildcard to about 2 wildcards.” 
etc.). 
The descriptions of the various embodiments of the present 
invention have been presented for purposes of illustration, but 
are not intended to be exhaustive or limited to the embodi 
ments disclosed. Many modifications and variations will be 
apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art without departing 
from the scope and spirit of the described embodiments. The 
terminology used herein was chosen to best explain the prin 
ciples of the embodiments, the practical application or tech 
nical improvement over technologies found in the market 
place, or to enable others of ordinary skill in the art to 
understand the embodiments disclosed herein. 
What is claimed is: 
1. A method for identifying a rogue domain name service 
(DNS) server, the method comprising: 
passively monitoring traffic on a network; 
identifying a DNS resolution response in the traffic on the 
network, wherein the DNS resolution response includes 
a mapping of a domain to an internet protocol (IP) 
address; 
comparing the DNS resolution response with a preconfig 
ured list of known mappings of domains to IP addresses, 
wherein each IP address in the preconfigured list of 
known mappings of domains to IP addresses is a range 
of IP addresses expressed using at least one wildcard; 
and 
determining whether the DNS resolution response is cor 
rect based on the comparing. 
2. The method of claim 1, further comprising sending an 
alarm in a case in which the DNS resolution response is 
determined to be incorrect. 
3. The method of claim 2, wherein the alarm comprises at 
least one of an email message, an SMS message, a log entry, 
or a security event notification. 
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the preconfigured list of 
known mappings of domains and IP addresses further 
includes a preconfigured list of domains most frequently vis 
ited by users of a network. 
5. The method of claim 1, wherein the preconfigured list of 
known mappings of domains and IP addresses further 
includes a preconfigured list of domains hosting sensitive 
information accessed by network users. 
6. The method of claim 1, wherein the network includes an 
intranet. 
7. A system for identifying a rogue domain name service 
(DNS) server comprising: 
a monitoring component for passively monitoring traffic 
on a network; 
an identification component for identifying a DNS resolu 
tion response in the traffic on the network, wherein the 
DNS resolution response includes a mapping of a 
domain to an internet protocol (IP) address; 
a comparison component for comparing the DNS resolu 
tion response with a preconfigured list of known map 
pings of domains to IP addresses, 
wherein each IP address in the preconfigured list of 
known mappings of domains to IP addresses is a range 
of IP addresses expressed using at least one wildcard; 
and 
a determination component for determining whether the 
DNS resolution response is correct based on the com 
paring. 
8. The system of claim 7, further comprising an alarm 
component for sending an alarm in a case in which the DNS 
resolution response is determined to be incorrect. 
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9. The system of claim 8, wherein the alarm comprises at passively monitoring traffic on a network; 
least one of an email message, an SMS message, a log entry, identifying a DNS resolution response in the traffic on the 
or a security event notification. network, wherein the DNS resolution response includes 
f a d in t int t tocol (IP 10. The system of claim 7, wherein the preconfigured list of 5 Apping of a domain to an internet protocol (IP) 
known mappings of domains and IP addresses further comparing the DNS resolution response with a preconfig 
includes a preconfigured list of domains most frequently vis- ured list of known mappings of domains to IP addresses, 
ited by users of a network. wherein each IP address in the preconfigured list of 
11. The system of claim 7, wherein the preconfigured list of known mappings of domains to IP addresses is a range of IP addresses expressed using at least one wildcard; 
and 
determining whether the DNS resolution response is cor 
rect based on the comparing. 12. The system of claim 7, wherein the network includes an 14. The computer program product of claim 13, wherein 
intranet. the method further comprises sending an alarm in a case in 
13. A computer program product embodied in a computer 15 which the DNS resolution response is determined to be incor 
known mappings of domains and IP addresses further 10 
includes a preconfigured list of domains hosting sensitive 
information accessed by network users. 
readable storage device which, when executed by a comput- rect. ing device, causes the computing device to implement a 15. The computer program product of claim 13, wherein 
method for identifying a rogue domain name service (DNS) the network includes an intranet. 
server, the method comprising: k . . . . 
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Beschreibung
Querverweis auf verwandte Offenlegungen
[0001] Diese Patentanmeldung steht mit der Patent-
anmeldung US 13/479,418 in Verbindung, die zeit-
gleich mit dieser Anmeldung eingereicht wird.
Technischer Anwendungsbereich
[0002] Die Erfindung bezieht sich im Allgemeinen
auf die Identifizierung nicht vertrauenswürdiger oder
manipulierter Quellen von Netzwerkinformationen. Im
Besonderen bezieht sich die Erfindung auf die Iden-
tifizierung eines bösartigen DNS-Servers durch pas-
sive Überwachung.
Hintergrund
[0003] Der Domain Name Service (DNS) löst alpha-
numerische Domainnamen in numerische IP-Adres-
sen auf. Dieser Dienst (bzw. Service) wird durch ei-
ne große Ansammlung von Servern bereitgestellt,
die im Internet wie auch in lokalen Intranets ver-
teilt sind. Wenn jedoch die über diesen Dienst be-
reitgestellten Informationen nicht von einer autorisier-
ten Quelle stammen, sondern vielmehr von einem
System eines Angreifers, das nicht korrekte Infor-
mationen liefert, oder von einer autorisierten Quel-
le, die manipuliert wurde, kann der Netzwerkverkehr
durch einen Denial-of-Service-(DOS)-Angriff manipu-
liert werden oder in einem Spoofing-(Fälschungs-)
oder Man-in-the-Middle-Angriff falsch weitergeleitet
werden. Dies kann dazu führen, dass sensibler Da-
tenverkehr an nicht vertrauenswürdige Systeme zu-
gestellt wird bzw. überhaupt nicht zugestellt wird.
[0004] Eine Möglichkeit, diese Dienste zu unterlau-
fen, besteht darin, dass ein Angreifer einen ”Evil
Twin”-WiFi-Hotspot einrichtet, der ich als vertrau-
enswürdiger drahtloser Zugangspunkt ausgibt und
sich als Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) einrichtet, der den
Netzwerkverkehr umleitet. Der MITM kann den ge-
samten Datenverkehr, der in das bösartige Netzwerk
hineinfließt und herausgeht, untersuchen und ver-
ändern. Eine andere Möglichkeit für den Angreifer
besteht darin, einen bösartigen Server einzurichten,
der Netzwerkdienste kapert, indem an alle Knoten
im Netzwerk eine Rundsendung abgesetzt wird, dass
er online und zur Verarbeitung von DNS-Anforderun-
gen verfügbar ist. Eine wiederum andere Möglichkeit
für den Angreifer wäre es, einen vertrauenswürdigen
DNS-Server zu manipulieren und ihn dazu zu veran-
lassen, fehlerhafte Ergebnisse zu erzeugen. In vielen
Fällen wird der letzte Server, der eine Rundsendung
vornimmt, von den anderen Knoten im Netzwerk als
maßgeblich betrachtet.
[0005] Eine Lösung zum Erfassen solcher nicht
vertrauenswürdiger oder manipulierter Quellen von
Netzwerkinformationen ist die Verwendung ei-
nes DNS-Watchers (bzw. DNS-Überwachungspro-
gramm), der eine „Gesundheitsprüfung” (bzw. Prüfen
des unversehrten Zustands) durch Polling einer vor-
konfigurierten Liste vertrauenswürdiger DNS-Server
ausführt, um sicherzustellen, dass sie betriebsbereit
sind und korrekte Ergebnisse zurückliefern. Dieses
Verfahren weist jedoch verschiedene Nachteile auf.
Polling-Operationen generieren zusätzlichen, über-
flüssigen Netzwerkverkehr und können von einem
Angreifer durch Ausspähen des Zielnetzwerks ent-
deckt werden. Ein Polling-Ansatz überprüft auch nur,
ob die Ausführung bekannter DNS-Server korrekt ist.
Aufgrund der aktiven Natur des Pollings bestimm-
ter bekannter DNS-Server kann damit die Korrekt-
heit von DNS-Auflösungen nicht geprüft werden, die
von anderen als den bekannten abgefragten Hosts
zurückgegeben werden. Da bösartige DNS-Provider
nicht vorab bekannt sind, würden sie von einer Pol-
ling-Lösung nicht entdeckt werden.
Kurzbeschreibung
[0006] Im Allgemeinen stellen Aspekte der vorlie-
genden Erfindung eine passive Überwachungslö-
sung zur Identifizierung eines bösartigen DNS-Ser-
vers in einem Netzwerk bereit, die keinen zusätzli-
chen Netzwerkverkehr generiert und die in der La-
ge ist, DNS-Auflösungen zu überwachen, die sowohl
von bekannten als auch nicht bekannten DNS-Ser-
vern bereitgestellt werden.
[0007] Ein erster Aspekt der Offenlegung stellt ein
Verfahren zur Identifizierung eines bösartigen Do-
main-Name-Service-(DNS)-Servers bereit. Das Ver-
fahren weist auf: passives Überwachen von Daten-
verkehr in einem Netzwerk; Identifizieren einer DNS-
Auflösungsantwort im Datenverkehr im Netzwerk,
wobei die DNS-Auflösungsantwort eine Zuordnung
einer Domain zu einer Internetprotokoll(IP)-Adres-
se aufweist; Vergleichen der DNS-Auflösungsantwort
mit einer vorkonfigurierten Liste bekannter Zuordnun-
gen von Domains zu IP-Adressen; und Bestimmen,
ob die DNS-Auflösungsantwort basierend auf dem
Vergleich korrekt ist.
[0008] Ein zweiter Aspekt der Offenlegung stellt ein
System zur Identifizierung eines bösartigen Domain-
Name-Service-(DNS)-Servers bereit. Das System
weist auf: eine Überwachungskomponente zum pas-
siven Überwachen von Datenverkehr in einem Netz-
werk; eine Identifizierungskomponente zum Identi-
fizieren einer DNS-Auflösungsantwort im Datenver-
kehr im Netzwerk, wobei die DNS-Auflösungsantwort
eine Zuordnung einer Domain zu einer Internetpro-
tokoll(IP)-Adresse aufweist; eine Vergleichskompo-
nente zum Vergleichen der DNS-Auflösungsantwort
mit einer vorkonfigurierten Liste bekannter Zuordnun-
gen von Domains zu IP-Adressen; und eine Bestim-
mungskomponente zum Bestimmen, ob die DNS-
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Auflösungsantwort basierend auf dem Vergleich kor-
rekt ist.
[0009] Ein dritter Aspekt der Offenlegung stellt ein
in einem computerlesbaren Speichermedium ausge-
führtes Computerprogrammprodukt bereit, bei des-
sen Ausführung durch eine Computingvorrichtung
das Computersystem dazu veranlasst wird, ein
Verfahren zur Identifizierung eines bösartigen Do-
main-Name-Service-(DNS)-Server zu implementie-
ren. Das Verfahren weist auf: passives Überwachen
von Datenverkehr in einem Netzwerk; Identifizieren
einer DNS-Auflösungsantwort im Datenverkehr im
Netzwerk, wobei die DNS-Auflösungsantwort eine
Zuordnung einer Domain zu einer Internetprotokoll
(IP)-Adresse aufweist; Vergleichen der DNS-Auflö-
sungsantwort mit einer vorkonfigurierten Liste be-
kannter Zuordnungen von Domains zu IP-Adressen;
und Bestimmen, ob die DNS-Auflösungsantwort ba-
sierend auf dem Vergleich korrekt ist.
[0010] Diese und andere Aspekte, Vorteile und her-
ausragende Merkmale der Erfindung werden aus der
folgenden Detailbeschreibung ersichtlich, die in Ver-
bindung mit den Zeichnungen im Anhang, wo in den
Zeichnungen ähnliche Teile durch ähnliche Bezugs-
zeichen bezeichnet werden, Ausführungsformen der
Erfindung offenlegt.
Kurzbeschreibung der Zeichnungen
[0011] Fig. 1 zeigt ein Datenverarbeitungssystem,
das für die Implementierung einer Ausführungsform
der Erfindung geeignet ist.
[0012] Fig. 2 zeigt ein schematisches Datenfluss-
diagramm, das die Überwachung eines Netzwerks
gemäß einer Ausführungsform der Erfindung veran-
schaulicht.
[0013] Fig. 3 zeigt ein schematisches Datenflussdia-
gramm, das die Identifizierung eines bösartigen DNS-
Servers gemäß einer Ausführungsform der Erfindung
veranschaulicht.
[0014] Fig. 4 zeigt eine vorkonfigurierte DNS-Auflö-
sungstabelle gemäß einer Ausführungsform der Er-
findung.
[0015] Fig. 5 zeigt ein Flussdiagramm eines Verfah-
rens zur Identifizierung eines bösartigen DNS-Ser-
vers gemäß einer Ausführungsform der Erfindung.
[0016] Die Zeichnungen müssen nicht skaliert wer-
den. Die Zeichnungen stellen nur Schemadarstellun-
gen dar, die nicht dazu gedacht sind, spezielle Pa-
rameter der Erfindung abzubilden. Die Zeichnungen
sind dazu gedacht, nur typische Ausführungsformen
der Erfindung darzustellen und sollten daher nicht als
Einschränkung des Umfangs der Erfindung betrach-
tet werden. In den Zeichnungen stellen ähnliche Re-
ferenznummern ähnliche Elemente dar.
Detaillierte Beschreibung der Erfindung
[0017] Wie oben ausgeführt, stellen Aspekte der vor-
liegenden Erfindung eine Lösung zum Erfassen des
Vorhandenseins eines bösartigen DNS-Servers über
die Verwendung eines Monitors bereit, der den Fluss
des Datenverkehrs zwischen den Knoten in einem
Netzwerk passiv beobachtet und in dem Netzwerk
nach gefälschtem DNS-Datenverkehr sucht. In eini-
gen Ausführungsformen kann das Netzwerk ein loka-
les Internet sein und in anderen kann das Netzwerk
das Internet sein.
[0018] Es wird nun auf die Zeichnungen Bezug ge-
nommen. Fig. 1 zeigt einen veranschaulichenden
Monitor 100 zum Erfassen des Vorhandenseins ei-
nes bösartigen DNS-Servers 215, der im Netzwerk
200 vorhanden sein kann. In diesem Umfang weist
der Monitor 101 ein Computersystem 102 auf, das
einen wie in diesem Dokument beschriebenen Pro-
zess durchführen kann, um eine ungültige DNS-Auf-
lösungsantwort von einem bösartigen DNS-Server
215 zu identifizieren. Im Besonderen wird ein Com-
putersystem 102 mit einer Computingvorrichtung 104
dargestellt, die ein Identifizierungsprogramm 140 für
einen bösartigen DNS-Server aufweist, durch das
die Computingvorrichtung 104 funktionsfähig wird, ei-
nen bösartigen DNS-Server 215 zu identifizieren, in-
dem ein in diesem Dokument beschriebener Prozess
durchgeführt wird.
[0019] Die Computingvorrichtung 104 ist dargestellt
mit einer Verarbeitungseinheit 106 (z. B. einen oder
mehreren Prozessoren), einem Speicher (Memory)
110, einem Speichersystem (Storage System) 118 (z.
B, einer Speicherhierarchie), einer Eingabe-/Ausga-
be (Input/Output, I/O)-Schnittstellenkomponente 114
(z. B. eine oder mehrere I/O-Schnittstellen und/oder
-vorrichtungen) und einen Kommunikations-Pathway
112. Im Allgemeinen führt die Verarbeitungseinheit
106 Programmcode aus, wie das Identifizierungspro-
gramm 140 für einen bösartigen DNS-Server, das
wenigstens teilweise fest im Speicher 110 vorliegt. In
diesem Umfang kann die Verarbeitungseinheit 106
eine einzelne Verarbeitungseinheit aufweisen oder
über eine oder mehrere Verarbeitungseinheit an ei-
nem oder mehreren Standorten verteilt sein.
[0020] Der Speicher 110 kann auch lokalen Spei-
cher aufweisen, der bei der konkreten Ausführung
des Programmcodes genutzt wird, Massenspeicher
(Speicher 118) und/oder Cachespeicher (nicht dar-
gestellt), die einen temporären Speicher für wenigs-
ten einen Teil des Programmcode bereitstellen, damit
Code bei der Ausführung nicht so oft aus dem Mas-
senspeicher 118 abgerufen werden muss. So kann
der Speicher 110 jeden bekannten Typ von Daten-
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speichern und/oder Übertragungsmedien aufweisen,
einschließlich magnetischer Medien, optischer Medi-
en, Direktzugriffsspeicher (Random Access Memory,
RAM), Festspeicher (Read-only Memory, ROM), ei-
nes Datencaches, eines Datenobjekts usw. Darüber
hinaus kann der Speicher 110, ähnlich wie die Ver-
arbeitungseinheit 116, sich an einem einzigen physi-
schen Standort befinden, einen oder mehrere Typen
von Datenspeichern aufweisen oder über eine Viel-
zahl physischer Systeme in verschiedenen Formen
verteilt sein.
[0021] Bei der Ausführung des Programmcodes
kann die Verarbeitungskomponente 106 Daten ver-
arbeiten, was zum Lesen und/oder Schreiben umge-
wandelter Daten aus/in den Speicher 110 und/oder
der I/O-Komponente 114 zur weiteren Verarbeitung
führen kann. Der Pathway 112 stellt eine direkte oder
indirekte Kommunikationsverbindung zwischen jeder
der Komponenten im Computersystem 102 bereit.
Die I/O-Schnittstellenkomponente 114 kann einen
oder mehrere für menschliche Benutzer konzipierte I/
O-Vorrichtungen aufweisen, die einem menschlichen
Benutzer 120 die Interaktion mit dem Computersys-
tem 102 und/oder einen oder mehreren Kommunika-
tionsvorrichtungen ermöglichen, um einem System-
benutzer 120 die Kommunikation mit dem Computer-
system 102 über jede beliebige Art von Kommunika-
tionsverbindung zu ermöglichen.
[0022] In diesem Umfang kann ein Identifizierungs-
programm 140 für einen bösartigen DNS-Server ei-
ne Gruppe von Schnittstellen (z. B. grafische Benut-
zeroberfläche(n), Anwendungsprogrammschnittstel-
le und/oder Ähnliches) verwalten, mit denen mensch-
liche und/oder Systembenutzer 120 mit dem Identi-
fizierungsprogramm 140 für einen bösartigen DNS-
Server interagieren können. Weiterhin kann das
Identifizierungsprogramm 140 für einen bösartigen
DNS-Server die Daten, wie die in der Tab. 220
(Fig. 2–Fig. 4) gespeicherten Daten, unter Verwen-
dung jeder beliebigen Lösung verwalten (z. B. spei-
chern, abrufen, erstellen, bearbeiten, organisieren,
darstellen usw.).
[0023] In jeden Fall kann ein Computersystem
102 eine oder mehrere allgemeine Computing-Fer-
tigungsprodukte 104 (wie Computingvorrichtungen)
aufweisen, die in der Lage sind, darauf installierten
Programmcode, wie das Identifizierungsprogramm
140 für einen bösartigen DNS-Server, auszuführen.
Wie in diesem Dokument verwendet, versteht es sich,
dass „Programmcode” eine beliebige Zusammenstel-
lung von Anweisungen in einer beliebigen Sprache,
einem beliebigen Code oder einer beliebigen Notati-
on bedeutet, die/der eine Computingvorrichtung mit
einer Informationsverarbeitungsfähigkeit veranlasst,
eine bestimmte Aktion entweder direkt oder nach ei-
ner beliebigen Kombination des Folgenden durchzu-
führen: (a) Konvertierung in eine andere Sprache, ei-
nen anderen Code oder eine andere Notation; (b) Re-
produktion in einer anderen materiellen Form; und/
oder (c) Dekomprimierung. In diesem Umfang kann
ein Identifizierungsprogramm 140 für einen bösarti-
gen DNS-Server als eine beliebige Kombination von
Systemsoftware und/oder Anwendungssoftware aus-
geführt werden. In jeden Fall besteht die technische
Wirkung des Computersystems 102 darin, Verarbei-
tungsanweisungen für die Computingvorrichtung 104
bereitzustellen, um einen bösartigen DNS-Server zu
identifizieren.
[0024] Weiterhin kann ein Identifizierungsprogramm
140 für einen bösartigen DNS-Server mit einer Grup-
pe von Modulen 142–150 implementiert werden. In
diesem Fall kann ein Modul 142–150 dem Com-
putersystem 102 ermöglichen, eine von dem Iden-
tifizierungsprogramm 140 des bösartigen DNS-Ser-
vers verwendete Gruppe von Aufgaben durchzufüh-
ren und kann eigenständig, getrennt von anderen
Bereichen des Identifizierungsprogramms 140 für ei-
nen bösartigen DNS-Server entwickelt und/oder im-
plementiert werden. Gemäß der Verwendung in die-
sem Dokument bedeutet der Begriff „Komponente”
eine beliebige Hardwarekonfiguration mit oder ohne
Software, die die in Verbindung damit beschriebe-
ne Funktionalität unter Verwendung einer beliebigen
Lösung implementiert, während der Begriff „Modul”
für Programmcode steht, der einem Computersystem
102 die Implementierung der in Verbindung damit be-
schriebenen Aktionen unter Verwendung einer belie-
bigen Lösung ermöglicht. Wenn ein Modul in einem
Speicher 110 eines Computersystems 102, das eine
Verarbeitungskomponente 106 aufweist, fest vorliegt,
ist es ein wesentlicher Bestandteil einer Komponen-
te, die die Aktionen implementiert. Unabhängig da-
von versteht es sich, dass zwei oder mehr Kompo-
nenten, Module und/oder Systeme einige Teile/alle
Teile der zugehörigen Hardware und/oder Software
gemeinsam verwenden können. Weiterhin versteht
es sich, dass einige Teile der hier erörterten Funk-
tionalität nicht als Bestandteil des Computersystems
102 implementiert werden können oder dass weite-
re Funktionalität als Teil des Computersystems 102
enthalten sein kann.
[0025] Wenn das Computersystem 102 mehre-
re Computingvorrichtungen 104 aufweist, kann je-
de Computingvorrichtung 104 nur einen Bereich
des Identifizierungsprogramms 140 eines bösartigen
DNS-Servers darauf fest vorliegend haben (z. B. ein
oder mehrere Module 142–150). Es versteht sich
aber, dass das Computersystem 102 und ein Identi-
fizierungsprogramm 140 für einen bösartigen DNS-
Server nur für verschiedene mögliche gleichwertige
Computersysteme stehen, die einen in diesem Do-
kument beschriebenen Prozess ausführen können.
In diesem Umfang kann die vom Computersystem
102 und dem Identifizierungsprogramm 140 für einen
bösartigen DNS-Server bereitgestellte Funktionalität
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in anderen Ausführungsformen wenigstens teilwei-
se durch eine oder mehrere Computingvorrichtun-
gen implementiert werden, die eine beliebige Kom-
bination allgemeiner und/oder Spezialhardware mit
oder ohne Programmcode aufweisen. In jeder Aus-
führungsform kann die Hardware und der Programm-
code, falls enthalten, jeweils mit standardmäßigen
Engineering- und Programmiertechniken erstellt wer-
den.
[0026] Wenn das Computersystem 102 mehrere
Computingvorrichtungen 104 aufweist, können die
Computingvorrichtungen über jede Art von Kommu-
nikationsverbindung kommunizieren. Weiterhin kann
das Computersystem 102 bei der Durchführung eines
in diesem Dokument beschriebenen Prozesses mit
einem oder mehreren Computersystemen unter Ver-
wendung einer beliebigen Art von Kommunikations-
verbindung kommunizieren. In jedem Fall kann die
Kommunikationsverbindung eine beliebige Kombina-
tion von verschiedenen Arten von kabelgebundenen
und/oder drahtlosen Verbindungen aufweisen; eine
beliebige Kombination von einem oder mehreren Ty-
pen von Netzwerken aufweisen; und/oder eine belie-
bige Kombination von verschiedenen Arten von Über-
tragungstechniken und -protokollen nutzen.
[0027] Wie in dem vorliegenden Dokument erörtert,
ermöglicht das Identifizierungsprogramm 140 für ei-
nen bösartigen DNS-Server dem Computersystem
102, eine Identifizierung eines bösartigen DNS-Ser-
vers zu implementieren. In diesem Umfang wird ein
Identifizierungsprogramm 140 für einen bösartigen
DNS-Server einschließlich eines Überwachungsmo-
duls 142, eines Identifizierungsmoduls 144, eines
Vergleichsmoduls 146, eines Bestimmungsmoduls
148 und eines Alarmmoduls 150 dargestellt.
[0028] Im Folgenden wird nun auf Fig. 2–Fig. 3 Be-
zug genommen, wo die Netzwerkumgebung 200, in
der der Monitor 100 verwendet werden kann, darge-
stellt wird. Wie dargestellt, kann ein Netzwerk 200
einen Anforderer (Requester) 205 enthalten, der ei-
ne von einem Benutzer oder einem Server betriebe-
ne Client-Workstation sein kann. Weitere Anforderer
205 können im Netzwerk 200 enthalten sein, sie wur-
den aber aus Gründen der Einfachheit in der Darstel-
lung des Netzwerks 200 in den Fig. 2–Fig. 3 weg-
gelassen. Der Anforderer 205 kann eine DNS-Auflö-
sungsanforderung 201 zur Auflösung eines alphanu-
merischen Domainnamens eines bestimmten Hosts
in eine numerische IP-Adresse senden.
[0029] Wie in Fig. 2 dargestellt, wird unter norma-
len Betriebsbedingungen, bei denen im Netzwerk 200
kein Angreifer vorhanden ist, die DNS-Auflösungs-
anforderung 201 empfangen und vom autorisierten
DNS-Server 210 verarbeitet, der eine DNS-Auflö-
sungsantwort 202 sendet. In diesem Fall kann die
DNS-Auflösungsantwort 202 eine gültige und exakte
Zuordnung des Domainnamens zur IP-Adresse ent-
halten.
[0030] In anderen Fällen, wie in Fig. 3 dargestellt,
kann ein bösartiger DNS-Server 215 eines Angreifers
im Netzwerk 200 zum Zweck der Nachahmung ei-
nes anderen Computingsystems vorhanden sein. In
diesem Fall wird von einem bösartigen DNS-Server
215 eine DNS-Auflösungsanforderung 201 empfan-
gen und verarbeitet und die DNS-Auflösungsantwort
202 wird vom bösartigen DNS-Server 215 bereitge-
stellt. Eine solche DNS-Auflösungsantwort 202 kann
eine nicht korrekte Zuordnung des Domainnamens
zur IP-Adresse aufweisen, was entweder zu einer fal-
schen Weiterleitung des Netzwerkverkehrs in einem
Spoofing-Angriff führt, bei dem sensibler Datenver-
kehr an ein nicht vertrauenswürdiges System gelie-
fert wird, oder der Netzwerkverkehr in einem Denial-
of-Service(DOS)-Angriff behindert wird.
[0031] In beiden Fällen ist der Monitor 100 an ei-
nem strategischen Punkt im Netzwerk 200 positio-
niert, sodass der Monitor 100 den Fluss des Netz-
werkverkehrs zwischen den Knoten im Netzwerk 200
beobachten kann. Wie oben mit Bezugnahme auf
Fig. 1 erörtert, weist der Monitor 100 die Module
142–150 auf, die bei der Ausführung durch ein Com-
putersystem 102 die passive Überwachung des Da-
tenverkehrs im Netzwerk 200 durchführen, darunter
unter anderem des Netzwerkverkehrs, der DNS-Auf-
lösungsanforder- ung 201 und der DNS-Auflösungs-
antwort 202.
[0032] Es wird gleichzeitig auf die Fig. 1–Fig. 3 Be-
zug genommen, wobei das Überwachungsmodul 142
als Bestandteil des Monitors 100 die Überwachung
143 des Datenverkehrs im Netzwerk 200 durchführt,
darunter die DNS-Auflösungsanforderungen 201 und
die DNS-Auflösungsantworten 202. Die Identifizie-
rungskomponente 144 kann in dem im Netzwerk 200
überwachten Datenverkehr eine DNS-Auflösungs-
antwort 202 identifizieren. Wie oben erwähnt, weist
eine DNS-Auflösungsantwort 202 eine Zuordnung ei-
nes Domainnamens 225 zu einer IP-Adresse 230
als Reaktion auf eine vom Anforderer 205 gesendete
DNS-Auflösungsanforderung 201 auf.
[0033] Sobald eine DNS-Auflösungsantwort 202
identifiziert ist, kann ein Vergleichsmodul 146 einen
Vergleich der DNS-Auflösungsantwort 202 vorneh-
men, wobei die bekannten Zuordnungen in einer vor-
konfigurierten Liste bekannter Zuordnungen von Do-
mainnamen zu IP-Adressen, die in einer bekann-
ten DNS-Auflösungstabelle 220 enthaltenen sind, ge-
speichert sind. Es ist bekannt, dass die in Tabelle
220 enthaltenen Zuordnungen von Domainnamen zu
IP-Adressen gültig sind. Wie in Fig. 4 dargestellt,
kann die in Tabelle 220 gespeicherte IP-Adresse 230
als eine spezielle IP-Adresse ausgedrückt werden,
wie yyy.yyy.yyy.yyy, die IP-Adresse der Domain my-
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bank.com. In anderen Ausführungsformen können
die in der Tabelle 200 gespeicherten IP-Adressen
230 als Bereich von IP-Adressen unter Verwendung
von wenigstens einem Platzhalter ausgedrückt wer-
den. Ein Bereich von IP-Adressen kann breit ge-
fächert sein, darunter verschiedene Platzhalter wie
zum Beispiel xxx.*.*.*, der IP-Adressbereich für die
Domain company.com. In anderen Ausführungsfor-
men kann der Bereich von IP-Adressen enger ge-
fasst sein, zum Beispiel mit nur einem Platzhalter,
wie zzz.zzz.zzz.1??, der IP-Adressbereich für die Do-
main email.org.
[0034] Gemäß Ausführungsformen der Erfindung
muss die in der Tabelle 220 gespeicherte Liste der
zugewiesenen Domainnamen 225 und IP-Adressen
230 keine erschöpfende Liste von Domains sein, auf
die ein Benutzer von Netzwerk 200 zugreifen kann
oder für die ein Anforderer 205 DNS-Auflösungen
anfordern kann. Stattdessen kann eine ausgewählte
Anzahl an Hosts in der Tabelle 220 als repräsentative
Stichprobe enthalten sein. In einigen Ausführungsfor-
men kann die Tabelle 220 eine vorkonfigurierte Lis-
te von Domains und deren zugehörige IP-Adressen
enthalten, deren Auswahl zur Aufnahme in Tabelle
220 auf der Domain basiert, die besonders sensible
Informationen, auf die die Netzwerkbenutzer zugrei-
fen, hostet. In anderen Ausführungsformen kann die
Tabelle 220 eine vorkonfigurierte Liste von Domains
und deren zugehörige IP-Adressen aufweisen, deren
Auswahl zur Aufnahme in Tabelle 220 auf einer ho-
hen Anzahl von Besuchen durch Benutzer des Netz-
werks 200 und daher auf einer hohen Wahrschein-
lichkeit eines großen zu überwachenden Stichpro-
benpools von DNS-Auflösungsanforderungen und -
antworten basiert.
[0035] Es wird wieder auf Fig. 1–Fig. 3 Bezug ge-
nommen. Das Bestimmungsmodul 148 führt eine Be-
stimmung durch, ob die DNS-Auflösungsantwort 202
eine korrekte und gültige Zuordnung der IP-Adresse
zum Domainnamen enthält. Diese Bestimmung ba-
siert auf dem vom Vergleichsmodul 146 durchgeführ-
ten Vergleich. Wenn die Zuordnung in der DNS-Auf-
lösungsantwort 202 der Zuordnung für den in der Ta-
belle 220 gespeicherten entsprechenden Domainna-
men entspricht, wird die DNS-Auflösungsantwort 202
als korrekt bestimmt. Dies gibt an, dass die DNS-Auf-
lösungsantwort 202 zu dem autorisierten DNS-Ser-
ver 210 gesendet wurde (Fig. 2). Wenn die Zuord-
nung in der DNS-Auflösungsantwort 202 nicht der
Zuordnung für den in der Tabelle 220 gespeicher-
ten entsprechenden Domainnamen entspricht, wird
die DNS-Auflösungsantwort 202 als nicht korrekt be-
stimmt. Es gibt an, dass die DNS-Auflösungsantwort
202 an einen bösartigen DNS-Server 215 gesendet
wurde (Fig. 3), und kann auf das Auftreten eines
Spoofing- oder DOS-Angriffs hinweisen. In diesem
Fall sendet das Alarmmodul 150 einen Alarm 240,
um den Anforderer 205 über den gefälschten DNS-
Datenverkehr zu informieren. In verschiedenen Aus-
führungsformen kann der Alarm 240 die Form ei-
ner Nachricht (E-Mail, SMS usw.), eines Logeintrags
oder einer anderen Form von Benachrichtigung über
ein Sicherheitsereignis annehmen, das das verdäch-
tige Verhalten dokumentiert und die Aufmerksamkeit
darauf lenkt.
[0036] Das obige Verfahren wird in einem Flussdia-
gramm in Fig. 5 dargestellt. Wie oben beschrieben,
überwacht ein Monitor passiv den Datenverkehr in ei-
nem Netzwerk. Über dieses Netzwerk fordert eine an-
fordernde Workstation eine DNS-Auflösung einer be-
stimmten Domain an.
[0037] Eine DNS-Auflösungsantwort wird von ei-
nem DNS-Server an den Anforderer über das Netz-
werk zurückgegeben. Die DNS-Auflösungsantwort
wird vom Monitor aus dem überwachten Netzwerk-
verkehr identifiziert. Nach der Identifizierung wird die
Zuordnung einer IP-Adresse zu einer Domain, die in
der DNS-Auflösungsantwort enthaltenen ist, mit einer
vorkonfigurierten Liste bekannter Zuordnungen von
IP-Adressen zu Domains verglichen. Wenn weder die
Domain noch die IP-Adresse in der DNS-Auflösungs-
antwort in der vorkonfigurierten Liste bekannter Zu-
ordnungen von IP-Adressen zu Domains erscheint,
kehrt der Monitor einfach zur Überwachung des Netz-
werks zurück.
[0038] Wenn entweder die Domain oder die IP-
Adresse in der DNS-Auflösungsantwort in der vor-
konfigurierten Liste bekannter Zuordnungen von IP-
Adressen zu Domains erscheint, wird die in der
DNS-Auflösungsanforderung enthaltene Zuordnung
mit der entsprechenden Zuordnung in der vorkonfigu-
rierten Liste bekannter Zuordnungen von IP-Adres-
sen zu Domains verglichen. Wenn die Zuordnung
übereinstimmt, d. h. sowohl die IP-Adresse und die
entsprechende Domain in der DNS-Auflösungsant-
wort und der vorkonfigurierten Liste bekannter Zuord-
nungen von IP-Adressen zu Domains identisch sind,
dann kann bestimmt werden, dass die DNS-Auflö-
sungsantwort korrekt ist und der DNS-Server, der sie
gesendet hat, autorisiert ist. Wenn jedoch die Zuord-
nung nicht übereinstimmt, d. h. die Domains unter-
schiedlichen IP-Adressen in der DNS-Auflösungsant-
wort und der vorkonfigurierten Liste bekannter Zuord-
nung von IP-Adressen zu Domains entspricht (oder
die IP-Adresse entspricht unterschiedlichen Domains
in der DNS-Auflösungsantwort und der vorkonfigu-
rierten Liste bekannter Zuordnungen von IP-Adres-
sen zu Domains), dann kann bestimmt werden, dass
die DNS-Auflösungsantwort ungültig ist. In diesem
Fall kann daraus geschlossen werden, dass der
DNS-Server, der sie gesendet hat, nicht autorisiert
ist und ein bösartiger DNS-Server sein kann. In die-
sem Fall wird ein Alarm ausgelöst, der den Anforde-
rer über das Sicherheitsrisiko benachrichtigt.
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[0039] Wenngleich die Erfindung in diesem Doku-
ment als ein Verfahren und System zur Identifizie-
rung eines bösartigen DNS-Servers dargestellt und
beschrieben wird, versteht es sich, dass Aspekte der
Erfindung weiterhin verschiedene alternative Ausfüh-
rungsformen vorsehen können. Zum Beispiel sieht
die Erfindung in einer Ausführungsform ein Compu-
terprogramm vor, das auf wenigstens einem compu-
terlesbaren Medium fest vorliegt, das bei der Ausfüh-
rung einem Computersystem ermöglicht, die Identifi-
zierung eines bösartigen DNS-Servers zu implemen-
tieren. In diesem Umfang weist das computerlesba-
re Medium Programmcode auf, wie das Identifizie-
rungsprogramm 140 für einen bösartigen DNS-Ser-
ver (Fig. 1), der einige oder alle der in diesem Doku-
ment beschriebenen Prozesse implementiert. Es ver-
steht sich, dass der Begriff „computerlesbares Medi-
um” ein oder mehrere eines beliebigen Typs eines
materiellen Ausdruckmediums aufweist, dass nicht
bekannt oder in Zukunft entwickelt wird, von dem
ein Exemplar des Programmcode erhalten, wieder-
gegeben oder anderweitig durch eine Computingvor-
richtung kommuniziert werden kann. Zum Beispiel
kann das computerlesbare Medium aufweisen: ei-
ne oder mehrere tragbare Speicherfertigungsproduk-
te; ein oder mehrere Speicherkomponenten (Memo-
ry/Storage) einer Computingvorrichtung; Papier und/
oder Ähnliches.
[0040] In einer anderen Ausführungsform stellt die
Erfindung ein Verfahren bereit, das ein Exemplar
von Programmcode bereitstellt, wie das Identifizie-
rungsprogramm 140 für einen bösartigen DNS-Ser-
ver (Fig. 1), das einige oder alle der in diesem Doku-
ment beschriebenen Prozesse implementiert. In die-
sem Fall kann ein Computersystem ein Exemplar von
Programmcode verarbeiten, der einen Teil oder den
gesamten des in diesem Dokument beschriebenen
Prozesses implementiert, um für den Empfang an ei-
nem zweiten entfernten Standort eine Gruppe von
Datensignalen zu generieren und zu übertragen, die
einen oder mehrere seiner Eigenschaften dergestalt
festgelegt und/oder geändert haben, um ein Exem-
plar des Programmcodes in der Gruppe von Datensi-
gnalen zu kodieren. Ebenso stellt eine Ausführungs-
form der Erfindung ein Verfahren zum Erfassen ei-
nes Exemplars von Programmcode bereit, der einen
Teil oder den gesamten des in diesem Dokument be-
schriebenen Prozesses implementiert, was ein Com-
putersystem aufweist, dass die in diesem Dokument
beschriebene Gruppe von Datensignale empfängt
und die Gruppe von Datensignalen in ein Exemplar
des Computerprogramms übersetzt, das wenigstens
auf einem computerlesbaren Medium fest vorliegt. In
jedem Fall kann die Gruppe von Datensignalen mit
jeder beliebigen Art von Kommunikationsverbindung
übertragenen/empfangen werden.
[0041] In wiederum einer anderen Ausführungsform
stellt die Erfindung ein Verfahren zum Generieren
eines Systems zur Identifizierung eines bösartigen
DNS-Servers bereit. In diesem Fall kann ein Compu-
tersystem, wie das Computersystem 102 (Fig. 1), er-
halten werden (z. B. erstellt, verwaltet, verfügbar ge-
macht werden usw.) und eine oder mehrere Kompo-
nenten zum Durchführen eines in diesem Dokument
beschriebenen Prozesses können erhalten (z. B. er-
stellt, erworben, verwendet, geändert usw.) und auf
dem Computersystem bereitgestellt werden. In die-
sem Umfang kann die Bereitstellung (Deployment)
eines oder mehrere aufweisen von: (1) Installati-
on von Programmcode auf einer Computingvorrich-
tung; (2) Hinzufügen von einer oder mehreren Com-
puting- und/oder I/O-Vorrichtungen zu dem Compu-
tersystem; (3) Aufnahme und/oder Modifikation des
Computersystems, um die Durchführung eines in die-
sem Dokument beschriebenen Prozesses zu ermög-
lichen; und/oder Ähnliches.
[0042] Wie in diesem Dokument verwendet, be-
zeichnen die Begriffe „erstes”, „zweites” und Ähnli-
che nicht eine Reihenfolge, Menge oder Bedeutung,
sondern werden nur zur Unterscheidung eines Ele-
ments von einem anderen verwendet, und die Begrif-
fe „ein” oder „eine” bezeichnen hier keine Mengen-
beschränkung, sondern geben stattdessen das Vor-
handensein von wenigstens einem der referenzierten
Elemente an. Der in Verbindung mit einer Mengen-
angabe verwendete Modifizierer „etwa” schließt den
angegebenen Wert mit ein und hat die vom Kontext
vorgegebene Bedeutung (enthält zum Beispiel den
Fehlergrad, der der Messung einer bestimmten Men-
ge zugeordnet ist). Das Suffix „(en)” ist gemäß der
Verwendungen in diesem Dokument dazu gedacht,
sowohl die Singular- wie auch die Pluralform des zu
modifizierenden Begriffs zu beinhalten, wodurch ein
oder mehrere Vorkommen des Begriffes (wie zum
Beispiel Verarbeitungseinheit(en) ein oder mehrere
Bearbeitungseinheiten beinhaltet) beinhalten. Die in
diesem Dokument offengelegten Bereiche sind inklu-
dierend und unabhängig kombinierbar (z. B. Bereiche
von „bis zu etwa drei Platzhaltern” oder im Beson-
deren beinhaltet „etwa ein Platzhalter bis etwa drei
Platzhalter” die Endpunkte und alle Zwischenwerte
der Bereiche von „etwa ein Platzhalter bis etwa zwei
Platzhalter” usw.).
[0043] Die Beschreibungen der verschiedenen Aus-
führungsformen der vorliegenden Erfindung wurden
für Veranschaulichungszwecke dargestellt, ist jedoch
nicht dazu gedacht, als erschöpfend oder auf die of-
fengelegten Ausführungsformen beschränkt zu sein.
Für Fachleute werden viele Modifikationen und Va-
riationen ersichtlich sein, ohne dabei vom Umfang
und Geist der beschriebenen Ausführungsformen ab-
zuweichen. Die hier verwendete Terminologie wurde
gewählt, um die Prinzipien der Ausführungsformen,
der praktischen Anwendung oder der technischen
Verbesserung gegenüber im Markt erhältlichen Tech-
nologien am besten zu erklären, oder um anderen
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Fachleuten das Verständnis der hier offengelegten
Ausführungsformen zu ermöglichen.
Patentansprüche
1.  Ein Verfahren zum Identifizieren eines bösarti-
gen Domain Name Service(DNS)-Servers, wobei das
Verfahren aufweist:
passives Überwachen von Datenverkehr in einem
Netzwerk;
Identifizieren einer DNS-Auflösungsantwort im Da-
tenverkehr im Netzwerk, wobei die DNS-Auflösungs-
antwort eine Zuordnung einer Domain zu einer Inter-
netprotokoll(IP)-Adresse aufweist;
Vergleichen der DNS-Auflösungsantwort mit einer
vorkonfigurierten Liste bekannter Zuordnungen von
Domains zu IP-Adressen; und
Bestimmen basierend auf dem Vergleich, ob die
DNS-Auflösungsantwort korrekt ist,
wobei jede IP-Adresse in der vorkonfigurierten Liste
bekannter Zuordnungen von Domains zu IP-Adres-
sen ein Bereich von IP-Adressen ist, der durch we-
nigstens einen Platzhalter ausgedrückt wird,
wobei die vorkonfigurierte Liste bekannter Zuordnun-
gen von Domains zu IP-Adressen eine vorkonfigurier-
te Liste von Domains aufweist, die von Benutzern ei-
nes Netzwerks am häufigsten besucht werden, und
wobei die vorkonfigurierte Liste bekannter Zuordnun-
gen von Domains zu IP-Adressen eine vorkonfigurier-
te Liste von Domains aufweist, die sensible Informa-
tionen hosten, auf die von Netzwerkbenutzern zuge-
griffen wird.
2.    Das Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, das weiter-
hin ein Senden eines Alarms in dem Fall aufweist, in
dem die DNS-Auflösungsantwort als nicht korrekt be-
stimmt wird.
3.    Das Verfahren nach Anspruch 2, wobei der
Alarm wenigstens eines aufweist von einer E-Mail-
Nachricht, einer SMS-Nachricht, einem Logeintrag
oder einer Benachrichtigung über einen Sicherheits-
vorfall.
4.    Das Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, wobei das
Netzwerk ein Internet aufweist.
5.    Ein System zum Identifizieren eines bösarti-
gen Domain Name Service(DNS)-Servers, wobei das
System aufweist:
eine Überwachungskomponente zur passiven Über-
wachung von Datenverkehr in einem Netzwerk;
eine Identifizierungskomponente zum Identifizieren
einer DNS-Auflösungsantwort im Datenverkehr im
Netzwerk, wobei die DNS-Auflösungsantwort eine
Zuordnung einer Domain zu einer Internetprotokoll
(IP)-Adresse aufweist;
eine Vergleichskomponente zum Vergleichen der
DNS-Auflösungsantwort mit einer vorkonfigurierten
Liste bekannter Zuordnungen von Domains zu IP-
Adressen; und
eine Bestimmungskomponente zum Bestimmen ba-
sierend auf dem Vergleich, ob die DNS-Auflösungs-
antwort korrekt ist,
wobei jede IP-Adresse in der vorkonfigurierten Liste
bekannter Zuordnungen von Domains zu IP-Adres-
sen ein Bereich von IP-Adressen ist, der durch we-
nigstens einen Platzhalter ausgedrückt wird,
wobei die vorkonfigurierte Liste bekannter Zuordnun-
gen von Domains zu IP-Adressen eine vorkonfigurier-
te Liste von Domains aufweist, die von Benutzern ei-
nes Netzwerks am häufigsten besucht werden, und
wobei die vorkonfigurierte Liste bekannter Zuordnun-
gen von Domains zu IP-Adressen eine vorkonfigurier-
te Liste von Domains aufweist, die sensible Informa-
tionen hosten, auf die von Netzwerkbenutzern zuge-
griffen wird.
6.  Das System nach Anspruch 5, das weiterhin eine
Alarmkomponente zum Senden eines Alarms in dem
Fall aufweist, wenn die DNS-Auflösungsantwort als
nicht korrekt bestimmt wird.
7.  Das System nach Anspruch 5, wobei die Alarm-
komponente wenigstens eines aufweist von einer E-
Mail-Nachricht, einer SMS-Nachricht, einem Logein-
trag oder einer Benachrichtigung über einen Sicher-
heitsvorfall.
8.  Das System nach Anspruch 5, wobei das Netz-
werk ein Internet aufweist.
9.    Ein in einem computerlesbaren Speicherme-
dium ausgeführtes Computerprogrammprodukt, das
bei dessen Ausführung durch eine Computingvorrich-
tung das Computersystem dazu veranlasst, ein Ver-
fahren zur Identifizierung eines bösartigen Domain
Name Service(DNS)-Servers zu implementieren, wo-
bei das Verfahren aufweist:
passives Überwachen von Datenverkehr in einem
Netzwerk;
Identifizieren einer DNS-Auflösungsantwort im Da-
tenverkehr im Netzwerk, wobei die DNS-Auflösungs-
antwort eine Zuordnung einer Domain zu einer Inter-
netprotokoll(IP)-Adresse aufweist;
Vergleichen der DNS-Auflösungsantwort mit einer
vorkonfigurierten Liste bekannter Zuordnungen von
Domains zu IP-Adressen; und
Bestimmen basierend auf dem Vergleich, ob die
DNS-Auflösungsantwort korrekt ist,
wobei jede IP-Adresse in der vorkonfigurierten Liste
bekannter Zuordnungen von Domains zu IP-Adres-
sen ein Bereich von IP-Adressen ist, der durch we-
nigstens einen Platzhalter ausgedrückt wird,
wobei die vorkonfigurierte Liste bekannter Zuordnun-
gen von Domains zu IP-Adressen eine vorkonfigurier-
te Liste von Domains aufweist, die von Benutzern ei-
nes Netzwerks am häufigsten besucht werden, und
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wobei die vorkonfigurierte Liste bekannter Zuordnun-
gen von Domains zu IP-Adressen eine vorkonfigurier-
te Liste von Domains aufweist, die sensible Informa-
tionen hosten, auf die von Netzwerkbenutzern zuge-
griffen wird.
10.    Das Computerprogrammprodukt nach An-
spruch 9, wobei das Verfahren weiterhin das Senden
eines Alarms in dem Fall aufweist, in dem die DNS-
Auflösungsantwort als nicht korrekt bestimmt wird.
11.    Das Computerprogrammprodukt nach An-
spruch 9, wobei das Netzwerk ein Intranet aufweist.
Es folgen 5 Seiten Zeichnungen
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1. 
SYSTEM FOR DETECTING THE PRESENCE 
OF ROGUE DOMAN NAME SERVICE 
PROVIDERS THROUGH PASSIVE 
MONITORING 
TECHNICAL FIELD 
The invention relates generally to identifying untrusted or 
compromised sources for network information. More par 
ticularly, the invention relates to identifying rogue DNS 
servers via passive monitoring. 
BACKGROUND 
The Domain Name Service (DNS) resolves alphanumeric 
domain names into numeric IP addresses. This service is 
provided by a loose collection of servers scattered around 
the Internet as well as within local Intranets. If, however, the 
information Supplied through this service comes not from an 
authorized source, but rather, an attacker's system Supplying 
incorrect information or from an authorized source that has 
been compromised, network traffic could be impeded in a 
denial of service (DOS) attack or misrouted in a spoofing or 
man-in-the-middle attack. This could result in sensitive 
traffic being delivered to untrusted systems or not being 
delivered at all. 
One way that these services could be subverted would be 
if an attacker set up an “evil twin' WiFi hotspot which 
impersonates a trusted wireless access point and establishes 
itself as a man-in-the-middle (MITM), which reroutes net 
work traffic. The MITM can examine and modify all traffic 
coming into and going out of the rogue network. Another 
way would be for the attacker to set up a rogue server which 
hijacks network services by broadcasting to all nodes in the 
network that it is online and available to process DNS 
requests. Yet another way would be for an attacker to 
compromise a trusted DNS server and cause it to produce 
erroneous results. In many cases, the last server to broadcast 
will be considered authoritative by other nodes in the 
network. 
One solution for detecting Such untrusted or compromised 
sources of network information is the use of a DNS watcher 
which performs a “health check” by polling a preconfigured 
list of trusted DNS servers to verify that they are operational 
and are returning proper results. There are several draw 
backs to this method, however. Polling operations generate 
additional, Superfluous network traffic, and may be discov 
ered by an attacker's reconnaissance of the target network. 
A polling approach also only verifies whether known DNS 
servers are performing properly. By virtue of the active 
nature of polling specific known DNS servers, it is unable to 
verify the correctness of DNS resolutions returned by hosts 
other than the known hosts being polled. Since rogue DNS 
providers would not be known in advance, they would go 
unchecked by a polling solution. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION 
In general, aspects of the present invention provide a 
passive monitoring Solution for identifying a rogue DNS 
server in a network which does not generate additional 
network traffic, and is able to monitor DNS resolutions 
provided by both known and unknown DNS servers. 
A first aspect of the disclosure provides a method for 
identifying a rogue domain name service (DNS) server. The 
method comprises: passively monitoring traffic on a net 
work: identifying a DNS resolution response in the traffic on 
10 
15 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
65 
2 
the network, wherein the DNS resolution response includes 
a mapping of a domain to an internet protocol (IP) address; 
comparing the DNS resolution response with a preconfig 
ured list of known mappings of domains to IP addresses; and 
determining whether the DNS resolution response is correct 
based on the comparing. 
A second aspect of the disclosure provides a system for 
identifying a rogue domain name service (DNS) server. The 
system comprises: a monitoring component for passively 
monitoring traffic on a network; an identification component 
for identifying a DNS resolution response in the traffic on 
the network, wherein the DNS resolution response includes 
a mapping of a domain to an internet protocol (IP) address; 
a comparison component for comparing the DNS resolution 
response with a preconfigured list of known mappings of 
domains to IP addresses; and a determination component for 
determining whether the DNS resolution response is correct 
based on the comparing. 
A third aspect of the disclosure provides a computer 
program product embodied in a computer readable storage 
medium which, when executed by a computing device, 
causes the computer system to implement a method for 
identifying a rogue domain name service (DNS) server. The 
method comprises: passively monitoring traffic on a net 
work: identifying a DNS resolution response in the traffic on 
the network, wherein the DNS resolution response includes 
a mapping of a domain to an internet protocol (IP) address; 
comparing the DNS resolution response with a preconfig 
ured list of known mappings of domains to IP addresses; and 
determining whether the DNS resolution response is correct 
based on the comparing. 
These and other aspects, advantages and salient features 
of the invention will become apparent from the following 
detailed description, which, when taken in conjunction with 
the annexed drawings, where like parts are designated by 
like reference characters throughout the drawings, disclose 
embodiments of the invention. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
FIG. 1 shows a data processing system suitable for 
implementing an embodiment of the invention. 
FIG. 2 shows a schematic data flow diagram illustrating 
monitoring of a network according to an embodiment of the 
invention. 
FIG. 3 shows a schematic data flow diagram illustrating 
identification of a rogue 
DNS server according to an embodiment of the invention. 
FIG. 4 shows a preconfigured DNS resolution table in 
accordance with an embodiment of the invention. 
FIG. 5 shows a flow chart for a method of identifying a 
rogue DNS server in accordance with an embodiment of the 
invention. 
The drawings are not necessarily to Scale. The drawings 
are merely schematic representations, not intended to por 
tray specific parameters of the invention. The drawings are 
intended to depict only typical embodiments of the inven 
tion, and therefore should not be considered as limiting the 
Scope of the invention. In the drawings, like numbering 
represents like elements. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE 
INVENTION 
As indicated above, aspects of the present invention 
provide a solution for detecting the presence of rogue DNS 
servers through the use of a monitor which passively 
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observes the flow of traffic across a network between nodes, 
and looks for spoofed DNS traffic in that network. In some 
embodiments, the network may be a local Intranet, and in 
others, the network may be the Internet. 
Turning to the drawings, FIG. 1 shows an illustrative 
monitor 100 for detecting the presence of rogue DNS servers 
215 that may be present in network 200. To this extent, 
monitor 100 includes a computer system 102 that can 
perform a process described herein in order to identify an 
invalid DNS resolution response from a rogue DNS server 
215. In particular, computer system 102 is shown including 
a computing device 104 that includes a rogue DNS server 
identification program 140, which makes computing device 
104 operable to identify a rogue DNS server 215 by per 
forming a process described herein. 
Computing device 104 is shown including a processing 
unit 106 (e.g., one or more processors), a memory 110, a 
storage system 118 (e.g., a storage hierarchy), an input/ 
output (I/O) interface component 114 (e.g., one or more I/O 
interfaces and/or devices), and a communications pathway 
112. In general, processing unit 106 executes program code, 
such as rogue DNS server identification program 140, which 
is at least partially fixed in memory 110. To this extent, 
processing unit 106 may comprise a single processing unit, 
or be distributed across one or more processing units in one 
or more locations. 
Memory 110 can also include local memory, employed 
during actual execution of the program code, bulk storage 
(storage 118), and/or cache memories (not shown) which 
provide temporary storage of at least Some program code in 
order to reduce the number of times code must be retrieved 
from bulk storage 118 during execution. As such, memory 
110 may comprise any known type of data storage and/or 
transmission media, including magnetic media, optical 
media, random access memory (RAM), read-only memory 
(ROM), a data cache, a data object, etc. Moreover, similar to 
processing unit 116, memory 110 may reside at a single 
physical location, comprising one or more types of data 
storage, or be distributed across a plurality of physical 
systems in various forms. 
While executing program code, processing component 
106 can process data, which can result in reading and/or 
writing transformed data from/to memory 110 and/or I/O 
component 114 for further processing. Pathway 112 pro 
vides a direct or indirect communications link between each 
of the components in computer system 102. I/O interface 
component 114 can comprise one or more human I/O 
devices, which enable a human user 120 to interact with 
computer system 102 and/or one or more communications 
devices to enable a system user 120 to communicate with 
computer system 102 using any type of communications 
link. 
To this extent, rogue DNS server identification program 
140 can manage a set of interfaces (e.g., graphical user 
interface(s), application program interface, and/or the like) 
that enable human and/or system users 120 to interact with 
rogue DNS server identification program 140. Further, rogue 
DNS server identification program 140 can manage (e.g., 
store, retrieve, create, manipulate, organize, present, etc.) 
the data, such as data stored in table 220 (FIGS. 2-4), using 
any solution. 
In any event, computer system 102 can comprise one or 
more general purpose computing articles of manufacture 
104 (e.g., computing devices) capable of executing program 
code, such as rogue DNS server identification program 140, 
installed thereon. As used herein, it is understood that 
“program code” means any collection of instructions, in any 
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language, code or notation, that cause a computing device 
having an information processing capability to perform a 
particular action either directly or after any combination of 
the following: (a) conversion to another language, code or 
notation; (b) reproduction in a different material form: 
and/or (c) decompression. To this extent, rogue DNS server 
identification program 140 can be embodied as any combi 
nation of system Software and/or application software. In 
any event, the technical effect of computer system 102 is to 
provide processing instructions to computing device 104 in 
order to identify a rogue DNS server. 
Further, rogue DNS server identification program 140 can 
be implemented using a set of modules 142-150. In this case, 
a module 142-150 can enable computer system 102 to 
perform a set of tasks used by rogue DNS server identifi 
cation program 140, and can be separately developed and/or 
implemented apart from other portions of rogue DNS server 
identification program 140. As used herein, the term “com 
ponent’ means any configuration of hardware, with or 
without software, which implements the functionality 
described in conjunction therewith using any solution, while 
the term “module” means program code that enables a 
computer system 102 to implement the actions described in 
conjunction therewith using any solution. When fixed in a 
memory 110 of a computer system 102 that includes a 
processing component 106, a module is a Substantial portion 
of a component that implements the actions. Regardless, it 
is understood that two or more components, modules, and/or 
systems may share somefall of their respective hardware 
and/or software. Further, it is understood that some of the 
functionality discussed herein may not be implemented or 
additional functionality may be included as part of computer 
system 102. 
When computer system 102 comprises multiple comput 
ing devices 104, each computing device 104 can have only 
a portion of rogue DNS server identification program 140 
fixed thereon (e.g., one or more modules 142-150). How 
ever, it is understood that computer system 102 and rogue 
DNS server identification program 140 are only represen 
tative of various possible equivalent computer systems that 
may perform a process described herein. To this extent, in 
other embodiments, the functionality provided by computer 
system 102 and rogue DNS server identification program 
140 can be at least partially implemented by one or more 
computing devices that include any combination of general 
and/or specific purpose hardware with or without program 
code. In each embodiment, the hardware and program code, 
if included, can be created using standard engineering and 
programming techniques, respectively. 
When computer system 102 includes multiple computing 
devices 104, the computing devices can communicate over 
any type of communications link. Further, while performing 
a process described herein, computer system 102 can com 
municate with one or more other computer systems using 
any type of communications link. In either case, the com 
munications link can comprise any combination of various 
types of wired and/or wireless links; comprise any combi 
nation of one or more types of networks; and/or utilize any 
combination of various types of transmission techniques and 
protocols. 
As discussed herein, rogue DNS server identification 
program 140 enables computer system 102 to implement 
identification of a rogue DNS server. To this extent, rogue 
DNS server identification program 140 is shown including a 
monitoring module 142, an identifying module 144, a com 
parison module 146, a determination module 148, and an 
alarm module 150. 
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Referring now to FIGS. 2-3, the network environment 200 
in which monitor 100 may be used is depicted. As illustrated, 
network 200 may include a requester 205, which may be a 
client workstation operated by a user or a server. Additional 
requesters 205 may be included in network 200, but are 5 
omitted from the depiction of network 200 in FIGS. 2-3 for 
simplicity. Requester 205 may send a DNS resolution 
request 201 for resolution of a particular hosts alphanu 
meric domain name into a numeric IP address. 
As shown in FIG. 2, under normal operating conditions, 10 
in which an attacker is not present in network 200, DNS 
resolution request 201 is received and processed by autho 
rized DNS server 210, which sends DNS resolution response 
202. In that case, DNS resolution response 202 may contain 
a valid and accurate mapping of domain name to IP address. 15 
In other cases, as shown in FIG. 3, an attacker's rogue 
DNS sever 215 may be present in network 200 with the 
purpose of impersonating another computing system. In this 
case, DNS resolution request 201 is received and processed 
by rogue DNS server 215, and DNS resolution response 202 20 
is provided by rogue DNS server 215. Such a DNS resolu 
tion response 202 may contain an incorrect domain name to 
IP address mapping, resulting in either misrouting of net 
work traffic in a spoofing attack in which sensitive traffic is 
delivered to an untrusted system, or impeding of network 25 
traffic in a denial of service (DOS) attack. 
In either case, monitor 100 is positioned at a strategic 
point in network 200 such that monitor 100 can observe the 
flow of network traffic between nodes on network 200. As 
discussed above with reference to FIG. 1, monitor 100 30 
includes modules 142-150, which when executed by com 
puter system 102, perform passive monitoring of traffic on 
network 200, including, among other network traffic, DNS 
resolution requests 201 and DNS resolution responses 202. 
Referring concurrently to FIGS. 1-3, monitoring module 35 
142, part of monitor 100, performs monitoring 143 of traffic 
across network 200, including DNS resolution requests 201 
and DNS resolution responses 202. Identification compo 
nent 144 can identify, in the traffic monitored on the network 
200, a DNS resolution response 202. As mentioned previ- 40 
ously, a DNS resolution response 202 includes a mapping of 
a domain name 225 to an IP address 230 in response to a 
DNS resolution request 201 sent by requester 205. 
Once a DNS resolution response 202 is identified, com 
parison module 146 can perform a comparison of the DNS 45 
resolution response 202 with the known mappings stored in 
a preconfigured list of known mappings of domain names 
and IP addresses contained in a known DNS resolution table 
220. The mappings of domain names to IP addresses con 
tained in table 220 are known to be valid. As shown in FIG. 50 
4, the IP address 230 stored in table 220 may be expressed 
as a specific IP address, such as yyyyyyyyyyyy, the IP 
address of the domain mybank.com. In other embodiments, 
IP addresses 230 stored in table 200 may be expressed as a 
range of IP addresses using at least one wild card. A range 55 
of IP addresses may be broad, including several wild cards 
such as, for example, XXX.*.*.*, the IP address range for the 
domain company.com. In other embodiments the range of IP 
addresses may be narrower, for example having only one 
wild card, such as ZZZ.ZZZ.ZZZ.1??, the IP address range for 60 
the domain email.org. 
According to embodiments of the invention, the list of 
mapped domain names 225 and IP addresses 230 stored in 
table 220 need not be an exhaustive list of domains that a 
user of network 200 may access, or for which requester 205 65 
may request DNS resolutions. Rather, a selected number of 
hosts may be included in table 220 as a representative 
6 
sample. In some embodiments, table 220 may include a 
preconfigured list of domains and their respective IP 
addresses whose selection for inclusion in table 220 is based 
on the domain hosting particularly sensitive information 
accessed by network users. In other embodiments, table 220 
may include a preconfigured list of domains and their 
respective IP addresses whose selection for inclusion in table 
220 is based on a high frequency of visits by users of 
network 200, and therefore a high likelihood of a large 
sample pool of DNS resolution requests and responses to 
monitor. 
Referring back to FIGS. 1-3, determination module 148 
performs a determination of whether the DNS resolution 
response 202 contains a correct and valid mapping of IP 
address to domain name. This determination is based on the 
comparison performed by comparison module 146. Where 
the mapping in DNS resolution response 202 matches the 
mapping for the respective domain name stored in table 220, 
DNS resolution response 202 is determined to be correct. 
This would indicate that DNS resolution response 202 may 
have been sent by authorized DNS server 210 (FIG. 2). 
Where the mapping in DNS resolution response 202 does 
not match the mapping for the respective domain name in 
table 220, DNS resolution response 202 is determined to be 
invalid. This would indicate that DNS resolution response 
202 may have been sent by rogue DNS server 215 (FIG. 3), 
and may indicate the occurrence of either a spoof or DOS 
attack. In this case, alarm module 150 sends an alarm 240 to 
advise requester 205 of the spoofed DNS traffic. In various 
embodiments, alarm 240 may take the form of a message 
(email, SMS, etc.), a log entry, or other form of security 
event notification which documents and draws attention to 
the Suspicious behavior. 
The foregoing method is depicted in a flow chart in FIG. 
5. As previously described, a monitor passively monitors 
traffic over a network. Over this network, a requesting 
workstation requests a DNS resolution of a particular 
domain. A DNS resolution response is returned to the 
Requester over the network by a DNS server. The DNS 
resolution response is identified by the monitor among the 
monitored network traffic. Once identified, the mapping of 
an IP address to a domain contained in the DNS resolution 
response is compared to a preconfigured list of known 
mappings of IP addresses to domains. If neither the domain 
nor the IP address in the DNS resolution response appears in 
the preconfigured list of known mappings of IP addresses to 
domains, the monitor simply returns to monitoring the 
network. 
If either the domain or the IP address in the DNS 
resolution response appears in the preconfigured list of 
known mappings of IP addresses to domains, the mapping 
contained in the DNS resolution request is compared to the 
corresponding mapping in the preconfigured list of known 
mappings of IP addresses to domains. If the mapping 
matches, i.e. both the IP address and the respective domain 
are the same in the DNS resolution response and the 
preconfigured list of known mappings of IP addresses to 
domains, then it can be determined that the DNS resolution 
response is correct and the DNS server that sent it is 
authorized. If, however, the mapping does not match, i.e., 
the domain corresponds to different IP addresses in the DNS 
resolution response and the preconfigured list of known 
mappings of IP addresses to domains (or the IP address 
corresponds to different domains in the DNS resolution 
response and the preconfigured list of known mappings of IP 
addresses to domains), then it can be determined that the 
DNS resolution response is invalid. In such a case, it can be 
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concluded that the DNS server that sent it is not authorized, 
and may be a rogue DNS server. In this instance, an alarm 
is initiated, alerting the requester to the security risk. 
While shown and described herein as a method and 
system for identifying a rogue DNS server, it is understood 
that aspects of the invention further provide various alter 
native embodiments. For example, in one embodiment, the 
invention provides a computer program fixed in at least one 
computer-readable medium, which when executed, enables 
a computer system to implement identification of a rogue 
DNS server. To this extent, the computer-readable medium 
includes program code, such as rogue DNS server identifi 
cation program 140 (FIG. 1), which implements some or all 
of a process described herein. It is understood that the term 
"computer-readable medium' comprises one or more of any 
type of tangible medium of expression, now known or later 
developed, from which a copy of the program code can be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated by a 
computing device. For example, the computer-readable 
medium can comprise: one or more portable storage articles 
of manufacture; one or more memory/storage components of 
a computing device; paper; and/or the like. 
In another embodiment, the invention provides a method 
of providing a copy of program code, such as rogue DNS 
server identification program 140 (FIG. 1), which imple 
ments some or all of a process described herein. In this case, 
a computer System can process a copy of program code that 
implements some or all of a process described herein to 
generate and transmit, for reception at a second, distinct 
location, a set of data signals that has one or more of its 
characteristics set and/or changed in such a manner as to 
encode a copy of the program code in the set of data signals. 
Similarly, an embodiment of the invention provides a 
method of acquiring a copy of program code that imple 
ments some or all of a process described herein, which 
includes a computer system receiving the set of data signals 
described herein, and translating the set of data signals into 
a copy of the computer program fixed in at least one 
computer-readable medium. In either case, the set of data 
signals can be transmitted/received using any type of com 
munications link. 
In still another embodiment, the invention provides a 
method of generating a system for identifying a rogue DNS 
server. In this case, a computer system, such as computer 
system 102 (FIG. 1), can be obtained (e.g., created, main 
tained, made available, etc.) and one or more components 
for performing a process described herein can be obtained 
(e.g., created, purchased, used, modified, etc.) and deployed 
to the computer system. To this extent, the deployment can 
comprise one or more of: (1) installing program code on a 
computing device; (2) adding one or more computing and/or 
I/O devices to the computer system; (3) incorporating and/or 
modifying the computer system to enable it to perform a 
process described herein; and/or the like. 
As used herein, the terms “first,” “second,” and the like, 
do not denote any order, quantity, or importance, but rather 
are used to distinguish one element from another, and the 
terms 'a' and 'an' herein do not denote a limitation of 
quantity, but rather denote the presence of at least one of the 
referenced item. The modifier "about” used in connection 
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with a quantity is inclusive of the stated value and has the 
meaning dictated by the context (e.g., includes the degree of 
error associated with measurement of the particular quan 
tity). The suffix "(s)" as used herein is intended to include 
both the singular and the plural of the term that it modifies, 
thereby including one or more of that term (e.g., the 
server(s) includes one or more server). Ranges disclosed 
herein are inclusive and independently combinable (e.g., 
ranges of “up to about 3 wild cards, or, more specifically, 
about 1 wild cards to about 3 wild cards,” is inclusive of the 
endpoints and all intermediate values of the ranges of “about 
1 wild card to about 2 wild cards,” etc.). 
The descriptions of the various embodiments of the 
present invention have been presented for purposes of 
illustration, but are not intended to be exhaustive or limited 
to the embodiments disclosed. Many modifications and 
variations will be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the 
art without departing from the scope and spirit of the 
described embodiments. The terminology used herein was 
chosen to best explain the principles of the embodiments, the 
practical application or technical improvement over tech 
nologies found in the marketplace, or to enable others of 
ordinary skill in the art to understand the embodiments 
disclosed herein. 
What is claimed is: 
1. A computer system comprising a non-transitory com 
puter readable storage device, one or more processors, and 
program code stored on the non-transitory computer read 
able storage device for execution by the one or more 
processors to perform a method comprising: 
passively monitoring traffic on a network; 
identifying a DNS resolution response in the traffic on the 
network, wherein the DNS resolution response includes 
a mapping of a domain to an internet protocol (IP) 
address; 
comparing the DNS resolution response with a precon 
figured list of known mappings of domains to IP 
addresses, 
wherein each IP address in the preconfigured list of 
known mappings of domains to IP addresses is a 
range of IP addresses expressed using at least one 
wild card; 
determining whether the DNS resolution response is 
correct based on the comparing; and 
sending an alarm in a case in which the DNS resolution 
response is determined to be incorrect. 
2. The computer system of claim 1, wherein the alarm 
comprises at least one of an email message, an SMS 
message, a log entry, or a security event notification. 
3. The computer system of claim 1, wherein the precon 
figured list of known mappings of domains and IP addresses 
further includes a preconfigured list of domains most fre 
quently visited by users of a network. 
4. The computer system of claim 1, wherein the precon 
figured list of known mappings of domains and IP addresses 
further includes a preconfigured list of domains hosting 
sensitive information accessed by network users. 
5. The computer system of claim 1, wherein the network 
includes an intranet. 
 
 
 188 
9.9 MIGRATION ACROSS AUTHENTICATION SYSTEMS 
 
(19) United States 
US 2010O2691.51A1 
(12) Patent Application Publication (10) Pub. No.: US 2010/0269151 A1 
Crume (43) Pub. Date: Oct. 21, 2010 
(54) MIGRATION ACROSSAUTHENTICATION 
SYSTEMS 
(76) Inventor: Jeffery L. Crume, Raleigh, NC 
(US) 
Correspondence Address: 
HOFFMAN WARNICK LLC 
75 STATEST, 14 FL 
ALBANY, NY 12207 (US) 
(21) Appl. No.: 12/426,365 
(22) Filed: Apr. 20, 2009 
Computer System 100 
Processor 104 
106 
I/O 108 
Memory 110 
Migration System 112 
Login System 11 System 122 
Migration Logic System 124 
System 118 o 
Publication Classification 
(51) Int. Cl. 
H04L 9/00 (2006.01) 
(52) U.S. Cl. ............................................................ 726/2 
(57) ABSTRACT 
A system, method, program productanda method for deploy 
ing a system for providing migration across authentication 
systems are disclosed. A system is provided that includes a 
login system that collects information from a user during a 
login process, a migration list check system that compares the 
information to a migration list to determine if the user is 
selected for migration, and a migration logic system that 
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MGRATION ACROSSAUTHENTCATION 
SYSTEMS 
FIELD OF THE INVENTION 
0001. This disclosure relates to the migration of users 
across authentication systems, and more specifically dis 
closes a system, method, program product and a method for 
deploying a system for the selective, secure and transparent 
migration of users across authentication systems. 
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
0002 Authentication systems are widely used by websites 
to authenticate a user. For example, an authentication system 
may be used to provide access to a secure resource. A secure 
resource may, for example, include: customer data, financial 
information or retirement accounts. Occasionally, websites 
may also implement new authentication systems to, for 
example, upgrade security, replace legacy systems and pro 
vide additional services to their customers. The migration of 
users from one authentication system to another introduces 
certain challenges. As an example, users are typically 
required to change their password or re-register because cre 
dentials are not typically transferable. In addition, there may 
be a desire to have a phased migration when a new authenti 
cation system is introduced. A phased migration allows for 
the conservation of resources, the ability to monitor the 
migration in a controlled environment, the ability to stop, 
increase or decrease the migration and the ability to select the 
number, or group, of users to be migrated. 
0003. In a typical migration, a user logs into an existing 
authentication system and is directed to a new authentication 
system. The user then typically has to login again or provide 
Supplemental information before reaching the new authenti 
cation system. The additional information required from the 
user, as an example, may be in the form of re-entering a user 
identification and password, creating a new password, or 
providing some other information to confirm the authenticity 
of the user. 
0004. The additional time and effort required by the user 
for entering this information or the need to provide and then 
remember a new user identification and password is often an 
inconvenience and a barrier to a user attempting to reach a 
new authentication system. 
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
0005. A system, method, program product and a method 
for deploying a system for providing migration across authen 
tication systems are disclosed. In one embodiment, there is a 
migration system that includes a login system that collects 
information from a user, a migration list check system that 
compares the user to a migration list to determine if the user 
is selected for migration and a migration logic system that 
migrates the user from the existing authentication system to 
the new authentication system during the login process if the 
user is selected. 
0006. In a second embodiment, there is a computer read 
able medium having a program product stored therein for 
migrating a user from an existing authentication system to a 
new authentication system, comprising program code for col 
lecting information from the user during a login process, 
program code for comparing the information to a migration 
list to determine if the user is selected for migration, and 
program code for migrating the user from the existing authen 
Oct. 21, 2010 
tication system to the new authentication system during the 
login process if the user is selected. 
0007. In a third embodiment, there is a method of migrat 
ing a user from an existing authentication system to a new 
authentication system, comprising collecting information 
from the user during a login process, comparing the informa 
tion to a migration list to determine if the user is selected for 
migration, and migrating the user from the existing authenti 
cation system to the new authentication system during the 
login process if the user is selected. 
0008. In a fourth embodiment, there is a method for 
deploying a system for migrating a user from an existing 
authentication system to a new authentication system, com 
prising providing a computer infrastructure being operable to 
collect information from a user during the login process, 
compare the information to a migration list to determine if the 
user is selected for migration and migrate the user transpar 
ently from the existing authentication system to the new 
authentication system. 
0009. The illustrative aspects of the present invention are 
designed to solve the problems herein described and other 
problems not discussed. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
0010. These and other features of this invention will be 
more readily understood from the following detailed descrip 
tion of the various aspects of the invention taken in conjunc 
tion with the accompanying drawings. 
0011 FIG. 1 depicts a computer system having a migra 
tion system in accordance with an embodiment of the present 
invention. 
0012 FIG. 2 illustrates an example of a migration list. 
0013 FIG. 3 depicts a flow diagram of embodiments of a 
method of using the system of FIG. 
0014. The drawings are merely schematic representations, 
not intended to portray specific parameters of the invention. 
The drawings are intended to depict only typical embodi 
ments of the invention, and therefore should not be consid 
ered as limiting the scope of the invention. In the drawings, 
like numbering represents like elements. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION 
(0015 Referring to FIG. 1, a computer system 100 for 
migrating users from an existing authentication system 122 to 
a new authentication system 124 is shown, and generally 
includes a processor 104, a bus 106, an input/output (I/O)108 
and a memory 110. Stored in memory 110 is a migration 
system 112 that includes a login system 114 that collects 
credential information from a user 102 (e.g., user identifica 
tion and password) to allow access to secure resource 128, a 
migration list check system 116 that compares the informa 
tion of user 102 to a migration list 126, and a migration logic 
system 118 that migrates user 102 from the existing authen 
tication system 122 to the new authentication system 124 (if 
selected). Secure resource 128 may include, as an example, a 
bank account, retirement account or history of mortgage pay 
ments. In one embodiment, user 102 may be able to access 
one or more secure resources 128 through new authentication 
system 124. 
0016 Login system 114 may comprise any system for 
collecting user credentials to authenticate user 102. For 
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example, login system 114 may collect a user identification, 
password, Voice recognition, or biometric data Such as fin 
gerprints, retinal scans, etc. 
0017 Migration list check system 116 utilizes migration 
list 126 to identify the users to be migrated from existing 
authentication system 122 to new authentication system 124. 
Initially, user 102 enters their credentials into login system 
114. Login system 114 then checks for the existence of user 
102 in new authentication system 124. If user 102 is in new 
authentication system 124, then login system 114 logs user 
102 in new authentication system 124. If user 102 is not in 
new authentication system 124, then migration list check 
system 116 checks migration list 126 to determine if user 102 
has been selected for migration. If user 102 is not selected for 
migration, migration list check system 116 causes user 102 to 
be logged in using existing authentication system 122. If user 
102 is selected for migration, then migration logic system 118 
migrates user 102 from existing authentication system 122 to 
new authentication system 124 as part of the login process. 
0018 Migration system 112 may migrate user 102 selec 
tively from existing authentication system 122 to new authen 
tication system 124 to, for example, allow for a phased migra 
tion. In an illustrative embodiment, migration list 126 
contains a list of users that have been selected for migration. 
The selection of the users for migration may be based on any 
number of criteria. For example, the users selected for migra 
tion may be determined on a specific class of users, on fre 
quency of use of the secure resource 128, or the size of the 
user's account, to name a few. In selecting users for migration, 
migration system 112 may use one of these or another crite 
rion. Migration system 112 migrates user 102 from existing 
authentication system 122 to new authentication system 124 
at the next time user 102 logs intologin system 114 after being 
“selected' (i.e., selected for migration in migration list 126). 
0019. The phased migration of users may result in a con 
servation of resources for computer system 100 as the migra 
tion occurs over time compared to the migration occurring all 
at once. Additionally, the phased migration may allow for the 
migration's progression to be observed and, if necessary, for 
changes to be made during the migration. Phased migration 
may also allow for changing during migration which users are 
to be migrated, the speed of migration and if an additional 
new secure resource 128 should be included or one removed. 
0020. In one embodiment, migration logic system 118 can 
perform the migration using a web authentication system. In 
an alternative embodiment, the migration can be architected 
to run in any environment where migration across authenti 
cation systems is needed. When migration utilizes a web 
authentication system, a migration website may be installed 
between existing authentication system 122 and user 102. 
This can be done, for example, by changing the domain name 
system (DNS) address of the authentication domain to point 
to the migration server. 
0021 When a user is selected for migration, migration 
logic system 118 captures a user's password during login and 
automatically stores the password in new authentication sys 
tem 124 upon a Successful authentication in existing authen 
tication system 122. In another embodiment, the expiration 
date of user's password is also migrated from existing authen 
tication system 122 to new authentication system 124. The 
migration of user 102 from existing authentication system 
122 to new authentication system 124 may be transparent to 
user 102. Thus, user 102, when being migrated from existing 
Oct. 21, 2010 
authentication system 122 to new authentication system 124. 
will not know they are being migrated. 
0022. It is understood that computer system 100 may be 
implemented as any type of computing infrastructure. The 
processor 104 may comprise a single processing unit, or be 
distributed across one or more processing units in one or more 
locations (e.g., on a client and server). Memory 110 may 
comprise any known type of data storage, including magnetic 
media, optical media, random access memory (RAM), read 
only memory (ROM), a data cache, a data object, etc. More 
over, memory 110 may reside at a single physical location, 
comprising one or more types of data storage, or be distrib 
uted across a plurality of physical systems in various forms. 
0023 I/O 108 may comprise any system for exchanging 
information to/from an external resource. External devices/ 
resources may comprise any known type of external device, 
including a monitor/display, speakers, storage, another com 
puter system, a hand-held device, keyboard, mouse, Voice 
recognition system, speech output system, printer, facsimile, 
pager, etc. BuS 106 provides a communication link between 
each of the components in computer system 100 and likewise 
may comprise any known type of transmission link, including 
electrical, optical, wireless, etc. Although not shown, addi 
tional components, such as cache memory, communication 
systems, system Software, etc., may be incorporated into 
computer system 100. 
0024. Access to computer system 100 may be provided 
over a network Such as the Internet, a local area network 
(LAN), a wide area network (WAN), a virtual private network 
(VPN), etc. Communication could occur via a direct hard 
wired connection (e.g., serial port), or via an addressable 
connection that may utilize any combination of wireline and/ 
or wireless transmission methods. Moreover, conventional 
network connectivity, such as Token Ring, Ethernet, WiFi or 
other conventional communications standards could be used. 
Still yet, connectivity could be provided by conventional 
TCP/IP sockets-based protocol. In this instance, an Internet 
service provider could be used to establish interconnectivity. 
Further, as indicated above, communication could occur in a 
client-server or server-server environment. 
0025 FIG. 2 illustrates a simple example of a migration 
list 126. In this case, migration list 126 may includealist of all 
the users and the status of their migration (i.e., migration 
complete or migration not complete). Additionally, migration 
list 126 may include a date after which a user is to be 
migrated. For instance, migration list 126 may have a group of 
users set for migration after January 1. The next time the 
users login after the pre-determined date (in this case, January 
1'), the user will be migrated. Migration list 126 may include 
additional information regarding each user. For example, 
migration list 126 may include a user type, list the Secure 
resource 128 (FIG. 1) that is associated with user and provide 
the last time the userlogged into the secure resource. The user 
type may also be used by the migration system to determine 
when users are to be selectively migrated. 
0026 FIG. 3 shows a flow diagram illustrating one 
embodiment of the process of migration system 112 (with 
reference to FIG. 1). In process P1, user 102 enters their login 
information. In process P2. login system 114 checks for the 
existence of user 102 in new authentication system 124. If 
user 102 is in new authentication system 124 (i.e., YES at P2), 
then login system 114 logs user 102 in new authentication 
system 124 (P5). If user 102 is not in new authentication 
system 124 (i.e., NO at process P2), then migration list check 
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system 116 checks if user 102 has been selected for migration 
(P3). Migration list check system 116 checks if user 102 is 
selected for migration by comparing user 102 to migration list 
126. If user 102 is not selected for migration (i.e., NO at 
process P3), then user 102 logs into existing authentication 
system 122, process P3A. Ifuser 102 is selected for migration 
(i.e., YES at process P3), then in process P4 the user is 
migrated from existing authentication system 122 to new 
authentication system 124 using migration logic system 118. 
In process P5, user 102 logs into and is authenticated by new 
authentication system 124. Once user 102 is migrated from 
existing authentication system 122 to new authentication sys 
tem 124, migration list 126 is updated to indicate that user 102 
was migrated to new authentication system 124. 
0027. It should be appreciated that the teachings of the 
present invention could be offered as a business method on a 
Subscription or fee basis. For example, a computer system 
100 including memory 110 with migration system 112 could 
be created, maintained and/or deployed by a service provider 
that offers the functions described herein for customers. That 
is, a service provider could offer to deploy or provide a 
migration system 112 as described above. 
0028. It is understood that in addition to being imple 
mented as a system and method, the features may be provided 
as a program product stored on a computer-readable medium, 
which when executed, enables computer system 100 to pro 
vide a migration system 112. To this extent, the computer 
readable medium may include program code, which imple 
ments the processes and systems described herein. It is 
understood that the term “computer-readable medium' com 
prises one or more of any type of physical embodiment of the 
program code. In particular, the computer-readable medium 
can comprise program code embodied on one or more por 
table storage articles of manufacture (e.g., a compact disc, a 
magnetic disk, a tape, etc.), on one or more data storage 
portions of a computing device, such as memory 110 and/or a 
Storage System. 
0029. As used herein, it is understood that the terms “pro 
gram code' and "computer program code are synonymous 
and mean any expression, in any language, code or notation, 
of a set of instructions that cause a computing device having 
an information processing capability to perform a particular 
function either directly or after any combination of the fol 
lowing: (a) conversion to another language, code or notation; 
(b) reproduction in a different material form; and/or (c) 
decompression. To this extent, program code can be embod 
ied as one or more types of program products, such as an 
application/software program, component software/a library 
of functions, an operating system, a basic I/O System/driver 
for a particular computing and/or I/O device, and the like. 
Further, it is understood that terms such as “component” and 
“system” are synonymous as used herein and represent any 
combination of hardware and/or software capable of per 
forming some function(s). 
0030 The block diagrams in the figures illustrate the 
architecture, functionality, and operation of possible imple 
mentations of systems, methods and computer program prod 
ucts according to various embodiments of the present inven 
tion. In this regard, each block in the block diagrams may 
represent a module, segment, or portion of code, which com 
prises one or more executable instructions for implementing 
the specified logical function(s). It should also be noted that 
the functions noted in the blocks may occur out of the order 
noted in the figures. For example, two blocks shown in Suc 
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cession may, in fact, be executed Substantially concurrently, 
or the blocks may sometimes be executed in the reverse order, 
depending upon the functionality involved. It will also be 
noted that each block of the block diagrams can be imple 
mented by special purpose hardware-based systems which 
perform the specified functions or acts, or combinations of 
special purpose hardware and computer instructions. 
0031. Although specific embodiments have been illus 
trated and described herein, those of ordinary skill in the art 
appreciate that any arrangement which is calculated to 
achieve the same purpose may be substituted for the specific 
embodiments shown and that the invention has other appli 
cations in other environments. This application is intended to 
cover any adaptations or variations of the present invention. 
The following claims are in no way intended to limit the scope 
of the invention to the specific embodiments described herein. 
What is claimed is: 
1. A system for migrating a user from an existing authen 
tication system to a new authentication system, comprising: 
a login system that collects information from the user dur 
ing a login process; 
a migration list check system that compares the informa 
tion to a migration list to determine if the user is selected 
for migration; and 
a migration logic system that migrates the user from the 
existing authentication system to the new authentication 
system during the login process if the user is selected. 
2. The system of claim 1, wherein the migration list iden 
tifies a set of users to be migrated. 
3. The system of claim 1, wherein the migration system 
migrates the user selectively from the existing authentication 
system to the new authentication system. 
4. The system of claim 1, wherein the migration system 
migrates the user from the existing authentication system to 
the new authentication system a first time the user logs in after 
being selected. 
5. The system of claim 1, wherein a password is captured 
during the login process and automatically stored in the new 
authentication system when the user is migrated. 
6. The system of claim 5, wherein an expiration of the 
password is migrated from the existing authentication system 
to the new authentication system. 
7. The system of claim 1, wherein the migration of the user 
from the existing authentication system to the new authenti 
cation system is transparent to the user. 
8. A computer readable medium having a program product 
stored therein for migrating a user from an existing authenti 
cation system to a new authentication system, comprising: 
program code that collects information from the user dur 
ing a login process; 
program code that compares the information to a migration 
list to determine if the user is selected for migration; and 
program code that migrates the user from the existing 
authentication system to the new authentication system 
during the login process if the user is selected. 
9. The computer readable medium of claim 8, wherein the 
migration list identifies a set of users to be migrated. 
10. The computer readable medium of claim 8, further 
comprising program code for migrating the user selectively 
from the existing authentication system to the new authenti 
cation system. 
11. The computer readable medium of claim 8, further 
comprising program code for migrating the user from the 
 
 
 195 
 
  
US 2010/0269 151 A1 
existing authentication system to the new authentication sys 
tem a first time the user logs in after being selected. 
12. The computer readable medium of claim 8, further 
comprising program code for capturing a password during the 
login process and automatically storing the password in the 
new authentication system when the user is migrated. 
13. The computer readable medium of claim 12, further 
comprising program code for migrating the expiration date of 
the password from the existing authentication system to the 
new authentication system. 
14. The computer readable medium of claim8, wherein the 
migration of the user from the existing authentication system 
to the new authentication system is transparent to the user. 
15. A method of migrating a user from an existing authen 
tication system to a new authentication system, comprising: 
collecting information from the user during a login process 
of a computer system; 
comparing the information to a migration list to determine 
if the user is selected for migration; and 
migrating the user from the existing authentication system 
to the new authentication system during the login pro 
cess if the user is selected. 
16. The method of claim 15, wherein the migration list 
identifies a set of users to be migrated. 
Oct. 21, 2010 
17. The method of claim 15, wherein the migration of the 
user occurs selectively from the existing authentication sys 
tem to the new authentication system. 
18. The method of claim 15, wherein the migration of the 
user from the existing authentication system to the new 
authentication system occurs a first time the user logs in after 
being selected. 
19. The method of claim 15, wherein a password is cap 
tured during the login process and automatically stored in the 
new authentication system when the user is migrated. 
20. A method for deploying a system for migrating a user 
from an existing authentication system to a new authentica 
tion system, comprising: 
providing a computer infrastructure being operable to: 
collect information from a user during a login process; 
compare the information to a migration list to determine 
if the user is selected for migration; 
Select the user for migration from the existing authenti 
cation system to the new authentication system; and 
migrate the user transparently from the existing authen 
tication system to the new authentication system. 
c c c c c 
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in response to the receipt of the phone call from the privileged 
phone number and the phone call exceeding a predetermined 
time duration threshold by: terminating, by the locked mobile 
device, the phone call from the phone having the privileged 
phone number, generating, by the locked mobile device, a 
temporary password; establishing, by the locked mobile 
device, a connection to the phone having the privileged phone 
number, displaying, by the locked mobile device, a password 
entry field; communicating, by the locked mobile device, the 
temporary password via the connection to the phone having 
the privileged phone number, and unlocking the locked 
mobile device upon Successful entry of the temporary pass 
word in the password entry field displayed by the locked 
mobile device. 
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1. 
MOBILE DEVICE PASSWORD RESET 
TECHNICAL FIELD 
The present invention relates generally to mobile devices, 
and more particularly, to a mobile device password reset. 
RELATED ART 
Many methods are available for resetting a forgotten or lost 
password of a mobile device. One method, typically referred 
to as a master or factory reset, returns a mobile device to its 
original, default operating system state. However, this pro 
cess erases all data (e.g., contacts, applications, personalized 
settings, etc.) added to the mobile device after purchase. 
Another method requires a phone call to the phone company 
that provides service to the mobile device. The present inven 
tion addresses these problems allowing users to avoid the data 
reconstruction of a hard reset and the cost of service provider 
involvement. 
SUMMARY 
A first aspect of the invention provides a mobile device 
password reset method, comprising: receiving a phone call at 
a locked mobile device from a phone having a privileged 
phone number, initiating a password reset in response to the 
receipt of the phone call from the phone having the privileged 
phone number and the phone call exceeding a predetermined 
time duration threshold, the password reset comprising: ter 
minating, by the locked mobile device, the phone call from 
the privileged phone number; generating, by the locked 
mobile device, a temporary password; establishing, by the 
locked mobile device, a connection to the phone having the 
privileged phone number, displaying, by the locked mobile 
device, a password entry field; communicating, by the locked 
mobile device, the temporary password via the connection to 
the phone having the privileged phone number; and unlock 
ing the locked mobile device upon successful entry of the 
temporary password in the password entry field displayed by 
the locked mobile device. 
A second aspect of the invention provides a mobile device 
configured to perform a password reset method, the method 
comprising: receiving a phone call at a locked mobile device 
from a phone having a privileged phone number, initiating a 
password reset in response to the receipt of the phone call 
from the phone having the privileged phone number and the 
phone call exceeding a predetermined time duration thresh 
old, the password reset comprising: terminating, by the 
locked mobile device, the phone call from the privileged 
phone number, generating, by the locked mobile device, a 
temporary password; establishing, by the locked mobile 
device, a connection to the phone having the privileged phone 
number, displaying, by the locked mobile device, a password 
entry field; communicating, by the locked mobile device, the 
temporary password via the connection to the phone having 
the privileged phone number; and unlocking the locked 
mobile device upon Successful entry of the temporary pass 
word in the password entry field displayed by the locked 
mobile device. 
A third aspect of the invention provides a computer pro 
gram product including program code embodied in at least 
one computer-readable storage medium, which when 
executed, enables a computer system to implement a mobile 
device password reset method, the method comprising: 
receiving a phone call at a locked mobile device from a phone 
having a privileged phone number, initiating a password reset 
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in response to the receipt of the phone call from the phone 
having the privileged phone number and the phone call 
exceeding a predetermined time duration threshold, the pass 
word reset comprising: terminating, by the locked mobile 
device, the phone call from the privileged phone number; 
generating, by the locked mobile device, a temporary pass 
word; establishing, by the locked mobile device, a connection 
to the phone having the privileged phone number, displaying, 
by the locked mobile device, a password entry field; commu 
nicating, by the locked mobile device, the temporary pass 
word via the connection to the phone having the privileged 
phone number; and unlocking the locked mobile device upon 
Successful entry of the temporary password in the password 
entry field displayed by the locked mobile device. 
Other aspects of the invention provide methods, systems, 
program products, and methods of using and generating each, 
which include and/or implement some or all of the actions 
described herein. The illustrative aspects of the invention are 
designed to solve one or more of the problems herein 
described and/or one or more other problems not discussed. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
These and other features of the disclosure will be more 
readily understood from the following detailed description of 
the various aspects of the invention taken in conjunction with 
the accompanying drawings that depict various aspects of the 
invention. 
FIG. 1 shows a flow diagram of an illustrative process for a 
mobile device password reset, according to embodiments. 
FIG. 2 depicts an illustrative setup process for a mobile 
device password reset, according to embodiments. 
FIG. 3 depicts a user initiating a mobile device password 
reset by placing a phone call to a locked mobile device, 
according to embodiments. 
FIG. 4 depicts a locked mobile device comparing the phone 
number of a received phone call to privileged phone numbers 
on a predefined list, according to embodiments. 
FIG. 5 depicts the display of a password reset option to a 
user via a display of a mobile device, according to embodi 
mentS. 
FIG. 6 depicts a mobile device placing a return phone call 
to the phone number of the phone that initiated a mobile 
device password reset, according to embodiments. 
FIG. 7 depicts the initiation of a password reset upon 
receiving a correct temporary password, according to 
embodiments. 
FIG. 8 shows an illustrative environment for a mobile 
device password reset according to an embodiment. 
It is noted that the drawings may not be to scale. The 
drawings are intended to depict only typical aspects of the 
invention, and therefore should not be considered as limiting 
the scope of the invention. In the drawings, like numbering 
represents like elements between the drawings. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
The present invention relates generally to mobile devices, 
and more particularly, to a mobile device password reset. 
When a mobile device enters a locked state, operation of 
the mobile device may be prevented or severely limited. Such 
a locked State may occur automatically, for example, after a 
predetermined period of inactivity, or may be activated manu 
ally (e.g., via buttons/keys on the mobile device or remotely 
over the Internet). Typically, the locked state of a mobile 
device is provided as a security measure to prevent unautho 
rized or unintended use of the mobile device. However, while 
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in the locked State, most mobile devices allow incoming 
phone calls, which can be answered by a user of the mobile 
device, and/or a user of the mobile device may be able to place 
an outgoing emergency call. 
To unlock a mobile device that has entered a locked state, 
a user typically enters a password into a password entry 
screen of the mobile device using a virtual or physical keypad 
of the mobile device. A password may comprise, for example, 
an alphanumeric passcode, passkey, passphrase, access code, 
personal identification number (PIN), a pattern entered on the 
screen, or other type of authentication data. If the user cor 
rectly enters the password within a predetermined number of 
attempts, the mobile device is unlocked and full functionality 
is restored. Repeated failures to enter the correct password 
may, in Some cases, cause the mobile device to erase all data 
and perform a master reset. 
The present invention provides a mobile device password 
reset that allows a user to securely regain full authorized 
access to a locked mobile device. In the present disclosure, 
Such a mobile device may include, for example, a cellphone, 
Smartphone, tablet computer, PDA, laptop computer, or other 
handheld computing/communication device capable of send 
ing/receiving phone calls. 
FIG. 1 shows a flow diagram of an illustrative process for a 
mobile device password reset according to embodiments. 
During a setup process S1, and as depicted in FIG. 2, a 
predefined list 10 of one or more privileged phone numbers 
12 is provided and stored in a mobile device 14 by an autho 
rized user 16 (e.g., owner) of the mobile device 14. For 
example, the predefined list 10 of privileged phone numbers 
12 may include the home and work phone numbers of the user 
16, a friends cellphone number, a relative’s land-line phone 
number, etc. 
The user 16 may provide the predefined list 10 of privileged 
phone numbers 12 during an initial or Subsequent configura 
tion of the settings of the mobile device 14. Application 
software 18 loaded and running on the mobile device 14 may 
also be used to provide the predefined list 10 of privileged 
phone numbers 12 to the mobile device 14. 
At S2, assuming the mobile device 14 is in a locked state 
and the user 16 has forgotten the password for unlocking the 
mobile device 14, the user 16 initiates a mobile device pass 
word reset by placing a phone call 20 (FIG. 3) to the mobile 
device 14 from another phone 22. The phone 22 can comprise 
any telecommunication device capable of sending/receiving 
phone calls, including a mobile device, a land-line phone, a 
computer with VoIP capabilities, and/or the like. At S3, the 
phone call 20 is received and answered by the mobile device 
14. 
At S4, the mobile device 14 compares (FIG. 4) the phone 
number 24 of the phone call 20 to the privileged phone num 
bers 12 on the predefined list 10. The phone number 24 of the 
phone call 20 may be determined via caller ID or using any 
other Suitable technique. 
If the phone number 24 of the phone call 20 is not on the 
predefined list 10 of privileged phone numbers 12 (N at S4), 
the mobile device password reset process ends and the call 
proceeds as normal. If, however, the phone number 24 of the 
phone call 20 is on the predefined list 10 of privileged phone 
numbers 12 (Yat S4), flow passes to S5. 
At S5, the elapsed duration of the phone call 20 is moni 
tored by the mobile device 14. If the elapsed duration of the 
phone call 20 exceeds a predetermined time threshold (e.g., 
10-15 seconds) (Yat S5), indicating that the phone call 20 has 
a high likelihood of being legitimate, a password reset option 
26 (FIG. 5) is displayed to the user 16 at S6 via a display 28 
of the mobile device 14. If the phone call 20 is terminated 
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before the predetermined time threshold has been exceeded 
(Nat S5), the mobile device password reset process ends and 
the call proceeds as normal. The duration of the phone call 20 
will generally be shorter in the case that the mobile device 14 
is lost/stolen. In such a case, the user 16 would realize the 
mobile device 14 has been compromised (e.g., based on who 
answered the mobile device 14) and hang-up before the pre 
determined time threshold, thereby terminating the mobile 
device password reset process. 
If the user 16 selects the password reset option 26 (Yat S7), 
the mobile device 14 enters a password reset mode at S8. If 
the user 16 does not select the password reset option 26 (Nat 
S7), the mobile device password reset process ends and the 
call proceeds as normal. Selection of the password reset 
option 26 may be provided, for example, via YES and NO 
buttons 30, 32, respectively, or in any other suitable manner. 
Upon entering the password reset mode at S8, the mobile 
device 14 terminates the phone call 20 at S9. Thereafter, at 
S10, the mobile device 14 generates a random, one-time, 
temporary password 34 (FIG. 6). 
At S11, and as shown in FIG. 6, the mobile device 14 
establishes a connection (e.g., via a return phone call 36) to 
the phone number 24 of the phone 22 that initiated the mobile 
device password reset. If the return phone call 36 is not 
answered by the user 16 (N at S12) the mobile device pass 
word reset process ends. If the return phone call 36 is 
answered by the user 16 (Yat S12), the mobile device 14, at 
S13, displays a password entry field 38 and speaks the tem 
porary password 34 to the user 16 (e.g., using text-to-speech) 
one or more times for a predetermined period of time (e.g., 30 
seconds). In other embodiments, the mobile device 14 may 
communicate the temporary password 34 to the user 16 in a 
non-vocal manner. For example, the mobile device 14 may 
communicate the temporary password 34 to the user 16 via a 
short message service (SMS) text message, an email, and/or 
the like. 
If the user 16 does not enter the correct temporary pass 
word 34 into the displayed password entry field 38 within the 
predetermined period of time (N at S14), the mobile device 
password reset process ends. If the user 16 enters the correct 
temporary password 34 into the displayed password entry 
field 38 within the predetermined period of time (Y at S14), 
flow passes to S15. As depicted in FIG. 6, a timer 40 may be 
displayed on the mobile device 14 to indicate the time remain 
ing during which the user 16 can enter the correct temporary 
password 34 into the displayed password entry field 38. 
At S15, upon receiving the correct temporary password 34, 
the mobile device 14 immediately initiates a password change 
process (FIG. 7), after which the user 16 is required to enter a 
new password 42 into the mobile device 14. After successful 
completion of the password change process (Y at S16), the 
mobile device 14 is unlocked at S17 and is ready foruse. If the 
password reset is not completed (Nat S16), the mobile device 
14 remains locked and the mobile device password reset 
process ends. In this case, the user 16 must return to S2 to 
restart the mobile device password reset process. 
An illustrative environment 100 for providing a mobile 
device password reset is shown in FIG. 8. The environment 
100 includes at least one computer system 101 and a mobile 
device password reset program 130 that can perform pro 
cesses described herein in order to provide a mobile device 
password reset in accordance with embodiments. The envi 
ronment 100 may be provided, for example, within a mobile 
device 14. 
The computer system 101 is shown including a processing 
component 102 (e.g., one or more processors), a storage 
component 104 (e.g., a storage hierarchy), an input/output 
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(I/O) component 106 (e.g., one or more I/O interfaces and/or 
devices), and a communications pathway 108. In general, the 
processing component 102 executes program code, Such as 
the mobile device password reset program 130, which is at 
least partially fixed in the storage component 104. While 
executing program code, the processing component 102 can 
process data, Such as a list 10 of privileged phone numbers 12 
and/or the like, which can result in reading and/or writing 
transformed data from/to the storage component 104 and/or 
the I/O component 106 for further processing. The pathway 
108 provides a communications link between each of the 
components in the computer system 101. The I/O component 
106 can include one or more human I/O devices, which enable 
a human user 112 to interact with the computer system 101 
and/or one or more communications devices to enable a sys 
tem user 112 to communicate with the computer system 101 
using any type of communications link. To this extent, the 
mobile device password reset program 130 can manage a set 
of interfaces (e.g., graphical user interface(s), application 
program interfaces, communication interface(s), and/or the 
like) that enable human and/or system users 112 to interact 
with the mobile device password reset program 130. Further 
more, the mobile device password reset program 130 can 
manage (e.g., store, retrieve, create, manipulate, organize, 
present, etc.) the data, such as the list 10 of privileged phone 
numbers 12 and/or the like, using any solution. 
The computer system 101 can include one or more general 
purpose computing articles of manufacture (e.g., computing 
devices) capable of executing program code, Such as the 
mobile device password reset program 130, installed thereon. 
As used herein, it is understood that “program code” means 
any collection of instructions, in any language, code or nota 
tion, that cause a computing device having an information 
processing capability to perform a particular action either 
directly or after any combination of the following: (a) con 
version to another language, code or notation; (b) reproduc 
tion in a different material form; and/or (c) decompression. To 
this extent, the mobile device password reset program 130 can 
be embodied as any combination of system Software and/or 
application Software. 
Furthermore, the mobile device password reset program 
130 can be implemented using a set of modules 132. In this 
case, a module 132 can enable the computer system 20 to 
perform a set of tasks used by the mobile device password 
reset program 130, and can be separately developed and/or 
implemented apart from other portions of the mobile device 
password reset program 130. As used herein, the term “com 
ponent’ means any configuration of hardware, with or with 
out software, which implements the functionality described 
in conjunction therewith using any solution, while the term 
"module” means program code that enables a computer sys 
tem 101 to implement the actions described in conjunction 
therewith using any solution. When fixed in a storage com 
ponent 104 of a computer system 101 that includes a process 
ing component 102, a module is a portion of a component that 
implements the actions. Regardless, it is understood that two 
or more components, modules, and/or systems may share 
some/all of their respective hardware and/or software. Fur 
thermore, it is understood that some of the functionality dis 
cussed herein may not be implemented or additional func 
tionality may be included as part of the computer system 101. 
When the computer system 101 includes multiple comput 
ing devices, each computing device can have only a portion of 
the mobile device password reset program 130 fixed thereon 
(e.g., one or more modules 132). However, it is understood 
that the computer system 101 and the mobile device password 
reset program 130 are only representative of various possible 
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equivalent computer systems that may perform a process 
described herein. To this extent, in other embodiments, the 
functionality provided by the computer system 101 and the 
mobile device password reset program 130 can be at least 
partially implemented by one or more computing devices that 
include any combination of general and/or specific purpose 
hardware with or without program code. In each embodi 
ment, the hardware and program code, if included, can be 
created using standard engineering and programming tech 
niques, respectively. 
When the computer system 101 includes multiple comput 
ing devices, the computing devices can communicate over 
any type of communications link. Furthermore, while per 
forming a process described herein, the computer system 101 
can communicate with one or more other computer systems 
using any type of communications link. In either case, the 
communications link can include any combination of various 
types of optical fiber, wired, and/or wireless links; include 
any combination of one or more types of networks; and/or 
utilize any combination of various types of transmission tech 
niques and protocols. 
While shown and described herein as a method and system 
for detecting illegal activity through interpersonal relation 
ship resolution, it is understood that aspects of the invention 
further provide various alternative embodiments. For 
example, in one embodiment, the invention provides a com 
puter program fixed in at least one computer-readable storage 
medium, which when executed, enables a computer system to 
for detect illegal activity through interpersonal relationship 
resolution. To this extent, the computer-readable storage 
medium includes program code, such as the mobile device 
password reset program 130, which enables a computer sys 
tem to implement some or all of a process described herein. It 
is understood that the term "computer-readable storage 
medium' includes one or more of any type of tangible 
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from 
which a copy of the program code can be perceived, repro 
duced, or otherwise communicated by a computing device. 
For example, the computer-readable medium can include: 
one or more portable storage articles of manufacture; one or 
more memory/storage components of a computing device; 
paper, and/or the like. 
Another embodiment of the invention provides a method of 
providing a copy of program code, Such as the mobile device 
password reset program 30, which enables a computer system 
to implement some or all of a process described herein. In this 
case, a computer system can process a copy of the program 
code to generate and transmit, for reception at a second, 
distinct location, a set of data signals that has one or more of 
its characteristics set and/or changed in Such a manner as to 
encode a copy of the program code in the set of data signals. 
Similarly, an embodiment of the invention provides a method 
of acquiring a copy of the program code, which includes a 
computer system receiving the set of data signals described 
herein, and translating the set of data signals into a copy of the 
computer program fixed in at least one computer-readable 
medium. In either case, the set of data signals can be trans 
mitted/received using any type of communications link. 
Still another embodiment of the invention provides a 
method for providing a mobile device password reset. In this 
case, a computer system, such as the computer system 101, 
can be obtained (e.g., created, maintained, made available, 
etc.) and one or more components for performing process(es) 
described herein can be obtained (e.g., created, purchased, 
used, modified, etc.) and deployed to the computer system. To 
this extent, the deployment can include one or more of: (1) 
installing program code on a computing device; (2) adding 
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one or more computing and/or I/O devices to the computer 
system; (3) incorporating and/or modifying the computer 
system to enable it to perform a process described herein; 
and/or the like. 
The foregoing description of various aspects of the inven 
tion has been presented for purposes of illustration and 
description. It is not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the 
invention to the precise form disclosed, and obviously, many 
modifications and variations are possible. Such modifications 
and variations that may be apparent to an individual skilled in 
the art are included within the scope of the invention as 
defined by the accompanying claims. 
What is claimed is: 
1. A mobile device password reset method, comprising: 
receiving a phone call at a locked mobile device from a 
phone having a privileged phone number; 
initiating a password reset in response to the receipt of the 
phone call from the phone having the privileged phone 
number and the phone call exceeding a predetermined 
time duration threshold, the password reset comprising: 
terminating, by the locked mobile device, the phone call 
from the privileged phone number; 
generating, by the locked mobile device, a temporary 
password; 
establishing, by the locked mobile device, a connection 
to the phone having the privileged phone number; 
displaying, by the locked mobile device, a password 
entry field; 
communicating, by the locked mobile device, the tem 
porary password via the connection to the phone hav 
ing the privileged phone number, and 
unlocking the locked mobile device upon Successful 
entry of the temporary password in the password 
entry field displayed by the locked mobile device. 
2. The mobile device password reset method of claim 1, 
wherein the connection comprises a phone call. 
3. The mobile device password reset method of claim 1, 
wherein the connection comprises a text message. 
4. The mobile device password reset method according to 
claim 1, wherein the unlocking further comprises: 
initiating, by the mobile device, a timer when communi 
cating the temporary password via the connection to the 
phone having the privileged phone number, and 
unlocking the locked mobile device upon Successful entry 
of the temporary password in the displayed password 
entry field within a predetermined period of time as 
determined via the timer. 
5. The mobile device password reset method according to 
claim 1, wherein the unlocking further comprises: 
requesting, by the locked mobile device, a new password 
upon Successful entry of the temporary password in the 
displayed password entry field; and 
unlocking the locked mobile device upon Successful entry 
of the new password. 
6. The mobile device password reset method according to 
claim 1, wherein the communicating further comprises: 
speaking, by the locked mobile device, the temporary pass 
word during the connection. 
7. The mobile device password reset method according to 
claim 1, further comprising: 
storing at least one privileged phone number in the mobile 
device. 
8. The mobile device password reset method according to 
claim 7, wherein 
the initiating the password reset further comprises: 
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8 
comparing a phone number of the received phone call to 
each of the privileged phone numbers stored in the 
mobile device; and 
initiating the password reset when the phone number of 
the received phone call matches one of the privileged 
phone numbers stored in the mobile device. 
9. A mobile device configured to perform a password reset 
method, the method comprising: 
receiving a phone call at a locked mobile device from a 
phone having a privileged phone number; 
initiating a password reset in response to the receipt of the 
phone call from the phone having the privileged phone 
number and the phone call exceeding a predetermined 
time duration threshold, the password reset comprising: 
terminating, by the locked mobile device, the phone call 
from the privileged phone number; 
generating, by the locked mobile device, a temporary 
password; 
establishing, by the locked mobile device, a connection 
to the phone having the privileged phone number; 
displaying, by the locked mobile device, a password 
entry field; 
communicating, by the locked mobile device, the tem 
porary password via the connection to the phone hav 
ing the privileged phone number, and 
unlocking the locked mobile device upon Successful 
entry of the temporary password in the password 
entry field displayed by the locked mobile device. 
10. The mobile device of claim 9, wherein the connection 
comprises a phone call. 
11. The mobile device of claim 9, wherein the connection 
comprises a text message. 
12. The mobile device according to claim 9, wherein the 
unlocking further comprises: 
initiating, by the mobile device, a timer when communi 
cating the temporary password via the connection to the 
phone having the privileged phone number; and 
unlocking the locked mobile device upon Successful entry 
of the temporary password in the displayed password 
entry field within a predetermined period of time as 
determined via the timer. 
13. The mobile device according to claim 9, wherein the 
unlocking further comprises: 
requesting, by the locked mobile device, a new password 
upon Successful entry of the temporary password in the 
displayed password entry field; and 
unlocking the locked mobile device upon Successful entry 
of the new password. 
14. The mobile device according to claim 9, wherein the 
communicating further comprises: 
speaking, by the locked mobile device, the temporary pass 
word during the connection. 
15. The mobile device according to claim 9, the method 
further comprising: 
storing at least one privileged phone number in the mobile 
device. 
16. The mobile device according to claim 15, wherein the 
initiating the password reset further comprises: 
comparing a phone number of the received phone call to 
each of the privileged phone numbers stored in the 
mobile device; and 
initiating the password reset when the phone number of the 
received phone call matches one of the privileged phone 
numbers stored in the mobile device. 
17. A computer program product comprising program code 
embodied in at least one non-transitory computer-readable 
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storage medium, which when executed, enables a computer 
system to implement a mobile device password reset method, 
the method comprising: 
receiving a phone call at a locked mobile device from a 
phone having a privileged phone number; 
initiating a password reset in response to the receipt of the 
phone call from the phone having the privileged phone 
number and the phone call exceeding a predetermined 
time duration threshold, the password reset comprising: 
terminating, by the locked mobile device, the phone call 
from the privileged phone number; 
generating, by the locked mobile device, a temporary password; 
establishing, by the locked mobile device, a connection 
to the phone having the privileged phone number; 
displaying, by the locked mobile device, a password 
entry field; 
communicating, by the locked mobile device, the tem 
porary password via the connection to the phone hav 
ing the privileged phone number, and 
unlocking the locked mobile device upon Successful entry of the temporary password in the password 
entry field displayed by the locked mobile device. 
10 
18. The computer program product of claim 17, wherein 
the connection comprises a phone call, a text message, or an 
email. 
19. The computer program product of claim 17, wherein 
the unlocking further comprises: 
initiating, by the mobile device, a timer when communi 
cating the temporary password via the connection to the 
phone having the privileged phone number; and 
unlocking the locked mobile device upon Successful entry 
of the temporary password in the displayed password 
entry field within a predetermined period of time as 
determined via the timer. 
20. The computer program product of claim 17, wherein 
15 the unlocking further comprises: 
requesting, by the locked mobile device, a new password 
upon Successful entry of the temporary password in the 
displayed password entry field; and 
unlocking the locked mobile device upon Successful entry 
of the new password. 
k k k k k 
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1. 
MOBILE DEVICE PASSWORD RESET 
REFERENCE TO PRIORAPPLICATIONS 
The current application is a continuation application of 5 
U.S. Utility application Ser. No. 14/020,937, which was filed 
on 9 Sep. 2013, which is hereby incorporated by reference. 
TECHNICAL FIELD 
The present invention relates generally to mobile devices, 
and more particularly, to a mobile device password reset. 
RELATED ART 
Many methods are available for resetting a forgotten or lost 
password of a mobile device. One method, typically referred 
to as a master or factory reset, returns a mobile device to its 
original, default operating system state. However, this pro 
cess erases all data (e.g., contacts, applications, personalized 
settings, etc.) added to the mobile device after purchase. 
Another method requires a phone call to the phone company 
that provides service to the mobile device. The present inven 
tion addresses these problems allowing users to avoid the data 
reconstruction of a hard reset and the cost of service provider 
involvement. 
SUMMARY 
A first aspect of the invention provides a device password 
reset method, comprising: receiving a phone call at a locked 
mobile device from a phone having a privileged phone num 
ber; initiating a password reset in response to the receipt of the 
phone call from the phone having the privileged phone num 
ber and the phone call exceeding a predetermined time dura 
tion threshold, the password reset comprising: terminating, 
by the locked mobile device, the phone call from the privi 
leged phone number; generating, by the locked mobile 
device, a temporary password; establishing, by the locked 
mobile device, a connection to the phone having the privi 
leged phone number, displaying, by the locked mobile 
device, a password entry field; communicating, by the locked 
mobile device, the temporary password via the connection to 
the phone having the privileged phone number; and unlock 
ing the locked mobile device upon successful entry of the 
temporary password in the password entry field displayed by 
the locked mobile device. 
A second aspect of the invention provides a device config 
ured to perform a password reset method, the method com 
prising: receiving a phone call at a locked mobile device from 
a phone having a privileged phone number, initiating a pass 
word reset in response to the receipt of the phone call from the 
phone having the privileged phone number and the phone call 
exceeding a predetermined time duration threshold, the pass 
word reset comprising: terminating, by the locked mobile 
device, the phone call from the privileged phone number; 
generating, by the locked mobile device, a temporary pass 
word; establishing, by the locked mobile device, a connection 
to the phone having the privileged phone number, displaying, 
by the locked mobile device, a password entry field; commu 
nicating, by the locked mobile device, the temporary pass 
word via the connection to the phone having the privileged 
phone number, and unlocking the locked mobile device upon 
Successful entry of the temporary password in the password 
entry field displayed by the locked mobile device. 
A third aspect of the invention provides a computer pro 
gram product including program code embodied in at least 
10 
15 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
65 
2 
one computer-readable storage medium, which when 
executed, enables a computer system to implement a device 
password reset method, the method comprising: receiving a 
phone call at a locked mobile device from a phone having a 
privileged phone number; initiating a password reset in 
response to the receipt of the phone call from the phone 
having the privileged phone number and the phone call 
exceeding a predetermined time duration threshold, the pass 
word reset comprising: terminating, by the locked mobile 
device, the phone call from the privileged phone number; 
generating, by the locked mobile device, a temporary pass 
word; establishing, by the locked mobile device, a connection 
to the phone having the privileged phone number, displaying, 
by the locked mobile device, a password entry field; commu 
nicating, by the locked mobile device, the temporary pass 
word via the connection to the phone having the privileged 
phone number; and unlocking the locked mobile device upon 
Successful entry of the temporary password in the password 
entry field displayed by the locked mobile device. 
Other aspects of the invention provide methods, systems, 
program products, and methods of using and generating each, 
which include and/or implement some or all of the actions 
described herein. The illustrative aspects of the invention are 
designed to solve one or more of the problems herein 
described and/or one or more other problems not discussed. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
These and other features of the disclosure will be more 
readily understood from the following detailed description of 
the various aspects of the invention taken in conjunction with 
the accompanying drawings that depict various aspects of the 
invention. 
FIG. 1 shows a flow diagram of an illustrative process for a 
mobile device password reset, according to embodiments. 
FIG. 2 depicts an illustrative setup process for a mobile 
device password reset, according to embodiments. 
FIG. 3 depicts a user initiating a mobile device password 
reset by placing a phone call to a locked mobile device, 
according to embodiments. 
FIG. 4 depicts a locked mobile device comparing the phone 
number of a received phone call to privileged phone numbers 
on a predefined list, according to embodiments. 
FIG. 5 depicts the display of a password reset option to a 
user via a display of a mobile device, according to embodi 
mentS. 
FIG. 6 depicts a mobile device placing a return phone call 
to the phone number of the phone that initiated a mobile 
device password reset, according to embodiments. 
FIG. 7 depicts the initiation of a password reset upon 
receiving a correct temporary password, according to 
embodiments. 
FIG. 8 shows an illustrative environment for a mobile 
device password reset according to an embodiment. 
It is noted that the drawings may not be to scale. The 
drawings are intended to depict only typical aspects of the 
invention, and therefore should not be considered as limiting 
the scope of the invention. In the drawings, like numbering 
represents like elements between the drawings. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
The present invention relates generally to mobile devices, 
and more particularly, to a mobile device password reset. 
When a mobile device enters a locked state, operation of 
the mobile device may be prevented or severely limited. Such 
a locked State may occur automatically, for example, after a 
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predetermined period of inactivity, or may be activated manu 
ally (e.g., via buttons/keys on the mobile device or remotely 
over the Internet). Typically, the locked state of a mobile 
device is provided as a security measure to prevent unautho 
rized or unintended use of the mobile device. However, while 
in the locked State, most mobile devices allow incoming 
phone calls, which can be answered by a user of the mobile 
device, and/or a user of the mobile device may be able to place 
an outgoing emergency call. 
To unlock a mobile device that has entered a locked state, 
a user typically enters a password into a password entry 
screen of the mobile device using a virtual or physical keypad 
of the mobile device. A password may comprise, for example, 
an alphanumeric passcode, passkey, passphrase, access code, 
personal identification number (PIN), a pattern entered on the 
screen, or other type of authentication data. If the user cor 
rectly enters the password within a predetermined number of 
attempts, the mobile device is unlocked and full functionality 
is restored. Repeated failures to enter the correct password 
may, in Some cases, cause the mobile device to erase all data 
and perform a master reset. 
The present invention provides a mobile device password 
reset that allows a user to securely regain full authorized 
access to a locked mobile device. In the present disclosure, 
Such a mobile device may include, for example, a cellphone, 
Smartphone, tablet computer, PDA, laptop computer, or other 
handheld computing/communication device capable of send 
ing/receiving phone calls. 
FIG. 1 shows a flow diagram of an illustrative process for a 
mobile device password reset according to embodiments. 
During a setup process S1, and as depicted in FIG. 2, a 
predefined list 10 of one or more privileged phone numbers 
12 is provided and stored in a mobile device 14 by an autho 
rized user 16 (e.g., owner) of the mobile device 14. For 
example, the predefined list 10 of privileged phone numbers 
12 may include the home and work phone numbers of the user 
16, a friends cellphone number, a relative’s land-line phone 
number, etc. 
The user 16 may provide the predefined list 10 of privileged 
phone numbers 12 during an initial or Subsequent configura 
tion of the settings of the mobile device 14. Application 
software 18 loaded and running on the mobile device 14 may 
also be used to provide the predefined list 10 of privileged 
phone numbers 12 to the mobile device 14. 
At S2, assuming the mobile device 14 is in a locked state 
and the user 16 has forgotten the password for unlocking the 
mobile device 14, the user 16 initiates a mobile device pass 
word reset by placing a phone call 20 (FIG. 3) to the mobile 
device 14 from another phone 22. The phone 22 can comprise 
any telecommunication device capable of sending/receiving 
phone calls, including a mobile device, a land-line phone, a 
computer with VoIP capabilities, and/or the like. At S3, the 
phone call 20 is received and answered by the mobile device 
14. 
At S4, the mobile device 14 compares (FIG. 4) the phone 
number 24 of the phone call 20 to the privileged phone num 
bers 12 on the predefined list 10. The phone number 24 of the 
phone call 20 may be determined via caller ID or using any 
other Suitable technique. 
If the phone number 24 of the phone call 20 is not on the 
predefined list 10 of privileged phone numbers 12 (N at S4), 
the mobile device password reset process ends and the call 
proceeds as normal. If, however, the phone number 24 of the 
phone call 20 is on the predefined list 10 of privileged phone 
numbers 12 (Yat S4), flow passes to S5. 
At S5, the elapsed duration of the phone call 20 is moni 
tored by the mobile device 14. If the elapsed duration of the 
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phone call 20 exceeds a predetermined time threshold (e.g., 
10-15 seconds) (Yat S5), indicating that the phone call 20 has 
a high likelihood of being legitimate, a password reset option 
26 (FIG. 5) is displayed to the user 16 at S6 via a display 28 
of the mobile device 14. If the phone call 20 is terminated 
before the predetermined time threshold has been exceeded 
(Nat S5), the mobile device password reset process ends and 
the call proceeds as normal. The duration of the phone call 20 
will generally be shorter in the case that the mobile device 14 
is lost/stolen. In such a case, the user 16 would realize the 
mobile device 14 has been compromised (e.g., based on who 
answered the mobile device 14) and hang-up before the pre 
determined time threshold, thereby terminating the mobile 
device password reset process. 
If the user 16 selects the password reset option 26 (Yat S7), 
the mobile device 14 enters a password reset mode at S8. If 
the user 16 does not select the password reset option 26 (Nat 
S7), the mobile device password reset process ends and the 
call proceeds as normal. Selection of the password reset 
option 26 may be provided, for example, via YES and NO 
buttons 30, 32, respectively, or in any other suitable manner. 
Upon entering the password reset mode at S8, the mobile 
device 14 terminates the phone call 20 at S9. Thereafter, at 
S10, the mobile device 14 generates a random, one-time, 
temporary password 34 (FIG. 6). 
At S11, and as shown in FIG. 6, the mobile device 14 
establishes a connection (e.g., via a return phone call 36) to 
the phone number 24 of the phone 22 that initiated the mobile 
device password reset. If the return phone call 36 is not 
answered by the user 16 (N at S12) the mobile device pass 
word reset process ends. If the return phone call 36 is 
answered by the user 16 (Yat S12), the mobile device 14, at 
S13, displays a password entry field 38 and speaks the tem 
porary password 34 to the user 16 (e.g., using text-to-speech) 
one or more times for a predetermined period of time (e.g., 30 
seconds). In other embodiments, the mobile device 14 may 
communicate the temporary password 34 to the user 16 in a 
non-vocal manner. For example, the mobile device 14 may 
communicate the temporary password 34 to the user 16 via a 
short message service (SMS) text message, an email, and/or 
the like. 
If the user 16 does not enter the correct temporary pass 
word 34 into the displayed password entry field 38 within the 
predetermined period of time (N at S14), the mobile device 
password reset process ends. If the user 16 enters the correct 
temporary password 34 into the displayed password entry 
field 38 within the predetermined period of time (Y at S14), 
flow passes to S15. As depicted in FIG. 6, a timer 40 may be 
displayed on the mobile device 14 to indicate the time remain 
ing during which the user 16 can enter the correct temporary 
password 34 into the displayed password entry field 38. 
At S15, upon receiving the correct temporary password 34, 
the mobile device 14 immediately initiates a password change 
process (FIG. 7), after which the user 16 is required to enter a 
new password 42 into the mobile device 14. After successful 
completion of the password change process (Y at S16), the 
mobile device 14 is unlocked at S17 and is ready foruse. If the 
password reset is not completed (Nat S16), the mobile device 
14 remains locked and the mobile device password reset 
process ends. In this case, the user 16 must return to S2 to 
restart the mobile device password reset process. 
An illustrative environment 100 for providing a mobile 
device password reset is shown in FIG. 8. The environment 
100 includes at least one computer system 101 and a mobile 
device password reset program 130 that can perform pro 
cesses described herein in order to provide a mobile device 
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password reset in accordance with embodiments. The envi 
ronment 100 may be provided, for example, within a mobile 
device 14. 
The computer system 101 is shown including a processing 
component 102 (e.g., one or more processors), a storage 
component 104 (e.g., a storage hierarchy), an input/output 
(I/O) component 106 (e.g., one or more I/O interfaces and/or 
devices), and a communications pathway 108. In general, the 
processing component 102 executes program code, Such as 
the mobile device password reset program 130, which is at 
least partially fixed in the storage component 104. While 
executing program code, the processing component 102 can 
process data, Such as a list 10 of privileged phone numbers 12 
and/or the like, which can result in reading and/or writing 
transformed data from/to the storage component 104 and/or 
the I/O component 106 for further processing. The pathway 
108 provides a communications link between each of the 
components in the computer system 101. The I/O component 
106 can include one or more human I/O devices, which enable 
a human user 112 to interact with the computer system 101 
and/or one or more communications devices to enable a sys 
tem user 112 to communicate with the computer system 101 
using any type of communications link. To this extent, the 
mobile device password reset program 130 can manage a set 
of interfaces (e.g., graphical user interface(s), application 
program interfaces, communication interface(s), and/or the 
like) that enable human and/or system users 112 to interact 
with the mobile device password reset program 130. Further 
more, the mobile device password reset program 130 can 
manage (e.g., store, retrieve, create, manipulate, organize, 
present, etc.) the data, such as the list 10 of privileged phone 
numbers 12 and/or the like, using any solution. 
The computer system 101 can include one or more general 
purpose computing articles of manufacture (e.g., computing 
devices) capable of executing program code, Such as the 
mobile device password reset program 130, installed thereon. 
As used herein, it is understood that “program code” means 
any collection of instructions, in any language, code or nota 
tion, that cause a computing device having an information 
processing capability to perform a particular action either 
directly or after any combination of the following: (a) con 
version to another language, code or notation; (b) reproduc 
tion in a different material form; and/or (c) decompression. To 
this extent, the mobile device password reset program 130 can 
be embodied as any combination of system Software and/or 
application Software. 
Furthermore, the mobile device password reset program 
130 can be implemented using a set of modules 132. In this 
case, a module 132 can enable the computer system 20 to 
perform a set of tasks used by the mobile device password 
reset program 130, and can be separately developed and/or 
implemented apart from other portions of the mobile device 
password reset program 130. As used herein, the term “com 
ponent’ means any configuration of hardware, with or with 
out software, which implements the functionality described 
in conjunction therewith using any solution, while the term 
"module” means program code that enables a computer sys 
tem 101 to implement the actions described in conjunction 
therewith using any solution. When fixed in a storage com 
ponent 104 of a computer system 101 that includes a process 
ing component 102, a module is a portion of a component that 
implements the actions. Regardless, it is understood that two 
or more components, modules, and/or systems may share 
some/all of their respective hardware and/or software. Fur 
thermore, it is understood that some of the functionality dis 
cussed herein may not be implemented or additional func 
tionality may be included as part of the computer system 101. 
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When the computer system 101 includes multiple comput 
ing devices, each computing device can have only a portion of 
the mobile device password reset program 130 fixed thereon 
(e.g., one or more modules 132). However, it is understood 
that the computer system 101 and the mobile device password 
reset program 130 are only representative of various possible 
equivalent computer systems that may perform a process 
described herein. To this extent, in other embodiments, the 
functionality provided by the computer system 101 and the 
mobile device password reset program 130 can be at least 
partially implemented by one or more computing devices that 
include any combination of general and/or specific purpose 
hardware with or without program code. In each embodi 
ment, the hardware and program code, if included, can be 
created using standard engineering and programming tech 
niques, respectively. 
When the computer system 101 includes multiple comput 
ing devices, the computing devices can communicate over 
any type of communications link. Furthermore, while per 
forming a process described herein, the computer system 101 
can communicate with one or more other computer systems 
using any type of communications link. In either case, the 
communications link can include any combination of various 
types of optical fiber, wired, and/or wireless links; include 
any combination of one or more types of networks; and/or 
utilize any combination of various types of transmission tech 
niques and protocols. 
While shown and described herein as a method and system 
for detecting illegal activity through interpersonal relation 
ship resolution, it is understood that aspects of the invention 
further provide various alternative embodiments. For 
example, in one embodiment, the invention provides a com 
puter program fixed in at least one computer-readable storage 
medium, which when executed, enables a computer system to 
for detect illegal activity through interpersonal relationship 
resolution. To this extent, the computer-readable storage 
medium includes program code, such as the mobile device 
password reset program 130, which enables a computer sys 
tem to implement some or all of a process described herein. It 
is understood that the term "computer-readable storage 
medium' includes one or more of any type of tangible 
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from 
which a copy of the program code can be perceived, repro 
duced, or otherwise communicated by a computing device. 
For example, the computer-readable medium can include: 
one or more portable storage articles of manufacture; one or 
more memory/storage components of a computing device; 
paper, and/or the like. 
Another embodiment of the invention provides a method of 
providing a copy of program code, Such as the mobile device 
password reset program 30, which enables a computer system 
to implement some or all of a process described herein. In this 
case, a computer system can process a copy of the program 
code to generate and transmit, for reception at a second, 
distinct location, a set of data signals that has one or more of 
its characteristics set and/or changed in Such a manner as to 
encode a copy of the program code in the set of data signals. 
Similarly, an embodiment of the invention provides a method 
of acquiring a copy of the program code, which includes a 
computer system receiving the set of data signals described 
herein, and translating the set of data signals into a copy of the 
computer program fixed in at least one computer-readable 
medium. In either case, the set of data signals can be trans 
mitted/received using any type of communications link. 
Still another embodiment of the invention provides a 
method for providing a mobile device password reset. In this 
case, a computer system, such as the computer system 101, 
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can be obtained (e.g., created, maintained, made available, 
etc.) and one or more components for performing process(es) 
described herein can be obtained (e.g., created, purchased, 
used, modified, etc.) and deployed to the computer system. To 
this extent, the deployment can include one or more of: (1) 
installing program code on a computing device; (2) adding 
one or more computing and/or I/O devices to the computer 
system; (3) incorporating and/or modifying the computer 
system to enable it to perform a process described herein; 
and/or the like. 
The foregoing description of various aspects of the inven 
tion has been presented for purposes of illustration and 
description. It is not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the 
invention to the precise form disclosed, and obviously, many 
modifications and variations are possible. Such modifications 
and variations that may be apparent to an individual skilled in 
the art are included within the scope of the invention as 
defined by the accompanying claims. 
What is claimed is: 
1. A password reset method, comprising: 
receiving a phone call at a locked mobile device from a 
phone having a privileged phone number; 
initiating a password reset in response to the receipt of the 
phone call from the phone having the privileged phone 
number and the phone call exceeding a predetermined 
time duration threshold; 
displaying a password reset option on the locked mobile 
device in response to the initiation of the password reset; 
and 
Selecting the password reset option to perform the pass 
word reset, the password reset comprising: 
terminating, by the locked mobile device, the phone call 
from the privileged phone number; 
generating, by the locked mobile device, a temporary 
password; 
establishing, by the locked mobile device, a connection 
to the phone having the privileged phone number; 
displaying, by the locked mobile device, a password 
entry field; 
communicating, by the locked mobile device, the tem 
porary password via the connection to the phone hav 
ing the privileged phone number, and 
unlocking the locked mobile device upon Successful 
entry of the temporary password in the password 
entry field displayed by the locked mobile device. 
2. The password reset method of claim 1, wherein the 
connection comprises a phone call. 
3. The password reset method of claim 1, wherein the 
connection comprises a text message. 
4. The password reset method according to claim 1, 
wherein the unlocking further comprises: 
initiating, by the mobile device, a timer when communi 
cating the temporary password via the connection to the 
phone having the privileged phone number, and 
unlocking the locked mobile device upon Successful entry 
of the temporary password in the displayed password 
entry field within a predetermined period of time as 
determined via the timer. 
5. The password reset method according to claim 1, 
wherein the unlocking further comprises: 
requesting, by the locked mobile device, a new password 
upon Successful entry of the temporary password in the 
displayed password entry field; and 
unlocking the locked mobile device upon Successful entry 
of the new password. 
6. The password reset method according to claim 1, 
wherein the communicating further comprises: 
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speaking, by the locked mobile device, the temporary pass 
word during the connection. 
7. The password reset method according to claim 1, further 
comprising: 
storing at least one privileged phone number in the mobile 
device. 
8. The password reset method according to claim 7. 
wherein the initiating the password reset further comprises: 
comparing a phone number of the received phone call to 
each of the privileged phone numbers stored in the 
mobile device; and 
initiating the password reset when the phone number of the 
received phone call matches one of the privileged phone 
numbers stored in the mobile device. 
9. A device configured to perform a password reset method, 
the method comprising: 
receiving a phone call at a locked mobile device from a 
phone having a privileged phone number; 
initiating a password reset in response to the receipt of the 
phone call from the phone having the privileged phone 
number and the phone call exceeding a predetermined 
time duration threshold; 
displaying a password reset option on the locked mobile 
device in response to the initiation of the password reset; 
and 
selecting the password reset option to perform the pass 
word reset, the password reset comprising: 
terminating, by the locked mobile device, the phone call 
from the privileged phone number; 
generating, by the locked mobile device, a temporary 
password; 
establishing, by the locked mobile device, a connection 
to the phone having the privileged phone number; 
displaying, by the locked mobile device, a password 
entry field; 
communicating, by the locked mobile device, the tem 
porary password via the connection to the phone hav 
ing the privileged phone number, and 
unlocking the locked mobile device upon Successful 
entry of the temporary password in the password 
entry field displayed by the locked mobile device. 
10. The device of claim 9, wherein the connection com 
prises a phone call. 
11. The device of claim 9, wherein the connection com 
prises a text message. 
12. The device according to claim 9, wherein the unlocking 
further comprises: 
initiating, by the mobile device, a timer when communi 
cating the temporary password via the connection to the 
phone having the privileged phone number; and 
unlocking the locked mobile device upon Successful entry 
of the temporary password in the displayed password 
entry field within a predetermined period of time as 
determined via the timer. 
13. The device according to claim 9, wherein the unlocking 
further comprises: 
requesting, by the locked mobile device, a new password 
upon Successful entry of the temporary password in the 
displayed password entry field; and 
unlocking the locked mobile device upon Successful entry 
of the new password. 
14. The device according to claim 9, wherein the commu 
nicating further comprises: 
speaking, by the locked mobile device, the temporary pass 
word during the connection. 
15. The device according to claim 9, the method further 
comprising: 
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storing at least one privileged phone number in the mobile 
device. 
16. The device according to claim 15, wherein the initiating 
the password reset further comprises: 
comparing a phone number of the received phone call to 
each of the privileged phone numbers stored in the 
mobile device; and 
initiating the password reset when the phone number of the 
received phone call matches one of the privileged phone 
numbers stored in the mobile device. 
17. A computer program product comprising program code 
embodied in at least one non-transitory computer-readable 
storage medium, which when executed, enables a computer 
System to implement a device password reset method, the 
method comprising: 
receiving a phone call at a locked mobile device from a 
phone having a privileged phone number; 
initiating a password reset in response to the receipt of the 
phone call from the phone having the privileged phone 
number and the phone call exceeding a predetermined 
time duration threshold; 
displaying a password reset option on the locked mobile 
device in response to the initiation of the password reset: 
and 
Selecting the password reset option to perform the pass 
word reset, the password reset comprising: 
terminating, by the locked mobile device, the phone call 
from the privileged phone number; 
generating, by the locked mobile device, a temporary password; 
10 
establishing, by the locked mobile device, a connection 
to the phone having the privileged phone number; 
displaying, by the locked mobile device, a password 
entry field; 
communicating, by the locked mobile device, the tem 
porary password via the connection to the phone hav 
ing the privileged phone number, and 
unlocking the locked mobile device upon successful entry of the temporary password in the password 
entry field displayed by the locked mobile device. 
18. The computer program product of claim 17, wherein 
the connection comprises a phone call, a text message, or an 
email. 
19. The computer program product of claim 17, wherein 
the unlocking further comprises: 
initiating, by the mobile device, a timer when communi 
cating the temporary password via the connection to the 
phone having the privileged phone number; and 
unlocking the locked mobile device upon successful entry 
of the temporary password in the displayed password 
entry field within a predetermined period of time as 
determined via the timer. 
20. The computer program product of claim 17, wherein 
the unlocking further comprises: 
requesting, by the locked mobile device, a new password 
upon successful entry of the temporary password in the 
displayed password entry field; and 
unlocking the locked mobile device upon successful entry 
of the new password. 
